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ABSTRACT 
Jordan is a case of a developing country where priority has been 
given at the official level to domestic financial intermediation as one 
major instrument by which to attain the economy's development objectives. 
This policy preference conforms with recent trends in economic literature 
that emphasise the significance of financial institutions in economic 
development and the necessity of proper adaptation of these institutions, 
which were largely created prior to independence, to the particular post, - 
colonial environment within which they have now to operate and to facilitate 
the required structural charge. 
The main objectives of this thesis are to analyse the structure and 
performance of the financial system in Jordan and examine whether its 
operations have been consistent with the country's development strategy. 
For this purpose, the study investigates three major areas of interest: - 
(1) Analysing the structure and operations of different types of 
domestic financial institutions. 
(2) Assessing their performance in the context of economic develop- 
ment, showing how well their activities have coincided with the defined 
development objectives. 
(3) Specifý, ing certain policies and procedures where financial 
innovation can take place to improve the operational efficiency of the 
system and to enlarge its contribution to real economic growth. 
It is hoped that the particular issues identified as being of 
crucial importance for the Jordanian economy and the policy solutions 
put forward will be a 'contribution to economic knowledge of the role of 
the financial intermediation process in economic development. 
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PART A 
.i7. 
THE FINANCIAL SECTOR AND ECONOMIC D73,77,, WPtjFW 
CHAPTER 1 
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Only comparatively recently have empirical and theoretical studies 
investigated the importance of the financial system in the process of 
economic development. The work of Gurley and Shaw, Goldsmith, and 
Cameron, constitutes the most prominbnt studies that have been done 
in this field of economic literature. 
(1) 
Their germinal work has 
given rise to a number of historical country case-studies, the results 
Of which have significant implications for current development strategies 
in the less developed countries. 
(2) 
What therefore do these studies 
sugglest, and what are their implications with reference to Jordan? 
Historical evidence of financial development in developed countries 
reveals the existence of two distinct patterns of financial intermediation 
for the purpose of creating growth within a particular economy. On the 
One hand, institutions have played a leading role in economic de-ýelopment 
through direct involvement in the financing and Promotion of industrial 
'ý-xPansion. On the other hand, in some economies institutions have not 
Per se been an engine of growth but have merely responded to the 
See John G. Gurley and Edward S. Shaw, "Financial Development and 
Economic Development", Economic Development and bd1_tur'a17Change, 
(April 1967); and Raymond Goldsmith, Financial Structure and 
Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969); and Rondo 
Cameron and-others, Banking in the Early Stages of Industrialisation 
(London: oxford University Press, 1967); and Rondo Cameron, ed., 
Banking and Economic Developmen (London: Oxford University Press 
1972). The recent work done by McKinnon and Shaw was also 
illuminating in this field. See: Ronald McKinnon, Money and Capital 
in Economic DeveLoREent (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1973): and Edward Shaw, Financial Deepening in Economic 
Deve122ment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973). - 
(2) See for example: Dimitrije Dimitrigevic, money and Finance In 
Contemporary Yugoslavia (New York: Praeger Publisher, 1973); 
and Richard Tilly, Financial institutions and Industrialisation 
in the Rhineland 
- 
(Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1966); 
Richard Rudolph, Banking and Industrialisation in Austria-Hungary 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1976); and Ali Abdi, Commercial 
Banks and Economic Development, The Experience of Eastern Africa 
(N. Y.; Praeger Publishers, 1977). 
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emergent demand made for their services. Germany is often cited as 
an outstanding example of the former, whereas England is usually put 
forward as the prime example of the latter. In both types of case, 
however, the financial system has been successfully used for development 
purposes. 
(1) 
The difference in financial structure and development in 
both cases can be attributed to varying development needs, which 
accordingly necessitated different uses of financial institutions, and 
to the particular evolution pattern of forms of business organisation. 
To take the English case first, here development of the financial 
system reflected, to a great extent, the characteristics of the early 
English industrialisation, with its emphasis on the textile industry. 
(2) 
As have been well documented, the industrial revolution in England was 
largely based on consumer goods industries, particularly textiles. The 
long-term requirements of such industries were comparatively small relative 
to their working capital needs, and were adequately met from accumulated 
Profits within these industries. 
(3) 
Furthermore, the emerqence of the 
Joint-stock company as a mechanism for channelling savings for investment 
purposes, and the existence of stock exchanges facilitating the transfer 
of the financial assets they created, tended to circum cribe the 
importance and areas of influence of the financial institutions as suppliers 
of capital. In such circumstances the main task of the English financial 
system was to provide short-term credits and to satisfy any current 
financial requirements of various industries. By these means, the English 
financial system became well adjusted to the special needs of its 
economy and thereby facilitated real economic growth. As Habakkuk puts it: 
(1) Richard Tilly, op. cit pp 7- 12 
Ibid, p. 7 
Ibid 
3. 
financial institutions adapted themselves 
to meet the principal economic needs of their period 
and English banks concentrated on the provision of 
working capital because that was what industry needed; 
if there had been a large unsatisfied demand from 
industry to finance fixed capital, financial institutions 
would, with relative ease, have adapted themselves to 
meet this need, or new institutions would have arisen 
for the purpose. " 
(1) 
On the other hand, economic and financial development in Germany during 
the nineteenth century was different to that of England during the early 
phase of its industrial revolution. Here, the relative absence of joint- 
stock companies and an emphasis on railway investment and other related 
productive activities (such as mining and metal working concerns which 
needed large requirements of capital formation) influenced the structure 
and operations of the financial system. As these capital needs exceeded 
available voluntary savings and the accumulated profits within these 
industries, they had to be financed by financial intermediation. 
Consequently, the German financial system coped with these needs by an 
active initiative in and extensive provision of short-term and long-term 
financial assistance and advice, thereby creating direct-growth inducing 
effects on domestic industrialisation. 
(2) 
Indeed banks were said to 
have assisted industrial enterprises from the cradle to the grave. 
(3) 
(1) ii. Habakkuk, American and British Technology in the Nineteenth 
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962) p. 175. 
Reported in Sidney Pollard, "Fixed Capital in the Industrial 
Revolution in Britain", The Journal of Economic History (Sept. 
1964) p. 308. 
(2) Richard Tilly, op. cit., p. 12 
(3) Richard Randolph, op cit. p. 2 
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One main conclusion to be derived from such historical financial 
experience in England and Germany, as well as from the experience of 
other developed countries, is. the existence of a variety of successful 
types of financial systems designed adequately to serve the particular 
context in which they operate. 
0) 
Rondo Cameron concluded his comparative 
study of the evolution of banking systems in eight developed countries 
by confirming that the historical record of banking evolution showed 
an absence of a single model of the banking system appropriate for all 
economies. 
(2) 
Countries are widely different in their culture, social, 
political and economic circumstances and these'accordingly impose 
different constraints, requirements, and responsibilities on their 
financial systems. Today's'developing countries should therefore seek 
to benefit from the historical financial: experience of their antecedants, 
failures as well as successes, and apply what they consider appropriate 
for their special circumstances. Adherence to inappropriate operational 
criteria inherited from a colonial past, or a slavish imitation of 
financial systems operating in different economic and financial 
environments are to be rigorously avoided. The financial systems in 
these countries must adopt policies, procedures and pursue institutional 
innovations that are consistent with their development objectives. The 
adjustment problem of the financial system demands an increasing 
interest in these countries which are experiencing structural changes 
in their economies to achieve the set development objectives. The 
financial system has a crucial role in facilitating and promoting the 
required infrastructural changes. 
(3) 
In realisation of this fact, 
(1) Scotland and Japan have also been considered as countries where the 
financial system was successful during the economic development. 
See Cameron, Panking in the early stages of Industrialisation, or. cit. 
P. 290. 
(2) Ibid. P-318, 
(3) The channels through which financial intermediation can induce 
growth in the real economy are discussed later in this chapter. 
5 
many developing countries have given priority to the development of 
financial institutions as an important instrument for attaining the 
selected goals of domestic development programmes. This has been 
particularly encouraged by the recent literature that emphasised the 
significant interaction between financial and real growth during the 
course of economic development, as sho-vm below. 
The issue of the extent to which a country's financial system 
influences real economic growth has been a controversial one in recent 
years. Numerous theoretical and empirical studies emphasised the 
existence of a close and. positive relationship between finance and real 
development. This view was mainly held by Adelman and 11orris, Goldsmith, 
Wallich, Cameron, McKinnon, and Shaw. 
(') 
The empirical studies of both 
Goldsmith and Wallich are of special importance in providing ci, _jantitative 
supporting evidence of the existence of this relationship* 
(2) 
In 
studying the financial structure and development of, 35 developed and 
developing countries, Goldsmith reached the conclusion that a country's 
financial superstructure is closely connected with its real infrastructure. 
(3) 
See: Irma Adelman and Cynthia Morris, "An Econometric I-Todel of 
Socio-Economic and Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries". 
The American Economic Review (December 1968); R. Goldsmith, 
Financial Structure and Developnent, op. cit; H. i1allich, "Money 
and Gro-k-th, A Country Cross-Section Analysis", Journal of Yoney, 
Credit and Banking (11ay 1969); R. Cameron, Banking in the Early 
Stages of Industrialisation, op. cit; R. Cameron, Fanking and 
P, conomic Development, opcit; R. McKinnon, 141oney and Capital in 
Econonic Develorment, op. cit; B. Shaw, Financia 1 Deepening in 
Economic Developnent, op. cit. 
(2) Adelman and I-Torris also tried to empirically establish a statistical 
explanation for the economic and noneconomic forces that directly 
and indirectly determine a country's capacity for economic growth. 
Although their analysis of financial intermediation was only one 
aspect of a variet-j of socioeconomic and political variables 
included in their model, the results obtained by this work further 
contributed to the positive role of the financial sector during the 
course of economic development. Using data covering 74 developing 
countries, they found that among all variables having impact on 
growth potential, the degree of improvement in financial institutions 
came first in order of magnitude. See Adelman and Morris, op-cit. 
P. 1206. 
R. Goldsmith, op-cit. PP. 372-390. 
6 
Wallich reached a similar conclusion using a country cross-section 
analysis including 43 developed and developing countries. - He found 
that the degree of financial intermediation was significant1y and 
positively related to real economic growthe(i) 
Gurley's, work supports the opposing view thatýthe development of 
financial institutions does not necessarily accomparry growth in the 
real economy. 
(2) 
He states that financial institutions are not an 
essential condition for economic development. 
(3) 
His view-is based 
on-the fact that financial, intermediation is only one among several 
other institutional techniques which a country may adopt to influence 
real growth. In addition to financial intermediationg there are other 
close substitutes for mobilising and allocating resources for development, 
such as central planning and fiscal policies. The choice among these 
alternatives depends on the social costs and benefits of each. Thus, 
if a country follows one of these options other than financial intermedia- 
tion, the financial system may not haveýan important impact upon economic 
growth. Countries can, therefore, achieve high rates of economic 
development without necessarily attaining parallel high levelsýof 
financial intermediation. 
Despite Gurley's theoretical analysis which gives doubt to the 
significance, of finanoial-intermediation in the course of economic 
development, the majority of economists who have studied this, area- 
agree that both finance and real growth'are closely connected. 
(4), 
ý 
H. Wallich, oP. cit. P-302 
(2) J. Gurley, "Financial Structures inýDeveloping Economies". - in , ý- 
Fiscal and Monetary Problems in Developing States: Proceedings of 
the Third Rehovoth Conference, ed. David Krivine tNew York: --1967) 
PP. 99-116. 
(3) Ibid; and Gurley, J. "Review of Banking in the Early Stages of 
Industrialisation, ed. Rondo Cameron". American Economic Review, 
(September 1967) PP. 950 - 53. 
See footnote No. I, P-5 and: A. Abdi, op. cit. P. 14; R. Porter,, 
"The Promotion of the Banking Habit and Economic Development". 
Journal of Development Studies, (1%6) no. 4. P-'347. 
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Nevertheless, even among this group there is still little agreement 
on two major matters: firstly, the unequivocal 6stablishment of the 
direction of this causal relationship, and secondly, agreement on a 
clear-cut and recognised method or indicator for measuring financial 
development. These two points need further clarifications. 
(a) The causal nexus of the relationship between financial 
development and real growth. 
The empirical investigations of the previously mentioned authors 
reveal that changes in the real sectors of the economy are accompanied 
and facilitated by parallel changes in the financial sector. Economic 
development is characterised by an increase in the role of the financial inst- 
ruments and requires diversified financial and specialised institutions 
to meet the growing and more sophisticated needs of the economy. 
However, whether it is financial development that induces economic 
growth, or vice', versa,, is still not clear. Although it is largely 
held that growth in the real economic sectors usually induces and 
stimulates financial developmentt(l) it is sometimes difficult to dis- 
, tinguish clearly the direction of the causal relationship-between the 
two changes. Theoretically, the causality of the relationship may be 
explained in both directions; economic growth can induce financial 
development and financial development can also promote growth. Economic 
growth can induce development in the financial sector through two main 
channels; firstly, as economic development progresses, potential savings 
are expected to increase as a result of rising incomes. Secondly, the 
process of economic development also influences the quality and quantity 
of investment opportunities. Naturally, more savings and greater invest- 
ment opportunities created in the economy encourage and induce a parallel 
development in the financial sector. As far as the financial influence 
on real economic growth is concerned, the way the financial system adapts 
itself to the particular needs of its economy and the efficiency by 
(1) R. Cameron, Banking in the Early Stages of Industrialisation, op. cit. 
P. 1 I 
8 
which this system performs its functions can effectively stimulate 
real economic growth. This influence will be revealed later when 
discussing the economic implications of the role of the financial 
system. 
However, the interpretation of the nature of the causal relation- 
ship between economic and financial development is necessary in order 
to explain whether the financial system in a given country has a 
passive or positive role during the course of economic development. 
The answer to this question must largely depend on the evolutionary 
pattern of the financial system, i. e. whether it is a 'demand-following' 
or 'supply-leading' financial system. The demand-following financial 
system develops in response to the demand for its services by investors 
and savers in the real economy. 
M 
As an economy grows, additional 
demand for financial services are generated, which accordingly creates 
a supply response in the growth of the financial system. That is, 
the demand for financial services creates its own supply. In this case, 
financial services (as compared with real capital) are considered as 
a passive and only permissive factor, rather than a factor of produc- 
tion. 
(2) 
The supply-leading financial system, on the other hand, means 
the creation of financial institutions and the supply of their services 
in advance of demand for them, especially the demand of entrepreneurs 
in growth-inducing sectors. 
(3) 
In this case, the financial service 
is created independently and not in response to the demand side. 
By channelling resources fmm traditional (non-productive) sectors. - 
and by direct finance and promotion of the entrepreneural response 
(1) H. Patrick 
9 
"Financial Development and Economic Growth in Uhderdeveloý ed 
Countries" Economic Development and Cultural Change, (Januar7,1966 
P-174. 
(2) R. Cameron, Banking in the Early Stages of Industrialisation, 
opocito Pole 
(3) H. Patrick, op. cit. P. 175. 
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in growth-inducing sectors, the financial system can play an active 
developmental role, since it represents an opportunity to induce and 
encourage new investments to take place, and thus promote economic 
growth by financial means. 
(1) 
However, it should be noted here that even if the financial 
system is of the demand-following type, an adequate adaptation of this 
system to the growing needs that emerge during the course of economic 
development is necessary to facilitate the required changes in the real 
economy. Experience shows that the financial system is nothoweverl 
neutral with respect to economic development. 
(2) 
Economic development 
demands some infrastructural adjustments in real economic sectors 
in a way consistent with the defined development objectives. 'This 
necessitates an adequate adaptation in the financial sector to facilitate 
and bring about the required infrastructural changes. Failure in this 
respect would undoubtedly result in retarding the development in real 
infra-structure. As a generalisation, it can be said therefore that 
the structure of the financial system, and the way the system reacts 
and responds to the special needs of its economy, may well hasten or 
retard the process of economic development. 
(1) Ibid, p. 176. 
(2) R. Cameron, Banking and Economic Development, op. cit. p. 24. 
This is also the theme of Shaw's book which emphasises that 
the financial system does matter in economic development: 
See E. Shaw, Financial Deepening in Economic Development, 
op. cit. p. 3. 
(3) R. Cameron, Banking and Economic Development, op. cit, p. 8 
and D. Dimitrijevic, Money and Finance in ContemporaM 
Yugoslavia, op. cit. p. 5. 
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(b) Metbods and concepts for measurinp financialýstructure and 
the degree of financial development. 
The term 'financial structurel"implies ratios and, relationships 
that characterise the components of the overall financial system and 
tie it to its economy. 
(') 
Changes in the financial structure of a 
given country over time reflect'the stage of financial development that 
the country reached. Countries are widely different with regard to 
their financial structures and the ways their structures have changed 
and adapted themselves to real infrastructural adjustments., These 
differences can be attributed to different economic rates of growth, 
the degree to which thefinancial system penetrates the economy,, 
and the speed and adequacy of financial adaptation*' 
(2) 
Differences 
in financial structures among countries imply the-existence of stages 
in a cycle of financial development'. as reflected in chances in the 
quantitative and qualitative relations between the size and character 
of the financial structure and financial transactionst on the one 
hand, and of the infrastructure of national wealth and national income 
(3) 
on the other. Financial structure and development, therefore, can 
be measured by relating financial magnitudes to comparative e6nomic 
quantitatives, 
The literature, at present, provides a variety of nethods and ways 
for measuring financial structure and thus distinguishing different 
staCes of financial development. Despite this variety, however, all 
these methods show a systematic pattern and a reasonable degree of 
regularity in financial development that takes place as the economy 
(1) R. Cameron, Fankinp, and Economic T)eveloTment, op,., cit. P. q. 
(2) Raymond Goldsmith, Pinancial Structure and Developnent. 0-r,., cit. P-5. 
(3) Ibid. 
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undergoes development. These measures, as shown below, illustrate 
that during economic development, countries usually experience more 
rapid growth in financial assets than in national wealth or national 
income. This phenomenon can be related to the rapid monetization of 
the subsistence sectors of the economy and the substitution of bank 
liabilities for commodity money. 
(') 
When non-monetized sectors of the 
econoa; y are drawn to market-oriented production, the financial function 
(2), 
has to service larger proportions of the economy, As economic 
development takes place, greater specialisation and divisionýof labour 
in production (and consumption) require more financial transactions 
between various economic units, thus leading to rapid financial growth 
in relation tD real economic development. 
(3) 
The rising trend of 
financial development is not, however, a process that continues without 
limitJO Empirical evidence reveals that once-an advanced stage of a/ 
development is attained, rapid financial growth gradually tapers off. 
(5) 
This is also the case in the financially matured economies which are 
experiencing the same finanoial/real growth ratios which they used 
to have many decades ago. Gurley and Shaw relate this phenomenon to 
the_fact that the space of monetization exceeds the space of real 
growth in diminishing degrees. 
(6Y 
At an advanced development stage, 
when various economic sectors are becoming almost fully monetizea, 
and as business firms are more able to'supply their financial needs 
(1) Rondo Cameron, Banking in the Early Stages of Indus trialis at ion. 
op. cit. P-307. 
(2) Banking and Economic Development, op. cit. P. 204. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) Raymond Goldsmith, Financial Structure and Develo ment, op,, cit,, P. 44. 
Ibid. P. 45; and Cameron, Banking and Economic Development, op. cit. 
P, 204. 
Gurley and Shaw, "Financial Development and Economic Development,, " 
op. cit. P. 259. 
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from their own resources-, relatively less financial transactions 
in relation to real output are required. 
Although the existing literature provides a variety of concepts 
and methods for measuring financial structure and the degree of financial 
development., two main approaches deserveýspecial interest(l): the 
adoption of a particular method depends basically on the precise 
purpose of the study, and the availability of the required statistics. 
1. The "Goldsmith Approach". In measuring the degree of financial 
development, Goldsmith relates a countz7's financial superstructure 
to its real infrastructure as reflected in the financial interrelations 
ratio. This ratio can be obtained by dividing the total value of the 
financial assets that exist in a community at one date by the total 
value of tangible assets plus net foreign balances, i. e. by national 
wealth. 
(2) 
Goldsmith's empirical studY shows that the financial 
interrelations ratio has a tendency to rise during the course of 
economic development because the financial superstructure in a country 
grows more rapidly than its real infrastructure. 
(3) 
Developed countries, 
as his study reveals, have much higher financial interrelations ratios 
(1) Moreover, Rondo Cameron developed the concept of "banking density" 
as a crade index of financial development. This measure of density 
relates bank offices to total population. The actual index is 
constructed as follows: 
No. of bank offices x 10.000 
Total Population 
Cameron defines a ratio over 1.0 (that is more than one office per 
10,000 inhabitants) as "high"; between 0.5 and 1,0 as "moderate"; 
below 0.5 as "low"; and below 0.1 (i. e. one office p, er 100,000) 
as "very low". See R. Cameron, Banking in the Early Stages of 
Industrialisation, op. cit. P. 297. 
(2) R. Goldsmith, Financial Structure and Development, op. cit. P. 27. 
(3) Ibid. P. 4J+. 
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than those prevailed in less developed countries. His study shows 
that this ratio continues to rise until a certain stage of development 
is attained, then it levels off. This occurs once the ratio reaches 
a value between I and 112-, as experienced in Vestern Europe and North 
America early in the twentieth century. 
0) 
The. U. S. A. has been cited 
as an example for this phenomenon, where the financial interrelations 
ratio is still at about the same level it reached fourty years ago (1.27). 
(2) 
On the other hand, the present value of the financial interrelations 
ratios of less developed countries averages between one and two-thirds, 
similar to those reached and then surpassed in the more developed 
countries during the second half of the nineteenth century . 
(3) 
The 
financial interrelations ratio therefore can be used to measure and 
compare the degree of financial development attained by a country, 
2* The "I-TcYinnon Anproach". McKinnon relates the monetary liabilities 
of the community to its total real output. 
(4) 
This can be obtained 
by dividing 1,12 money supply (including time and saving deposits as 
well as 1,11) by GNP. YcKinnon considers this method as the simplest way 
for measuring changes in a country's financial structure over timep 
and comparing different financial structures that exist among countries 
at different stages of their financial development. What distinguishes 
this from the Goldsmith approach is the simplicity and wider availability 
of the necessary required statistics, on both the regional and the 
universal sides. 
(5) 
In developing countries in particularv the 
Raymond Goldsmith, Pinancial Structure and Developpent ýv OP. cit. 
P-45. 
(2) Ibid. P. 340. 
(3) Ibid. P-45. 
(4) Ronald McKinnon, Yoney and Canital in Pcononic Development, op, cit. P. 91. 
(5) Y, 2 and Gl, ', Plf3. f; ures required by this method can be easily obtained from the International Pinancial Statistics published by the TMF. 
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statistics required by this method (i. e. 1.12 and GITP) are usually more 
obtainable than that required by the previous measure-(i. e. aggregate 
financial assets and national-wealth). This is especially the case 
in Jordan where the published financial statistics do not comprehensively 
cover the whole financial sector. As will be shoum in Chapter 9, there 
is a particular lack of statistics pertaining, to the activities of 
insurance companies operating in the country. For this reason, it 
therefore seems impractical to try to apply Goldmaith's approach to 
the Jordanian case. 
Despite the above advantages of the 1421GITP ratio, - it is important 
to note that this measure does not provide a comprehensive picture of 
domestic-financial development; it-only reflects the degree of inter- 
mediation(') by the monetary system as represented by the central 
bank and the commercial banks. In this respectt Goldsmithts approach 
has an advantage over this measure since it covers the intermediation 
by the whole financial system. Despite this weakness, however,, it is 
generally believed that the TT2/GVP ratio can be used as'a broad index 
of the degree of financial intermediation in develoPind countriest 
where the liabilities of the monetary sector account for the bulk of 
(2) 
financial assets. Given the fact that, in most, of these countries, 
financial institutions other than banks are either non-wexistent, or 
are still of little imPortance in the financial structure, it seems 
Financial intermediation and financial development are two terms 
of one concept revealing the degree to which the financial system 
penetrates in the economy. '' 
(2) See: IT. Wallich, op. cit. P. 294; H. Engberg, "The New African' 
Central Banks and Monetary llianagementll,, In Financial Develoment 
and Econonic Growthp Arnold Sametz, ed. (New York: New York 
University Press, 1972, ) P. 197; R. Bhatia and D. Rhatkhate, 
"Financial Intermediationp Savings Mobilisation, and Entrepreneurial 
Development: The African Experience". TT-TF Staff Papers, (Harch 1975) 
P-138; and A. Abdi, op. cit. P. 68. 
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reasonable to use the ratio of money and near money to GNP as a broad 
index of financial intemediation, - i. e. the extent to which non- 
financial sectors of the economy hold part of their wealth in the 
form of financial assets, 
(') 
Having analysed the close interrelation between financial and 
economic development, it is necessar7 now to examine the precise 
ways and mechanisms whereby the financial system can influence real 
economic growth. This will be shown by an investigation of three 
principal functions that the financial system can, or should, -perform 
in a growing economy. 
1. The Intermediation Role. The financial system plays a vital role in 
carrying out and facilitating the saving-investment process, through 
its intermediation between the sources of funds and their ultimate 
users. In the first place, the financial system serves as a reservoir 
of the accumulated funds of the community. It mobilises the savings 
and idle funds of those who have an income surplus in excess of their 
current requirements. Those surplus units are large in number, and 
varied in character, ranging from individual personal savers to different 
economic sectors. It-is the responsibility of the financial system, 
to adopt and devise adequate means and instruments through which it 
can satisfy the varied needs of savers and mobilise their surplus-, 
funds. Mobilising funds is only one aspect of the twin-intermediary 
role of the financial system. Equally important, is its role in utilising 
these funds among competing investments. This allocative function is- 
particularly important in order to achieve the required infrastructural 
changes implied by development programmes. Economic development 
In developing countries,, generally, holdings of currency, demand 
deposits, time and saving deposits (i. e. M2) constitute Ihe bulk 
of financial assets; whereas other forms such as government securities, 
corporate shares, and contmetual savings are still relatively 
insignificant in private asset portfolio. 
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emphasises the necessity of channelling sufficient resources into 
certain priority sectors which are necessary for attaining the overall 
development objectives. This is an important area in which the financial 
system can participate in economic development, as ceteris Paribus, 
the more efficient the allocation of financial resources in accordance 
with domestic development strategies, the higher will be the rate of 
economic growth and the greater will be the contribution of the saving- 
investment process (through financial intermediation) to economic 
development. 
The above intermediar7 function would suggest that the financial 
system can indirectly stimulate growth in real output through its 
influence on-increasing the aggregate volumes of saving and investment 
and improving the allocation pattern of investable funds in accordance 
with development needs. -By offering a wide array of financial assets 
of differing degrees of security, liquidity, yield, etc.,, an efficient 
financial system can substantially institutionalise and increase the 
aggregate savings available for investment. 
0) 
Such a financial system 
can also stimulate and encourage larger investment to take place, 
Since intermediaries are able to tap enormous amounts of savings 
and can also diversify their risks among alternative outlets, they 
are more able to providefunds at lower cost than would prevail in the 
case of direct individual financing. 
(2 ) 
Even if financial intermediation 
does not imply a reduction In the cost of borrowing, the availability of 
funds from the financial system enables investors, who used to suffer 
from the lack of adequate finance, to enlarge their investment under- 
takings. 
(3) 
Clearly, reducing the cost of borrowing and/or increasing 
(1) Gurley and Shaw, Money in a Theory of Financev (Washington D. C.: 
The Brookings Institution, 1960) P-55. 
(2) H. Wallich, op. cit. P. 295; and E. Furness, Money and Credit in 
Developing Africa, (London: Heinermann Educational Books Ltd. 1975) 
P. 19. 
(3) H. Patrick, op. cit. P. 184. 
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the availability of finance are important incentives to larger investments, 
thus giving an important development impact of the financial system. 
2. The Credit-Creation Function. A second outstanding function of 
the financial system is mainly confined to one major group of financial 
institutions only - the commercial banks. What distinguishes commercial 
banks from other financial institutions is that they act not only as 
intermediaries, but also have power as creators of credit through their 
own operations on the basis of the-fractional reserve system. 
(') 
This privilege, results from their unique position among financial 
institutionsilgiven to them by the fact that their demand deposits 
liabilities are widely accepted as money and thus furnish a substantial 
portion of the effective domestic money supply. Bank deposits are 
book entries resulting from the crediting of deposits (currency as 
well as cheques) and the proceeds of loans and investments to customers' 
accounts. These deposits can be increased by extending loans and 
investments so long as the required cash reserves ratio is maintaineý,. 
This distinguishes commercial banks from other financial institutions 
which merely act to mobilise funds from various sources and then allocate 
these funds to different assets. 
(2) 
The significance of money creations, 
(1) R. Cameron, Bank: ing and Economic Development, op-cit. P-7. 
(2) The distinction between commercial banks and non-bank financial 
institutions (IMPIJ has been a controversial issue in recent years. 
Culbertson, Aschheim, and others maintained the "traditional view" 
that commercial banks are unique in the process of credit creation 
and they can alone create loanable funds, whereas IMFIscan extend 
credit only after a prior act of saving. On the other hand, 
Gurley and Shaw,, among others, adopted the "new view" that TMIFIS 
are essentially similar to commercial banks in that they can also 
generate a process of credit-creation through their Olin operations. 
The latter economists argued that although 147, FIscannot create 
money in a technical sense because their liabilities do not serve 
as a means of payments (like the commercial banks), nevertheless, 
these institutions are able to create the particular types of 
financial claims which are close substitutes for money. In so 
doing, IMFIscan also expand the supply of loahable funds through 
extending loans and investments. However, despite these opposing 
views, our concern here is to emphasise the fact that the financial 
cd/fwa ..... 
18 
from the economic development point of view, is that commercial bankcs 
could make funds available to finance larger investments in excess of what 
it could be financed from current savings. 
(') 
3. The Direct Promotion and Pinancing of Industrial Development. A 
third possible function of the financial system is the provision of 
entrepreneurial talent and the financing of technical and industrial 
innovation. 
(2) 
This function differs from the previous two functions 
in that it has a direct developmental impact, whereas the other functions 
can only stimulate economic growth indirectly. Direct growth-inducing 
effects can come about ky the provision of initiative, guidancet 
feasibility studies, as well as finance for the creation and expansion 
of industrial and other productive ventures. 
(3) 
Such promotional 
activities can be carried out by specialised financial institutions 
which axqusually created, with government support,, to encourage certain 
priority sectors which have a direct influence on development. However, 
the historical evidence of banking evolution in many countries has shown 
that even the commercial banks could play a leading role in financing 
technical innovation and the long-term requirements of industrial 
expansion. 
(4) 
bt/fwd... system, or at least its commercial banking institutions, can 
considerablý assist development by supplying the community, through 
credit-creation, with larger amounts of investable funds above that 
which could be available from current savings. For more details 
of the above controversy, see D. Fand, "Intermediary claims and 
the adequacy of our monetary controls", In: _Banking and T-Tonetary 
Stadies, Deane Carson, ed., (Homewood, Illinois: Richard Irwin, 
Inc. 1963) 1P. 238. 
However, any excessive use of this power of money creation may create 
inflationary pressures which usually have unfavourable impact on 
economic growth. I 
(2) R. Cameron, Fanking and Economic Development, OP. cit. P. 7. 
Ibid. 
As shown earlier, Germany and Japan are cases in point. See PF. 2-3 
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I , 3ur. rla= ýmd Conclusions. 
The preceding 
I 
discussion has demonstrated that both historical 
evidence and theoretical analysis suggest that the financial system 
can play an active promotional role in instigating and manipulating 
the course of economic development. The issues that have been raised 
above will now be examined in the context of Jordan in the light of 
five main levels of enquix7: - 
(1) Development stratep-v: 
What are the development strategies that have been adopted in 
Jordan, and what role has been officially assigned to financial 
institutions to help in attaining the set development objectives? 
(2) Financial Intermediation: 
How far has financial intermediation in Jordan proceeded with 
economic growth? 'What degree of financial development has Jordan so 
far attained? Did financial development occur with price stability 
or was it accompanied by price inflation? 
(3) Financial and Economic Develonnent Interaction: 
What is the nature of the operational linkage between economic 
development and the development of domestic financial structure? That 
isv did the process of economic development stimulate the growth of 
the financial structure, or was the provision of financial services 
responsible for promoting real development? 
(4) The Nabire of the Evolution Model: 
"The above questio n leads the-study to enquire whether the country's 
financial institutions are of the 'demand-following' or the'supply- 
leading' type, and how does the pattern of evolution influence the 
development in the real economy? 
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(5) A critical assessment of the Financial Policies Adopted: 
What was the actual role played by the financial system in 
promoting economic development and to what extent has its activities 
been consistent with the defined development strategies? Did the 
financial system play a growth-inducing role which has been shown 
possible? If not, how can it be made to play such a role? 
Before this analysis can properly be attempted, however, it is 
necessary to establish the historical experience of Jordan by, first 
of all, (Chapter2) examining the nature of the inheritance of the 
colonial monetary experience and the resultant behavioural constraints 
and blockages that remained during the first years of political 
independence; and secondly (Chapter 3) by establishing the initial 
and subsequent pattern of financial intermediation and economic develop- 
ment that occurred after independence. These are two important parameters 
within which future policies and achievements of domestic financial 
institutions must have relevance if new policies are to be effective 
in creating significant structural change. 
I 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE FINANCIAL DUTERITANCE ATM IT'I'PLICATION OF 
'"HE JORDANIAN COLONIAL PMOD I 
The evolution of the financial system of many developing countries 
was initiated during a colonial period in their history, which signifi- 
cantly shaped its operational characteristics and biased its operational 
activities towards the promotion of external rather than internal invest- 
ments. This developmental bias was consistent with the then prevailing 
interest of economic policy in these countries, which concentrated on 
promoting complementary economic and trading ties between them and their 
metropolitan centres, whereas little attention was actively paid to their 
industrial autonomous needs. Once political independence was achieved, the 
requirements of a now alltonomous development programme and the promotion 
of internal activities within a coherent indigenously chosen framework 
demanded a radical re-allocation of financial resources to remove this 
bias. However, the possession of de jure executive freedom of action 
tended to be inhibited by traditions and attitudes inherited from the 
colonialist past, due to administrative inertia and lack of indigenous 
expertise. As a result, countries were unable to realistically identify 
" new post-independence structural plan for economic activity. Jordan is 
" particular example of a financial re-adjustment problem which still 
remains, despite more than three decades of political independence as 
has been shown in my M. A. 'Thesis. 
(1) 
The present thesis attempts to 
identify the precise role of the financial system in economic development 
and the ways and methods by kftich this system can participate effectively 
in promoting the Jordanian economy. The M. A. Thesis reached the following 
six specific conclusions about the process of banking evolution, which 
(1) Salah, J. -, The olution of the Ranking System 
- 
in Jordan 
M. A. Thesis The U, K. : Keele University, ? larch-19-7-7)- 
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will furnish an adequate background to this study(') - 
(1) AN IMPORTANT PRE-CONDITION FOR ECONOMIC STABILITY AND AN 
APPROPRIATE EW-IROW, 21ITT COITIXJCIVE TO BANKING DEVELOPHENT IS THE 
I11TER31M INTEGRATION OF THE CONSTITUENT PARTS OF THE COUNTRY 
UNDER =T AEGIS OF SOME POID1 OF NATIONAL CENTRAL POLITICAL CONTROL: 
Jordan suffered more than most countries before independence from 
changes in the administrative colonial centre of control, and after 
independence from territorial changes that radically altered its 
geographical boundaries and largely influenced its financial system. 
In the period prior to 1946, as the smaller state of Transjordan, 
it was economically and financially linked to Palestine under admini- 
strative control first from Turkey and subsequently from Britain. Both 
Palestine and Transjordan were under Turkish rule from the beginning of 
the sixteenth century to the end of the first World Waro 
(2) 
With the 
Turkish defeat in this War, the United Kingdom was granted (in accordance 
with the San Remo Conference of the Allied Powers held in April 25th 
1920 
(3) 
) the mandate for Palestine and Transjordan. The British Mandate 
came into effect on September 29th 1923 and terminated in 1946. 
(4) 
Two 
years after independenceg the 1948 Arab-Israeli War resulted in the creation 
of Israel out of the geographical area of Palestine, followed in 1950 by 
the establishment of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to include both 
Transjordan (subsequently referred to as the East Bank) and the remaining 
part of Palestine which wa3 latt in Arab hands after the War (and thereafter 
knovm as the West Bank. ) The Second Arab-Israeli War of 1967 further 
(1) The following conclusions were based upon the analysis of banking 
development during the period since the Colonialist era up to 
1975. After this year, however, the financial system exhibited 
further response to the country's development needs. See Chapter 
It of this thesis. PP-348-349. For the above conclusions, however, 
see J. ;; alah, The Evolution of the 13ankinp! System in Jordan. 
op-cit. PP. 116-123. 
(2) Robert Nathan &- others, Palestine: Problem and Promise, An Economic 
Stud (Washington, D. C. : Public Affairs Press, 1946) P. 48 
(3) Salid B. Himadeh, Monetary and Bankirr System of Syria, (Beirut: 
American University of Beirut, 1935) P. 61 
(4) The Mandate over Palestine was ended in 1948. See R. Nathan 
others, op. cit P. 62 
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resulted in the West Bank of Jordan being occupied by Israel, All these 
vicissitudes in political control and geographical area throughout the 
Jordanian history took place within the space of fifty-five years. 
Needless to say, such events helped to retard the-internal development 
of the country. 
The above political changes were accompanied by parallel developments 
in the financial sphere. During the period of Turkish rulet Transjordan 
and Palestine had been subsumed under the Turkish monetary system, their 
domestic currency, beina the Turkish gold pound, the currency of the 
Ottoman Empire. With the British occupation of both countries, the Turkish 
currency was withdrawn from the market and replaced by the Egyptian pound, 
rigidly fixed to the pound sterling. 
0) 
The Egyptian pound was recognised 
as legal tender up to November Ist. 1927, when the Palestine Currency 
Board (PCB) was established to issue an independent monetary unit for 
Palestine (the Palestine, Pound). Immediately after its introduction in 
Palestine, the Palestinian pound was declared legal tender in Transjordan 
as from December 7th. 1927. 
(2) 
The Palestinian pound continued to be legal 
tender in Transjordan up to July 1950, when the Jordan Currency Board was 
finally established to issue-an independent monetary unit - the Jordan 
Dinar - for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Thus, during the British 
Mandate Period, Transjordan was a satellite area within the Palestinian monetary 
system* This monetary dependence paralleled overall economic dependence 
on Palestine. The latter was a major market for Transjordan's exports and 
an important supplier of its import needs. on average, about 94rSof Trans- 
Jordan's exports was exported to Palestine during the period 1937 - 1944# 
(1 ) Salid Himadeh, op-cit. P-50 
(2) A. Konikoff, Transiordan, An Economic Sury2Z. (Jerusalem: Economic 
Research Institute of the Jewish AGency for Palestine, 1946) P. 86 
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'whereas about one fifth of her imports came from Palestine. 
(') 
The Arab-Israeli War of 1967 left adverse effects on the Jordanian 
economy and its financial system. As a result of the War and the consequent 
occupation of the West Bank of Jordan, the economy was deprived of 4011'o' of 
its GVP which had originated from this area. The banking system was 
seriously affected by this War and its aftermath. All bank branches situated 
in the occupied West Bank were completely closed. 
(2) 
This situation 
immediately resulted in considerable losses in bank resources and severely 
limited bank activities. The banks, while they had to gradually repay 
customers' deposits as agreed with the Central Bank of Jordan, failed 
because of the political circumstances to collect their credit extended 
in the West Bank, incurring severe losses. By 1975, commercial banks had 
aid out about 90,110 pI of their deposits liabilities to West Bank residents, 
'While they had only received 13%o of their total credit extended there. 
(3) 
The occupation of the ITest Bank also deprived the banks of one of their pre- 
vious sources of deposits. In I-lay 1967, i. e. a month before the War, the 
relative share of the West Bank in total bank deposits was 31, 'o- 
(4) 
Purther- 
more, a large area of credit extension in the West Bank became no longer 
available. The proportion of credit extended in the West Bank in total 
bank credit in May 1967 comprised about 23,5, - 
(5) 
Such events adversely 
influenced bank operations in the East Bank of Jordan, as reflected in 
the slow growth of the network of bank branches; only one bank branch was 
established in the East Bank in the year following the 1967 War. 
(6) 
(1) Ibid. PP. 66-67 
(2) Bank branches in the West Bank of Jordan accounted for 27. See 
Chapter four of this thesis, table 4.5. 
(3) & (4) & (5) The Central Bank of Jordan, Banking Control Department 
(Unpublished data). 
(6) See Appendix 4.3 of this thesis. 
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(2) THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE BROUGHT ABOTJT CHANGES IN THE FIMUICIAL SYSTEM 
THAT WEIM3 BOTH PROGRESSIVE AND YET IIUIIBITDD THE EVOLUTION OF A 
NATIONAL FIM1111CIAL IITRASTRUCTURE APPROPRIATE FOR DOMESTIC ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPME14T. 
The banking history of Transjordan essentially began in 1925, with 
the domestic establishment of the Ottoman Bank, 
(') 
one of the largest 
colonial banks operating in the Middle East. The early presence of this 
foreign bank gave a stimulant to other domestic banks to start operations 
in the country. It was the Arab Bank, that was established in Palestine 
in 1930, which followed the example of the Ottoman Bank in extending its 
activities to Transjordan; it opened two branches there, one in Amman 
in 1934 and the other in Irbid in 1943. 
(2) 
As a result of the Palestine 
War and the establishmcilt of Israel in 1948, the head office of the 
Arab Bank was moved to Jordan. The introduction of banking activities,, 
where effectively there had been none before, together with the setting- 
up of the PCB to issue a monetary unit for Palestine and Transjordan, 
constituted an essential step towards monetizing the economyv a necessary 
pre-condition for economic development. 
Despite this advantage, howevert monetary subjugation resulting 
from Currency Board control of monetary affairs and banking operations 
put the economy in a strait-jacket of dependency. During the British 
Mandate Period, both Palestine and Transjordan were monetarily dependent 
on the UX. In this context, their monetary system operated in accordance 
with the "Sterling Exchange Standard" which applied to other British 
colonies. According to this system, the issue of local colonial currencies 
(1) Dr. Abdul Malik, "Commercial Banking in Jordan", 'The Parikerst 
I-Tagazine, (November 1966), P-331. 
(2) Central Bank of Jordan, Banking Control Department, (unpublished 
data). 
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was undertaken by an authority often called "Currency Board". 
(') 
The PCB 
acted as the agency for the operations of the Sterling Exchange Standard 
and the issue of domestic currency, Issues of Palestinian pounds were 
made against sterling deposits placed in London. By this mechanism, an 
automatic link was established between the Palestinian pound and sterling. 
Sterling convertibility meant that the PCB was always ready to buy and ý 
sell Palestinian pounds at a fixed parity against sterling surrendered in 
London. These sterling reserves were invested on the London Money Market. 
Accumulated sterling investment served also as backing for the Palestinian 
currency outstanding. Thus the monetary dependence on the U. K. manifested 
itself in a rigidly fixed par value between the Palestinian pound and the 
sterling, on the basis of 10(Y/'o' sterling cover for the Palestine currency 
issued. 
Although such Colonial monetary arrangements had some domestic 
advantages, in the sense of -providing a sound local currency, involving an 
absolute guarantee of full and free convertibility into sterling at a 
stable rate of exchange, it had on the other hand a serious retarding 
(2) 
impact on internal economic development* The PCB was unable to adopt an 
independent monetary rolicy to suit domestic economic requirements. It 
'was a dependent monetary instiUition with headquarters in London, the members 
of the Board were appointed by the British Secretary of State for the 
colonies. 
(3) 
It was represented in Palestine by a currency officer (the 
treasurer) and a foreign conmercial bank (Barclays Bank). The Board acted 
purely automatically as a money changer, without discretionary powers to 
practise any ty-pe of official domestic monetary policy. The adoption of 
the Sterling Exchange Standard in Palestine and 'Transjordan was, in fact, 
to promote the economic and trading ties with the U. K. and to finance 
(1) IV. T. iieýiýn, "The Colonia 1 Empire", in Pankinf, in the Pritish 
CoTmony-alth, R. S. Sayers ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19527 P. 423 
(2) Edward Nevin, Capital Punds in Underdeveloped Countries,, (London: 
Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1961). P. 8. 
(3) A. Yonikoff, op. cit. P. 86 
27 
'British Uar expenditures in the Middle East. The full and automatic 
relationship between the 'Palestine pound and sterling meant that the 
more sterline and British Treasuz-y 'Bills surrendered to the PCP in Tondon, 
the more Palestinian pounds could be issued and submitted to the Yandate 
authorities to meet their local expenditures. The standard system was 
not, therefore, designed to promote internal innovation and mobilisation 
of funds for domestic development purposes. On the contrary, it consti- 
tuted a major drain on national resources, since the requirements of the 
10T/of sterling cover of local currency led to immobilisation of a considerable 
part of the country's savings in the form of sterling assets invested abroad. 
(3) 'WHILE EFFICIENT ALLOCATION OF CAPITAL IS GETIERALLY PU. SU? rTED TO RESULT 
FROM CAPITAL NOBILITY I-10TIVATED BY TFE MARKET NIECHATTIST4, COLO, 'TIAL 
7-. XPERIP, 11CE WOULD :. 3UGGT, ', ST, AS ITDZED THAT OF JORDAN D72,1ONSTRATES, THAT 
INSTITUTIONAL IITRASTRUCTURE IS CRUCIAL AND CAN DIAS D011-1013TIC CAPITAL 
ALLOCATION AND SEVERELY LIMIT THE SUPPLY OP BAITX CREDIT FOR DOITTSTIC 
USE. 
During the period of the British 14andate, the Banking system of 
the 
country adhered to the general pattern of the colonial 
banking system, 
Which was generally characterised by the dominance of foreign 
banks, 
British overseas banks (colonial banks) spread throughout the Colonial 
Ikpire to facilitate and finance the needs of both Britain and colonial 
territories. Tn Palestine, 
(') 
for examplet three rrincipal colonial 
banks were responsible for holding about four-fifths of total deposits. 
(2) 
The dominance of foreign banks largely influenced the general characteristics 
of the banking system and biased its operations towards external, rather 
than domestic activities. The colonial context in which this system had 
to operate created the following four operation biases - 
(a) A distinct bins towards investment abroad. Given the operational 
strait-jacket of the Currency Board System, the PCB was precluded by 
law from pursuing any type of banking or demand management functions,, 
(1) During the British Mandate period, internal banking statistics for 
Transjordan were not available. 
(2) Robert Nathan and others, OP-Cit- P-307 
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Commercial banks were therefore left free to choose their investment 
Portfolios. Due to the absence of adequate domestic investment outlets 
acceptable to the banks, together ifith the significance of the City of 
London as a banking centre where additional funds were always demanded, 
the London Money Harket naturally absorbed the bulk of the coloniest, 
surpluses. As a result, large proportions of domestic deposits were, 
in effect, re-deposited in various sterling investments in London. 
During the period 1937-1945, about half of Palestinds deposits was transferred 
abroad through the operations of the banking system. Such a situation was 
natural in the absence of any control on bank activities. Colonial banks 
operated as branches of an international banking system, transferring 
funds from one area to another to satisfy differing credit requirements 
as they arose. Only one single balance sheet was published by these 
banks, showing the aggregate assets and liabilities, regardless of the 
origin of deposits. These banks were thus in a similar situationto. other 
branches of the same bank operated in a metropolitan country. They were 
functioning as if they were part of the United Ydngdom's banking system, 
giving a similar situation when the Currency Board System made the 
colonies part of the monetary system of the United Kingdom. 
(1) 
A Preference for maintaining a markedly high level of liqutdJ Lty in 
-40mestic 
banking.. This was partly due to the limited opportunities 
for domestic investment and partly to the fact that these banks, being 
mainly British overseas banks, had their special conservative operational 
criteria which severely minimised their intexmal activities. These banks 
brought with them their traditions and attitudes which they used to follow 
in their home country. 
(2) 
For instance, in extending credit to local 
E. Nevin, op, cit. P. 45; and W. T. Newlyn,, OP-Cit- P-438. 
D. Nevint OP-cit, P-48; and Newlyn &- Rowan, Money and Banking i 
. 
the Pritish Colonial Africa, (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1954) P. 94. 
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potential borrowers, the banks required a high standard of credit worthiness 
and a conventional collateral security which they usually used to ask for. 
Few indigenous enterprises were able to provide the type of conventional 
security and to cope with the high standard of credit worthiness. In 
addition, in keeping with the British tradition in banking practice, 
colonial banks restricted themselves mainly to short-tern assets and self- 
liquidating loans. 
0) 
Given the development needs of colonial territories,, 
what thqrreally needed were long-term credit facilities for financing 
newly established industries. All these conservative operational attitudes 
resulted in mininising the volume of domestic bank activities, and thus 
maintaining a high percentage of bank funds in a liquid form. 
(c) An institutional bias towards the financina of the foreiL-n trade 
sector at the expense of domestic agricultural and nanufacturing activitiqs. 
Since colonial banks were originally established to facilitate the 
economic and trading ties with the United Kingdom, it was not surprising 
that their operations were mainly confined to those activities which 
served this purpose. Therefore, credit extended to the foreign trade 
sector constituted the bulk of total bank credit, whereas the requirements 
of the domestic agricultural and manufacturing sectors were not adequately 
met. This situation was worsened by the lack of any domestic government 
backing which would make bank credit available for these sectors. Further- 
more, the inability of the Currency Board System to foster the development 
of specialised credit Institutions added to the difficulty of these sectors 
to obtain adequate finance. 
(d) The development-of bank activities vras confined almost exclusively 
to previously established centres of trade and connerce, depriving rural 
areas of basic banking services. As these banks concentrated their 
activities on the financing of the foreign trade sector, the bulk of their 
transactions was carried out in the main commercial centres. As a result,, 
commercial banks maintained branches only in the big cities in which well- 
established enterprises existed. There was no economic incentive for the- 
0 (1) R. A. Gunasekera, "Banking Arrangements in Ceylon,. Inn Panking in the 
British Comnonweal_th,, OP-cit. P. 46. 
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banks to extend their services into the rural and deeper areas of the country. 
The colonial banking system was therefore characterised by low branch density 
in relation to total population. 
(') 
COLONIAL TRADITIONS A111D PROCEDURES CONTINUED TO MIST OVER SOME., 14 
YEARS ONCE POLITICAL IlrDEPMENCE WAS ACHIEVED, AND DURING ', -., IIICH THE 
COU11TRY REMAINED MONETARILY DLIPE11DEITT ON TIM UNITED KINGDOM UNDER THE 
CURRENCY BOARD SYSTE11. THIS SITUATION PURTHER RETIT-DED THE PROSPECTS 
AND A13ILITY TO SET-UP AND ACHIM AUTONOMOUS DIMMOPME-11T OBJECTIVES 
kl,,! D TO IM. 71FY THE WAYS IN THIC-11 THE BATIKING UYSTM! NEEDED TO CHANGE 
TO FACILITATE THIS PROCESS. 
Even whenTýransjordan did achieve independence in 1946, the Palestine pound 
continued to be its damestic currency until the setting-up of the Jordan 
currency Board VC3)1n 1950, and the subsequent issue of an independent 
national domestic currency. Despite political independence, Jordan 
continued to be monetarily dependent on the United Kingdom throughout the 
period of the JCB which ended in 1964. Although the members of the Board 
were appointed by the Jordan Council of Ministers, it was managed and 
directed by British experts. Its headquarters were situated in London, 
and represented in Amman by a currency officer. Three out of the five 
members appointed to the Board were British, one of whom, was the chairman, 
whereas the remaining two were Jordanian, one representing the Jordanian 
Government and the other was representing the largest domestic bankt i. e. 
the Arab Bank. 
(2) 
This situation prevailed until 1957, when the Board's 
headquarters were transfenmd to Amman and new members of the Board were 
appointed. 
(3) 
Four of the five members appointed were now Jordanianst with 
the Minister of Finance being Chairman, and the remaining member vras 
British. However, although the Board's headquarters were moved to Amman, 
this procedure did not, in practice, result in any significant change in 
(1) W. T. Newlyn, "The Colonial Empire", op-cit. P. 449. 
(2) Jordan Currency Boardt Renort for the period 20th July 1949 to 
31st Harch IQ51 (London: i951), Appendix A Law ITO. 35 of 1949, P-1- 
(3) Jordan Currency Board, Report for the Year 'Ended on 31 pt March 1958, (A=an. - 3rd August 1958) P. 2. 
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the operational characteristics of the JCB. The Board followed its 
precedent the PCB and continued to adhere to the basic features of the 
Sterling Exchange Standard: maintaining a stable rate of exchange between the 
-jor(; Tanian dinar and the pound sterling on a one-to-one basis, and keeping 
a full sterling cover of the Jordan currency issued invested in London. 
Holding any proportion of the currency cover in domestic assets was 
prohibited by Law, thus precluding any possibility of a fiduciary issue. 
One major consequence of the pure automatism of the operations of 
the JCB T/ras its inability to practise any deliberate influence on the 
quantity of money and adjust it to domestic economic needs. Credit 
policy of the commercial banks played an insignificant role in inducing 
changes in money supply because of their limited domestic activities. 
Changes in the money SUPPlYwere largely induced by net changes in balance 
of payments flows and not by domestic expansionary policies. This situation 
involved relatively high money creation costs, since such surpluses 
actually represented part of the country's available resources*(1) 
1111oreover, the continuation of a dependent monetary system left the 
banking system without significant structural change as compared with the 
previous colonial period. The JCB was precluded from pursuing an indepen- 
dent monetary policy or practising any banking functions. The Board was 
therefore incapable of influencing the banking system and adjusting it to 
the particular environment of the Jordanian economy. The previous colonial 
biases continued to prevail. In particular, commercial banks continued to 
follow the traditional practice of holding a large proportion of their 
funds in overseas investment. Throughout the period 1951-1964, an average 
of 42.61ý2 of total domestic deposits were re-deposited abroad* Secondly, 
a continued adherence to maintaining a high liquidity in commercial 
banking. The liquidity ratio, measured as a percentage of liquid assets 
ta total deposits, averaged around 5Wo during the period of the JCB. This 
(1) For more details about the high economic costs of the money supply 
in Jordan during this period, See J. Salah,, op%cit, PP. 52-57 
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was almost twice the 2&, 'o' liquidity ratio customarily retained by the 
United Kingdom. 
(') 
Thirdly, bank credit was still mainly extended to 
the financing of short-term transactions in the foreign trade sector. 
Although the sectoral distribution of bank credit is not available during 
this period, it iras estimated that this sector absorbed about half of 
total bank credit. 
(2) 
This percentage seems to be excessive, especially 
if an account is made to the relative importance of this sector in tile 
economy, which comprised one fifth of the GITP during this period. 
(3) 
Pourthly, a slow spread of banking services into the deeper and rural 
area3 of the country. Although the network of bank branches expanded 
noticeably, reaching 43 offices at the end of the period, as compared 
with 12,13 and 29 offices in the years 1950,1955 and 1960, 
(4) 
the 
increase was ma#ly confined to the principal towns. According to the 
available data, nine of the thirteen bank branches in 1955 were situated 
in three main cities. 
(5) 
(5) LACK OF EFF1,11CTIVE DOMESTIC CENTRAL DIRECTION OF THE FINANCIAL 
SYSTWT MANIFESTED ITSELF III A SLOIJ REALISATIOIT OF W-, T!, ITEED TO 
Ii"41, TOVATF. XZD ESTABLISH A NEW 'FINANCIAL INFRASTRUCTURBE TO PROMOTE 
0 =- LOPI-13TT. IlTnj RNAL DOHESTIC 
Due to the continued strait-jacket constraint of effective foreign 
monetary control, not only was the JCB incapable of correcting the 
I 
previous colonial biases in commercial banking, but it was also unable to 
strengthen the country's financial infrastructure. Under the JCB's regime, 
there was an obvi. ous need to develop an effective network of specialised 
(1) J. Revell The Pritish Financial System (London: The Macmillan Press, 
Ltd. 1973 . P. 204. 
(2) Abdul Nalik, op-cit. P. 332. 
(3) F. A. 0. Mediterranean Development Project, Jordan Country Re-, nort, 
(Rome; 1967) Table 8, r. 14. 
(4) Central Bank of Jordan, Banking Control Department, (Unpublished data). 
(5) The I. B. R. D. The 7, cononic nevelopnent of Jordant(Baltimore: The 
John Hopkins Press, 1957) P. 372. 
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credit institutions with adequate resources, to assist and finance the 
requirements of the basic economic sectors that were not adequately 
served by commercial banks (namely agriculture and manufacturing sectors). 
Although the goverment tried to promote and encourage agricultural 
development, either directly by providing grants and loans or indirectly by 
establishing and supporting agricultural credit institutions, its endeavours 
were still limited. Total loans granted by the goverment did not exceed 
JD I million at the end of 1955, idAle the credit outstanding of the 
Agricultural Pank, the only agricultural credit institution at that time, 
did not exceed JD 0.5 million. 
(') 
It was only after the first decade of 
the period of the JCB that the Central Co-operative Union and the Agricul- 
tural Credit Corporation were established to specialise in agricultural 
credit. The former was established in 1959 to provide seasonal loans, 
supervision and advice to local agricultural societies, while the latter 
was established in 1960 to provide medium and long-term loans to farmers 
and to the central -co-operative societies for agricultural needs. However, 
the JCB did not take any action or participate in any efforts to encourage 
and promote the activities of such institutions. As far as the manufacturing 
sector was concerned, the Board also did not contribute to any development 
of this sector. Throughout the period of the JCB, there was no effective 
industrial credit institutions with adequate resources to promote industrial 
development. The only specialised institution for financing manufacturing 
and tourism was the Industrial Development Fund, which was established in 
1 
1958. Due to its limited resources, the Fund was liquidated after the 
clone of the JCB period (i. e. in July 1965), when the new and more efficient 
Industrial Development Bank was established to take the responsibility of 
financing such activities. The poor performance of the previous Industrial 
Fund can be shoim by the fact that during the seven years of its existence, 
(2) its credit extention amounted to only JD. 0.70 Million. 
(1) The IBRD, The Economic Develo-nmmt of Jordan', OP'acit- P. 51. 
(2) Ibid. 
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Moreover, due to the very limited powers and responsibilities given 
to the JCB by the Currency Law, the Board was also unable to underta. 1-ce any 
action with regard to the promotion of domestic money and capital markets. 
The creation of such markets could have been instrumental for internal 
development in the sense of providing alternative domestic avenues for 
bank overseas investment, and mobilising and channelling national savings 
towards internal development outlets. 
The above discussion made it clear that the banking system during 
the JCB; period was not an adequate instrument for the autonomous needs 
of a newly independent economy that desired economic growth. On the contrary, 
its operations must have inhibited development as a large part of the 
country's financial resources were invested abroad. This was worsened 
by the continued adoption of the dependent Currency Board System which 
further encouraged a continuous immobilisation of a considerable proportion 
of domestic resources in the form of currency cover invested in London. 
This situation would have been much better if the country had adopted an 
independent monetary system, or at least modified the existing JCB to enable 
it to exert some influence on banking activities. Although the immediate 
creation of a fully-fledged Central Bank was not justified when the country 
obtained political independence (mainly because of the rudimentary state of 
the Jordanian economy, the high financial dependence on the U. K. and the 
lack of a trained domestic staff with adequate experience to operate a 
central bank), it is difficult to accept the delay of establishing this 
institution which came after 14 years of political independence. 
(') 
Moreover, there ; -ras a failure on the part of the Jordanian Government to 
(1) For more details of the reauons of the delay of establishing the 
Central Bank. see J. Salah, op-cit PP. 35-36- 
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carry out the recommendations of the IBRD Mission of 1955 regardinE; 
the Currency Board Law. According to the Hission's view, the Currency 
Board Law needed to be modified to enable the JCB to pursue some 
central banking functions, until such time as the creation of a fully- 
fledged central bank would be practical. 
(1) 
The Mission did recommend that 
legislation should require the Board to hold a certain proportion of its 
currency cover in domestic assets, thus enabling it to undertake a limited 
fiduciary issue, and also to rediscount certain domestic bank assets. 
However, one major result of the non-amendments of the Currency Board Law 
and the delay of establishing a central bank was that the economy had to 
suffer the aforementioned serious deficiencies in banking operations for 
a longer time after independence. This inertia further inhibited the 
emergence of development planning which was clearly essential for the 
newly independent economy. 
(6) UITLESS AITD TUTTTIL DE7ELOPMEITIT PLAITITING OCCURS, ITO 14BAITINGFUL 
STRUC"1M. DTG OF TH75, BAITKING SYSTEM CAIT BZ ACHIEVED BECAUSE 
OBJECTIVES HAVE NOT B7,211 CLA-11IFIED. 
The continued acceptance of the previous colonial financial situationt 
in which domestic monetary and banking policies were externally determined, 
was clearly against the internal autonomous needs of newly independent 
countries. Once political freedom was obtained, most of these countries 
embarked upon economic development programmes to develop their economies 
as autonomous and not subservient ones, with great emphasis being placed 
on promoting investment in domestic agricultural and manufacturing 
sectors. Such programmes required internal reallocation of financial 
resources to achieve the development profile envisaged. This situation 
demanded the replacement of the existing strait-jacket of Currency Board 
control of monetary institutions with independent control capable of 
(1) The IBRD, the Pcononic Development of Jordan, OP-cit. P-35 
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assisting the developmental process, vested in central banks. 
It is no coincidence therefore that the Central Bank of Jordan(CBJ) 
began its operations in 1964, and was at once followed by attempts at 
central planning of economic development under the seven Year Programme 
for Economic Development, 1964-1970. Its creation was necessitated in 
view of the consequent required changes in the prevailing financial 
infrastructure to achieve the set development objectives. Such a 
development prograrme necessarily needed independent monetary and credit 
policies hlich the preceding Currency Board was unable to provide. Since 
its existence, the crucial task of the CBJ has been to correct the struc- 
tural colonial biases in the bariking system and adjust it to the particular 
context of the Jordanian economy and its domestic requirements. The 
CBJ has so far achieved partial success in four particular respects- 
(i) The R'e-natriation of Overseas Funds and the LiouiditY of Commercial 
Banks: 
One major achievement has been the repatriation of funds transferred 
bbroad through the operations of the commercial banks. Investment in 
overseas assets was restricted by the CBJ, and bank holdings of foreign 
assets were confined to levels required to meet overseas liabilities only. 
As a result, the composition of bank liquid assets has been significantly 
changed in favour of domestic assets, as compared with the previous period 
of the JCB when commercial bank-s were left free to choose their investment 
portfolios, vhile the average ratio of overseas investment to total 
bank liquid assets accounted for 90.71j'o' during the years 1951-1964, it 
dropped noticeably to an average of 19.55 during the period 1965-1975- 
This was accompanied by. a notable rise in the ratio of domestic assets to 
total liquidity which increased from only 9.3% to 80.5% during the two 
periods respectively. Despite this success, and attempts to lower the 
liquidity of the commercial banks, the impact of CBJ's policies has been 
limited. Cor-mercial banks continued to maintain a high level of liquidity 
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averaged around 43.2, "l' throughout the period 1965-1975. Although this 
was much lower than the previous figure of 5e,, during the JCB era, it was 
still considerably above the officially desired level. 
(') 
The CBJ's 
failure in this respect is mainly due to the narrow scope of monetary 
policy in Jordan, which deprives the CBJ of the effective use of the monetary 
weapons available in its armoury. 
(ii) The Donestic Allocation of Credit and the Geop--raphical Di-stribution 
of Bankinr Activities: 
By repatriating overseas funds, commercial banks were compelled to seek 
investment in domestic avenues. This was clearly reflected in the rise in 
domestic credit to deposit ratio which averaged around 75-3/'% as compared 
with 57-45 under the previous JCD regime. Although the CBJ's policy of 
repatriating overseas funds has thereby strengthened the domestic credit 
base of the commercial banks, it has not satisfactorily succeeded in 
influencing the distribution of bank credit, neither on the sectoral 
side by diverting more resources to be in line with the development prioritieE 
nor on t1le regional side by expanding the scope of domestic credit to the 
interior and rural areas. Bank credit was still heavily geared to the 
financing of the foreign trade sector which absorbed on average 425,, of 
total bank credit, whereas an average of only 2.5,1ý and 11.1ýj went in 
favour of domestic agricultural and manufacturing sectors during the 
petiod 1965-1975. On the regional side, although the network of bank 
branches increased noticeably from 43 in 1964 to 77 in 1975, the increase 
was mainly confined to the Capital and to other main cities, leaving rural 
areas without adequate banking services. In 1975, for example, out of 
the 77 branches in the East Bank of Jordan, 42 were situated in Amman 
(1) The level of bank liquidity has always been considered high from 
the CW's point of view (See the CBJIs annual Reports of 1966 P. 14, 
1971 P. 17, and 1975 P-34 
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(i. e. 55r- of the total). Furthermore, not only did this concentration 
deprive other areas of banking facilities, but also even existing branches 
in these areas were unable to extend sufficient credit in their localities. 
Bank branches there were in fact merely deposit-receiving centres since they 
did not undertake much lending. These branches used to transfer the 
largest part of their deposits to head offices in A=an, not only because 
investment opportunities were more plentiful in the Capital, but also due 
to another institutional deficiency: that is, branch managers were not 
given adequate powers in regard to credit extension. 
(') 
As a result,, 
bank credit tended to be concentrated in Amman which absorbed, ýas one 
of the CEJIs studies reveals, about 95% of total credit facilities. 
(2) 
(iii) Domestic 'Financial Tnfrastructure: 
The contribution made by the CBJ to settingo-up an adequate financial 
infrastructure has not been very significant. Despite some diversification 
of the financial system i-rith the creation of some new specialised credit 
institutions during the last decade, credit facilities extended by the 
CBJ to these institutions only began in 1971, and constituted a small prop- 
ortion of their total activities, comprising on average 8. eo during the 
period 1971-1975. On the other hand, the CBJIs contribution to the 
formation of adequate financial markets, either for the short-term funds 
or for the long-term investment, has been only nominal. 
(3) 
(iv) The Econonic Cost of Money Supply Creation: 
Some partial success has been achieved by the CBJ irith regard to 
reducing the high economic cost of money supply creation, particularly 
as compared with the procedures of the JCB, judged by the increasing role 
(1) Abed Alhadi Alawin, The Role of the Commercial Banks in the Econonic 
Development of Jordan, H. A. Thesis (Beirut: The American University 
of Beirut, 1972) P. 94. 
(2) The Central Bank of Jordan# "Proposals about the role of the Commercial 
Banks in the 3 Year Development Plan, 1973", P-4. 
(Unpublished paper, in Arabic) 
(3) It was not until 1978 that a domestic Stock Exchange Commenced 
operations in the Country. 
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played by net domestic factors in inducing changes in the money supply. 
These factors became responsible,, on average, for 38,5% of the total changes 
in the money supply, as compared with only 8% during the previous JCB era. 
The increase in the relative importance of domestic factors meant that 
the money supply in Jordan became more adjusted to domestic needs and 
less connected to external fluctuations resulted from balance of payments 
transactions. Despite this improvement, however., external factors. 
continued to be the dominant determinant of the money supply in Jordan. 
While such a situation can be partly related to the limited efficiency of 
the CBJ's instruments to adjust the money supply in accordance with 
domestic factors, it can be largely explained by the heavy dependence 
of Jordan on foreign aid. The latter made it easy for the CBJ to strictly 
follow the traditional policy of currency issue of maintaining a full 
foreign assets cover of domestic currency outstanding. This has been 
maintained, despite the ability of the CBJ to undertake fiduciary issues 
by including a certain percentage of the currency cover in the form of 
domestic assets. 
(') 
Pursuing an 'appropriate' fiduciary issue policy would 
release part of the high foreign assets cover for financing internal 
development. The CW's policy of keeping a high ratio of foreign assets 
to local currency issued indicates a very cautious and conservative 
central banking approach, which is a relic of the previous currency Board 
System. This has been made evident by the fact that the above ratio was 
much higher than that which the preceding JCB used to keep, although the 
latter was precluded by its law from undertaking any fiduciary issue or 
engaging in domestic banking operations - the ratio averaged around 103% 
(1) The maximum 
' ceilingof 
the fiduoiar7 issue was fixed, in accordance 
with the 1971 Law, at IC% of total CBJ's liabilities. See: The CBJ, 
The Central Bank of Jordan During Ton Years (CBJ's publications, 1974)P-) 
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and 1215 during the two periods respectively. This clearly reveals that 
the CEJ itself still conforms to one major operational characteristic of 
the colonial monetary system. 
Summary and Conclusions. 
The foregoing discussion has clearly shown that the financial readjust- 
ment problem still persists in Jordan. Despite some important improvements 
since 1964 under a new post-colonial central bank regime, the financial 
system still adheres, in many basic respects, to strictly conservative 
practices that were inherited from the pre-independence period, and which 
are now inappropriate for the achievement of the economy's development 
needs and objectives. However, before the structure and operations of 
the finaacial system are examined in the above content, the pattern of 
financial intermediation and economic growth actually realised needs to 
be established. 
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CHAPTER 
FINANCIAL INTEMIEDTATION AND ECONOMIC DEVEMPMM 
IN JORDAN. 1955 -1977 
Chapter One has examined the historical evidence and theoretical 
explanations of the lin between financial and real development. 
Howeverg whether the two variables are closely connected dependstin 
reality, largely on the development strategy adopted and the extent to 
which the development of financial institutions has been relied upon as 
an instrument for promoting development. This Chapter will examine 
the significance officially given to domestic financial institutions in 
Jordan, and the extent to which financial intermediation has proceeded 
with economic development in the Jordanian context. For this purpose, 
the country's development strategies are outlined in Section 1. together 
with the siglificance atta(2hed to financial institutions; then, in Section V 
IIp the develomment of domestic financial intermediation is analysed; 
finally, the relationship between financial and real development is 
examined in Section III. 
I 
Jordanian Development Strategy and the Role Assigned to Financial 
Intermediaries. 
As with almost all developing countries during their colonialist 
period, Jordan experienced a complete absence of any deliberate efforts 
to induce domestic development prior to independence. 'This was consistent 
with the economic and political dependence of the colonial territories 
on the U. K., and the consequent required diversion of interest towards 
promoting external ties with the metropolitan centre, rather than encouraging 
internal developmental activities. This situation of undefined national 
development objectives continued to prevail for 15 years after achieving 
independence. The first attempt to plan domestic development took place 
in 1962 with the preparation of the Five Year Pro-ramme for Economic 
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Development, 1962 - 1967. The reason for this delay can be explained by 
the very uncertain political circ=stances which accompanied the early 
years of independence and an absence of efficient dorriestic machinery to 
plan and implement development programmes. However, due to financial 
difficulties resulting from a large reduction in the level of budget 
support received mainly from the U. S. A.,, this Programme became non- 
operative and was replaced by the Seven Year Programme For Economic 
Development, 1964 - 19070. The objectives and performance of this Plan 
were frustrated by the serious economic and social problems that followed 
the 1967 Arab-Israeli ýIar together with the consequent occupation of 
the West Bank of Jordan. It was not until 1973 that a reasonable degree 
of political stability enabled the country to embark upon a new era of 
planned development with the launching of the Three Year Development Plan, 
1973 - N75. This vras subsequently followed by the Five Year Plan, 
1976 - 1980. The resumption of economic planning since 10,73 has considerably 
influenced the g growth of the economy and helped in revitalizing various 
economic activities that were largely disrupted during the earlier period 
of political unrest. This impact is clearly reflected in the following 
brief analysis of growth in the Jordanian economy during the period 1955 - 
1977. 
During the period under review,, the Jordanian economy experienced 
high rates of growth, with mi annual average-rate of incre4e in GITP of 
12. V,,,. This expansion in production was much faster than that of populations, 
so that per capita GITF increased from JD 34.65 in 1955 to JD 213.90 by 
1977, an average rate of increase of 8.71rfo per annum. Measured by constant 
prices, however, real growth rates were noticeably less, particularly in 
the 1970's during the periods of price inflation. Table 3.1 illustrates 
that over the whole period, real GNP rose by 6.95 whereas real per capita,., 
GNP increased by 
However, the course of development that the Jordanian economy 
experienced during the 23 years covered by this analysis took three 
distinct phases, which clearly reflect three different rates of growth. 
43 
For economic and political reasons, the period as a whole can be therefore 
subdivided into: 
(1) The period 1955 - 1966 during which the economy achieved 
noticeable progress within an environment of price stability. The above 
mentioned table demonstrates that the economy experienced high growth in 
GNP of 13.211'4, per annum. Development in this period occurred within a 
climate of price stability, with the annual rise in prices not exceeding 
e7o, Real GILIP grew rapidly, risine from JD 49.90 million in 1955 to JD 
158.63 million by 1966, an average annual rate of growth of 11.7j'44(l) 
This substantially improved the standard of living amongst Jordanians 
whose real per capita GNP was more than doubled, rising from only JD 
34.65 in 1955 to JD 80.52 in 1966. 
(2) The period 1967 - 1972, which nas generally characterised by 
a decline in economic activity, as a result of the Arab-Israeli 'jar of 
1967 and the internal disturbances of 1970. The upward trend of economic 
growth that prevailed in the previous period was greatly disrupted by the 
Arab-Israeli Nar of 1967 which caused great damage to the economy and 
hindered its notable progress. The adverse effects of this Var were 
evident in 1968 ii-hen real GLP declined by 5.2ýý. Although the economy in 
1969 began to recover gradually from the "Yar and its aftermath (during which 
GNP rose by 9.9ýcý)r it was again faced by new retardations resulting from 
the internal disturbances which culminated in a civil war in September 
1970. These upheavals had largely reversed the upward trend of development 
(1) This high rate of growth in GITP can be favourably compared with that 
of other countries during the same period. A study conducted by 
the U. N. in 1967 classified Jordan as the second amongst 63 developing 
countries that achieved the highest rates of growth during 1955 
1965. See: The United Nationst "'The Problems and Policies of 
Econcmic Development, An Appraisal of Recent " perie-nce". World 'jx 
7'conomic Survev. Part One i967 (N. Y. 1968) Table 6, P. 20. 
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of 1969, with most economic sectors showing diminishing performances as 
reflected in the overall decline in real GNP of 8.3%. This situation 
deteriorated with the rise in the price level (averaging 4.9% per annum) 
which further depressed real achievements within the economy. From 1967 
to 1972, both GNP and per capita GNP declined in real terms by respective 
ratios of 1.4% and 5.1%, as against considerable real growth rates of 
11.7% and 8.2% achieved during the previous period. 
(3) The period 1973 - 1977 which witnessed a resumption of 
economic activity and an overall expansion in total output accompanied 
the launching of a new era of economic and social development programmes. 
The adoption of new plans in 1973 and 1976 promoted growth in all sectors 
of the economy, with the GNP accelerating rapidly at an average rate of 
23.3% per annum. Unfortunately, this high nominal rate of growth over- 
states the real rate because of the high level of inflation., Between 1973 
and 1977, prices rose at an average annual rate of 14.4%. This had the 
effect of suppressing the annual real growth of GNP to 7.7% and real per 
capita GNP to 4.8% per annum. 
The Five Year Plan (1976 - 1980) was a continuation of the planned 
development efforts initiated by the Three Year Plan (1973 - 75). Both 
plans aimed at achieving similar long-term objectives and also adopted 
analogous strategies to achieve the selected goals. 
(1) 
The main objectives 
of both plans can be summarised as follows: 
(2) 
(1) Realisation of high growth rates in GNP in real terms with a view of 
raising per capita income levels. 
(1) The discussion of the development: plans excludes the previously 
mentioned Seven Year Plan (1964-1970), which was not implemented 
because of the 1967 war and its aftermath. However, the long-term 
goals adopted by this Plan were similar to those discussed above. 
(2) National Planning Council, Three Year Plan for Economic Development 
(1973-1975), P. 15; and the Five Year Plan for Economic Development 
(19716-1980) P. 26. 
(3) GNP was planned to grow at averages of 8% and 12% in both plans 
respectively. 
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(2) Achievement off sýtructural dhanges in the -Jordaýiian economy in favour 
of the commodity-producing sectors and increasing their relative share 
in GDP at the expense of the service sector. 
(') 
Achievement 6f the highest possible level of employment, development 
of manpower capabilities and increase of productivity. 
(4) A reduction in the trade deficit, expansion and diversification of 
exports, and strengthening of the balance of payments components related 
to factor income from abroad. 
(5) Enhancement of the general budget's dependence oil domestic financial 
resources for the purpose of eliminating dependence oid foreign aid in the 
long-run. 
(6) Distribution of economic activities, public services and ensuing 
gains on a more equitable basis among the different regions of the country. 
To achieve these goalst development planners in Jordan defined certain 
development strategies which -ezere basically similar in both plans. Among 
these strategies, 
(2) 
four are of special relevance here, and have direct 
implications for the role of financial intermediation. The discussion of 
these strategies is necessary for two main reasons: firstly, to analyse 
the main structure and characteristics of the Jordanian economy, Secondly, 
to assess later the contribution of the financial system in facilitating 
and implementing these strategies. 
lepvate consm-otion -and 
GTT. P and (a) Narrowin!! the pan between a! ý7- 
redistributing resources in favour of investment. 
A characteristic feature of the Jordanian economy was the high 
level of private and public consumption which, in most years, exceeded gross 
(1) This was explicitly mentioned as a general objective of the pive Year 
Plan, whereas the Three Year Plan implicitly aimed at restructuring 
the economy by allocating more resources in directly-producing sectors. 
(2) The adopted development strategies include many institutional and 
policy measures covering the economic, social, and educational 
aspects of development, See: Three Year Plan, PP. 16-19; Five Year 
Plan, PP. ZT-31. 
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national income. As shown by Figure 3-1,, aggregate consumption exceeded 
GNP in 10 out of the 14 years between 1959 - 1972. 
(') 
During this period, 
aggregate consumption averaged around 103/1ý of GNP. The private sector 
constituted the major source of consumption, claiming an average of three 
quarters of the total during the whole period, 
(2) 
1-Phile the high level 
of domestic consumption could be partly explained by the so-called 
IldemonstraU: 6n effectO (which is familiar in developing countries), it 
has been recently accentuated by the rising inflationary pressures that 
accompanied the economy. Inflation usually intensifies. coiMimption 
because,, in an environnient of continuous price increases, people seek to 
buy more goods before further anticipated rises in their prices take 
place. At the same time, individuals are usually unwilling to save when 
the value of their savings is being , -continuously undermined by rising 
prices. Such effects were exacerbated,. in the Jordanian case_as people 
received negative real returns on their'financial holdings during the* 
inflationary years,, due to the deliberate adoption of a low interest rate 
policy (to be discussed later). As far as the demonstration effect in 
Jordan was concernedt this was particularly encouraged by the liberal 
commercial policy which left the door wide open to satisfy the increasing 
demand for imported consumer goods. Such a policy was made possible 
because of the considerable inflow of foreign aid idAch played a fundamental 
role in maintaining equilibrium in the Jordanian economy as will be 
demonstrated in detail. 
Thus, one major concern of development planners was to reduce the - 
consumption/GITP gap and direct more resources away from consumption and 
towards capital-. formation,, so, as-ýto-raise-the-rate of growth in income. 
Detailed National Accounts St . atistics are only available since 1959. 
(2) See Appendix 3.1. 
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Such a deliberate shift of emphasis on investment took time to achieve. 
Resource re-allocation was slight during the Three Year Plan, and only 
became noticeable under the 5 yk plan. Table 3.2 illustrates this fact. 
The average ratio of consumption to GNP was planned to reach 101% during 
the first Plan as compared with a corresponding average of 94% during the 
second Plan. These planned rates are compared with actual consumption/GNP 
ratios of 104% during 1955 - 1966, and 102% between 1967 and 1972. At 
the same time, the shift towards investment was noticeable under the 
second Plan which projected capital formation to comprise an average of 
30% of GHP per annum, as compared with an annual planned ratio of 20% 
in the first Plan. * Clearly, the aim here was to redistribute resources 
in favour of investment, so raising the proportion of national income 
going to capital formation, which accounted for an average of 15% during 
the period 1959 - 1972. 
Table 3.2 Actual and Projected Allocation of 
Resources Between Consumption and Investment, 1959 - 1980 
%f (24P 
Actual Planned 
Average Average (1)Three Year Plan (2) Five Year Plan 
1959-66 1967-72. 
I 
I - -v---j- II I 
1973 1974 1975 Averag e 1976 1977 1978 1979 198O. Average 
1 
1973-7 5 1976-80 
Aggregate 
Consump- 104 102 101 101 100 101 100 96 94 91 88 94 
tion 
Gross 
Capital 15 16 21 20 19 20 35 38 32 
_'25 
20 30 
Forma- 
tion 
I 
Expendi- 
ture on 119 118 122 121 119 121 135 134 126 116 108 124 
consump- 
tion & 
invest- 
ment 
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The encouravement of and further reliance on the private 
sector as a najor source of financing development e)menditures. 
Jordan has a mixed economy wherein both the private and the public 
sectors are participants in the development process, but with some two 
thirds of total capital formation being undertaken and financed by the 
former sector during the period 1959 - 1972 
(Table 3.3). One basic 
assumption made in both plans was that the private sector should continue 
tolrespond to development efforts and assume an important role in 
attaining the set development objectives. Public investments were placed 
in areas and projects which could encourage and help to create profitable 
investment opportunit'les,, which the private sector, it was hopedo would 
be attracted to. The table shows that public investment wasý heavy 
during the first two years of the Three Year Plan, forming 60, "b' and 5VIo 
of total capital expenditures. ý This could be explained by the government 
intention to revitalize economic activity and encourage private investment 
after the recession of the 1970. 
(') 
The private sector was expected to 
gradually increaseýits contribution to development expenditures to 50/", 
', 
of the total by the third year of the Plan. On the other handq the Five 
Year Plan further stressed the role of the private sector which was 
planned to provide half of the JD 765 million allocated for investment 
during the Plan's period. The private sector in both plans was expected 
to continue to, play an active-and ever-increasing role in domestic 
activities, thus representing the largest source of development finance 
in the longýterm period. 
(C) Incr6aýinp the reliance on domestic, rather than foreigml 
sources for financinr economic development. 
(1) National Planning Council, Three Year Plan, OP-cit. P-34 
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Jordan is an open economy whose economic activities depend 
largely on the inflow of foreign resources. Aggregate demand in Jordan 
has always exceeded total domestic resources and the Cap has had to be 
filled by a considerable inflow of foreign aid and, to some extent, by 
net factor income from abroad. 
(') 
Poreign finance has therefore been 
essential to maintain equilibr-ium, in the Jordanian economy where, as 
sho,,,, n earlier, aggregate expenditures on both consumption and investment 
comprised, on average, llet of GNP during 1959 - 1972. 
(2) 
'Foreign aid 
has been given in the form of budget support (mainly from Arab Oil- 
Producing Countries(3)) to help meeting current expenditures. 
(4) 
As 
Table 3.4 illustrates, there has been a noticeable imbalance between 
goverment current revenue and current expenditurei as domestic sources 
of revenues covered, on average, only 6Wo of total current expenditures. 
However, whenever foreign aid exceeded any deficit balance between 
current domestic revenues and expenditures,, the resultant surplus on 
current account was allocated to finance public investment. 
(5) 
The 
(1) Jordan is characterised by a chronic trade deficit since exports lag 
substantially behind imports. The magnitude of this deficit is evident 
by observing the high ratio of net imports to GITP which averaged around 
27ý during 1959-1972. Net imports constitute resources made available 
to the economy in excess of -ýLat was produced within the economy itself, 
This was mainly financed by foreign aid and net factor income from 
abroad (largely remittances from Jordanians working overseas) which 
respectively comprised 15ý and 65 of GITP during the same period. See 
Appendixes 3.1 & 3.2 
(2) See Table 3.2 
(3) ? oreign aid received from Arab Oil-Producin- Countries comprised,, on 
average, about two thirds of the total inflow of aid during 1970-1977, 
whereas the U. S. A. contributed to the remaining percentage (see Central 
Bank of Jordan's monthly bulletins). However, the ýxab aid emerged 
as the predominant ele-ment after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the 
"overnments as agreed consequent, financial support received from Arab G 
upon in the Khartoum Arab Summit in that Year. 
(4) According to the definition of the Jordanian Dept. of Statistics, 
foreign aid is considered part of current government receipts. 
(5) This -was the case in 12 out of the 14 years between 1959-1972. 
(See Appendix 3.2) 
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significance of foreign aid can be gauged by the high ratio of aid 
received to gross govern ent savings, which averaged around 436, Irf, during 
1959 - 1972. Clearly, without foreign aid, government savings would certainly 
be negative, and the government would find it e-#remely difficult to 
allocate resources for development. 
As indicated earlier, one major objective of development programmes 
was to encourage the general budget dependence on domestic financial 
sources for the purpose of eliminating dependence on foreign aid in the 
long-term period. For this purpose, the Three Year Plwr required - 
improvements in tax collection techniques, more appropriate rent 
assessment and the imposition of new taxes (such as the inheritance and 
capital gains taxes). 
(1) 
This would have the effect of increasing the 
relative importance of domestic sources from an average ratio of 53.3% 
of total current revenue during 1959-1972 to 57.8r- during the Plan's 
pe3ýiod 1973 - 1975. The Five Year Plan required a fi=ther-increase 
in 
the relative importance of domestic revenue, which was envisaged to 
comprise an average of 70.5,1, 'o between 1976 - 1980. During this period, 
it is intended to reduce dependence on foreign aid to an average of 
29.5% of total current revenue as compared with 42. Z, 4, under the previous 
plan (1973-1975). These figures were compared with an actual ratio of 
46.7/'f- which was experienced between 1959-1972 ( See Figure 3.2). 
Moreover, development programmes reveal a noticeable reliance on 
other domestic sources of financing development. 
(2) 
As demonstrated by 
table 3.5. domestic public sector intermediation was envisaged to rise 
from an average of 55.3% of total public investnent under the Three Year 
Plan to 60.3% under the Five Year Plan, as agains't an average of only 
26.6ro during the period 1959 - 1972. This is an aggregate of three 
(1) National Planning Council, Three Year Plan, OP-cit. P. 26 
(2) ilowever, despite the importance attached to domestic sources of 
financing public investment, foreign loans and economic and technical 
assistance from abroad were also significant in financing government 
capital formation. See Table 3.5 
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domestic channels through -kbich the goverment hopes to transfer resources 
for development purposes- 
(1) Goverment bonds were planned to provide funds capable of 
6r financing 2 ý, of public investment under the Three Year Plan and 20ol, 
under the Five Year Plan. These were compared with a corresponding 
figure of only 7. Vo during 1967 1972. 
(') 
(2) Borrowing from the banking system, either directly or through 
issuing treasuxy bills, was projected to finance 20. elo of public investment 
during 1973 - 1975, whereas this was reduced to 9.2! /1*' during 1976. - 1980. 
N-Finally, intermediation by the public sector through transferr- 
ing resources to the private sector for investment purposes was very 
important under the Five Year Plan, comprising 31 % of public capital 
expenditures. This wa. s compared with a projected average of 7.3% under 
the-Three Year Plan and an actual average of 9.9/1',, during 1959 1972. 
On the private sector's side, domestic savings were the main source 
for financing private investment throughout the period under review, as 
the same table shows. This source, however, experienced a relative 
decline under the Five Year Plan due to a noticeable rise in other 
sources of finance. During the period of the Plan, loans and grants 
from the government were envisaged to form, on average, 315 of private 
investment (compared to 7-eP under the earlier Three Year Plan and 6. lpcf 
during 1959 - 1966), whereas foreign sources were projected to finance 
19. e/i, (compared to 995% and 3. elo during the two previous periods 
respectively). On the whole, however, total resources available for 
investment in the private sector were in excess of expenditures on real 
investment, thus directing the surpluses towards financial asset holdings. 
(2) 
(1) Domestic borrowing was non-existent during 1959 - 1966. 
(2) Except for the period 1959 - 1966 uhere the private sector 
financed an average of 17.6i'of of total investment by drawing 
from its financial asset holdings. 
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(d) The diversification of the industrial structwe of the economy 
and reducing its dependence on services. 
The Jordanian econowil unusually, was ver7 largely service-oriented. 
The services sector constituted, on average, some 65% of GDP throughout 
the 1959-1972 period, and employed more than 601'- of the total labour 
(I )- 
force. Development Planners realised that these percentages were 
excessive, especially as compared with other countries at similar stages 
of development, where the comparative GDP figures are not mcre than W/o 
and the employment figures range between 15% and 25%. 
(2) 
To correct this structural bias in the Jordanian econozy,, both 
development plans emphasised the necessity of diversifying and strength- 
ening other domestic activities by concentrating on the commodity- 
producing sectors. To this end, the Three Year Plan required an annual 
average growth rate in these sectors of 9.9/'L, with a lower services'sector 
annual average growth rate of 6.95. This would have had the effect, as 
Table 3.6 reveals, of increasing the relative importance of the commodity- 
producing sectors from 36.2% in 1973 to 37.6% by the year 1975. Most 
of this increase was planned to come about in the manufacturing sector 
which was expected to grow in relative'importance from 11.4% to 13. Vlo 
during the Plan's period. However, the Five Year Plan shifted further 
towards industrialisation by allocating A% of total Plants investment 
in the manufacturing sector, as compared with only 14% under the previous 
Plan. This would encourage the manufacturing sector-to develop at an 
average rate of 26.2% per annum, thus increasing its relative GDP 
importance from 19.9%, in 1976 to 28.3% by 1980. As a result,, the 
commodity-producing sectcrs would increase their relative contribution 
to GDP from 38-%'fo to 44.1% during the Plan's period,, thus, reaucing 
the relative share of the services sector from 61.1% to 55.5F/lo. 
r- 
(1) National Planning Council, Five Year Plan, OP-cit. P. 22. 
(2) Ibid. 
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I-lost of the decrease in the later sector would occur in the wholesale 
and retail trade sector, which was expected to decline in relative 
importance from 17. ec to 15. V,, during the Plan's period, as can be seen 
by Figure 3.3. These planned figures clearly revealed the shift in 
economic policy towards industrialisation which was adopted as one 
Im strategy to achieve the selected development goals. 
Having discussed the main Jordanian development strategies, their 
implications for domestic financial intermediation must be-discussed 
together with the role assigned to , financial institutions in the achieve- 
ment of the development goals set for the economy. 
The above development strategies have clear implications for the 
role of financial institutions. Firstly, a proper allocation of 
resources available for these institutions would greatly help in narrowing 
the gap between aggregate consumption and WILD, thus channelling further 
resources to finance investment. The Five Year Plan asked the commercial 
banýs. to reduce consumer credits, requiring the Central Bank to apply strict 
measures for this purpose. 
(1) 
Secondly, the large size of, and the 
significance attached to, the private sector in economic activity enable 
domestic financial intermediaries to participate effectively in carrying 
out and facilitating the saving-investment process. According to the Five- 
Year Plan, the financial system was expected to extend, sufficient credit 
to finance the large private investment envisaged by the Plan. 
(2) 
Thirdly, 
increasing reliance on domestic source's for financing develo-Ment implies 
an increased need for financial intermediation to promote Crowth. "In 
additio'n-to inst 
I ituti onalising th e pri 
, 
vate 
, 
se 
; 
ct 
-o- 
r's savinesp which, were 
shown to constitute the major source for financing private investment, the 
financial wistem was also relied upon to finance part of public investment. 
(1) National Planning Council, Tive Year Plan, OP-cit. P-72 
(2) Ibid, P. 69 
62 
C: ) 
Co 
ts% 
«a 
t-, «ty u 
CL 
16- 
cu 
0 
c 
0 C--. 
ß_ 
--0- :3 t- (D > CO 
0 
M 
0 ci 
w 0 
Z 0 
u 
0 
ß_ 
CL 
CD C» 
c 
Co 
(0 -0- 
>% od t- 
«a c7) (n 
(D Ty 0 «5 u (IB 10 (1) 
En 
v- 
X 
. - u E 
E 
(A -2 :1 E 
C» 0 
0 
0 3: E UD «cl %0- 
9.0 ti a: 
r4 NO 
4.0 
(7) 
UD (D C: ) C: ) En 
0/0 LL 
63 
It was --tio-6-n that domestic borrowing, eit]-er direct from the bankine 
system or through issuing treasury bills.. and government bonds, gained 
an increasing importance during the period under study. Finally, as the 
central concern of economic policy shifted towards restructuring the economy 
by ccncentrating bn industrialisation, the financial system was expected 
to facilitate this strategy, by allocating resources in a way conducive 
to the required structural changes. Both Plans required commercial banks 
to adjust the sectoral distribution of their credit in accordance with 
the new direction of policy trend, and the Central Bank in particular 
was required to ensure such a change. 
(') 
Subsequently, the Five Year Plan 
further embhasised the role that should be played by specialised credit 
(2) 
institutions to induce the above structural shift in the economy. 
Although both the Threa Year PlaarL and the Five Year Plan stressed 
the significance of financial institutions in the development process, 
(3) 
the former was, however, less specific in defining the ways and methods 
by which these institutions can help in attaining the selected objeýctives. 
Their role was -enerally prescribed under the Three Year Plan, with 
emphasis being placed on financing the development expenditures of the 
eovernment. The Plan also recommended the establishment of some 
specialised institutions that were deemed necessary for economic develop- 
ment; 
(4) 
the adoption of certain policies that encourage the flow of 
financial resources towards development (in particular, the Central Bank 
was required to exercise qualitative credit control over bank credit and 
stop paying interest on bank deposits maintained with the Central Bank). 
(1) Three Year Plan, P. 46 and Five Year Plan, P. 72 
(2) Five Year Plan, P. 72 
(3) Three Year Plan, PP. 44-46; Five Year Plan, PP. 65-72 
(4) As will be showm in detail in Part C, the Plan asked for the 
creation of a government pension fund, a housing bank, and also 
required the Central Bank to study the possibility of setting up 
a domestic stock exchange. 
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was 
The latter measure/intended to increase goveryment revenues and also 
to induce banks to seek alternative outlets for their funds. 
The 7-ive Year Plan was much more specific in defining the develop- 
mental role of the financial system. It first outlined the major 
operational deficiencies that were seen discouraging to development. Then, 
secondly, a set of goals were definei to be implemented by the financial 
system during the ': Ilan's period. To achieve these goals, the Plan, 
finally, recommended the adoption of certain measures relating to the 
activiiies of different types of financial institutions. Such measures 
and policies, and their effect on development, will be revealed in the 
following chapters when the role of each type of institution is discussed 
in detail. 
ii 
Development of Domestic Financial Intermediation Between 1955-1977 
As was shown in Chapter 1, the 7,12/GNP ratio can be used as an 
appropriate method for measuring financial intermediation and the degree 
of financial development attained by developing countries. 
(') 
It was 
argued there that although this measure reveals only the intermediation 
of the banking system and does not, therefore, reflect the whole 
intermediation by different financial institutions, its adoption seems 
suitable for developing countries where the banking sector accounts for 
the bulk of the financial assets. 
As is the predomingnt case in developing countries, the non-bank 
financial sector in Jordan was still of little significance in the overall 
financial structure. Table 3.7 reveals the structure of the Jordanian 
financial system and the relative importance of each type Of intermediary--,, 
as measured by asset holdings. The total assets held by the specialised 
sector as of December 31,1977 comprised only 16.4ýo of the total assets 
held by the entire financial system. This sector constituted nine 
intermediaries specialising in different areas and activities, which 
(1) See Chapter I, PP. 13 - 14 
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distinguished them frcm the ordinary commercial banks(, 
Af-these, 
six 
operated as sPecialised credit agencies for financing and promoting 
certain sectors of the economy. Their relative weight in the entire 
financial system accounted for 135. Predominant among these institutions 
was the Housing Bank which claimed alone 6. elo of the total assets held 
by the financial system, i. e. about equal to the share of the other 
five credit institutions taking tooether. The remaining non-bank 
financial internediarie3 performed three different specialised activities 
carried out by the Post Office Savings Fund and contractual savings 
institutions (insurance comDanies and the Pension Fund). The operations 
of these institutions were still of minor importance, with their relative 
share in total asset holdings constituting only 3.4/ý. Noreover, not only 
were the non-bank financial intermediaries of s=all importance in the 
country's financial structure, but many of these institutions were of 
recent inception, such as the-Housing Bank, the post office Savings 
Fund, and the Pension Fund. However, the settingý-up of these institutions 
added. to the significance of the non-bank financial sector as shown by 
the table. 
The table also demonstrates the predominance of the banking sector 
in the country's financial structure, its relative asset share comprising 
some 83.6% of 
'total asset holdings. Commercial banks represented 45. 
eP, 
whereas the re-maining percentage of 38.2, ýfj comprised the relative asset 
share of the Central Bank of Jordan. -Commercial banks, were the " 
first 
financial instituions to operate in the country their existence dated 
(2) 
back to 1925, vhen the Ottoman Bank started business in Jordan. The 
Central Bank of Jordan, on the other hand, was created in 1964 to 
supersede the previously operating Jordan Currency Board. 
(1) ', Differences beh%Teen ordinary banks and specialisedý financial 
institutions will be discussed in Part C of this thesis. See Pp. 207 - 210 
(2) Por further details of the early evolution of the comercial banks in 
Jordan, see ^. hapter 2, p. 25 
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Table 3.7 Relative Importance of Different 
Types of Financial Institutions in Jordan as 
of December-31.1977 
Type of Institution Year of Assets % of the Total 
Establishment (JD million) Assets of the 
Financial 
System 
A. Banking S Stem r 1 676-74 83.6 I I plus 2 
1. Commercial Banks From 1925 367-39 45.4 
2. Central Bank of Jordan 1964 309-35 38,2 
B. Speciali3ed Credit 105-49 13.0 Institutions (3 through 8) 
3. Municipal & Village Loans 1957 10.57 1.3 Fund 
4. Agricultural-Credit Corp. 1960 11-34 1.4. 
5. Industrial Development Bank 1965 12.13 1.5 
6. Housing Corporation 1965 11.63 1.4 
7. Jordan Co-op. Organisation 1 %8 4.74 o. 6 
8. Housing Bank 1974 55-08 6.8 
C. Other Non-Bank Financial 27.62 3.4 Institutions (9 through 11) 
9. Post Office Savings Fund 1974 1.29 0.2 
10. Insurance Companies From 1951* 10.74ý* 1.3 
11. Pension Fund 1976 15-59 1.9 
D. Total Non-Bank Financial 
133-11 16.4 Sector (B plus C) 
E. Total Financial System 809.85 100.0 (A plus D) 
- I 
Source: (1) Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin (March, 79) 
(2) The above non-bank Financial Institutions, Annual Reports. 
As is shown in Chapter 9. Jordan lacks adequate published statistics and 
information pertaining to the insurance sector. The above year was related 
to the establishment of the first Jordanian compaziy for which statistics 
were obtainable; although branches of foreign companies definitely operated 
in the country before this year. 
Due to the absence of a combined balance sheet covering the insurance 
sector, the above figure of the assets held by insurance companies of JD 
10.74 million is an estimated one and should be, therefore, taken with 
reservation. It was based on an estimation that the largest three 
insurance companies, for which statistics were obtained, comprised 8V/- 
of the insurance industry in Jordan. (See Chapter 9, footnote 1 P. 296) 
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Given the above predominance of the banking system in the 
country's financial structure, the adoption of the Vj2/GNP ratio seems 
to be appropriate for measuring domestic financial intermediation and 
the degree of financial development attained by Jordan. The financial 
intermediation ratio (or the financial development ratio) as measured by 
the size of money and quasi money to GITP can be used as a broad index 
of the extent to which the Jordanian financial system penetrates in the 
real economy. The small relative weight of the non-bank financial sector 
means that this sector represents only a relatively small part of the 
entire flow of saving to investment that takes place through the 
financial system. 11oreover, the YT2 figures which are included in the 
above ratio cover not only the money and quasi money held by the commercial 
banks and the Central Bank, but also that of the largest specialised 
credit institution represented by the Housing Bank. Since the latter 
institution is, unlike other specialised institutions, active in deposit 
mobilisation as will be shown in Chapter 8, its deposits are taken into 
consideration when dalculating the size of the Jordanian 1112. This 
situation further adds to the validity of using the 1.12/GNP as. an approp- 
riate broad measure for financial intermediation in Jordan, since the 
relative importance of the financial institutions whose operations are 
reflected in this ratio is increased from 83.6% to 90.401'o of the entire 
financial system, 
O) 
Despite this, however, one should take the above 
ratio as a crude measure because it does not cover the whole intermediation 
by the financial system. 
(2) 
i. e. ky adding the relative share of the Housing Bank to that of the 
banking system. See Table 3.7 
(2) Although Goldsmith's financial interrelations ratio (total financial 
assets *7 national wealth) is more representative of the intermediation 
carried out by the entire financial system, its adoption is difficult 
in Jordan because of the lack of the required statistics, especially 
those related to the insurance companies. (For more details of the 
alternative measures for financial development, see Chapter 1. pp. 10-14). 
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Taking 1,12/GN. P as an indicator, Jordan experienced a notable and 
steady progress in domestic financial intermediation throughout the 
period 1955 - 1977. During this period, the ratio rose frcm 45. 
WP to 
71.9,51% thus reflecting an increasing degree of penetration of the 
financial system into the real economy. Table 3.8 reveals that the 
financial intermediation ratio grew steadily during the three distinct 
phases of economic development, rising from an average of only 34.7ro- 
during 1955 -1966 to 57. 
e/c. and 71-31,? ý during 1967 - 1972 and 1973 - 1977 
respectively. -he relatively small ratio of 112/GNP during the first 
period reflected a lower financialýpathýthat the economy experienced 
during early years of independence. Prior to 1964, the financial system 
was comparatively underdeveloped under the Currency Board system which 
had little impact on diversifying financial institutions and encouraging 
their contribution to development. With the establishment of the Central 
Bank in 1964 and the consequent diversification and promotion of domestic 
financial institutions, the latter's involvement in various economic 
activities increased noticeablyp as reflected in thelsteady rise in the 
financial intermediation ratio during the last two periods. 
The movemEnt in the above ratio throughout the whole period is 
consistent wit-Ii the theoretical explanation stated earlier of the general 
increasing importance that the financial development takes as the economy 
undergoes development. 
( 
The steady rise in 1.12/GY-P meant that, as, 
generally experienced in other countries during the course of economic 
development, Jordanian financial assets grew more rapidly than the 
growth in real output. 
(2) 
This-can be explained by the monetization 
(1) See Chapter 1, P. 11 
(2) This implied that inccme velocity of money (which is the inverse of 
money income ratio) declined gradually during the same period. Table 
3.8 reveals this fact, showing that the velocit y of money ýrelated to 
the narrow and broad definition of the money supply) exhibited a 
declining trend throughout the whole -period. This is consistent with 
the general behaviour of this ratio in a developing economyr which 
can be largely related to the monetization arounent as discussed above. 
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argument and the income effect which both lead to higher groi-Ah rates in 
monetary and financial assets as compared with the increase in real 
production. On the one hand, the rapid monetization of the subsistence 
sectors of the economy and the replacement of financial liabilities for 
commodity money led to higher financial -rowth as compared with the 
increase in GYP. On the other hand, the rise in the real per capita 
income durin,, & the course of economic development worked to increase the 
demarxi for financial assets in relation to real output. 
The steady rise in the 1,12, /(RTP ratio during the course of Jordan's 
.,, -est 
that growth in t1lie real sector was economic development would sugg 
accompanied and facilitated, by a parallel development in the 
fi-nancial sector. The relationship between financial and real development 
and the extent to which both were connected will be revealed in the next 
section of this chapter. lvýhat is necessary here is to examine the degree 
of financial development attained by Jordan, and how this can be compared 
with the exr)erience of other countries. 
Judged by the M2/GNIP ratio, Jordan has attained a high level of 
financial development ýdiich was favourably compared with developing as 
well as developed countries. Table 3.9 reveals financial data pertaining 
to 25 countries classified in order according to the degree of financial 
development attained by each country. Among these countries, Jordan came 
seventh in achieving a high level of financial development, with the 
ratio of 1, T2/G-,. T". o reaching 71-Zo by 1977. Switzerland attained the highest 
financial development ratio (116. e,:: ), whereas Chile experienced the 
lo'west ratio of only 14.0, ", '. The high level of the Jordanian 142/0? 
ratio meant a hiý: h degree of financial development attained by Jordan, 
which was much higher than what was experienced in most of the developing 
countries, and even as compared with many developed countries included 
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Table 3.9 Monetary/Income Ratios and CoM22sition o-f 
-Total Liquidity in Selected Countries (1977) 
O'k 
monetary/ Income Ratios Total Liquidity (M2) 
Country 
M2/GNP (M2-CC), dNP Quasi Mone 
GN CC DD 
I 
Ml 
I 
- ; M2 Rank Rank Rank Q 
Switzerland 116.4 1 102-3 1 75.6 1 11.8 23.2 35-0 65-0 100-0 
Austria 10119 2 90.0 2 75.4 2 11-7 14-3 26.0 74. o 100.0 
Portugal 94-5 3 76-5 4 46-5 7 19-0 31.8 50.8 49.2 100.0 
Japan 85.4 4 77.8 3 52.4 5 8.8 29.8 38.6 61.4 100.0 
Spain 84.8 5 76.0 5 52.6 4 lo. 4 27-5 37-9 62.1 100.0 
Cyprus 78-3 6 68.1 6 57.4 3 13-0 13.6 26.6 73.4 100.0 
Jordan 71-5 7 40.8 16 20.1 19 42.9 28.9 71.8 28.2 100.0 
Germany 65-0 8 59.2 7 48*5 6 8-7 16*7 25.4 74.4 100.0 
Greece 63.4 9 49.8 9 44-5 8 21-3 8-5 29.8 70.2 100.0 
Singapore 62.5 10 48-3 11 34.4 12 22.8 22.1 44.9 55-1 100.0 
Egypt 59.6 11 34-3 18 18.0 20 40.9 28. o 68.9 31-1 100.0 
Norway 58.6 32 50-3 8 39-3 9 14-3 18-7 33-0 67-0 100.0 
Netherlands 
. 
56.1 13 49.6 10 34-5 11 11-5 27.2 38-7 61-3 100-0 
France 53.4 14 46.8 12 25.6 16 12.2 39.7 51.9 48.1 100.0 
Malaysia 48.4 15 38.7 17 29.0 14 20.0 20.0 40.0 60.0 100.0 
U. S. A. 46-3 16 41.6 13 28.1 15 10-3 28-9 39.2 6o. 8 100.0 
Canada 45.2 17 41.4 15 31.9 13 8.4 21.1 29.5 70-5 100.0 
Finland 44.1 18 41.5 14 35.6 10 5.8 13-5 19-3 8o-7 100.0 
Tunisia 41-3 19 31-3 19 14.1 21 24-3 41.4 65-7 34-3 100.0 
Sweden 35.7 20 28.4 21 25.4 17 20.0 8.8 28.8 71*2 100.0 
Iran 35.6 21 30-9 20 20.2 18 13.2 29.9 43.1 56.9 100.0 
Turkey 30.8 22 23-1 22 4.9 24 25-0 59.1 84.1 15.9 100.0 
Philippines 21.7 23 17.1 23 11.8 22 21.2 24.2 45.4 54.6 100.0 
Peru 21.6 24 15-5 24 3-9 25 27-9 54.0 81.9 18.1 100.0 
Chile 14.0 25 11.2 25 1 8.4 23 EO. 0 20.0 40.0 60.0 100.0 
Source: IMF, IFS (November 1978) 
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in the sample. 
(') 
Such a high level of domestic financial intermediation 
could be a reflection of a high propensity of Jordanians to hold a large 
proportion of their assets in financial forms. It could be also related 
to the very success of the financial system in institutionalising domestic 
savings. 
However, the above interpretations should be made with some reserva- 
tion. 
(2) 
A close examination of the structure of the Jordanian money 
supply seems to, somehow, change the above picture. Table 3.9 shows 
that a considerable proportion of Jordanian 1,12 (accounting for 42.9/'of by 
1977) was in the form of currency in circulation which were kept idle 
outside the financial system. Among all the countries included in the 
sample, Jordan experienced the highest ratio of currency in circulation 
to money supply. Such immobilised funds were included within the 
financial as3ets in measuring the degree of financial intermediation and 
development attained by different countries. However, a high elenent 
of currency in the money supply structure is usually an indication of 
(1) The Jordanian financial intermediation ratio was also favourably 
compared with a sample of developing and developed countries included 
in a recent study of Ronald 1-1cKinnon in 1979. - In eight of "semi- 
industrial" developing countries, the 1,12/GITP ratio was found to 
account for 25/19 during the period 1960 - 1975, whereas the same 
ratio in five selected industrial countries averaged around 60ro. 
See: Ronald McKinnon, Financial Repression and the Liberalisation 
Problem within less 'ýevelo2ed Countries (First International Conference on the Financial DeveloTment of Latin --tuerica and 
the 
Caribbean: Feb. 26th to 28th, 19791 PP. 7-9 
(2) One should accept with caution the ratio of 1ý2/GNp as a measure 
for financial development in developed countries. !; hile this method 
is generally suitable for developing countries, where the banking 
sector occupies the dominant share in the financial sector, this is 
not the usua case in developed countries in which the I-T2 constitutes 
only part of a large range of finazzicial assets which should be all 
considered in measuring financial intermediation and development. 
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underdevelopment of the financial system and its inability to institution- 
alise domestic savings. Thus, if the currency element were to be excluded: 
from the T, 12/GTP measure, a more meaningful comparison of financial develop- 
ment can be obtained. Considering (112-CC)/GLrP as an indicator,, Jordan 
showed a much lower degree of financial development as compared with the 
same group of countries included in the sample. This accounted for 40. Wo 
compared to the previous 1,12/01P ratio of 71.5, co, thus dropping Jordan's 
rank along the financial development ladder from the 7th to the 16th. 
The comparative table made it clear that when the currency element was 
excluded, all developed countries surpassed Jordan in the degree of 
financial development attained. Despite this,, howeverg, the level of 
financial development, measured by the modified ratio, was still favourably 
compared with other developing countries. 
Lhe comparatively high relative weight of the currency element in I 
Jordanian I-T2 needs explanation. In addition to the prevalence of an 
underdeveloped banking habit, especially in rural areas, the above 
situation can be partly related to domestic political instability which 
further accentuated the public's desire to hold their assets in readily 
available fo: rms of savings represented in cash. During the fir3t phase 
of development (1955 - 66), a comparative degree of political stability 
helped to encourage the development of the banking habit, thus reducing 
the percentage of currency in total 1.12 from 54. fo, in 1955 to 40-0/oo by 
1966. However, the great deal of political unrest experienced in the 
second phase of development (1967-1972) worked to reverse the previous 
declining trend of currency/X2. Following the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, 
the ratio in this year rose to 54.8ý,,. T'he ratio reached its peak of 63. eP 
in 1970 when fi&%ting broke out between the Jordanian army and the 
Palestinian liberation or,, oanisations. - Finally, the relative degree of, 
political stabilitj prevailed in the last phase of development (1973- 
1977) helped the ratio to resume its decline as experienced before 1967. 
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During the last period, the ratio declined gradually to reach 42.91"of by 
1977 - still higher than the 1966 level. One main reason of the continued 
high demand for currency is the use of the Jordanian Dinar as a reserve 
asset in the West Bank of Jordan after the 1967 'Var. Given the relatively 
stable value of the Dinar as compared with the Israeli Lira, which has 
been frequently devaluated, Nest Bank's Palestinians always showed a 
strong desire to hold the Jordanian currency, rather than the Israelils.. 
as an asset to hold. The outflow of the Jordanian Dinar into the Uest 
Bank was estimated to form about one third of the total currency outside 
the banking system. 
(') 
Another characteristic feature of the structure of domestic liquidity 
in Jordan (i. e. X2) was the noticeably small relative importance of 
quasi money, which comprised only 28.2,1'fo by 1977, This ratio was very low 
especially uhen compared to both developed as well as developing countries 
included in the sample. As a proportion of total domestic liquidityr 
quasi money constituted, on average, about two thirds in developed 
countries, and around one half in developing countries. Only in two 
countries contained in the sample, Turkey and 'Peru, was the quasi money 
ratio lower than that experienced in Jordan (the ratios being 15-95, 
and 18.1% respectively). The very low level of quasi money in Jordan 
reflected the high desire of Jordanians to hold very liquid assets in their 
portfolio; it also meant that the financial syitem was not successful 
in lengthening the maturity of deposits offered to the public. The 
special structure of 11.2 in Jordan is shoun in Figure 3.4 which clearly 
reveals the noticeable high element of currency and the very small 
proportion of quasi money during the period 1955 - 1977. As percentages 
of M2 during this period,, the components of, currency, demand deposits,, 
DIF, Jordan - Recent 7conomic Development (Feb. 6,1978) P. 28 
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and quasi money accounted for 51.8%, 28.0%, and 20.2% respectively. 
This situation has a special implication for the country's economic 
development because the longer the maturity of the financial assets the 
larger the ability of utilising such assets for financing development. 
This is empirically shown in the next section in which currency in 
circulation is found to be of little significance for Jordan's economic 
development, whereas quasi money is found to be significantly and highly 
correlated to real growth. This situation must also call the attention 
of the monetary authoritiesto provide means and create conditions 
conducive to the structural change in domestic liquidity in favour of 
quasi money, as will be discussed in Chapter 11. 
In studying financial development in Jordan, one final point needs 
illustration. That is, the financial intermediation ratio continued its 
upward trend even during the last phase of development (73-77), which 
experienced high inflationary pressures. Despite a high annual rate of 
inflation averaging 14.4%, the growth of M2 continued to outpace the 
increase in output, indicating that Jordanians exhibited a noticeably 
high tendency to hold financial assets even when such assets depreciated 
sharply in real values because of-inflation. The adoption of a low 
and comparatively stable interest rate policy throughout the whole period 
further depressed the real return on holding bank deposits into negative 
levels in recent inflationary years. Table 3.10 illustrates that the 
average nominal interest rate on bank deposits increased slightly through- 
out the whole period, rising from 4.0% during 55-66 to 4.2% and 5.2% 
during 1967-72 and 73-77 respectively. Due to relatively stable prices 
prevailing during the first phase of development (inflation rate averaging 
only 1.4% per annum), deposits yielded an average annual Positive return 
of 2.6%. The continued adoption of a low interest rate Policy during 
the second phase of development, which experienced a mild inflation 
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(annual rise in prices of 4-95), naturally lowered the real return on 
holding deposit3 to a negative average of Although nominal rates 
Table 3.10 No-minal and Real 'Rate of Interest On 
Pank De-nosits, 1955 - 1977 
(%) 
Average Rate of Nominal interest rate Real Return on 712, IGITP Quasi 
Inflation on bank deposits bank deposits 1-Toney/ 
(1 (2) (3 =2- 1) GITP 
1955-66 1.4 4.0 2.6 34.7 6.5 
1967-72 4.9 4.2 -o. 7 57.2 10.5 
1973-77 14.4 5.2 -9.2 71.3 1 
15.7 
Source: Chapter 11, Table 11.1t 
- 
P. 352 
of interest were slightly increased by an average of during the laot 
period 1973 - 1977, the noticeably high rate of inflation, averaging 
14X: ý per annum, led to a considerable reduction in the real yield of 
deposits, w1hich declined to a negative level of -9.2,1,4o. Howeverv despite 
such a hiCh cost in holdin, -- deposits, Joraanians continued to exhibit 
an increasing tendency to hold such assets in their -portfolio, as 
reflected in the rising ratio of T. T2/TTP (and also by the steady rise in 
quasi money/G. T. 1 as shown by the table). 
In conditions of relative price stability, individuals usually 
tend to distribute their savings among financial and rhysical assets, 
guided largely by the net profitability of each type. In inflationary I 
environments, the risinC prices work. to reduce the real value of money 
and other financial holdings as compared -with physical assets w'hose 
value naturally rises with price inflation. 'he fall in the real value 
of the financial assets is a tax on their holders whose savings are 
virtually under-mined by inflation. To avoid, or at least to reduce 
this tax, people seek to change the Composition of their investnent by 
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shifting away from financial holdings and towards physical assets. 
(') 
This was what ha-, )pened in many Latin Arerican countries, such as 
Argentina, rrazil, and Chile, which experienced a financial decline 
(IIZ/G-", P decreasing) during the 19601's; people abandoned their financial 
holdings which increasingly yielded negative return because of strong 
inflationary pressures. 
(2) 
However, this was not the case in Jordan 
where financial development continued its ujrjard trend during the last 
inflationary period as discussed earlier. 
(3) 
The Jordanian experience 
was not, however, unique since similar experiences have occurred in many 
developed and developing countries where people continued to increase 
their financial holdings even when such assets yielded negative return 
in real terms. 
(4) 
The question remains as to why Jordanians, despite 
the considerable opportunity cost involved in financial holdings in recent 
inflationary years, have continued to increasingly acquire this type of 
asset in their portfolio investment. Such behaviour can be explained 
by the followlno- three possible reasons: - C, 
(1) For further details of the effect of inflation on asset portfolio 
behaviour, see : Graem. e Dorrance, 1117he effect of inflation on 
economic development", T7_TF Staff Parers (March 1963) P. 3 
(2) Ronald McKinnon, Voney and Capital in 7cononic Develo-nnent, op. cit. P. 101 
5) Although there was a clear shift towards physical investments as 
will be revealed later, financial development (reflected in the 1.12,1 
GITP ratio) showed a rising trend throughout 73-77. 
(4) This was, for example, the case in the U. Y., Japan, and India 
during the period 1965 - 1969. See Anand Chandavarkar, "Some Aspects of Interest Rates Policies in Less Developed Countries", 
ITT, " Staff Paoers. (March 1971)%P. 67. 
79 
(a) Inflation is only a comparatively recent phenomenon in the 
Jordanian economy, an economy which has been used to a long period of 
price stability. Jordanians have not yet adapted the composition of 
their portfolio balances to appropriately avoid the liquidity cost 
resulting from high rates of inflation. Consequently, people might 
have been still deluded by the sharp rises in their nominal incomes, 
which encouraged them to accumulate further resources in financial form. 
(b) As prices rose, people might have consciously felt the need to 
increase their cash balances in order to retain the same purchasing power 
of their savings. 
(c) A high liquidity preference and a noticeable risk-aversion on 
the part of many investors led them to accumulate further resources in 
financial forms, despite their knowledge of the considerable depreciating 
value of such assets. The element of uncertainty accompanying inflation 
and the disadvantages of illiquidity attached to long-term fixed invest- 
ment (including industrial activities) worked together to discourage the 
already hesitant public to invest in such avenues. The reluctance of 
this type of investor was particularly accentuated by the previous period 
of political instability which made their outlook for the future of 
long-term industrial concerns more obscure. In such unforeseen circum- 
stances, many investors preferred to invest their savings in continuously 
depreciating financial assets, rather than risking their investment in 
other unsecured forms. 
money illusion is defined as observing monetary magnitude (eg. money 
income) without considering changes in the price level. In the 
above context, money illusion means treatment of nominal interest 
rates as real rates. See Peera, Nurali, "Interest Rates: Illusion 
or Reality", National Westminster Bank, Quarterly Review (May 
1970). P. 41. 
so 
However, it will be argued in Chapter 11 that maintaining a low 
and conventional interest rate policy is not appropriate -for the changinZ 
conditions of the Jordanian econonzy, particularly during .,, 
inflationary 
periods. Such a policy Eight be suitable in an environment of relative 
price stabilit-y where holders of financial assets can yield reasonable 
rewards for their savings. The monetiry authorities should not under- 
estimate the verý-, possible adverse reaction of deposit holders who have 
been rewarded with negative returns on their savings for many years. If 
such a situation prevails any longer, it is expected that individuals 
would adjust their investment pattern in face of high rates of inflation. 
Mcney illusion is usually a short-term phenomenon and those who continue 
to be deluded by nominal monetary magnitudes would soon realise the reality 
of their financial loss. This would probably lead to a sharp reduction 
in financial holdings, and a consequent adverse effect on domestic 
development as experienced in many developing countries. The recent 
speculative boom in real estate and luxury buildings, particularly during 
1972 - 1976, gave a clear example of the unprofitabilit-j of financial 
savings and the willingness of a large part of the public to shift away 
,s when the opportunity rose. Clearly, 
this must from financial holding 
have led to a considerable misallocation of resources since a large 
number of potential investors '11-ere indulging in speculative real estate 
transactions. By raising the real return on financial savings into 
positive levels, the authorities would encourage people to invest more 
in such assets, which can be used productively by the financial sector. 
This would also help to all! eviate inflationary pressures because of the 
expected relative decline in the speculative demand for commodities and 
other ph sical assets as people would increase the relative share of Iy 
their financial holdings. 
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III 
The Relationship Between Financial and Real Development in Jordan 
Given the emphasis placed on financial institutions within Jordanian 
development strategy, it is only to be expected that financial development 
will tend to be closely associated with real growth. It is the aim of 
this section to examine this relationship, showing how far financial 
intermediation proceeded with economic growth in the Jordanian context. 
This will now be established by the application of the simple regression 
technique. 
(a) The form of the function and the nature of the variables used. 
GIP/capita was adopted as a measure for real economic growth. M2/GNP 
was taken to reflect the degree of financial intermediation. 
(') 
Data were 
readily available from the IMF (IFS) publications to cover the period 
1955 - 1977. The relationship between the two variables is expected to 
take the following linear form: 
(ZIP/capita =a+b (M2/GNP) 
/The 
above function asserts that an increase in financial intermediation 
is accompanied by a rise in per capita GNP. As theoretically discussed 
in Chapter 1, the financial intermediation thesis emphasises the interaction 
between economic growth and the development of financial institutions with- 
out resolving the causality of the relationship. The direction of influence 
may be both ways. Finance can induce economic. growth or vice versa. 
(2) 
It must be stated here that the published figures for ji2 Contain a 
particular peculiarity. Since the occupation of the West Bank in the 
1967 war, the Central Bank of Jordan has included an estimate of the 
deposits held an the West Bank at that time and partially frozen 
thereafter following the closure of all West Bank branches ever since. 
In practice, West Bank residents can conditionally withdraw these 
deposits when visiting the East Bank (because of the 'open brLdýpdl 
policy). For practical purposes therefore, such deposits can 
be meaningfully combined to reflect the actual money circulation. 
Therefore, whenever the relationship between the two variables is. 
mentioned in the following analysis, it automatically means the two 
possible directions of influence between economic growth and financial 
development. 
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(b) Statistical Analysis. 
Relviný- on the time series approach, an attempt was made to relate 
GITP/capita to ?, 121r, "Tp and the following equation was obtained. 
2 (GINP/Capita) = 9.9 + 170.0 (1-12/GlýiP) R=0.429 
(3.97)* DF = 21 
D'.; = 0.48 
The above equation establishes that the coefficient of financial 
intermediation was statistically significant at the 1ýý level, with the 
coefficient sign as hypothesized, It implies that finance was significant 
in inducing economic development but the degree of correlation was weak 
as shown by sma'11 R2 of 0.429. 
Another atte=pt was made using GDP figures, instead of GTIP, on the 
assumption that the external factors included in the latter might have 
been insignificant in the process of domestic financial intermediation. 
It is expected that by employing GDP figures, these external factors 
would be excluded and a closer relationship between economic growth and 
financial intermediation can be obtained. Thus, when GDP/capita was 
examined in relation to M2/GDP, some improvement occurred in the R2 . which 
rose to 0.573, with the t-value of the coefficient of financial inter- 
mediation remaining statistically si, -nificant at the 1ý, level (equt. 2) 
2 (2) (GDP/Capita) = 20.5 + 113.3 (1,12/GDP) R=0.573 
(5.31)* DF = 21 
DW = 0.53 
However, although in equation (2) the financial intermediation ratio 
explained more of the variation in real gmith as shown by the rise in 
R 2, it was believed that the extent to which the two variables were 
connected was still not strong. 7herefore, it was found necesswýy to 
discover why, despite the statistically sierlificant -influence of 
finaracial intermediation, the degree of correlation between the two 
variables was low. 
Statistically significant at the V-' level, 
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As was extensively discusse(I in the previous section, the broad 
measure of financial intermediation 
(Tý', 2/GITP) includes both noney proper 
(11, I) and near money. The first component is usually demanded for trans- 
actions purposes, whereas the second is largely held to satisfy the 
saving motive. Thus, due to varying reasons for holdine both components 
of the ': "2, a disa, '-, '-Tegated analysis of 
the financial intermediation ratio 
may improve the above results. Theoretically, this explanation seems 
quite reasonable because, given the motivations for holding quasi money 
and its relatively longer te3m maturity, one would expect the financial 
system to utilise such funds for development purposes. Alternatively, 
economic development may promote an increase in quasi money through the 
rising levels of incomes and savings. As a result, therefore, quasi 
money is expected to be closely related to real growth, rather than the 
very liquid '-T1 It was shoim in the preceding section that the Jordanian 
financial intermediation ratio (142/GNP) was largely constituted from the 
1.11 which accounted for an average of 80ýo throughout the period 1955 - 
1977. Thus, there was a reason to believe that the unsatisfactory degree 
of connection between 11-72/0-F and real growth mif; ht be related to the 
special structure of Jordanian Y2. 
Given the above theoretical explanation, further attempts were 
made to relate real growth to the two disag3regated componants of the 
1.12/GITP and the results are shown below: 
(3) 111: (G. NP/Capita) = 19.8 + 188.6 (T-II/GNP) R2 0.300 
(3.00)* DF 21 
7f 0.41 
(4) luasi Money: (GNP/C 2 , apita)= 12.2 + 797.9 (Q/GTTP) R 0.740 
(7.86)* DF 21 
DIT = 0.73 
* Statisticallv significant at the 1% level. 
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Equations 3 and 4 clearly fit the above theoretical justification 
of the relatively poor correlation between the broad measure of financial 
intermediation and economic growth. Equation 3 makes it abundantly 
clear that although the coefficient of the Ml/GNP ratio was still 
statistically sic=ificant in inducing a change in real growth, the 
degree of correlation between the proper money/GNP ratio and sTowth was 
2 
very poor (rR = 0.300). Vhen regressing GNIP/capita on quasi money/GNP, 
a noticeable improvement in the level of R2 occurs Ath the t-value of 
the coefficient remaining statistically significant at the levelt 
(Equation 4). R2 rises to 0.740, revealing that financial intermediation, 
represented in the relativel. -y- longer-term and more stable component of 
the M2, explains about three quarters of the change in real growth. This 
is compared with R2 value of 0.429 in equation (1), when growth was 
examined in relation to the a, -PTegated measure (M2/GNP). The discrepancy lwý 
between the two values of R2 means that when the two components of the 
financial intermediation ratio are taken together, the degree of correlation 
between economic growth and financial intermediation is partly weakened 
by the poor connection between HI and growth (as shown when 1-11 and quasi 
money were exa=ined separately). However, the disaggregation of the 
financial intermediation process yields even better results when GDP 
figures are employed instead of GNP's (this also happened in equation 2). 
As shown below, the RP values rise in both equations with the coefficients' 
t-values remaining statistically significant in inducing the variation 
in real growth. 
(') 
(1) The rest of the determination of growth in Equation 6 can be 
explained by other factors, such as the fiscal policy. As sholm in 
Section I of this Chapter, public investment contributed importantly 
to gross capital formation. see P. 51 
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(5) MI: (GDP/Capita) = 23.4 + 136.6 (ITi/GDP) R2=0.453 
(4.17)* DF = 21 
DW = 0.47 
2 (6) Quasi money: (GDP/Capita) = 28.7 + 469.8 (VGDP) R=0.816 
(9.66)* DF = 21 
D'I = 0.87 
A further disaogregation of Tll between currency in circulation and 
demand deposits reinforces the above argument that the structure of 
the Jordanian financial intermediation ratio was a significant factor in 
influencinC real growth. Although both components of the T-TI are usually 
held for transactions purposes, one would expect demand deposits to be 
more related to economic growth as comDared with currency in circulation, 
which are kept idle outside the financial system. This was found empiri- 
cally true as equations 7 and 8 read: 
2 (7) Currency in Circulationt(GITP/Capita) = 47.1 + 1.8 (CC/GNP) R=0.171 
(2.00) DF = 21 
D7 = 0.29 
(8) Demand Deposits (GITP/Capita) = 26.1 + 4.7 (dd/GTTP) R2 ---0.308 
(3.06)* DF = 21 
MI = 0.72 
Equation 
(7) shows that the response of real growth to a unit change r 
in currency in circulation is statistically insignificant. R2 also reveals 
a very low value of 0.171, reflecting a poor correlation between growth 
and the currency element. When the latter is excluded from the 111, better 
results are obtained in both the t-value of the coefficient and the degree 
of determination (equation 8). The coefficient of the demand deposits 
was found statistically significant i-n determining groirtht though explaining 
only a small percentage of changes in GIT, "'/capita. 
* Significant at the 1ý! level. 
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imn, ary of the Main Findin-mg and Conclusions: SI 
The preceding andlysis in this section attempted to relate growth 
in the real economy to financial development in the Jordanian case. The 
relationship was exanined with the aid of simple regression techniclues. 
The main findings are strLmarised as follows: - 
1 7inancial intermediation waý significant in determining the real 
growth in the Jordanian economy. The response of real growth to a unit Z 
change in financial intermediation was found statistically significant 
at the 1% level. 
2. Although the above analysis clarified that financial develoPMent 
pro. _-ressed with real growth, 
it did not resolve the causality of the 
relationship. This was difficult to reveal empirically. As was 
discussed 
in Chanter lf the direction of the'cau'sal relhLtionship may rUn both waYs: 
financial interme diation can influence economic growth mainly through 
encourag3mg saving-s in financial forms, reaucing the cost of investnent, 
and improvijig t'--. e allocation pattern of resources; uhile economic 
develo-iment may induce the developmen-,, - in the financial sector through 
raising the le,. rels of incones ard savings and enlarging 
ihe scope for 
investment opportunities. Uowever, although the direction of the influence 
of the relationship between the two variables has not yet been clarified, 
attempts are made in the following chapters to illustrate this point 0 
when the role of each type of Intermediary , is discussed* 
3. Despite the statistically sigmificant influence of ljqý/GJTP on real 
growth, this broad measure of financial intermediation was able to 
explain only less than half of the variation in per capita GTTP. It is 
believed that this poor correlation might be due to the special structure 
of the Jordanian T-12 with the high element of I'll. This was 
found 
quantitatively true. "when 1-11 was excludedthe quasi money/GITP ratio 
yielded good results. Some further improvements occurred when GDP figures 
were employed instead of GNPIs. The coefficient of the quasi money/GDP 
ratio remained statistically significant at the 1rb level with the R2 
explaining 827f of GDP/CaDita variation. 
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4. The above statistical test proves the fact that the longer the 
maturity of the financial asset, the greater the link between finanical 
intermediation and development. This was not only illustrated by the 
high correlation between real growth and the relatively more stable 
quasi money, but it was further clarified when the GNP/capita was 
related to the disaggregated components of the Ml. Currency in 
circulation was found to be very weakly related to economic growth 
with R2 accounting for only 0.171 of the variation. Demand deposits/GNP 
exhibited a higher correlation ratio of 0.308. This was higher than 
the R2 of the Ml/GNP because the very low performance of currency in 
circulation adversely influenced the general performance of the Ml/GNP. 
M2/GNP came next with R2 registering 0.429. When the currency element 
was dropped from M2, (quasi money + demand deposits)/GNP yielded a 
noticeably higher R2 of 0.698. Finally, when quasi money was taken 
separately, it gave the best R2 of 0.746. The same order of development 
occurred when GDP figures were used, giving higher R2 value for each 
independent variable. A summary of these results is given in Table 3.11 
which classifies the independent variables employed in the analysis in 
accordance with their relative liquidity. As is clearly shown by the 
table, R2 values increase with a rise in the relative illiquidity of 
the financial asset. 
S. The finding in 4 indirectly emphasises the significance of the 
financial assets held by the non-bank financial institutions which deal 
mainly in long-term financial instruments. Although the adopted measure 
of financial intermediation was largely confined to the banking system 
because of data constraint, 
(1) 
the strong connection between real growth 
(1) Apart from one non-bank financial institution (Housing Bank) whose 
deposits were included in the M2 figures. (see P. 67). 
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Table 3.11 Regressions of Changes in Domestic 
Financial Intermediation (aggregated and 
disaggregated ratios) on Real Growth in the 
Jordanian EconomyY1955 - 1977 
DF = 21 
Independent Variables Constant 
Term 
Reg. Coeff. t-Value R2 DW 
I. GNP Data 
1. CC/GNP 47.1 +1.8 (2.00) 0.171 0.29 
2. M11GNP 19.8 +188.6 (3-00)* 0.300 0.41 
3. DD/GNP 26.1 +4-7 (3-06)* 0.308 0.72 
4. IWGNP 9.9 +170.7 (3-97)* 0.429 0.48 
5. Q+ DD/GNP 9.3 +4.4 (6.97)* 0.698 0.96 
6. Q/GNP 12,2 +797.9 (7.86)* 0.746 0.73 
II. GDP Data 
7. CC/GDP 37.9 +1-5 (3.17)* 0.324 0.35 
8. M1/GDP 23.4 4-136.6 (4-17)* 0.453 0.47 
9, DD/GDP 26.1 +4-7 (3-06)* 0.508 0.72 
10, M?, /GDP 20.5 +113.3 (5.31)* 0.573 0.53 
11. Q+ DD/GDP' 18.7 +2.4 (6.63)* 0.735 0.86 
12. Q/GDP 28.7 +469.8 (9.66)* 1 0.816 1 0-87 
All Reg. Coeff. are signifteantly different from zerorat the 1% 
level. 
DW< 2 implies positive autocorrelation. 
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and the long-term nature of the financial asset can be also indicative to 
the significance of the non-bank financial sector in development. 
6. Finally, the above results have very important implications for 
economic development and the role of financial intermediation in the 
development process. The strong correlation between quasi money and 
real growth should further attract the attention of the monetary 
authorities to the small relative weight of this component in the 1.12 
structure. One major concern of the Central BanIr of Jordan should be 
to provide means and create conditions capable of inducing a structural 
transformation of financial savings in favour of longer-term maturity. 
Having established in the first three chapters the theoretical and 
applied framewoex within which the Jordanaian financial system has operated 
and must be viewed, it is now necessary to investigate the development 
roles played by the com-ponent parts of the financial system, beginning 
with that of the coruiercial banking system in Part B, and continuing 
in 'Part C with that of the non-bank financial institutions, and concluding 
in Part D with that of the Central Bank and an assessment of monetary and 
banking techniques and innovations. 
PART B 
THE COMMERCIAL BANKING SYSTEM 
0 
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CHAPTER 4 
COMMERCIAL BANKING ACTIVITY AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMT IN JORDAN. 1964 - 1977 
The ectivitiesof commercial banks are best analysed by reference 
to their balance sheets, which can reveal how efficient they are as 
financial intermediaries specialising in the mobilisation. of funds from 
various sources and allocating these funds between alternative uses. 
This type of analysis must however have reference to the rules and 
constraints on their operations placed by the system of legislative 
regulation in Jordan since the Banking Law of J959. 
Since independence and up to 1959,, commercial banks were completely 
free to undertake business and were not subject to any special law 
regulating their operations. Throughout this period, commercial banks 
operated in accordance with the "Law of Companies" which applied to 
other commercial and industrial firms. The absence of any banking law 
during this period can be explained by the lack of an independent 
monetary authority with discretionary power to regulate and influence 
bank activities. The system was still regulated by the Currency Board 
which was itself precluded by law from practising any banking functions. 
It was-therefore no coincidence that the introduction of the first law 
regulating banks was concomitant with the creation of an independent 
monetary authority vested in a central bank. Thus, Law No. 4 of estab- 
lishing the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) was issued in 1959. In this 
year also, commercial banks became subject to Banks Control Law No. 
as published in the official Gazette. 
(') 
The Official Gazette,, (Feb. 14,1959) P. 161 
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Since the CBJ did not effectively start operations until 1964, the 
Minister of Finance was given executive powers for the application of 
this Law, including issuing licences for banks to undertake business in 
the Country, after consultation with the CBJ's Board of Directors. The 
Law comprised 21 articles regulating bank business and forbidding them 
to undertake certain activities. In practice, however, this Law was 
non-operative due to the absence of a central bank. 
(') 
Effective 
banking control did not start until 1966, some two years after the CBJ 
had commenced its operations, and had subsequently enacted Temporary 
Banking Law No. 94., The two years of initial central banking experience 
made this new Law more realistic and adapted to the special domestic 
environment within which commercial banks had to function. According 
to this Law, all powers ihich were previously given to the Minister of 
Finance, regarding control over banks, were transferred to the CBJ which 
now became the sole authority responsible for licensing banks. As will 
be shown later, the new Law was both more specific in controlling bank 
investment behaviour and regulating the volume and composition of their 
liquid assets, and yet more 'liberal', as it introduced some relaxation 
in and modifications to the prohibited areas which had previously 
restricted bank activities. There were six main business areas which 
commercial banks were forbidden to undertake(2)_ 
0) A bank cannot extend credit or guarantee to any customer more than 
25% of its paid-up capital and reserves. The ratio can be raised only 
if the approval of the CBJ is obtained. Excluded from this restriction 
are inter-bank transactions or facilities granted against letters of 
Alawin, A. A. The Role of the Commercial Banks in the Economic 
Development in Jordan,, M. A. Thesisp OP-cit. P-52 
(2) The"Temporar7 Banking Law ", No. 94, Part 3,, Article 
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credit or bills or documents payable in foreign exchange. The above 
ratio was fixed by the 1959 Law at a maximum of 20%. 
(2) A bank cannot extend ary credit facilities against the security 
of its own shares. Moreover, unsecured credit facilities cannot be 
granted to any member of a bank's board of directors in excess of JD 
1,000, or to arW employee in excess of half his annual salary. These 
restrictions can be removed after the approval of the CBJ. 
(3) A bank cannot engage on its own account, or on a commission basis, 
in wholesale or retail trade including foreign trade. 
(4) A bank's maximum investment in any industrial, agricultural or 
commercial project should not exceed 25% of its paid-up capital and 
reserves. Excluded from this restriction, howeverp is bank invest- 
ment in local institutions contributing to economic development. The 
above ratio was fixed by the 1959 Law at a maximum of 15%. 
(5) A bank's loans secured by the real estate should not exceed 4C% 
of its total deposits unless the bank specialises in mortgages, providing 
it gains the CBJ's approval. 
(2) 
(6) A bank's holdings of foreign exchange became no longer free and 
should be subject to limits and conditions specified by the CBJ. 
However, although the Temporary Banking Law of 1 %6 was more 
realistic than the previous Lawo the rapid development of the Jordanian 
econozy, particularly the financial. sector, necessitated new amendments 
to this Law. Consequently, two amending laws were passed in 1971 and 
1975 (i. e. The Banking Law No. 21+ of 1971, as amended by the Provisional 
Law No. 5 of 1975), which are, at present,, governing bank activities in 
Jordan. 
(1) The maximum ratio was raised in accordance with Law No. 24 of 1971to 75%. 
(2) This article was placed in the amending Law of 1971 by a new article 
which stipulates that any bank should not extend mortgage loans in 
excess of 20% of its deposits unless it is a specialised mortgage 
bank. 
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Given this legislative framework, how then did bank activities 
develop throughout the period 1964 - 1977? This is shown by the following 
analysis of commercial banks' sources and uses of funds. Within this 
analysis, their fundamental role as mobilisers and allocators of funds 
is examined. 
I. Sources of Funds 
The role of the commercial banks in the task of economic development 
depends primarily on their resources and the extent to which they are 
able to mobilise the communitý's savings, and other idle funds. An 
examination of Table 4.1 reveals, that the bulk of bank funds in Jordan 
came from domestic sources which comprised, on average, 95.8% of total 
bank funds throughout the period 1964 - 1977. The relatively small 
share of foreign sources can be mainly explained by, firstly, the weak 
position of Jordan as a financial centre capable of attracting a consid- 
erable inflow of financial resources and, secondly, the restrictions 
imposed by bank legislation as regard to foreign exchange transactions. 
As far as deposits are concjýnedv commercial banks were forbidden to 
accept any deposit in currencies other than the Jordan dinar. This 
legislation further discouraged commercial banks in their efforts to 
attract foreign capital. However, some relaxations to the Law were 
introduced in 1973 when the CBJ allowed the commercial banks to accept 
deposits in foreign currencies from Jordanians working abroad and from 
non-residents. 
(') 
These deposits were favourab1y treated as they can 
be withdrawn at any time without the prior approval of the CBJ,, and 
regardless of any foreign exchange restrictions. Moreover, they consti- 
tuted a profitable investment outlet since they were offered high rates 
that were competitive with interest rates prevailing on the international 
(1) The CBJ, Tenth Annual Report, 1973, P. 62 
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financial markets. This procedure led to an increase in the relative 
importance of foreign sources in total bank funds from 2.3% in 1973 to 
5.3% by 1977. 
Capital and Reserves. Of domestic sources, internal capital and reserves 
represented)on average, some 7.8% of total bank funds during the period 
under review. Banks are legally required to provide a specified minimum 
capital before starting business. These prudential requirements have 
been subject to successive amendment: the 1959 Law specified these 
levels as JD 250,000 for local banks and the equivalent of JD 500POOO 
for foreign banks, whereas both local and foreign banks became subject 
to unified minimum requirements under the Temporary Banking Law of 1966, 
which were fixed at JD 250POOO. This was raised to JD 500,000 (for 
both types of banks) when the provisional Law of 1975 came into effect. 
The increase was necessitated by the spectacular increase in deposits 
which resulted in declining the capital to deposit ratio. 
(') 
Increasing 
active capital requirements was considered necessar7 to protect the 
rights of both depositors and shareholders, and to ensure and strengthen 
the banks' financial position. 
(2) 
As a result of this procedure, and 
due to the entry of two new banks into banking in 1975, the capital 
and reserves of commercial banks increased in absolute terms from 
JD 9.50 million in 1974 to JD 12.29 million in 1975. - Despite this 
increase, however, the relative contribution of this item to total 
bank funds showed a continuous decline throughout the whole period, 
decreasing from 7.3% in 1964 to 5.6% in 1977. This decline can be 
related to the rapid increase in deposits which comprised the main 
source of bank funds. 
(1) CBJ, Twelfth Annual Report. 1975, P. 36 
(2) Ibid. 
96 
Bank Deposits. The same table makes it clear that bank'deposits (domestic- 
as well as foreign) comprised, on average, about three quarters of 
total funds during the period under review,, thus giving one*main feature 
of commercial banks as financial intermediaries depending on their'opera- 
tions on funds mobilised from different economic units. The increase 
was mainly concentrated in the deposits of the resident private sector 
which increased in relative importance of total bank funds from 44.0% 
in 1964 to 66.9% by 1977. These deposits showed a steady increase over 
the whole period with the exception of 1967 and 1970: the years which 
witnessed heavy withdrawals from the banka because of the unsettled 
political circumstances. As is shown by the table, these deposits dec- 
reased from JD 44.46 million in 1966 to JD 4o. 63 million in 1967,, and 
from JD 45-32 million in 1969 to JD 1+3.45 million in 1970. As a 
compensatory procedure, the government deposited more funds with the 
commercial banks in both - .. years, 
thus increasing -its deposits from 
JD 6.23 million in 1966 to JD 10.63 million in 1967ý. and from JD 9.54 
million in 1969 to JD 11.70 million in 1970. As far as government 
deposits are concerned, it is worth noting here that these deposits 
used to comprise an important source of bank funds before the establish- 
ment of the CBJ in 1964, Their relative importance declined, -considerably 
after that year as the government transferred the bulk of its funds 
to the CBJ, which acts as its official banker. The table indicates 
that while these deposits formed 30.7% of total bank funds in 1964, - 
their relative importance decreased to 10.6% in 1965, and continued to 
decline to form only 5.7% by 1977. 
Borrowing fromthe Central Bank. Banks' resort to the CBJ as an ultimate 
source of liquidity was insignificant as is shown by the very low share 
of this item in total bank funds, the ratio comprising only 0.3% 
throughout the whole period. This behaviour indicates'the high liquidity 
IýI 
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of the commercial banks which made it unnecessary for them to resort to 
the CBJ for additional funds. 
As has been already observed, the private sector's deposits held 
with the commercial banks formed the bulk of bank resources; therefore., 
a further examination of their structure and nature is essential for the 
later discussion of their role in financing economic development. 
Commercial banks in Jordan offer to the public three types of 
deposit facilities, i. e. demand, time, and saving deposits. Table 4.2 
shows that demand deposits comprised more than half total deposits, 
their relative share varying slightly from year to year and averaging 
around 52.5% throughout the whole period. These deposits differ from 
other types of deposits and claims because they are highly liquid and 
represent a chief medium of payments. This function of demand deposits 
gives the commercial banks a unique position among other financial 
intermediaries as being responsble for a great ýart of the payments 
mechanism. However, it is interesting to note that, unusually, demand 
deposits in Jordan are interest-bearing,, just like other types of 
deppsits. It will be shown in the following chapter that rising 
competition for deposits between commercial banks, particularly after 
1973, led to the offering of interest on demand deposits, near to those 
offered on savings and time deposits. During the period 1973 - 19779 
the rate of interest paid on demand deposits averaged 4.52%. 
(') 
The same table shows that time deposits came second in importance, 
with an average ratio to total deposits of 33.9%-throughout the whole 
period. These deposits are either due on a fixed date or they are 
withdrawable subject to an agreed period of notice. Interest paid on 
--ý, I 
(1) CBJq Monthly Statistical Bulletin (Ju: LY 1978) Table 13 
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Table 4.2 Composition of Private Sector'r Deposite 
Held with Commercial Banks 
1964 - 1977 
(In millions of JD) 
Demand Time Saving 
I 
Total Deposit Average Annual 
Deposit Deposit Deposit I Rate of Iherease 
Years Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Demand ý6 Timel Saving 
1964 15-75 52,9 10.96 36.8 3,. 08 10.3 29,. 79 100.0 
1965 20,01 53.0 13-70 36.3 4.03 10.7 37.74 100.0 27.0 25,0 30.8 
1966 25,94 55.7 16-52 35.5 4.13 8.8 46-59 100,0 29.6 20.6 2.5 
1967 24.06 56.3 15-07 35.2 3.63 8-5 42-76 100.0 -6.3 -8.8 -12.2 
1968 24.21 54.1 16.67 37.2 3.88 8.7 44.76 100.0 - 10.6 6.9 
1969 24.86 51.9 18.23 38.3 4.77 9.8 47.86 100,0 2.7 9.3 -3.0 
1970 22.56 49.1 17-58 38.2 5.84 12.7 45-98 100.0 -10.0 -3.6 54.9 
1971 24.27 47.7 19-31 38.0 7.30 14.3 50.88 100-0 7.5 9.8 25-8 
1972 32-30 51,1 21.46 33.9 9.51 15-0 63,27 100.0 33.1 11.1 30.3 
1973 39.09 51.8 23-97 31.8 12-39 16.4 75-45 100.0 21.0 11.7 30.3 
1974 52.41 52.8 30.91 31.2 15.89 16.0 99,21 100.0 34.1 29.0 28,2 
1975 79-58 56,, 2 39-50 27.9 22,46 15.9 141-54 100.0 51.8 27.8 41.3 
1976 108.89 52.2 53-32 25.6 46.18 22,2 208-39 100.0 36.8 35.0 105.6 
1977 132-03 50,, 2 77.69 29.5 53.12 20.3 262.84 100,0 21.2 45.7 15.0 
Av. 
64-77 52.5 33.9 13. 100.0 
t 
0.2 15.9 
1 
25.5 
Source: (1) The Central Bank of Jordan, Statistics Pertaining to some 
Aspects of the Jordanian EconoM (Amman: Central Bank 
Publications, October 1974). 
(2) The Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin (Feb-79) 
Both resident and non-resident. Non-resident figures include amounts of 
deposits of foreign agencies, which are only a small percentage of the 
total as shown in Table 4.1 
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time deposits was slightly higher than that offered on demand deposits, 
averaging 5.73% between 1973 - 1977. 
(') 
The same table shows that., the 
relative size of this. type of deposits in the deposit structure declined 
noticeably during the period under review, decreasing from 36.8%, in 
1964 to 29.5% by 1977. This was owing to the notable rise-in saving 
deposits. 
Saving deposits registered the highest rate of growth as compared 
with the above two types of deposits.. Given an average annual rate of 
growth of 25.5%, these deposits increased their contribution to total 
bank deposits-from 10.3% in 1964 to 20.3% by 1977. The largest increase 
in saving deposits occurred in 1976, when in that year alone they more 
than doubled, increasing from JD 22.46 million to JD 46.18 million. , 
This remarkable increase can be partly explained by rising money incomes 
and partly by a slight increase in thp-interest rate paid on these 
I- 
deposits, which rose from 4.50% in 1975 to 5.25% in 1976. 
(2 ) 
This was, 
further increased to 5.5Wo by 1977-0) 
In differentiating between types of deposits, it can be said that 
saving deposits are similart in one respect, to demand depositst ,, 
whereas in another respectq they can be considered as time depOsitso, 
The similarity between demand and saving deposits stems from the fact 
that they are both withdrawable without an advance notice; but they. are 
different in that the latter cannot be used as means of payments. _The 
holder of saving deposits cannot draw a cheque on his account and he can 
only withdraw money if he cashes it himself over the counter of his bank, 
It is for this latter aspect that, saving 4eposits, are, considered similar 
to time deposits and, sometimes, they are both grouped within one 
(1) Ibid. 
(2) Ib id. 
(3) Ibid. 
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categor7 as distinct from demand dePosits. 
(I) 
Both time, and saving 
deposits represent the less liquid claims on commercial banks. ýThese 
deposits have generally a more stable character as compared with the 
more volatile demand deposits. Their large relative size in total 
bank deposits, combined with-their non-fluctuating character, have been 
used in mary countries as a base for extending bank activities into 
medium and long-term business, As will be shown later in this chapter, 
the implications of term lendinghave a special bearing in developing- 
countries, which are experiencing an increasing demand for such type 
of credit necessitated by launching comprehensive development programmes. 
The argument for term lending undertaken by commercial banks is further 
encouraged in the particular case of Jordanýbecause of the relatively 
low rate of turnover of demand deposits. As can be seen below, demand 
deposits in Jordan have special features which work to lower their annual 
velocity. Part of these deposits is kept on demand-withoutýbeing actively 
used,, thus reflecting a disguised form of saving deposits which commercial 
banks can rely on in extending longer-term credit& 
The term Iturnoverl or,, Ivelocityl Of demand deposits indicates how 
many times these deposits have been used in a specific period of time; 
To obtain this figure, one can divide the total debits of the banks 
over one year by the corresponding volume of demand deposits. 
(2 ) 
As is 
the case in many developed arxl developing, countiries, figures for bank 
debits are not available in Jordan; -therefore, it is necessary to adopt 
The IMF classifies both types of deposits under one heading as 
distinct from the more fluid demand deposits. 
(2) Bank debits figures measure-the extent to which depositors are using 
their checking accounts., For this measure-of velocity, see: The 
Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Bulletin (Washington, D. C.: 
July i9F72) PP. 631 - 635 
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another appropriate method to measure the velocity of demand deposits. 
Bank clearings can be used here to serve this purpose. Clearing 
activities do not, however, give as accurate figures as the previous 
measure because they do not take into account two matters: firstly, 
clearings within the bank itself (or between different branches of the 
same bank) and, secondly, the volume of cash withdrawals on these deposits 
direct from the banks' counters. In order to obtain accurate figures 
indicating how many times these deposits are used in a year, the above 
two channels should be taken into consideration. The volume of deposits 
which could be used through these channels was estimated to form about 
half of total bank clearings. 
(') 
By increasing total clearings 5C%, 
therefore, more accurate figures for the total use of demand deposits 
are now obtained. 
Table 4.3 demonstrates the annual turnover of demand deposits 
in selected developed and developing countries during the period 1965 - 
19702) One striking feature of this table is the distinct difference 
in turnover figures between the two groups of countries. 
(3) 
Given the 
fact that demand deposits are largely used as the main medium of payments 
in developed countries, it is expected that such deposits would have a 
higher rate of turnover as compared with less developed countries. In 
the U. S. A., for example, demand deposits experienced high turnover, 
averaging around 66.7 a year during the period under review. This means 
that these deposits were used, on average, once every five days, or 
This was estimated with the help of staff of some commercial banks 
during the Author's field study visit to Jordan in the Summer 1978. 
(2) The analysis here does not cover the year 1977 because figures for 
this year regarding other countries included in the table have not 
yet been published. 
(3) See Figure 4.1 
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Table 4.3 Demand Deposits Turnover In Selected 
Developing and Developed Countries,, * 
Ratio ' 
1965 - 1976 
Deve 'Pin, -, Countries D veloped Countries 
Years Jordan** Iraq Libya Ghaw U. S. A. Germany Japan 
1%5 6.1 25.2 27.6 23.6 
1 
37.0 37.0 40.6 
1966 6.9 25.0 29.7 22.5 42.2 55.5 40.1+ 
1967 7.3 24.4 31.7. 21.5 43.9 50.6 41.9 
1%8 7.5 24.1 32.2 23.0 48.4 55.0 44.4 
1969 7.8 21.9 37.8 17.4 53.2 62.5 43.8 
1970 7.8 20.3 18.1 24.8 57.8 68.3 46.7 
1971 8.1 15.3 12.0 25.2 63.4 64.0 39.6 
1972 7.8 14.8 16.0 20.9 66.2 61.0 38.4 
1973 8.8 14.4 18.4 17.6' 79.2 69.9 44.2 
1974 9.5 14.4 19.4 22.5 95.9 67.6 50.2 
1975 11.2 13.7 19.6 17.4 100.9 69.6 53.4 
1976 14.4 14.6 14.4 16.1 112.4 69.5 50.7 
Aver- 
age 8.6 19.0 23.1 21.0 66.7 60.8 44.5 
65-76 
Source : (I ) Appendix 4.1 
(2) Appendix . 4.2 
* Since an appropriate-method of computing turnover of demand deposits 
is to divide total bank debits by the volume of deposits, it-is proposed 
here-to select, for the purpose of comparison, some developing and 
developed countries which publish -bank debits figures in their financial 
statistics. Countries which publish only bank clearings stetistics are 
excluded because it is-difficult to-estimate, in each-individual case, 
the amount of clearings occurting within one bank and the direct encash- 
ment, over the banks' counters. 
Turnover figures are computed for Jordan by dividing bank clearings 
(adjusted figures) by., the-volume of demand deposits. (See P. 101) 
t 
1' 
I- 
a, > 
0 
C 
1 
I. - 
0 
.0 
Fig. 4-1 Demand deposit turnover in selected developed 
and developing countries from 1965 to 1976. 
(source: table4-3 ) 
1965 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 
. 
73 74 75 76 
Year 
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about six times a month. 
(') 
Germany and Japan also experienced high 
turnover figures of 60.8 and 44.5 respectively. On the other hand, the 
table reveals that developing countries showed a relatively low rate'of 
turnover. for their demand deposits. Out of these countries covered in 
the table, Jordan experienced the lowest turnover, accounting for 8.6 
a year. This means that, on average, demand deposits were used in 
Jordan once every one month and twelve days 
(2)_ 
this is particularly low 
when compared with averages of 19.0 for Iraq, 23.1 for Libya-and 21.0 
for Ghana. However, the table illustrates that the Jordanian turnover 
figures more than doubled during the-period under reviewg increasing 
from 6.1 in 1965 to 14.4 in 1976. -This rise, particularly since-1973, 
can be explained by a higher rate of growth in the economy as a'result 
of the launching of development programmes. A rise in the level--of 
aggregate expenditure on goods and services activates and swells the 
volume of Cheques drawn on demand deposits and thus increases their 
velocity. This has been further accentuated by the recent high inflation- 
ary pressures which effectively increased the cost of domestic trans- 
actions and thus the volume of-deposits withdrawn from the banks. 
The relatively low turnover of demand deposits in Jordan means 
that these deposits are not used by their owners as much as they are 
used in countries with higher turnover figures. Apart from common-factws 
which are generally behind the low turnover of demand deposits in 
develoýing countries,, such as the relative underdeveloped-stage of the 
banking habit, there seem. to be three particular reasons for the continued 
relative reduction oft-he Jordjýnian ratio compared i; ith other countries - 
f 
12 
= 0.18' month = 5.4. days 
66.7 
.- 12 (2) 
_=I-4 month = 
42 days. 
8.6 
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Since demand deposits in Jordan earn interest these 'deposits 
are kept on demand not only to settle current transactions, ' but also'as 
an investment outlet. This accordingly lowers the annual turnover of- 
such dep03itS. 
(2) Influenced by the traditional' belief of a'significant part 
of the Moslem population who regards interest on borrowed money as 
usury . large amounts of 
demand deposits are held not only for trans- 
action purposes, but as a-conveniexit-way to hold"individuals' savings. 
Many people who still believe interestAO be, %jsury_ -; and who look 
towards banks as a safe' place for keeping money, try to avoid such 
suspicion by depositing their funds in the banks without receiving any 
interest. 
(') 
As they do not accept interest, it does not matter for; ' 
those people whether their funds are deposited on demand or saving 
account. They may even find it more convenient and less complicated 
to hold their savings on demand accounts. This part of the demand 
deposits is kept with the banks without any/active use"es'would other- 
wise be the case If these deposits are deposited on demand to settle 
current payments. This also works to lower the velocity of demand 
deposits. 
In Jordan, as in many developing countries, people tend to 
keep part of their funds on demand as-a precautionary procedure against 
unforeseen emergencies, such as unemployment, -illness ... etc. In the 
more developed countries, people display less incentive to keep part 
of their funds for such purposes because these. aspects are. covered by 
active social security programmes. This situation further'lowers the 
turnover of demand deposits in Jordan, since part of these deposits, 
which is kept for emergency purposes, may not be used if the need does 
not arise. 
For further details of this point, see J. Salah, The Evolution of 
the Banking System in Jordan., op. cit. P. 48 
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Having discussed the developments in the sources of banks' funds 
and the composition and nature of their deposits, it is now necessary 
to assess how successful these banks were in performing their function 
as mobilisers of the community's funds. 
The growth in the volume of the private sector's deposits from 
JD 29.79 million in 1%4 to-JD 262.84 million in 1977, and the rise 
An their relative importance-in bank funds from 46.6% to 71.5% during 
(2) 
the same Period, may suggest that commercial banks achieved a notice- 
able success in institutionalising domestic savings. However, to 
precisely assess the mobilisation function of the banks, the following 
two measures are employed: (a) the growth in bank deposits in relation 
to GNP, and (b) the expansion in the network of bank branches in relation 
to the number of inhabitants. 
changer. in the ratio of bank deposits to GNP reveals that banks 
in Jordan achieved notable progress in mobilising funds. The ratio 
averaged around 26.2%. rising from only 18.5% in 1964 to 38.616 by 1976. ý 
(3) 
This can be favourably compared with the situation in other developing 
countries included in Table 4.4 during the same period. As demonstrated 
by the table, the Jordanian ratio behaved in a similar manner to that of 
Greece where its ratio accounted, on average, for 24. whereas the 
Jordanian ratio was considerably above that of Turkey, Egypt, India, 
Iraq and Sudan where the same ratio averaged around 21. 
* 21.0 0 il. 9 1 7.1 15 
10-51, and 9.17respectively. 
(4) 
(1) Including private sector's deposits (residents and non-residents) 
as shown by Table 4.2 
(2) See Table 4.1 
(3) The analysis here does not include 1977 because figures for this 
year regarding other countries included in the table have not yet 
been published. 
(4) See Figure 4.2 
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Table 4. Bank Deposits to GNP Ratio In 
Selected Developing -Countries, 
1964 - 1976 
Years Jordan Greece Turkey Egypt India Iraq Sudan 
1%4 18.5 17.3 15.6 20.1 11.1 9.7 6.0 
1%5 20.9 16.4 18.6 18.1 12.1 10.5 6.7 
1 %6 25.1 18.1 20.3 17.4 12.3 10.3 --, 7.4, 
1%7 20.8 18.2 25.4 19.0 11.6 10.6 _8.1, 
1 %8 22.7 18.7 , 23.8 18.9 12.8 11.1 7.4 
1%9 20.5 23.4 25.2 18.0 13.3 11.7- 8.3 
1970 20.3 26.2 21.9 , 17.0 - 
13.8 10.4 9.2 
1 1971 25.5 28.4 22.2 1 8.3 16.0 10-5. 9. 3 
1972 28.6 ', "-31.6-- 22'. 9" 20.8 18.7 10.9 10.9 
1973 31.8 -27-4 22.6 26.8 18.3 11-8 11.5 
1974 32.3 27.6 20.5 26.6 17.8 8.5 10.9 
1975 38.5 
-30.4- 
21.5-- 27.0 19.5 10.4- 11.1 
1976 38.3 -31-9 
21*4' 26.6 23.7- 1o. 6 12.0 
Aver 5 
Rat* 26.2 24.5- 21.7- 21.1 15.6 10.5 9.1 
1%4-76 
1 
-- 
i 
Source: (1) IMF,, IFS, (1972 Supplement) 
(2) IFS (Dec. 1977) 
(3) IFS (Dec. 1978) 
private sector's deposits.. 
- 
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ý c, Z4 
z 
in 0 
Fig 4-2 Bank deposit to G. N. P. ratio in selected 
deyeloping countries from 1964 to 1976. 
source: toble 4-4 
1964 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 
I Year 
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However,, such a remarkable rise in the bank deposit/GNP ratio 
not only reflects banks I concerns and efforts to mobilise funds.. but it is 
also the -result of the steady growth of the Jordanian economy which . -' 
encouraged bank activities. Thus, income factozVas well-as institutional 
factors have both stimulated the noticeable increase in the above raVio, 
On the one hand, internal development has undoubtedly encouraged bank 
growth through a steady rise in money incomes and the consequent increase 
in domestic savings. On the other hand, the notableextension of the 
network of bank branches throughout the country has increasingly enabled 
commercial banks to institutionalise domestic f uads. * Prior to 1967, bank 
branches were increasing steadily in both parts of the country (the East 
Bank and the West Bank). Thus, by the end of'1967, the number of bank 
offices increased to 59 as compared with 43 in 1_964. As can be seen 
from Table 4.5. sue h branches were about equally distributed between 
the two regions with the relative share of the East Bank being slightly 
higher (comprising 32 offices or 54% of the total). Expansion in bank 
branches was greatly disrupted by the Arab-Israeli War of 1 %7 and the 
consequent occupation of the West Bank of Jordan. As a result, all 
bank branches there were closed. The War, and its aftermath, also 
influenced bank activities in the East Bank of Jordan, as reflected in 
the slow growth of bank offices in the following two years. Branch 
expansion was again retarded by the civil war of 1970, which seriously 
hindered all economic activities. -The number of branches in the following 
year remained constant at 40. It was only when the country experienced 
a relative degree of political stability in 1973, together with the 
launching of a new era of planning development in that year, that banks 
resumed a rapid expansion of their branches. This was also accompanied 
by the recent entry of new foreign banks into banking. business in Jordan, 
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starting with the local establishment of the First National City Bank 
in 1974 and followed, in 1975, by the Chase Manhattan Bank and the Bank 
of Credit and Commerce International. As a result, bank branches in 
the East Bank rose to 81 by 1976, compared with a mere 23 in 1964. Such 
institutional expansion increased the number of inhabitants having 
access to bank facilities. Thus, in terms of domestic bank facilities 
per head of population, there was one banking office in the East Bank 
per 24,358 in 1976, as compared with the 1964 figure of one per 54,522 
inhabitants. In other words, these figures meant that in 1976, there 
were two bank branches serving about the same population as used to be 
covered by one bank office in 1964. 
However, it is worth noting that although the increase in bank 
branches was substantial, most of the expansion was confined to Amman 
and the other main cities, thereby leaving a large number of small towns 
and villages without adequate bank facilities. For example, 10 out of 
the 23 bank offices in the East Bank in 1964 were situated in Amman and 
its suburbs (i. e. 43.5%). The table shows that the concentration of 
bank. branches in Amman was further increased in recent years, when its 
relative share accounted for 54.5% by 1975. This concentration can be, 
generally, explained by the dominant position of Amman as a prosperous 
commercial and industrial centre, and partly by the traditional practice 
of some commercial banks, particularly the foreign banks, of confining 
their activities to the big cities and commercial centres . Such a 
situation not only prevents people living in rural areas from the 
benefits of using bank facilities, but also deprives the economy itself 
of the proper use of its resources, since part of the funds available 
in the remote areas are kept in idle forms which could otherwise be 
mobilised in financial assets. 
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Although banks achieved notable progress in institutionalising 
funds, as indicated by the increasing proportions of population covered 
by bank services,, banking density in Jordan is still low as measured by 
Cameron's universal method. Based on his observations of banking 
development in many countries during different stages of development, 
Rondo Cameron developed the banking density concept as a crude index of 
financial development. Although the application of this method should 
be treated with some reservation, it nevertheless can be employed 
as an approximate measure for the adequacy of bank branches in relation 
to total population. The above term refers to the number of bank branches 
per 101,000 population. From his experience, Cameron classified a banking 
density ratio of over 1.0 as 'high' (i. e. one bank office for 10,000 
person ); between 0.5 and 1.0 as 'moderate'; and below 0.5 as 'low'; 
and finally, below 0.1 as $very low'. 
(') 
When applying Cameron's 
method to the Jordanian case, Jordan can be classified as having a low 
bank density, despite the rapid expansiori in the network of branches of 
recent years. This ratio, however, increased steadily during the whole 
period.. as can be seen from Figure 4.3, rising from only 0.183 in 1964 
(being very near to the 'very low' level) to 0.410 in 1976. 
(2 ) 
These 
figures reveal that although, on Cameronts scale, banks in Jordan still 
had a low density ratio, they on the other hand displayed increasing 
efforts'to serve larger proportions of population. 
(1) R. Cameron & others,, Banking in the Early Stages of Industrialisation, 
op. cit. P. 297-- 
(2) The Jordanian banking density ratio in 1976 was slightly above 
the Ja r io in 1884 (0-320)-and the Prussian ratio in 1861 
05anese 
at 
(0-31+ whereas it was slightly lower than that of England and 
Wales 
ý; 
1800 (0.480). See Ibid. PP. 297 298 
t 1-3 
(140- 
038, 
0.36 
0.34 
0.32 
x 
0 030. 
«a 
0.28- 
0.26 
.X 
024 
.0 
022 
0181 
. 
1964 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 
Year 
(dashed line represents the years 1965 91966 
in which data were not available. ) 
Fig. 4-3 Bank density index in Jordan from19104 toI976 
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Finally, it should be mentioned that banks in Jordan did not adopt 
sufficiently active policies to encourage people to utilise banks as 
reservoirs of their funds,, especially in the ruralareas, where a large 
proportion of people are still not fully aware of the benefits and 
facilities offered by banks. Furthermore, commercial banks did not offer 
attractive rates of return on holding bank deposits, which would have 
encouraged people to pour more of their funds into the banking system. 
As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 11, commercial banks were 
unable to offer the public attractive yields on their-financial holdings 
because of the maintenance of a low and conventional interest rate 
policy by the monetary authorities. 
ii 
Uses of Bank Funds 
The allocative function of commercial banks has an important bearing 
on, and considerable implications for, a country's rate of economic 
development. Bank portfolio behaviour and the way these banks distri- 
bute their funds between domestic and foreign outlets, on the one hand, 
and the composition of their domestic investment on the other., may 
significantly influence the allocation df capital among various sectors 
of the economy. Clearly, the more resources allocated in sectors of 
national priority, the larger the contribution of commercial banks to 
domestic economic development. It is by , this allocative 
function that 
such institutions can substantially assist the developmental process by 
adjusting their asset structure in accordance with the defined develop- 
ment strategies. 
An examination of Table 4.6 reveals that asset portfolio behaviour 
of the commercial banks in Jordan has undergone significant changes in 
favour of domestic assets during the period 1964 - 1977, their relative 
importance in total assets rising from 60.2! A"' to 90.0%. This favourable 
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shift towards domestic investment was related, on the one hand, to 
legislative prohibition of overseas investment ) and, on the other, to 
a rapid internal development. Under the Currency-Board System 
(1951 - 1963). banks in Jordan were completely free to invest in 
foreign assets which accounted, on average, for 90.3% of bank liquid,, 
assets throughout the whole period. 
(') 
This situation was-completely 
changed under the Central Banking Regime when such a traditional practice 
was made illegal. 
(2) 
The aim was to repatriate oversea3--funds trans- , 
ferred abroad through bank operations, and to ensure that they would be 
internally invested. As can be seen from the table, the relative share 
of overseas investment in total bank assets declined noticeably from 
39.8% in 1964 to 16.7% in 1965 and Io 10.3% in 1966. -This percentage 
continued to decline up to 1972 when it reached only 3.5%. From 1973 
onwards, however, the relative importance of foreign assets rose slightly 
to reach 5-9, "o in 1973 and 10. C% by 1977. This - increase was owing, to - the 
CBJ's decision of allowing commercial banks to accept deposits in 
foreign currencies from Jordanians working abroad and non-re3idents. As 
(3) 
it was observed earlier, this procedure led to a slight increase in - 
bank overseas liabilities. Banks therefore found it appropriate-to 
hold more foreign assets in their portfolio to cover the-increase in 
their liabilities abroad. 
(1) Jamal Salah, The Evolution of the Banking System -in 
Jordanp op. cit. P. 40 
(2) Article II of the Temporar7 Banking Law of'1966 made it clear that 
commercial banks became no longer allowed to invest abroad. Banks' 
holdings of foreign assets were restricted to levels Just sufficient 
to cover their overseas liabilities. See: Temporar7 Banking Law No. 
94,1966, Article 11-H P. 17 (In Arabic) 
See P. 93 
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Loans and Advances. The same table shows that, out of the domestic use, 
credit facilities represented the largest item in the assets side, claiming 
an average of more than half of the total during the whole period. -Such 
credit was mainly extended in the form of overdraft which comprised., on 
average, 44.3% of bank assets during the same period. This credit con- 
tinued to be largely concentrated in the traditional foreign trade sector. 
Still influenced by the orthodox commercial loan theory. commercial banks 
in Jordan, modelled on the British, maintained their past experience of 
providing loans for only short-term purposes. Proper term lending was 
virtually non-existent. As will be discussed later, in this chapter, 
credit concentration in financing the foreign'-trade sector and term 
lending practice have both significant implications for the economic 
development of the Country, 
Liouid Assets. Bank holdings of domestic liquid assets claimed., on average 
about one quarter of total bank assets during the period under review. 
Their relative share experienced significant changes over the-years, rising 
from only 8.2% in 1964 to 29.9/'Io by 1977. This noticeable shift-can be 
explained by two main factors: (a) as a result of repatriating over- 
seas funds,, the CBJ had to provide alternative domestic avenues for, 
banks' liquid investments. These banks were allowed-to deposit their 
funds with the CBJ against receiving interest. 
0) 
This procedure led to 
a rise in the relative share of liquid assets from only 8.2% of total 
assets in 1964 to 17.7% and 22. C% in 1965 and 1966 respectively. ý(b) The 
introduction of now forms of domestic liquid assets (representing - 
(I ) This point is disCU33ed later in the Chapter... See, P. 
- . 
142 
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treasury bills in 1969 and development bonds in 1971(l)) further 
increased the relative significance of liquid assets in bank asset 
portfolio. Although commercial banks financed their purchase of treasury 
bills In 1969 by running down their balances with the CW (i. e. by 
changing the relative composition of the liquid assets themselves)., the 
purchase of government bonds in 1971 was mainly financed by running down 
their holdings of foreign assets, which declined from 7.5% of total 
assets in 1970 to 3.7% in 1971. As can be seen from the table, the 
acquisition of treasury bills in 1969 d3d not result in ar; y change in 
the relative share of liquid assets, whereas the purchase of development 
bonds in 1971 increased the relative importance of liquid assets to 
30.7% as compared with 24.2% in 1970. 
Howeverp although the structure of bank liquid assets has changed 
in favour of domestic uses, the volume of liquid assets held by the 
banks in relation'to their deposits has still been high and above the 
officially desired level. It will be argued later that the excess 
liquidity maintained by banks has an important'bearing as a potential 
source of financing economic development. 
Equity Investment. Bank holdings of industrial shares and securities 
comprised only a minor proportion of their total assets, averaging less 
than-1% throughout the v&ole period. This indicated the insignificant 
participation of commercial banks in the equity capital of the industrial 
enterprises, thus reflecting banks' conservative attitude towards this type 
of investment. Their conservatism can. be-further illustrated. if the 
value of their share holdings is compared with the legal- ceilings 
(1) Although these bonds'had a maturity of three years, they were 
considered by the CW as liquid assets for purposes of computing 
liquidity ratios. This procedure was taken to encourage banks 
to acquire these bonds in their asset portfolio. See the CBJ9 
Eigth Annual Report, 1971, P. 70 
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that commercial banks were forbidden to overtake in equity participation. 
Bank investment in the equity capital of any industrialt commercial and 
agricultural enterprise was restricted by law to a certain percentage 
of the bank total capital and reserves. The maximum ceiling was fixed 
in the 1959 Law at 15%. then raised to 25% and finally to 75% in accor- 
dance with the two amending laws of 1966 and 1971.0 
) 
Desp ite these 
relaxations, however, equity participation continued to form only a 
minor segment of bank capital and reserves. As indicated by the table, 
such investments reached a maximum of JD 2.50 million in 1977, thus 
comprising only 12% of total bank capital and reserves. 
Not only did commercial banks shy away from any signiiicant 
participation in the equity capital of the industrial firms, but these 
banks also hesitated to furnish these industries with the type of credit 
necessary to finance their expansion. It will be shown that even the 
small proportion of their credit going to finance industrial activities 
was confined only to financing the circulating capital of existing 
industries. Commercial banks never ventured beyond their traditional 
boundaries by extending their operations to finance medium or long-term 
financial requirements of industrialists. Moreover, they have not 
maintained close relations with the industrial sector in the sense of 
providing financial advice and assistance in the preparation of new 
industrial undertakings, unlike the experience of many countries during 
their early stages of development. 
(2) 
It can beitherefore, said that 
Excluded from this restriction was the participation in the equity 
capital of any project or instit, 4tion with a direct relation to. 
economic development. 
(2) Germany and Japan have been cited as cases in point. See Chapter 
19 PP. 2-3 
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commercial banks in Jordan played little direct role in promoting 
industrial development. It was for this reason that the need arose for 
a specialised financial institution capable of meeting such industrial 
requirements. As will be discussed in Chapter 8, these needs were 
partly met by the Industrial Development Bank which was established in 
1965. 
However, in the context of the promotional impact of the commercial 
banks, indirect contribution was made by these banks to industrial 
expansion by their provision of share transaction facilities. Since a 
domestic capital market only commenced operations in 1978, industrial 
firms used to raise- funds through the commercial banks. This undoubtedly 
made it more convenient for industrialists to meet their financial needs, 
and, at the same time, encouraged the public to invest in industrial 
enterprises. Purchase through the banking system had in fact more 
response from the public than would have been the case if people had 
to buy direct from the firms. Influenced by their confidence in the 
banking system, people believed that commercial banks would not 
accept such undertaking unless they themselves were convinced of the 
future financial position of these firms. 
Having analysed the composition of bank assets and the channels in 
which resources have been invested, it is necessary now to assess the 
allocation function. of commercial banks# showing how far their asset 
portfolio behaviour has been in lin4'_wI: th the country's development 
needs. Thus, from an economic development point of view, three areas 
of functional deficiencies can be recognised: firstly, strict adherence 
to traditional banking practice of confining bank credit only to short- 
term loans; term lending was virtually non-existent. Secondly, a distinct 
sectoral bias towards financing foreign trade transactions; little 
attention has been given to priority sectors. Thirdly, maintaining 
excessive liquidity in domestic banking, which has been unnecessarily 
held because of conservatism and lack of innovation on the part of many 
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banks. These systemic features will now be examined in detail. 
(a) A Strict adherence to 'traditional' commercial banking theory. 
Influenced by their past, commercial banks in Jordan followed the 
British banking tradition of confining credit extended to short-term- 
loans. This traditional practice is based on the ground that banks should 
not lock up in illiquid medium and long-term advances funds which they 
have acquired on. sight or short notice. Such an orthodox banking prac- 
tice of borrowing short and lending short is undoubtedly sound and 
characterised the successful experience of British banks over their long 
history. This concept formed the base for the 'commercial loan theory, 
of banking which predominated in the 19201s. However, a departure from 
this theory took place in the U. S. A. as early as 1933, when the experience 
of the great depression taught the lesson that the short-term character 
of a loan was not necessarily an assurance of liquidity for a bank. 
(') 
The departure from orthodoxy was, in fact, necessitated by the growing 
demands made upon the commercial banks for longer-term credit. After 
the great depression of 1933, many industrial firms in the U. S. A. 
experienced an increasing demand for longer-term advances. 
(2) 
, In response 
to this, commercial banks began to review their operational criteria and 
then deviated from orthodoxy by introducing the term-lending technique 
into their practice. 
(3) 
(1) The American Bankem Association, The Commercial Banking IndustrV. 
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J. Prentic-Hall, inc. 1962) P. 148 
(2) National Bureau of Economic Research, CapitaI in Manufacturing an 
Mining. Its Formation and Finanoin (ýr-inceton: Princeton University 
Press, 1960) P. 179. 
The expression 'term lending' refers to loans with maturities over 
one year (i. e. both medium and long-term loans). Term lending 
is used in the discussion as distinct from short-term lending which is usually extended for periods up to one year. 
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Howeverv the above innovation was not only necessitated by changing 
economic needs, but it was also justified 'On theoretical grounds. - Banks 
considerations and attitudes towards their liquidity have undergonel'', 
significant changes over time, and have become nowadays less connected 
to the short-term character and self-liquidating aspect of the commercial 
loan theory. Attitudes and views on how a bank can best provide for 
its liquidity have changed over the last 50 years, from the traditional 
concept of the 'commercial loan theory' of the 1920's, to the Ishiftability 
thesis' in the 1930's, to the theory of 'anticipated income' in the 1940's 
and 1950's and, finally, to the doctrine of 'liability management' in 
the 196o's. 
(I) 
These theories have largely influenced banking'practice 
in many countries, while they only left marginal impacts on others. It 
is therefore necessax7, first of all, to briefly review the above four 
theories which provided the theoretical base on which commercial'banks 
(2) 
relied in undertaking longer-term business. 
(1) The 'Commercial Loan Theory' of Banking. ' This theory insists 
that because of the nature of their deposits, commercial banks should 
(3) 
confine their business to short-term, self-liquidating transactions. 
L. Ritter and W. Silber, Principles of Money. Banking and Financial 
Markets, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1974) P. 399. 
(2) Throughout the discussion of banking theories, reference is made 
to the following: Ritler and Silber, op-cit. PP. 400-405; 'and the 
American BankerrAssociation, op. cit. PP. 146-153; and S. Basu, 
A Review of Current Banking and Practice (London: Macmillan Ltd. ' 
1974) PP. 26 1 -26 6. 
The 'Self-liquidating' aspect of the theory implies th,? t the funds 
which the borrower must use to repay his loan should arise from 
the very transaction being financed by the same loan. Financing 
inventories can serve as illustriting examples here since the 
borrower is expected to repay his loan from the quick sale of these 
inventories. Such transactions being on short-terms and of self- 
liquidating character would give a continuous and automatic self- 
liquidation of bank assets. See Ritter and Silber, OP-cit. P. 400 
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As was shown earlier, the experience of the 1933 depression proved the 
fallacy of this theory because banks' attempts to -obtain payments -of, such 
loans to meetýdepositsl withdrawals often failed. 'This experience showed 
that the, short-term and self-liquidating character, of loans wasýnot a 
guarantee for bank liquidity. 
(2) The 'Shiftability Thesis' . The shortcomings, of the above 
theory led to the development of -the shiftability thesis which means 
that the bank can safeguard its liquidity if it possesses assets, regard- 
less of their nature, which can be sold readily when funds are needed. - 
This theory, however, had a similar defect to the preceding traditional 
theory, since securing liquidity by shifting assets to others, is not 
guaranteed in a crisis, when all banks. are affected and when an indivi- 
dual bank faces-difficulties in shifting its own assets to obtain., liquidity. 
In such circumstances, liquidity is obtained from the Central Bank which 
is the ultimate source of liquidity for the banking-system as a whole. -, 
Within this concepti the extent of an individual bank, liquidity, instead 
of depending on, the short-term, self-lijuidating aspect of an asset, - 
became more related to the ability of the bank to shift-assets, especially 
to ý the Central Bank, and the extent to which the latter accepts such 
shiftable assets. 
The'Anticipatea Income' Theory. The shiftability-thesis 
encour8ged commercial banks to extend their operations into holding 
longer-term assets as far as these assets are sound, and espeoially-if 
they are easily shiftable and acceptable to the Central Bqnk. Started 
in the U. S. A., as indicated earlier, commercial banks developed the- 
term-lending technique by providing medium and long-term credit to 
businessmen, This was based on a new theory called the anticipated 
income which was a distinct departure from the traditional loan theory. 
A term loan, having a maturity of more than a year but-usually not - 
exceeding five years, is repayable either by regular instalm-ants. over 
a fixed period of time, or in full at a given date. The repayments are 
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usually made out of the future earnings of the borrower which accrue 
to him from his transactions with numerous third parties. This is in 
sharp contrast with the self-liquidating aspect of the commercial loan 
theory which claimed that every loan should automatically generate its 
own repayments. What is important according to the new theory is the 
soundness of the-loan and the proper examination of the borrower's 
creditworthiness. This theory has changed banks' attitudes and consider- 
ations for their liquidity: -, while in the traditional loan theory loans 
are liquidated by selling the borrower's assets, and in the shiftability 
doctrine by shifting them to other parties, bank liquidity according to 
the anticipated income concept can be provided by periodical repayments 
which provide a continuous cash inflow, thus contributing regularly to 
liquidity. Bank liquidity, moreover, can be provided, by resorting to 
the Central Bank in an emergency, 
(4) Liability Management. A new development in liquidity consider- 
ations occurred in the 1960's, when the interest was shifted to the other 
part of the balance sheet, i. e. the liabilities side. With the exception 
of the occasional resort to the Central Bank, the aforementioned three 
theories relied on asset management for providing liquidity; whereas 
the fourth concept reveals that banks can secure their liquidity by 
managing their liabilities. That is, instead of adapting their assets 
portfolio to fit the structure of their liabilities, banks began to 
take a target asset growth as given and then adjust their liabilities 
to meet their needs. Banks, therefore, started to invest their funds 
in different types of assets, regardless of their liquidity,, relying on 
their ability to borrow money when the need for liquidity arose. One 
main defect of this theory, however, is that bank liquidity in this case 
will depend mainly on market conditions which may not be encouragJXLg 
for borrowing. Competition with other borrowing instruments, such as 
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treasuzy bills, together with the intervention of the Central Bank in 
the market operations, may sometimes make it unprofitable for banks to 
borrow, thus endangering their liquidity. 
What can be understood from the above theories is that banks' 
considerations for their liquidity have undergone considerable changes 
over. time and,, in actual practice nowadays, they depend on managing both 
sides of their balance sheet to secure liquidity, Moreover, the recent 
theories proved the fallacy of the strict adherence to the commercial 
loan theor7, thus providing a solid theoretical base for term lending 
practice. This was further encouraged by some views expressed by bankers 
and economists who strongly criticised the traditional loan theory. For 
example, in a lecture given at the 6th International Banking Summer 
School in 1953, Dr. Shweitzer emphasised the fact that bank credit has 
nowadays lost, to a great extent, its self-liquidating and self-securing 
character as implied by the orthodox banking theory. 
(1) 
The fallacy of 
this theory was earlier shown by Joseph Schumpeter when he stated that: 
The short-term character of bank credit is indeed one of the 
fictions of banking theory and rests on the prejudice that banks 
essentially lend their depositors' money whereas their essential 
function lies in their creation of money I not 
in acting as 
intermediaries between borrowers and depOsitors. (2) 
On the practical side, term lending continued to form increasing 
proportions of the American's bank credit., rising from one quarter in 
1939 to 38% in 1957. 
(3) 
The relative importance of this type of credit 
was further increased to average around 53% - 5816 between 1960 - 1963., 
(4) 
(1) Dr. S. Schweitzer, "The Transformation of Bank Credit and Its 
New Forms". In Recent Evolution of the Role of Banks in the Econo 
Lectures given at the 6th International Banking Summer School in 
1953 (Brussels, Association Beige de Banques) P-79. 
(2) Joseph A. Schumpeter, "Money and the Social Product". In International 
Economic Papers (London: Macmillan and Company Ltd. 1956 6p P. 204. 
(3) The American BankervAssociation, Commercial Banking Industry, 
op. cit. P. 146 
(4) Joachim Ahrensdorf, "Japanese Bank Loans For Private Fixed Invest- 
ment". IMF Staff Papers,, (March 1,165) P. 67. 
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The American experience in this field was followed by many developed 
countries which found the technique necessary to satisfy the increasing 
demand for longer-term credit. Germany, Japan, France, and Italy are 
cases in point where the relative importance of term lending in total 
credit during the period 1960 - 1963 accounted for 20%, 15%, 14% and 
10% respectively. 
(1) 
Even in Britain, the origin of banking tradition, 
there was a shifting interest towards term lending. The Radcliffe 
Committee in 1959 revealed that such types of credit became no longer 
alien to British banks and recommended that: 
"The banks should be ready to offer term loans facilities, 
within reasonable limits, having due regard to their liquidity 
requirements, as an alternative to running overdraft for 
creditworthy industrial and commercial customers" (2) 
In response to this recommendation, the clearing banks became increasingly 
engaged in lending for periods up to 5-7 years. The involvement 
of British banks in term lending manifested itself clearly in the 1970's 
as a result of the ending of quantitative credit restrictions in 1971 
and the greater degree of operational flexibility obtained through 
access to wholesale deposits. 
(3) 
Thus by the end of 1976, the proportion 
of lending provided on a medium-term basis comprised 40% of total credit 
extended to industry and trade, compared to less than 27% in 1973. 
(4) 
(1) Ibid 
(2) committee on the working of the Monetary System "Report Presented to 
Parliament by the Chancellor of the Exchequer by Command of 
Her Majesty", Cmnd. 827 (London: August 1959) Paragraph 942. 
(3) Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions: 
Evidence on the Financing of Industry and Trade (London: 
H. M. S. O. March 1978) Vol. 5, P. 148 
(4) Ibid. P. 149 
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The term lending technique also found a strong response in developing 
countries which realised its significance for the genuine requirements 
of their economies. This was based on the official recognition of the 
desperate need of their economies for medium and long-term credit 
associated with undertaking comprehensive development programmes. Term 
lending can be used to finance future productive expansion by financing 
the acquisition of raw materials, livestock, and other industrial 
machinery and equipment. The importance of term lending was not only 
emphasised by the monetary authorities in some developing countries, 
but it was also felt by the commercial banks themselves in countries 
like India where: 
"The need for participation by commercial banks in equipment 
capital financing through the provision of term loans in 
the context of India's rapidly developing economy has been 
stressed by the country's central bank and also recognised 
by the bankers themselves. In recent years, the Indian 
banking system has shown a heightened awareness of this 
need and has displayed an increasing interest in term-lending 
business. " (1) 
The term lending technique was also recommended to Latin American 
economies. In discussing the role which financial institutions should 
play in the course of economic development, what Dr. Marquez insisted 
upon was that the loans should be sound, expressing the view that: 
"There was no reason why commercial banks should not make medium 
and long-term loans. The liquidity of short-term inventory loans 
was economically meaningless. Embarrassment of the banks as a 
result of a shrinkage in the total volume of deposits was not 
to be expected nowadays since such shrinkage was unlikely. The: 
Central Bank, moreover, could always help them out if necessary". (2) 
(1) S. Basu, A Review of Current Banking and Practice, op. cit. P. 283 
(2) H. Ellis, Economic Development for Latin America 
(London: Macmillan and Company Ltd., 1961) P. 199 
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Many developing countries went even further by requiring commercial 
banks, by law,, to extend a certain percentage of their resources for 
longer-term purposes. Thus, one outstanding feature of bank legislation 
in these countries is the explicit specification of a certain percentage 
of banks' funds that should be invested in medium and long-term forms. 
(') 
Bank legislation in Guatemala requires commercial banks to extend a 
limited amount of loans with maturities in excess of one year but not 
(2) 
exceeding three years. The Monetary Board is authorised to specify 
from time to time the amount of such credit as a percentage. - either of 
bank deposits, or of its capital and reserves. 
(3 ) 
Bank legislation in 
the Dominican Republic permitted commercial banks to allocate a specified 
percentage of their funds in loans even for a period exceeding three 
years subject to the approval of the Superintendent of banks. 
(4) 
The 
Korean General Bank Act also permits commercial banks to extend their 
activities into long-term busines3. 
(5) 
In Greece, the Central Bank'in 
1957 required commercial banks to allocate lWo (raised later to 151o) 
of their deposits for medium and long-term loans, mainly to industrial 
firms. 
(6) 
The General Banking Legislation of Paraguay also allowed 
commercial banks to extend term loans UP to 70% of their saving deposits 
and of 15% of other deposits. 
(7) 
(1) S. Basu, A Review of Current Banking and Practiee,, op. cit. P. 281 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) Ib id. 
(5) Ibid. 
Xenophon Zolotas, 
with sDecial Refe 
S. Basu, op. cit. P. 281 
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The above enforcement of term lending in bank legislation-in, many 
developing countries reflects the awareness of the authorities of the 
significance of this type of credit to their economies. Howeverp the 
significance of term lending differs from one country to another, depending 
on the prevailing economic and financial circumstances in each individual 
country. This means that introducing such a technique into banking 
practice of a country may be unnecessary if the need for this did not 
arise. As was shown, the business of term lending was a post-war 
financial innovation introduced by the American-banks in response to 
changing economic needs. Slavish imitation by todais developing 
countries of the financial experience of the more developed countries, 
regardless of the special needs of their economies,, should be vigourously 
avoided. Such imitation may be as harmful to these economies as that 
which would result from their strict adherence to inappropriate 
orthodox banking practice. In other words, every individual country must 
adjust its own banking practice to suit its particular environment, , - 
guided to a large extent by the hard core financial experience of obher 
countries. Bearing this in mind, it is necessary now, to inquire whether 
there is a case for commercial banks in Jordan to undertake term lending,, 
or whether they are justified in, confining, their credit to short-term' 
character as understood by orthodox banking practice. IIý,. I ýI ý 
Banks' strict adherence to traditional lending-practice might be 
appropriate to the circumstances within which these institutions, used 
to function dur-ing the colonial era. Before independence, no emphasis 
was given to develop internal agricultural and industrial activities 
Ybich, by nature, require longer-term facilities. The main interest was 
directed towards facilitating foreign trade transactions, which usually 
demand short-term credit. The-commercial loan theory,, therefore, 
adequately fit the particular environment within which banks had to 
operate. These eircumztances naturany changed after independence with 
more emphasis being put on domestic development. Banks nevertheless 
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continued to extend credit only on a short-term basis, even when the 
country embarked upon comprehensive development programmes starting 
in 1973. Strict adherence to orthodox lending practice is undoubtedly 
harmful since economic development, which involves building up of 
capital equipment, requires longer-term financing. It might be argUQA 
here that this type of credit is provided by special credit institutions, 
such as the Industrial Development Bank (in the case of manufacturing) 
and the Agricultural credit Corporation (in the case of agriculture). 
This is true; but the increasing demand for longer-term credit which 
accompanied development programmes is above the lending capacity of 
such specialised institutions as will be shown in Chapter, 8. This 
situation requires the commercial banks to participate in meeting part 
of such new demands if they have to contribute effectively to the economic, 
development of the country. 
It was shown that the introduction of term lending into banking 
practice was justified on theoretical grounds. Moreover, the argument 
for term lending in the particular case of Jordan is not only necessitated 
by the increas ing demand f or s uch loans . but it is further encouraged by 
the structure and nature of bank deposits. As was shown earlier, about 
half of bank deposits is of a relative stable character, in the form of 
time and saving deposits,, which banks can rely upon in extending longer- 
term facilities without endangering their liquidity. As Richard Bond 
argues 
"The asset structure of a commercial bank is influenced to a 
considerable extent by its deposit structure. Time depositso 
for example , tend to be more stable and predictable than demand deposits. As is well known., the greater stabiliV of time deposits 
entices banks to place a greater proportion of these funds in high 
earnings, though less liquid assets. "(1) 
Furthermore, demand deposits In Jordan are not as fluid and- 
volatile as their counterpart in the more developed countries, and even 
as compared with many developing countries. It was illustrated that due 
(1) Richard Bondq "Deposit Composition and Commercial Bank Earnings, " 
Journal of Finance., (March 1971) P-41. 
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to many reasons, demand deposits in Jordan have a low turnover which 
indicates that they are used less, comparatively speaking, -in a specific 
period of time. In other words, part-of such deposits is, in effect, a 
disguised form of saving deposits which can further encourage longer, 
term business. Given all these favourable conditions, it is necessary 
for commercial banks to review and reconsider their lending policies to 
serve the growing requirements of the Jordanian economy. This does not 
mean that short-term lending by commercial banks is no longer importantý, 
but it is still essential for financing and smoothing various economic 
activities. What is required is not a complete departure from the 
traditional lending practice, but a partial deviation-from strict 
orthodoxy necessitated by changing economic conditions. It is therefore 
stggested that term lending should not comprise the bulk of bank credit, 
thus transferring these banks into investment banks, rather it should 
comprise only a moderate proportion of their funds, which does not 
endanger their liquidity. This is consistent with whatWilliamson 
recommended for developing countries. In a lecture given at the Central 
Bank of Egypt in 1965, he emphasised that' 
"A portion of Commercial banks' funds can be tied up in various 
loans or investment which are a little longer than would be 
strictly Justifiable on normal banking tests"(1) 
One final point regarding the introduction of term lending practice 
in Jordan deserves mentioning. In asking them to extend longer-term 
loans, commercial banks may raise two major issues. Firstly,, they may 
argue that they have already been Contributing to financing longer-term 
purposes on informal basis. Although they extend credit'only on short-, 
terms, some of their sound loans are sometimes subject to renewal when 
they mature. Commercial banks in this practice are, in fact., following 
G. I. Williamson,, The Role and Practice of Commercial banks and - 
other Institutions in Financing Developmen . 
(Cairo: National Eank 
Of EgYPtt 19G5) P-11. 
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the British example of 'rolling-over' their short-term credit extended 
to reliable borrowers. However, although such a practice may contribute 
to'financing longer-term needs, borrowers cannot'depend on such an 
unpredictable source of funds for long-term purposes. In planning their 
future expansion, for example, businessmen want to'make sure that long- 
term funds necessary for this expansion are certainly obtainable. Rolling- 
over short-term credit does not provide this assurance because such a 
practice is subject to annual review, which may deprive the borrower of 
using the loan for longer periods. This point was adequately explained 
by the Radcliffe Committee in Britain which emphasised that rolling-over 
short-term credit cannot meet long-term reliArements as formal term lending 
because: 
...... Bank overdrafts are however legally repayable on demand and 
in practice subject to review annually; and it 
' 
seems that some 
borrowers consider that, because the overdraft is subject to 
annual review, and because they fear that the annual review may 
sometimes lead to a request for reduction of the overdraft, bank 
credit is too unreliable form of credit for medium and longer-term 
purposes. "M 
Secondly, banks may rightly also argue that if term lending practice 
is to be accepted, the Central Bank of Jordan should provide rediscounting 
facilities for long-term -as. seta to secure bank liquidity in an emergency. 
This is a pre-requisite condition for encouraging commercial banks to 
venture into such new bus . iness. It is necessary to 'note ýerethat dentral 
banking legislation in Jordan forbids the CBJ from providing commercial 
banks with rediscounting facilities'for'any financial instrument with 
(2) 
maturities exceeding nine months. Jordanian bank legislation, 
therefore, not only lacks legal enforcement of term lending by commercial 
banks (as was shown in recent bank, legislation, in many developing 
countries), but also discourages commercial banks from undertaking such 
(1) Committee on the Working of the Monetary Systemp Report Represented 
to Parliament by the Chancellor of the Exchequor by Command of Her 
Majest . op. cit. Parag. 941. 
(2) Central Bank of Jordan, Law No. 93 for 1966&. Article 39-b 
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important business voluntarily. It will be shown in Chapter 11 that ýr 
if term lending is to be encouraged, it is essential first to modify 
such an impediment to enable the CBJ to secure bank licluidity by 
rediscounting long-term financial instruments. 
(b) A distinct bias towards financing the general commerce qnd. 
foreign trade sector at the expense of other important domestic 
activities. 
Commercial banks in Jordan are still heavily geared to the finance 
of the foreign trade sector which claimed the bulk of their credit, 
averaging 43-3% týroughout the period 1964 - 1-976. 
(1 ) The sectoral 
distribution of bank credit has not been significantly altered, even 
after 1973 when priority was given to promoting internal agricultiral 
and manufacturing activities within comprehensive development programmes. 
As can be observed from Table 4.7, although the relative share of the 
foreign trade sector in total bank credit experienced a slight decrease, 
dropping from 49.2% to 44.4% between 1964 and 19769 it was still by 
far the predominent share. Another decline occurred in the proportion 
going to the transport sector which halved between the beginning and 
the end of the period, decreasing from 8. Wo-in 1964 to 4.3% in 1976. 
The decline in the relative share of the above two sectors was-made, up 
for mainly by the spectacular growth of the share that went in favour 
(2) 
of the construction sector - the percentage having Jumped from 7.7% in 
1964 to 16.8% in 1976. On the other hand, the relative importance of 
See Table 4.7 which illustrates the relative shares of the main 
economic sectors in GDP as well as in bank credit. The aim here 
is to reveal whether the sectoral distribution of bank credit has 
been altered in line with the structural changes that occurred in 
the real economy. The analysis excludes the year 1977 because the 
actual figures for the relative contribution of economic sectors 
to GDP have not been published yet. However, the sectoral allocation 
of credit for 1977 is shown in Appendix 4-5 - 
(2) This rise was in part due to a property boom that was related to the existence of high domestic rates of inflation during the last years of this Period. 
134 
Table 4.7 - The Relative weight of the main Economic 
Sectors in Both GDP and 
Bank Credit. 1964 -I ZZ6 
Wholesale and Agriculture Mining and Construction Transportation 
Retail Trade Manufacturing 
Y ear 
5 of 
] 
% of % of % of % of % of % of % of. % of % of 
GDP Credit GDP Credit GDP 
I 
Credit GDP Credit GDP Credit 
1964 20.7 49.2 25.2 2. ý 9.2 12.0 4.0 7.7- 8.9 8.8 
1965 20.8 51.3 22. j 2.0 10.7 13.0 5.2 7.4 8.4 7.0 
1966 19.3 52.2 18.5 1.6 11.5 12.2 6. '2 8.4 9.6 5.5 
1967 22.1 44.6 21.9 2.0 9.9 10.9 4.9 12.9 8.1+ 4.6 
1968 17.3 41.6 16.3 1.6 11.9 9.8 5.8 14.9 8.6 4.4 
1%9 19.3 42.0 18.3 1.6 11 .6 9.3 5.5 15.7 8.1' 3.1+ 
1970 20.0 37.1 15.1 1.3 10.4 10.5 4. A 24.6 8.4 5.3 
1971 19.3 40.4 18.7 1.7 10.1 9.8 3.7 . 22-4. 8.0 5.6 
1972 18.9 42.4 18.9 1.6 11.3 9.2 4.3 21.1 8.1 4.8 
1973 18.8 40.5 13.3 3.3 11.9 10.2 6.5 23.4 8.4 3.6 
1974 16.9 36.1 17.7 4.5 15.9 12.5' 5.5 22.4 ý8.2 6.3 
1975 16.3 42.3 10.0 3.0 18.1 12.4 6.0 21.6 ý9.3 3.0 
1976 15.0 44.1+ 11.1 2.8 18.2 12.0 1 6.9 16.8 10.0 1 4.3 
Av 
194- 18.8 43.3 17.5 2.3 12.4 11.1 5.3 16.9 8.6. 5.1 
1976 
Source: (i) For GDP Percentages, See Appendix 4.4 
(2) For Bank Credit Percentages, See Appendix 4.5 
* Includes credit for real estate purchase. 
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credit going to agricultural and manufacturing activities (sectors - 
having priority in domestic development strategies) did not show any 
considerable charge throughout the Yhole period. The relative size'of 
credit extended to both sectors by 1976 ranged-around the same-, level-' 
as in 1964. The relative share of agriculture in 1964 was"as-low as 
2.91%. and continued around this level to account for 2.8% in 1976. -The 
same experience occurred in the relative proportion going to the manufac- 
turing industries which remained constairt at 12% between 1961+ and 1976. 
Credit concentration in the foreign trade sector can be related, 
firstly, to the relatively high share of this sector in GDP'and, 'secondly', 
to the fact that this has been a traditional area which commercial banks 
preferred to finance throughout their history. Although the relative 
importance of the foreign trade sector in'GDP declined slightly from 
20.7% to 15. C% between 1964 and 1976, 'this sector remained a major 
contributor to GDP, comprising an average ratio of 18. wo throughout the 
whole period. However, such a relative share, though substantial, was 
not as much as to absorb 43.3% of the total credit extended to all-" 
economic sectors. The above second factor may, therefore, provide 
another explanation for credit concentration'-in foreign trade activities. 
This has been further encouraged by the-short-term'nature of the'6redit 
required by this sector, which commercial banks have always preferred 
to finance. 
A distinguishing feature of commercial banking in developing 
countries, nowadays, is the rising importance of-the relative share 
of the manufacturing sector in total bank credit at the expense of 
the foreign trade sector, 
(') 
This trend is'-consistent with-the growing 
official interest towards diversifying and developing other domestic 
sectors of the economy, particularly manufacturing, within a comprehensive 
(1) S. Basu, A Review of Current Banking and Practice. op. cit. P. 293 
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p1hnning of economic development. As the economy grows anl diversifies 
its activities, a shift in bank credit towards those sectors which are 
given prime priority occurs. India, Ghana, and Nigeria are cases where 
the distribution of bank credit has radically altered in response to 
the new structural change in their-ecOý6mieS. - In India,, while the 
relative share of manufteturing and agriculture in total bank credit 
rose respectively from 34% and 2% in 1951 to_64% and V- in 1970, the 
proportion-going to commerce dropped significantly from 41% to 17% 
during the. same period, -(') 
in Ghana, the'deciini in credit going to 
commerce f'z%)m 37% in 1961 to 25% in 1965 was made up for'by the notice- 
able rise in the relative share of agriculture which rose from only 
5% to 22%. 
(2) 
Nigeria-also provides a clear example where the relative 
importance of the traditional trade sectordeclined from 35% to 2% 
between 1958 and 1 %5, whereas manufacturing industry increased its 
share from 5% of'total'credit to 14%'duý&g'the-same period. 
(3) 
I-I. - 
However, this was not the case in Jordan where the sectoral 
distribution of bank credit has not been-con3istent with the emphasis 
placed on developing and diversifying the national economy. The propor- 
tion of bank credit going to the directly producing sectors-, 'which have 
been emphasisea by development programmes, remained without arq 
sigrificant change despite the increase -in their relative contribution 
to GDP. This is quite clear (as can be seen by-Figure 4-4)"in the case 
of the manufacturing sector v&ich doubled its contribution to GDP 
(I ) Ibid. P. 292 I 
(2) S. Basu, Central Banking In the Emerging Countries. A study of 
African Experiments, (N. Y.: Asim Publishing House, 1967) P-33. 
(3) Ibid. P. 23 
For domestic development strategies and the significance given 
to directly producing sectors, see Chapter 3, PP- 59 - 61 
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between 1964 and 1976 without a corresponding rise in its relative share 
I in total credit, which remained constant at 12ý76. - Although there was a- 
slight increase in the relative share of this sector with the implemen- 
tation of development programmes in 1973, this was clearly insufficient 
to match the increasing importance of this sector in GDP and the great 
emphasis placed by development strategies on promoting this sector. 
This situation reflects, firstly, the poor adaptation of the commercial 
banks to the changing needs of their economy and, secondly, the failure 
of the monetary authorities to sufficiently influence the allocation of 
bank credit in favour of developmental activities., It will be argued 
in Chapter 11 that, for the commerci&1 baxAs to participate actively 
in development, their operations should be effectively planned along 
the lines laid down in economic development strategies. The pursuance 
of specific central banking innovations, will be shown necessary to en- 
courage and direct the flow of bank resources towards priority sectors, 
thereby promoting the required structural change in the real economy. 
(c) 'Excessive liquidity holdings maintained by the Commercial Banks. 
Prior to the creation of the CBJ, commercial banks were not subject 
to any law regulating their liquidity. Nevertheless, commercial banks 
conventionally maintained a high ratio of liquidassets (mainly in 
overseas forms) to deposits, averaging around 581- throughout the period 
1951 - 1964-(1) The absence of liquidity regulations, was ended in,, _. 
1966 by the Temporary Banking Law which stipulated that bank holdings, 
of specified liquid assets should range between 25% - 357- of total bank 
deposits. 
(2 ) 
The maximum ceiling on bank liquidity was removed in - 
accordance with the Temporary Banking Law of 1971, vdiich required the 
commercial banks to adhem to the minimum ceiling of-25%. 
(3 ) 
This was 
the case until August 1975, when the CBJ raised the minimum liquidity 
(1) J. Sal-ah, The Evolution of the Banking System in Jordan op. cit. P-42 
(2) CBJ, Third Annual Report, 
-1966, 
P. 8. 
(3) CB-T. Temporary Bsnking Lsw No. 23 of J971, Article 17-b 
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ratio to 30%. 
(') 
In addition to specifying lirluidity ratios; commercial 
banks were also required to hold a minimum percentage of their deposits 
in balances with the CBJ. Thus, in January 1967, commercial banks, for 
the first time in their history.. became subject to a minimum cash ratio 
of 7%. 
(2) 
This ratio was raised to lWo in December 1970 and'to 127o in 
August 1974.0) Finally, starting from_November 1976, the res 
. 
erve ratio 
on demand deposits was raised to 15% whereas that imposed on time and 
(4) 
saving deposits remained unchanged at I eo. 
An examination of Table 4.8 clearly reveals that commercial banks 
continued their conventional practice of maintaining high liquidity ratios, 
averaging around 44.3%. much higher than the statutory minimum specified 
by the CBJ (See Figure 4-5. a). - This situation can be largely explained 
by the fact that commercial banks were still pursuing very cautious and 
conservative operational policies inherited from their past. - The 
application of conservative lending criteria by many commercial banks, 
such as requiring high standards of cre##, orthiness and certain types 
of collaterals, undoubtedly minimised the opportunity for domestic 
investors to acquire adequate bank credit. This accordingly led commer- 
cial banks to accumulate larger proportions of their funds in liquid 
forms, much above the necessary and the offical-desired level. As can 
be seen from the table, the level of free liquidity maintained by banks 
(1) CBJ, Twelfth Annual Report 12Z. 5. P-34. However, the above ratio 
was temporarily raised to 3Z/a in Dec. 1976 and to 35% starting in 
Jan. 1977. This was part of the stringent monetary policy which 
was followed in 1976 and was relaxed later in 1977. The liquidity 
ratio was again fixed at the previous level of 306. See Chapter 11,, 
P. 371 
(2) CBJ, The Central Bank During Ten Years, op. cit. PP. 66-67 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) See Chapter 11, P. 370 
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(i. e. the amount of liquid assets in excess of the official minimum 
required) was substantially high, fluctuating around 18.0% throughout 
the Yhole period. This was mare than half of the present legal minimum 
of 3C%. Banks' conservatism, however, was encouraged by the political 
instability in the region,, which further accentuated their desire to 
be very liquid. 
Excessive liguidity in commercial banking was also intensified 
when commercial banks were allowed to deposit their funds with the 
CBJ and receive interest after the-1966 prohibition of overseas invest- 
ment. Due to the lack of domestic outlets for short-term investment, 
the CW had, as a compensatary procedure, to provide such an alternative 
as a temporary solution until adequate domestic investment occurred. 
Nevertheless, the CW continued to pay interest on such deposits even-, 
when internal short-term investment became available. 
(') 
It was not 
until 1974 that the CBJ stopped paying interest only on that part which 
kept within the minimum legal requirements. 
(2) 
Interest on free cash 
reserves continued to be paid. This undoubtedly further intensified 
bank lijuidity and also discouraged commercial banks to seek invest- 
ment in alternative domestic activities. As can be seen from the 
table, actual cash reserves accounted-, on average, for 23. (Y/- during the 
whole period, a ratio which was more, than twice the average legal 
reserves required by the CBJ (See also Figure 4.5. b), Clearly, this 
behaviour reflected excessive prudential operational banking policies 
which were maintained despite the relatively low turnover of demand 
deposits as discussed earlier. 
(I ) Treasury Bills, for example, were issued for the first time in 1969. 
(2) CBX, -The Central Bank of Jordan During Ten Yearst OP-cit. P. 67 
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Maintaining such high liquidity in domestic banking, particularly 
in the form of unnecessary cash' reserves kept idle with the CBJ,, has a 
special significance as a potential source of financing economic devel- 
opment. An excessive liquidity ratio of 18.0% and a free cash reserve 
of 13-Ul. have undoubtedly absorbed substantial proportions of bank 
funds which could be otherwise invested in domestic development activities. 
This situation calls on development planners, together with the monetary 
authorities, to make a full use of such potentialities within further 
planning of the part that the financial system should play in economic 
development. 
It is important to mention here that the level of liquidity in 
domestic banking varied widely among individual banks. Such differences 
were not only related to orthodoxy or conservatism in banking practice, 
but they could be also explained by certain characteristics pertaining 
to the structure of the bank balance sheet. Changes in these character- 
istics or factors from one bank to another, or within the same bank 
over time, may lead to different positions of liquidity among banks. 
However, due to the significance of*excessive liquidity holdings as a 
major operational deficiency in commercial banking in Jordan, and because 
of the important implication of this situation for economic development, 
it is found useful to analyse and discuss the licluidity behaviour of the 
commercial banks in more detail. This will be the concern of Chapters 
5 and 6. 
Summary and Conclusions. / 
This chapter has analysed and then assessed commercial banking 
activity in Jordan with special reference to domestic economic develop- 
ment. The analysis demonstrated that commercial banks have played an 
important, though still insufficient, role in carrying out and facili- 
tating the saving-investment process through their intermediation 
between the sources of funds and their ultimate uses. As mobilisors 
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of funds, although these banks made notable progress (made evident by 
the rise in both the deposits/GNP ratio and the banking density ratio), 
nevertheless, little has been achieved in two major areas of, operation. 
(1) The mobilisation of untapped sources of savings in remote and rural 
regions. (2) The introduction of new effective metbods or-techni2. ues 
for encouraging a continuous influx of resources to the banking system. 
On the one hand, there was a clear absence of adopting effective adver- 
tisement and saving campaigns which would have been useful in attracting 
additional funds. On the other hand, there was a failure to offer real 
and attractive returns on bank deposits, thus discouraging further 
financialisation of domestic resources. As allocators, of funds,, 
commercial banks have not shown any significant adaptation of their 
operational lendizig practice to match the changing domestic needs. They 
displayed an obvious reluctance to venture beyond their traditional 
boundaries and did not therefore pursue innovational. lending policie6 
which were crucial to their economy. The sectoral distribution of 
bank credit was itill not consistent with the new trend towards the 
diversification and industrialisation of the domestic economy. Moreover, 
commercial banks have not been successful in tiýnsformlng the relatively 
more stable time and saving deposits into instruments of medium and 
long-term finance. This situation was exacerbated by maintaining high 
liquidity in commercial banking, particularly in idle cash reserves 
held with-the CBJ, which further minimised the flow of funds into 
productive channels. Given all these functional deficiencies, it is 
easy to understand the significance of the points th4t have been raised 
earlier,, particularly with reg4rd to the need for (1) introducing 
adequate financial innovations to improve banks' operational efficiency 
as mobilisers as well as allocators of funds, and (2) proper and detailed 
planning of the financial operations of these institutions within the 
general framework of development programmes. 
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It will be shown in Chapter 11 that, while effective participation 
of the commercial banks in domestic development requires them to further 
adapt to the changing needs of their economy,, this should be facilitated 
and encouraged by the CBJ which has to provide the appropriate financial 
climate for the readjustment process to take place. Central banking 
actions will be shown also necessary to exerci$e a vigorous influence 
over the allocation pattern of bank resources to bring it in line with 
the selected development strategies. 
However, prior to this, the liquidity behaviour and balance sheet 
structure of the commercial banks, together with the policy implications 
of their excess liquidity balances need to be examined in more depth. 
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CHAPTER 
LIQUIDITY BEHAVIOUR AND TBE BALANCE 
SHEET STRUCTURE OF C012ERCIAL BANKS 
The preceding chapter has already demonstrated that commercial 
banks in Jordan have always maintained excessive liquidity holdings, 
much above the officially desired levels. However, a close examination 
of individual banke liquidity reveals wide differences in liquidity 
positions. Although aýl banks are subject to the same framework of 
regulations specifying the quantity and the quality of the minimum 
liquidity ratio., individual banks behaved in distinctly different 
ways; some maintaining very high liquidityp while others kept their 
liquiaity within moaerate levels. 
(I) 
The general outcome was that 
the liquidity of the commercial banks as a whole was remarkably high. 
In general., liquidity variations among banks can be related to 
two main types of factors - 
(1) Institutional factors. Liquidity considerations vary from one 
bank to another because of differences in bank managementspsychological 
propensity to avoid or to accept risk. In other-words, whether bank 
managers are risk-takers or risk-avoiders can largely influence asset 
portfolio decisions of individual banks and thus their liquidity 
positions. ', * -, A6 Will be showTi later, two distinct groups of bank- 
management exist in Jordan. On the one hand, there are 'conservative' 
banks which tend to pursue orthodox and very cautious lending policies, 
confining their activities to traditional and well-established lines 
of business. On the other hand, there are 'aggressive' banks that 
(1) Iri a few cases, banks maintained negative excess liquidity (i*el 
operating at a level Of liquidity lower than the Officially 
prescribed level). 
\-S4 
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are less inhibited by traditions and more innovative in domestic 
banking practice. Clearly, conservatism and over-cautiousness on 
the part of the former lead to maintaining excessive liquidity,, whereas 
the more dynamic approach of banking adopted by the latter results 
in operating at comparatively lower liquidity levels. 
(2) Balance sheet factors. Variation in liquidity amongst banks 
can also be explained by differences in the structure and the 
relationship between the main components of the bank balance sheet. 
Selected balance sheet attributes have been suggested in the literature 
as having explanatory possibilities of lirjuidity behaviour. Bank-to- 
bank variations in these characteristics (such as bank size, bank 
growth rate, ratio of time deposits to total deposits, and the capital 
to deposit ratio) lead to maintaining varying liquidity by , banks. 
The impact of the institutional factors on liquidity behaviour is 
difficult to measure in quantitative terms. This analysis will there- 
fore be confined to examining the influence of the balance sheet factors 
on bank liquidity. The aim is to investigate to what extent the struc- 
ture of the bank balance sheet and the relationship between certain 
assets and liabilities necessitate holdings of excessive liquidity. 
The analysis will also reveal the extent to which the bankers in 
Jordan are pursuing rational balance sheet management. The findings 
of this chapter will have a special significance in suggesting 
specific policy implications (chapter 6) for increasing the contribu- 
tion of the commercial banks to the economic development of the country. 
However, before examining the influence of the balance sheet structure 
on bank liquidity behaviour (section II), it is necessary first to 
analyse (in section I) some basic features of the banking industry 
in Jordan. 
(') 
It is important to indicate that the detailed statistics used in 
this chapter are not derived from published materials but were 
directly obtained from the Banking Control Department of the CBJ. 
These statistics were provided on the condition that the names of 
individual banks were not mentioned. 
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I 
Basic Features of Jordanian Banking 
In general, three outstanding features of commercial banking 
can be distinguished in Jordan - 
(1) Concentration of bank activities within a few banks. As is 
clearly shown by Table 5-1, one big bank (Bank A) was responsible 
for 42.3% of total deposits and 41.7% of total creditv furnished by 
the banking system in 1976. This was followed by Bank H which claimed 
14.5% and 16.4% of total deposits and credit respectively. Bank D 
was also important with respective relative shares of 10.4% and 15.8% 
of total bank deposits and credits. The big three banks together 
were therefore responsible for more than two thirds of total deposits 
(67.2%) and slightly less than three quarters of total credit W. A. 
At the same time, the big three banks seem to have the highest 
loark/deposit ratio, ranging from 120. Vo for Bank D to 89.7% and 7wo 
for both banks H and A respectively. Here, it should be mentioned 
that banks-are subject to certain limitations on credit extension. 
All banks have to observe the maximum loan/deposit ratio specified 
by the monetary authority. The maximum legal ceiling was altered 
during the period under review due to changing economic circumstances. 
During the early years of its operations., the CBJ was interested in 
repatriating overseas funds transferred abroad by the banking system 
throughout the previous period of monetary dependence. During the 
period of the Currency Board System, the actual loan/deposit ratio 
averaged around 57.4'-. 
(') 
In order to strengthen the domestic credit 
(1) J. Salah, The Evolution of the-Banking EXstem in Jordan_ 
OP-cit. P-71. 
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Table 5.1 Individual Banks' Activities Ps of December 31.1976* 
(In millions of J. D. ) 
Loans , Deposits Loans Actual MiniMur4 
-Poccess Bank*" 
Amount 
(I 
% of 
Total 
Amount 
(2) 
" 
-/C 
of 
To tPI 
Depos-its 
Ratio 
(3) =(I 
)!. 
-(2, 
' 
Liauidit3 
Ratio 
(4) 
Legal 
Requir- 
ment 
(5) 
Liquiclity 
-Ratio 
(6)=(4)' 
(5) 
A 74-58 41.7 955.45' 42.3' 73.1 . 28.0 30.0 -2.0 
B 11.11 6.2 10-72 7.4 66.1+ 44.9 30.0 14.9 
C 12-43 7.0 17-76 7.9 70.3 42.7 30.0 12.7 
D 28-32 15.8 23-46 10. Ls. 120.7 49.1 30.0 19.1 
E 4.97 2.8 7.62 3.4 65.2 33.9 30.0 3.9 
F 1.31 0.7 2.09 0.9 62.6 78.7 30.0 48.7 
G 1.95 1.1 4.32 1.9 45.1 73.8 30.0 43.8 
H 29-37 16.4 32-76 14.5 89.7 25-4- 30.0 -4.6 
1 6.73 3.8 13-91 6.2 4-8.4 65.6 30.0 35.6 
3.33 1.9 4.45 2.0 74.8 49.1 30.0 1911 
K 0.83 0.5 1.53 0.7 51+. 2 56.2 30.0 26.2 
L 3.72 2.1 5.47 2.4 68.0 63.8 30.0 33.8 
Total 
Banks 178-70 100.0 225-54 100.0 70-3 
I 
37.3 
I 
30.0 
'ýource: Central Bank of Jordan, Banking Control Dept. (Unpublished Data). 
* Figures are only for the East Bank of Jordan 
** Due to secrecy purposes, individual banks are shown in symbols. 
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base, the CBJ in 1968 specified a high maximum ratio of 85% to be 
observed by the commercial banks. 
(') 
Since 1973, however, the CBJ 
has ceased to be interested in increasing the volume of domestic credit, 
which was largely responsible for the notable rise in the money supply. 
As will be shown in Chapter I I, the rapid increase in bank credit 
after 1973 has largely induced inflationary conditions which led the 
CBJ to adopt many measures to restrict the credit extended by banks. 
Among these measures was the reduction in the loan/deposit ratio to 
SM16 in 1971+, which was further reduced to 75% during the first half 
of 1976 and to 7C% during the rest of the year. 
(2) 
However, in spite 
of the fact that all banks had to observe a unified maximum ratio.. 
Table 5.1 clearly shows that individual banks tended to behave in 
widely differing ways. The actual ratio ranged from a low level of 
45.1% in the case of Bank G to a high level of 120.7% in the case of 
Bank D. 
W 
One main reason for such variations lies in bank management 
portfolio selection, which varies from bank to bank. In general, it'-can be 
said_,, that banks with aggressive management usually maintain high 
loan/deposit ratios, while those with conservative behaviour tend 
to keep a low ratio between loans and deposits. 
(1) The CBJ., Memorandum No. 60/68 of 1968. 
(2) It will be shown in Chapter 11 that the CBJ removed all credit 
restriction imposed on commercial banks, starting from August 1977. 
(3) Bank regulations do not reveal any penalty imposed on banks who 
surpass the ma imum loa4/deposit ratio. The CBJ in such cases 
depends on moral persuasion asking such banks to adjust their 
loan/deposit ratios within the prescribed level. However, in the, 
case of Bank D. the unusual high percentage between credit 
and deposits was in fact due to special circumstances associated 
with the bank in the past. Part of the credit extended by the bank 
to certain customers a few years ago is still now unpaid. This 
comprised about one quarter of total credit outstanding. Undoubt- 
edly, such a situation led to an unusual rise in the loart/deposits 
ratio. However, even if this proportion of unpaid loans was 
excluded from total credit outstanding, Bank D still claimed the 
highest percentage between credit and deposits with a ratio of 95%. 
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(2) The maintenance of widely different levels of excessive 
liquidity amongst individual banks, ranging from a negative level of 
4.6% in the case of Bank H to 48. r,, o in the case of Bank F. Such 
bank-to-bank liquidity variations can be related to both the 
institutional and the balance sheet factors as mentioned earlier. 
However, it is important to mention here that all banks are subject to 
unified liquidity regulations. Each bank has to tiaintain a minimum 
liquidity ratio which in August 1975 was raised from 25% to 3W--('). 
The CBJ was also empowered to penalize any bank which keeps lirluidity 
below the minimum specified ratio. Article 17 of the Temporary 
Banking Law of 1971 reveals that the CBJ could impose a penalty 
rate of -1 
1 
on the difference between the minimum fixed level 3 ý5-0 
and the actual liquidity maintained. This should be applied daily 
as long as the deficit exists. Moreover; the Law empowered the CBJ 
to apply (in addition to the penalty rate) other serious punishments 
(2) 
if the bank frequently keeps its liquidity below the legal minimum. 
A high lo&rVdeposit ratio indicates risk-taking on the part 
of bank management, whereas a high excess liquidity ratio reflects 
risk-aversion. 
(3 ) 
This imans that banks with a higher loan/deposit 
ratio would tend to have a lower excess liquidity ratio. This was 
the general trend in Jordan except for a few cases as is shown by 
Figure 5.1. Given the high loarj/deposit ratio of the big three banks, 
it is therefore expected that these banks would have a low excess 
(1) See Chapter 4, P. 138 
(2) In such cases, the-CBJ may, according to the Law., restrict 
bank activities or even cease its license to operate in the 
country. 
(3) Deane Carson and Ira Scott, Jr., "Co=ercial Bank Attributes 
and Aversion to Risk". P. 425 &: P-430. 
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Fig. 5-1 Loan/Deposit Ratio and Excess Liquidity 
Ratio of Individual Banks (1976). 
(source : table 5-1 ) 
Symbol, s A to L refer to individual banks. 
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liquidity ratio. As is clearly shown by the Figure, this was true 
for both banks A and H which operated at negative excess liquidity 
ratios of 2. W- and 4.6% respectively, whereas this was not the case 
in Bank D which maintained excess liquidity of 19.1%. The behaviour 
of the latter seems paradoxical in view of the above relationship 
0)- 
between the two ratios. However, the lower liquidity ratio 
maintained by bigger banks, in general, is consistent with the 
future findings later in this chapter, which reveal that bank size 
is the dominant factor in the balance sheet that determines bank liquidity. 
Classifying commercial banks according to nationality, there 
were at the end of 1976 (the recent year for which the detailed statistics 
were available) four Jordanian banks, three Arab banks, and five 
foreign banks. 
(2) 
Table 5.2 demonstrates that Jordanian banks dominate 
bank activities, claiming on average 68.8% of total bank deposits 
and 70. ea of total bank credit during the period 1967-1976. Next in 
importance are the foreign banks whose relative share in total bank 
deposit and credit averaged around 23.6% and 22. Vo during the same 
period. The Arab banks were responsible for the remaining percentage 
of 7.6% of total deposit and 7-W- of bank credit. One obvious 
difference between the three groups of banks was that Jordanian 
banks in general tended to follow more liberal and aggressive 
(3) 
lending policies as compared with both the Arab and foreign banks. 
This might have resulted from the special circumstances attached 
to this bank as discussed earlier, see footnote (3) P. 150 
(2) See Appendix 4.3 
(3) The comparison applies only for all banks within each group 
which may not necessarily reflect the situation in individual 
banks. In other words, if banks were taken individually, some 
foreign banks may demonstrate more aggressive lending policies 
than some of the Jordanian banks. Thus although in theory the 
general expectation would be that foreign banks would not be too 
involved with indigenous investment,, in practice Jordan is an 
exception to this due to the long historical presence of 
particular banks and their local knowledge of and participation 
in its domestic economic affairs. 
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This fact was clearly reflected in the loan/deposit ratio which 
recorded an average of 75-144 throughout the period under review, whereas 
the ratio for the Arab and foreign banks averaged around 71. V/o. 
The higher loary/deposit ratio maintained by Jordanian banks was 
associated with a lower excessive liquidity ratio, as compared with 
the Arab and foreign banks. Table 5.3 illustrates that Jordanian 
banks' holdings of excessive liqddity accounted for2l. 5%t as 
compared with an average of 48.9% for Arab banks and 24. 
Wo for 
foreign banks. The lower liquidity maintained by the Jordanian 
banks supports the above explanation that these banks followed more 
aggrdssive lending policies which absorbed part of their excess 
liquidity. 
(1 ) 
(3) A recent rising trend of keen competition in domestic commercial 
banking. This competition effectively took place withýthe introduction 
of new banks, starting with the domestic establishment of the First City 
Bank in 1973. This was followed by the introduction of another 
foreign bank in 1975, when the Bank of Credit & Commerce International 
was allowed to conduct operations in Jordan. The degree of compet! tion 
was further intensified in 1976 and 1977, when the CBJ licensed four 
other new banks to operate in the country. One of these banks was 
foreign, while the remaining three were Jordanian. 
(2 ) 
This led to an 
(1) For the difference in the behaviour of the above ratios amongst 
the three goups of banks, see Figure 5,2 
(2) These banks are: 1. Chase Manhattan Bank (started in 1976). 
2. Jordan-Kuwait Bank (1977). 
3. Jordan-Gulf Bank (1978). 
4. Petra Bank (under Establishment). 
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increase in the number of the commercial banks operating in the country 
to 15 by the end of 19771 
Prior to 1973, the market was shared by nine commercial banks which 
were operating in the country for many years. The market for both 
credit and deposit was largely dominated by the old and well-established 
banks, which had their traditional customers, either as depositors 
or borrowers. Market competition was not keen. Usually, competition 
in the financial system takes the form of interest rate competition, 
or it occurs through the provision of services. 
(') 
Interest rate 
competition was not in fact active, given-the fixed interest rate 
policy that has been traditionally adopted in Jordan together with 
lower activity in the market for both the credit and deposit sides. 
The market for bank credit was constrained by a ma imum ceiling of 
Vo. which has been fixed by law. 
(2 ) 
Banks in Jordan charge extra 
rates on their credit as commission. As is well known, the major 
source of revenue for banks comes from the margin between their lending 
and borrowing rates of interest. The margin, or what is sometimes 
called the cost of intermediation, must cover the actual operating 
expenses, taxation, the earning of a surplus to build up reserves 
and the profits distributed to bank3l shareholders. 
(3) 
Fixing -the 
maximum credit rate did not leave wide room for banks to compete for 
attracting deposits by offering competitive rates of interest. Mare- 
over, the market experienced a comparatively slow growing demand for 
bank services as compared with the later period which accompanied 
development programmes. This situation further minimised the 
(1) Jack Revell, The British Financial Syste . OP-cit- P-93. 
(2) Domestic interest rate policy is fully discussed in Chapter II 
(3) Jack Revell, The British Financial System, op. cit. P. 1 00. 
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opportunities for interest rate competition. As far as the provision 
of services was concerned, banks did not also show active competition. 
This form of congetition consists of offering a number of ancillary 
facilities which make dealing with one bank more attractive than 
another offering the same interest rate. 
(') 
This can be done by 
providing easier and quicker withdrawal facilitie3 and by extending the 
rietwork of bank branches to serve a wider proportion of population. 
Banks in Jordan showed little competition in this area since withdrawal 
facilities in all banks should go through a routine and somehow long 
procedures. 
(2) 
However, some competition might have occxxred through 
the exiension, of bank branches. A number of commercial, banks adopted 
an expansionary branch policy, which, enlarged their relative share in 
the market. 
(3) 
Keener competition has been brought to bear within the commercial 
banking system as a result of the permission given to the forermntioned 
new banks to start operations in the country. These banks,.., competed 
with the already existing ones in both the credit and deposit sides 
of the market. The new foreign banks were backed by their, well-known 
international rep utat ion, which made it easier for them to. enter the 
market. 
(4) 
The rest of the new banks were, in fact, all joint ventures 
with the majority of 60ro of the equity held by Jordanians, and the 
(i) Ibid. P. 96. 
(2) The procedures for cash withdrawals are usually long, especially 
if compared with the developed countries, such as the U. K. The 
client is always required to present his identity card or to ask 
one of the staff members to vouch for his identity to the cashier. 
In both cases, the customer has to wait until his balance is checked. 
Moreover, he has to sign on the back of the cheque, besides the 
information taken from his identity card. 
(3) For the extention of bank branches of individual banks, see 
Appendix 4-3. 
(4) Clearly, Citibank, Bank of Credit and Commerce International and 
the Chase Manhattan Bank are all branches of wide international 
banking. 
160 
0 (1) remaining 407b by other Arab financial interests. The introduction 
of there banks to the market was largely facilitated by their high level 
of capitalisatione 
(2) 
Howeverv the rising number of the commercial banks 
operating in the country created highly competitive conditions in the 
domestic market. This was further encouraged by an active demand for bank 
services resulting mainly from the execution of economic development 
programmes. Although there was some kind of competition in the provision 
of bank services (particularly in the form of bank expansion))the major 
area of competition was by varying the cost of loans and the yield on 
0 
deposits. On the credit side, although the maximum legal ceiling of 9/o 
was still operating, active competition among banks occurred through changing 
the commission rate. Banks were able to attract new customers for loans 
mainly by varying the rate of commission chargedq which fluctuated between 
j0 ýb and 2ý6. On the deposit side, the degree of competition was even 
keener. The introduction of the new banks led to fierce competition to 
attract funds from the local market. By offering higher interest rates on 
depositsl these banks succeeded in shifting part of the existing deposits from 
the older banks. Depositors began to shop around seeking higher yields on 
their funds. The older banks had to raise their deposit rates in order to 
keep their customers. Thus the system became much more competitive as 
compared with the pre-1973 period* 
However, despite some advantages that must have resulted from the 
higher competitive banking environment (particularly in attracting 
further resources to the banks and improving the quality of bank 
(1) Middle East Communicators, "Jordanian Banking and Finaince, 1978". 
(Anunan: Jordan Times, Sunday,, March 19,, 1978) P-3 
(2) The authorised capital of these banks were as follows: le Jordan- 
Kuwait Bank (JD 5 million). 2. Jordan-Gulf Bank (JD 5 million). 
3- Petra Bank (JD 3 million). According to the Middle Fast 
communicators, the authorised capital of the above three banks 
was almost equal the paid-up capital of the remaining twelve banks 
operating in the country* See Ibid, 
161 
services), the recent fierce competition for funds left an unhealthy 
impact on the composition of deposits. Since they were in need of 
funds, the new banks offered competitively high rates of interest 
even on those deposits held on demand. Some new banks, especially the 
foreign ones, found it more profitable to attract such deposits by 
offering interest rates reaching 5%, than borrowing from overseas markets 
agairzt higher rates. However, paying interest on current accounts is 
undesirable banking practice. By offering such a high rate of interest on 
current accounts, almost equivalent to those paid on term deposits, 
(1) 
people found it more convenient to keep their money on demand because 
they yield similar interest to those of other deposits. This discouraged 
any considerable growth in the relative size of the more stable type of 
deposits as represented by time and saving accounts. During 1964-11,167, the 
relative importance of these deposits in the deposits structure rose only 
slightly, increasing from 4Vo to 49.8ý'c. 
(2) 
Clearlyeconomic development 
requires a substantial shift in favour of term deposits which can be utilised 
fcr financing the long-term developmental needs. However, in a realisation 
of the adverse effect of competition on the composition of deposits, the 
CBJ issued a memorandum in 1977, fixing the maximum ceiling of interest on 
demand deposits at 2%. and the minimum rates on both saving and time deposits 
at 5-4-% and 50 respectively. 
(3) 
This action must have minimised the 
degree of competition for demand deposits, whereas it left the door widely 
open to compete for term deposits by offering them higher interest rates. 
(1) See Chapter 4, * P-97 
(2) See Chapter 4, Table 4.2, P. 98 
(3) CBJ, Memorandum No. 31/78 (Feb. 2nd, 1978). 
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ii 
A Model of Jordaninn Bsnk Licuidity Behaviour 
A selected set of factors in the bank balance sheet has been 
suggested in the literature as being significant in determinirig 
the liquidity behaviour of individual banks. The purpose of this 
section is to investigate whether, and to what extentf these factors 
are responsiblb for explaining variations in bank liquidity in the 
Jordanian context. 
It should be recalled here that the analysis is confined to the 
influence of the balance sheet factors on bank liquidity. Other 
institutional factors (mentioned at the outset of the chapter) 
which may largely influence bank liquidity, are excluded from the 
analysis. Moreover, the model also excludes any exogeneous influences, 
such as economic and political factors,, 
(') 
which can largely affect 
liquidity considerations of the commercial banks. 
1. Theoretical Framework. 
Existing literature points to four main factors in the bank 
balance sheet as having explanatory possibilities for liquidity 
External monetary impacts are also excluded., such as: 
(a) changes in interest rates on alternative assets which may 
change the structure of bank assetsand its liquidity holdings. 
However, due to a relatively rigid interest rate policy adopted 
in Jordan, this factor does not seem important in determining 
Jordanian bank liquidity. (b) Alterations in the minimum 
liquidity requirements which can also influence liquidity 
behaviour. As shown in Chapter 4, the minimum required ratio 
was changed only once during the period under review,, rising 
from 25% to 30, ', - in 1975. However, one would not expect such 
a change of being important in determining liquidity behaviour 
because banks, in general, have almost always maintained their, 
actual liquidity well above the legal minimum. 
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behaviour. 
(') 
These factors are: (a) Bank size, (b) Bank growth rate, 
(a) Relative importance of time and saving deposits, and (d) Capital and 
reserves to deposits ratio. Relying on the multiple regression technique, 
Carson and Scott employed these factors (independent variables) to explain 
variation in bank liquidity (dependent variable) in the U. S. A. 
(2 ) 
The 
equation estimated was in a linear form. The theoretical treatment of the 
influence and direction of the relationship between liquidity and the above 
mentioned factors is shown for each factor as follavs: 
(3) 
(a) Bank Size. This variable has been frequently cited in the literature 
as having an important impact on liquidity behaviour. 
(j+) 
On a prior 
grounds, the size of the bank should be inversely related to liquidiv. 
That is, the bigger the bank, ceteris paribus, the less liquidity it can 
maintain. The explanation of such a relationship lies in the fact that 
s inx large banks can diversify their risk among a wide variety of portfolio 
selections, they are therefore more able to undertake riskier activities 
(thus maintaining less liquidity) as compared with smaller banks. 
(5) 
In 
For the significance of the above four factors, see Deane Carson 
and Ira Scott, "Commercial Bank Attributes and Aversion to Risk".. 
op. cit. PP. 420-433; for the significance of Bank size, see also 
Ernst Baltensperger, "Economics of Scale, Firm Size and Concentration 
in Banking", Journal of Money. Credit and Bankin (August 1972) 
PP. 467-488; and Raymond McEvoy,, "Variation in Bank Asset Portfolios"., 
Journal of Finance, (December 1956) PP. 463-473- 
(2) Carson and Scott examined the influence of the above factors on 
variation in risk-aversion (i. e. liquidity preference) among 
commercial banks In the U. S. A. To indicate the degree of risk-aversion, 
many selected asset ratios (one of which the liquidity ratio) were 
used to serve as proxy variables. Relying on cross-section analysis includ- 
ing 3,930 banks, they found that the four factors were signif ica, tLt in 
detenining bank liquidity with. the correct hypothesized sign. These 
fagtors, however, were able to explain only less than half of the 
variationin the dependent variable. See Carson and Scott, op. cit. 
(3) The following theoretical discussion is largely based on Carsorls and 
Scott's. 
(10 See Carson and Scott, P. 422; McEvoy,, P-473; and Baltensperger, P-484. 
Li%uidity preference and risk-taking are used here as inverse terms. 
0 
164 
other words, because of their ability to change the composition of their 
large asset portfolio by shifting from one asset to another when the need 
for liquidity arts es, large banks are in a favourable situation to hold 
a lower proportion of their assets in a lijuid form. Moreover, specialised 
resources and economies of scales associated with large banks, together 
with a relatively greater access to the money and capital markets, enable 
such banks to accept riskier business. Empirical studies showed some 
evidence for the existence of economies of scales in commercial banking. 
That is, the long-term average cost in banking industry declines as output 
increases. 
0) 
Alhadeff and others emphasised the labour-intensive nature 
of the banking industry., indicating that specialisation of labour is the 
predominant determinant of any economies of scales. 
(2) 
As Alhadeff 
illustrates: 
,,, "By virtue of the volume of business done in the different 
aspects of banking, large banks can afford to hire expert 
talent and to give its (sic) personnel in various fields 
an opportunity to specialise in their limited areas. 
Specialisation breeds expertise, and expertise enhances 
efficiency. In the banking functions of business lending 
and securities investment, the bankers in large institutions 
are probably more knowledgeable in their respective fields 
than their small-bank counterparts. In short, specialisation 
in large banks is conducive to greater efficiency of labour, 
and, ceteris paribus,, to lower unit costs". (3) 
Moreover, recent computerisation of bank operations has undoubtedly 
enabled the banks to get greater benefits of economies of scale.. 
Some interesting empirical work done by Baltensperger revealed that 
not only do banks' operational costs decline relatively with increasing 
size, but the large banks' reserves are also, on average, relatively 
(1) Output of commercial banks is defined as gross revenue or total 
assets, or aggregate deposits. See George Benston, "Economies of 
Scales of Financial Institutions", Journal of Money. Credit and 
Banking (May 1972) P-312. 
(2) David, A. Alhadeff, Monopoly-and Comnetition in BA. nkin (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1954) P. 86; and Bell, F. and Murphy, 
N. "Economies of Scales and Division of Labour in Commercial Banking"t 
The Southern Economic Journal (Oct. 1968) P. 139. 
(3) David Alhadeff, op. cit. P. 86. 
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closer to the optimal level than the smaller banks'. 
(1) 
Another study 
conducted by McEvoy emphasised that bank size was (among other variables) 
a significant element in explaining variations in bank asset portfolio. 0 
He found that bank liquidity varies negatively and markedly with bank size 
ý2) 
(b) Bank Growth Rate. This variable is expected to be negAtively 
related to bank licluidity. That ist rapidly growing banks are expected 
to maintain less liquidity as compared with those which are experiencing 
slower growth. This may result from two situations. Firstly, bank 
management operational policies, whether aggressive or passive, are 
significant in determining the speed at which banks grow. One would 
expect a bank with aggressive management pursuing vigorous expansionar7 
policies (either in competing for funds, or in exploring new investment 
outlets) to grow more rapidly than a bank with a passive management. 
Therefore., if a bank grows at a relatively fast rate because of 
aggressive operational policies, one would expect bank management to 
be also aggressive in selecting assets by increasing the element of 
risk, thereby minimising liquidity. Secondly, rapidly growing banks 
can maintain less liquidity because the growth process itself generates 
a continuous cash flow which reduces the need to operate at a high liquidity 
level. 
(c) Deposit Structure. 
(3) 
Undoubtedly, the composition of bank deposits 
is one important factor in determining asset portfolio-selection. 
(1) Ernst Baltensperger, op. cit. P. 1+72. 
(2) Raymond McEvoy, OP-cit- P-1+73- 
(3) The influence of this factor on liquidity behaviour is consistent with: (a) Revell's concept of "Hatching Maturities" as a general principle 
of balance sheet management. In determining liquidity holdings__ in the 
asset side of the balance sheet, a great emphasis should De placed 
on the nature and composition of liability structure of the financial 
institution concerned. See Jack Revell., The British Financial System., 
op. cit. PP. 106-110. 
(b) Richard Bond's argument which runs as follows: "The asset structure 
of a commercial bank is influenced to a considerable extent by its 
deposit structure. Time deposits., for example, tend to be more stable 
and predictable than demand deposits. As is well knownp the greater 
stability of time deposits entices banks to place a greater proportion 
of these funds in high earnings, though less liquid assets". See Richard 
Bond, "Deposit Composition and Commercial Bank Earnings", op. cit. P. 4i* 
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Since term deposits are less fluid and volatile as compared with 
demand deposits, banks that hold higher proportions of their deposits 
in this form are more able to acquire risk assets. This accordingly 
implies that such banks can maintain less liquidity. It is therefore 
expected, on a Driori grounds', that bank liquidity is inversely 
associated to the ratio of time and saving deposits to total deposits. 
(d) Capital nnd Reserves/Deposit Ratio. 
(') 
Theory does not clearly 
indicate the nature of the influence of this factor upon lijuidity. 
The direction of the relationship between the two variables may be of 
either sign. That is, liquidity is either negatively or positively 
related to the ratio of capital and reserves to total deposits. The 
negative association between the two variables can be explained by 
the fact that, if one considers capital and reserves to serve on 
the liabilities side of a bank balance sheet as a substitute for 
liquidity on the asset side, banks with higher capital and reserves/ 
deposit ratios can, epteris naribuR. operate with less liquidity. On 
the other hand, if capital and reserves were not viewed as above, one 
may expect the relationship to be positively related. The latter case 
can be explained by two possibilitiest (1) This may be found in the case 
of banks with conservative dividend policies leading, to the accumulation 
of capital and reserves at a rate higher than the growth of deposits. 
This is further encouraged by a conservative asset portfolio policy 
favouring- excess licuidity. As Carson and Scott noted: 
oev"If conservative dividend policies are coupled 
with conservative portfolio policies, the previously 
expressed relationship between risk asset ratios 
(or as in our case liquidity ratio) and the capital- 
to-deposit ratio would be reversed. "(2) 
(1) It is important to point out that capital and reserve accounts-are 
subject to official regulations. As shown in Chapter 4, each commercial 
bank has to provide a minimum capital of JD 5009000. Moreover, bank 
regulations stipulated that every bank has to allocate 1 W'. 'of its 
net profit for reserves up to a level when these reserves ecual the 
vajue of bank capital. (Article 13 of the Temporary Banking Law of 
1971). The purpose of capital and reserves regulations is usually 
to protect depositors from less of thoir deposits and to reduce the 
possibility of bank insolvency. 
(2) Carson and Scott, op. cit. P. 424. 
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(2) Or this may be the case in banks with aggressive management which 
tolerates both a low capital & reserves/deposit ratio and a tight 
linuidity position. In the latter case., banks' net worth (capital & 
reserves) increases at a rate slower than the growth of deposits. 
Y. "hen this is accompanied by an aggressive asset portfolio management 
operating at a low level of liquidity, the influence of the relationship 
between the two ratios works in the same direction. 
2. linuidity Function Model. 
Given the above theoretical framework., the liquidity function of 
commercial banks in Jordan may be postulated to be of the form: 
L=a+bS+b2G+b3T+b4K 
where: L Liq uidity 
S Bank Size 
GS Bank Growth Rate 
Te Ratio of Time and Saving Deposits/Total Deposits, 
KS Capital and Reserves/Total Deposits Ratio 
and where: bI 1-- 0pb2 4--0 -, 
b3 'e-0 
b: RO 4 
Using the multiple regression technique, the following analysis 
examines whether, and to what extent., the above liquidity function 
explains liquidity behaviour of commercial banks in Jordan. 
(') 
3. Data Uied. 
3-1 Structure of Data. For the purpose of the model, it was necessary 
to employ statistics pertaining to each individual bank's assets and 
liabilities. Since only the combined balance sheet of commercial banks 
is published by the CBJ9 it was therefore necessary to obtain such 
information directly from the Banking Control Department of the CBJ, to 
which commercial banks are required to submit monthly statements of their 
balance sheets. All the ratios used in the model are based on individual 
(1) A correlation Matrix showed a weak relationship between the above independent variables, indicating smll chances of multicollinearity. 
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banks' balance sheet reports as of December 31 of each year. The study 
covers the period 1967-1976 for which the required statistics were 
obtained. When the time series approach was used., the analysis was 
confined to the nine commercial banks for which statistics were available 
during this period. The remaining three banks, which were recently 
established, were excluded. However, statistics for the twelve commercial 
banks were employed when cross-section analysis was used, 
3.2 The Nature of Varlnblesý The variables used in the model have 
been calculated as follows - 
A. The Dependent Vnriable (Liquidity Ratio). Ratios fcr individual 
banks' liquidity were readily obtained from the Banking Control Department. 
These ratios were calculated by this Department according to a certain 
formula relating short-term assets to total deposits and other short-term 
liabilities. 
B. The Tndepenclent VariablesI. 
B. 1. Bank Size (S) was computed for each individual bank as a ratio 
of its assets to total bank assets M. 
B. 2. Bank Growth Rate (G) was computed for each individual bank as 
an annual change in its assets over the preceding year (%)'. 
B-3. Ratio of Time and Saving Deposits/Total Deposits (T) was, 
computed for each bank individually (%). 
B. 4. Capital and Reserves/Deposit Ratio (K) was also computed for 
each bank individually (%). 
4. Statistical Analysis (1). 
Relying on a time series approach, equations were Computed to 
relate liquidity for each individual bank to the explanatory variables 
discussed above. The results are given in Table 5.4 . As can be clearly 
seen, none of the explanatory variables were found to be statistically 
significant in influencing bank liquidity, except for one in the case 
of Bank I. The ratio of time and saving deposit, /total deposits was 
sig. nificant and negatively associated with bank liquidity. This is 
consistent with the theoretical treatment of the relationship between 
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Table 5.! ± Regressions of Changes in Selected Balance Sheet RRtios 
on Bank Liquidity For Inclividunl Banks. 1967-1976. 
DF = 
B k Constant 
Independent Variables 
2 
an Term R 
S G T K 
A Reg. Coeff-#, --12.700 +1.871 -0.784 +0.518 -1.601 0.295 7-val. (0.223) (0.669) (0.222) (0.254) 
B eg. Coeff. 
h 
-28.844 +4.222 +0.498 +0-584 f-0.968 0.683 
al. (0.981) (1.196) (0-572) (o. 833) 
C Reg. Coeff. +54-799 -6.122 +0-425 +0 793 1-0.4-37 0.396 
T-Val. (0.973) (1-588) (0: 810 (0.416) 
D eg. Coeff. +42.125 -0-079 +0-059 +0.203 -0.495' 0 . 488 
-Val (0.203 (0.281) (1.067) (1-019) 
3 eg. Coeff. 
I 
+14-512 +3.083 -0.321 +0-515 +0.229 0.889 
T-Val (0.643) (1-445) (1-751) (0.1+99) 
F Reg. Coeff. +69.970 +17.242 +0-389 -0-321 -0-390 0.761 
T-Val 0.780) (2.123) (0-397) (1.169) 
Reg. Coeff. 1 +78.782 -19-837 +0.222 +0.724 +0.498 0.412 
T-Val (0-351) (1.495 (1.137) (0.536) 
H Reg. Coeff. +1+7.861+ -0.738 -0.087 -0.108 -1.527 0.343 
T-Val (0.2710 (0-141) (0-097) (0-555) 
1 Reg. Coeff. +202-370 +9.716 -0-511 -2.2o6 -2-760 0.752 
T-Val 
1 
(1.313) (1-715) (2.4Q* 
1 
(1-675) 
* Significant at the 5 per cent level. 
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the two variables. HOWSTer, the poor results obtained here may be 
largely related to the 3=all nu=7ber of observations (10 for each 
individual bank) which, for 5 variables, allow for only 5 degrees of 
freedom. This accordingly minimi-ses the chances for the explanatory 
variables to record significant i--pacts on liquidity changes. 
1herefore, atte=pts were =de to employ the cro3s-section approach 
in order to explain the liquidity fizziction of the co=ercial banks. It 
was expected that increasing the nu. -: oer of observations 
(though slightly) 
with the rise in the nu=ber of banks in recent years my improve the 
re3ults. The regression ejuation for 1976 reads as follows: 
(Tear 1976) 
L= 24.1,42 - 0.948-" + 0.414G- + 0.263T + 0.663K (2.132) (2.035) (1.046) (1.288) 
2 R 0.661 
D? 7 
, lificant 
in determining None of the above inlepenaent variables were sl,,,, U 
bank liquUtty. All the t-values of the coefficients were stati3tically 
lmiLmlf Ic-int. 
Other Rtte=pts were also =ado to exa=ine the liquidity function 
in other years but no tp. -igible i=prove=ents occurred. Then figures 
for 1975 and 1973, for exa=le, were exploye!, the following eapations 
were obtaine-I with In3ignifIc%nt t-valu? s of the coefficients for the 
all inlepenlent v%riibles: 
(Year 1973) 
L- 57.689 - 1.348S - 0.025Gr + 0.102T + O. i84K' (1.654) (0.029) (0.258) (0.263) 
2 R=0.624 
DF =4 
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(Year 1975) 
L= 38.118 - 0.439S - 0.06IG + 0.167T + 1-311K (0.620)- (0.944) (0-430) (2.067) 
R2=0.593 
DF =6 
However, it is believed that the poor results obtained from using 
the time-series approach for individual banks and the cross-section 
analysis can be largely related to the small number of observations 
in each case which resulted in fewer degrees of freedom. It was 
frequently noticed that if the degrees of freedom were larger, some 
of the explanatory variables might have been significant in influencing 
liquidity behaviour. 
-Therefore, 
it was found necessary to resort to 
an appropriate method which could increase the number of observations 
without affecting the structure and the assumptions of the model. The 
solution was found by pooling the data for the nine banks together for 
the ten years period covered by the study. In so doing, 90 observations 
were obtained. Such a procedure is justified since it does not influsnee 
the validity of the model. The model excluded time as an explanatory 
variable., and liquidity behaviour was assumed to be a function of certain 
balance sheet ratios. Pooling the data leaves these assumptiom unaltered. 
When regressing liquidity ratios on the same independent variables 
using the pooled data, some improvement occurred and the results are 
given in Table 5.5. This table is divided into three sections; the 
first showing the influence of each explanatory variable considered 
separately on lijuidity change; the second shows the impact of the 
independent variables taken together; and the last part provides 
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5.5 Regrossion5ý of Chn, ýes In ýelected B, ýJ-nce Cheet Ratios 
on ll,, -ýnk Li- ul,, I-t., - --', ). c ' '. I Commercial 1967-1 ý76. 
con: `ý-ýnt -n ;, gnendent 
C. 272 03 0. '02 J- '57 
cl. 
Cne Const. term +64. 'ni 1 3 . 4-85 +0.57U- I+ 36 72 
Tndeoendent TR ejý. Co ef f -11.127 --'. 05 b C, 5, J 1 (11. 
Vrý r 1, -- b le 7 -Va 1 0 0.514 rO. 4ý 6. ? 25 
TIO) Peg. Coeff. +42.108 -01 16 + , 
+ 0.02'11 + 0.75 9 
Independent T -Val (3.077 (1.552) ( 0.2 914-8 
Variables 
Toýýether 
DF=85 
(-0 
,. Coe f f. -,::, +! _'". 'ý50 -0.637 
0 
* 752 D. 
D! '=86 . - -V- 1. 
(-. 
1 
(I 082ý 
0. c'7 `3 42 
'ý-070/ 4- 7 
4u U 7 961' 
Tý' 
J L-'_"z. nian 2 eE;. C0 3 5. S5 7 1 -O. C20 +0.701 -c. "63 27 
riks (5 T-Val . 174) 
'c (3-1751 
, `=35 
%--b Pfýfýkj Reg Coeff. +70-835 -8. N' Q +0 146 + 0.3 "0 " 036) 0.45 9 /N T-Val (3. (1: 45C) 
ý25 
Forei, n _t3g. coelof. Ill-. 626 -4-570 +0.111 -0.274 -1 51+5 0.729 Bari". -Vq I (1: 021 
DF=!, 
* Significant at the I per cant level. 
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equations estimated for groups of banks classified according to 
nationality. Taken sepurately, the test shows that onlytNo independent 
variables were significant in determining bank liquidity (Section I). 
The coefficients of Bank Size (S) and capital and reserves/deposit 
ratio(K) were found statistically significant at the 1% level with 
the coefficient signs' as hypothesized. Respectively, each variable 
was able to explain 2ri. and 35% of liquidity variation. Considering all 
independent variables together, only the above two variables exhibited 
a significant impact on liquidity with the correct signs. The coeffic- 
ients for the other two variables (i. e. growth rate (G) and deposit- 
mix (T)) were insigfiificant with opposite signs to those hypothesized 
(equation IIA). This means that the response of liquidity to the 
speed at which the bank grow3,, or the changes in the structure of its 
deposits was insignificant. Even when T was dropped from the equation, 
the remaining three variables explained the same percentage change in 
liquidity (R 2 remained the same at 0.440 as shown in equation 11.2. ), 
S and K were still significant whereas G remained insignificant. When 
the latter was excluded, R2 dropped slightly to 0.428 with S and K 
remaining significant (equation II. M. Excluding both G and T from 
the equation, R2 remained at 0.428 with statistically significant 
t-values for the coefficients of S and K (equation 11.4. ). 
- These findings suggest that the size of the bank and the ratio of 
its capital and reserves/deposits were the dominant balance sheet factors 
determining bank liquidity. As regards bank size, the marginal response 
of liquidity to changes in size was negative and significant. The 
influence and the direction of the relationship are consistent with 
the theory discussed earlier, which related the inverse association' 
between the two variables to economies of scales and portfolio 
diversification potentials of larger banks. As far as capital and 
reserves/deposit ratio was concerned, liquidity appeared to have a 
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positive and significant marginal response to a unit change in this ratio. 
As was theoretically discussed., the direction of the relationship may 
run both ways. The positive association between the two variables ' 
suggests the existence of banks with (1) either conservative dividend 
policies (accumulating bank net worth at a higher rate than the growth 
of deposits) coupled with conservative asset portfolio policies 
favouring excessive liquidit 0 y. 
(2) Or aggressive management accepting 
both a low capital and reserves/deposit ratio and a low liquidity 
ratio. As will be shown later, banks with both types of management 
led to associate L and K in a positive way. 
Attempts were also made to examine the liquidity function for 
each gmup of banks classified according to mtionality. Due to lesser 
degrees of freedom obtained in this case, one should take the results 
with some reservations. However, the impact of the independent variables 
on changes in liquidity for each group of banks was studied and the 
results are given in Section III of Table 5.5. The main findings were 
that: 
(1) For all classes of banks, S was the dominant balance sheet factor 
influencing liquidity behaviour. This variable was statistically 
significant at the 1% level with the predicted negative sign. 
(2) When co=ercial banks were divided into groups, K became no 
longer significant in determining liquidity. 
(3) G continued to have insignificant impact. 
(4) T remained insignificant for both the Arab and the foreign banks, 
whereas for the Jordanian banks the coefficient of this variable was 
statistically significant but with the opposite sign to that predicted. 
The last finding pointed out the fact that while changes in the 
maturity structure of deposits did not seem to have a significant 
influence in determining liquidity for the Arab and foreign banks as 
groups, this variable showed significant impact on liquidity behaviour 
of Jordanian banks but in the reverse direction to that expected. 
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The opposite sign for the coefficient of the deposit mix in the 
Jordanian banks meant that the less risky the deposit structure, 
the more the need for liquidity. This is paradoxical in view of the 
y discussed earlier, which emphasised that because of th re theor a MO 
stable nature of time and saving deposits as compared with demand 
deposits, the need for liquidity is reduced as these deposits increased 
their relative importance in the deposit structure. 
77hat seems remarkable from the equations pertaining to the three 
groups of banks is the large difference in the regression coefficients 
for size in each group. Size coefficients were, - 0.619, - 8.980, and 
- 4.370 for Jordanian, Arab and foreign banks respectively. These 
figures implied three distinctly different slopes. In other words, 
the marginal response of liquidity to a unit change in size in each 
group was very different, as indicated by the above values of the 
coefficients. It was shallower for Jordanian banks, steeper for the 
Arab banks and moderate for the foreign banks. Such differences may 
suggest that liquidity and size relationship are associated in a non- 
linear manner. Attempts were therefore made to introduce an element 
of non-linearity in the model and better results were obtained. This 
accordingly led to reformulation of the model Fts shown below: 
5. Reformulation of the Model: 
Attempts were made to express the previous relationship between 
liquidity and the four explanatory variables in the fcrm of a quadratic 
function. The new model used is of the fcrm: 
L=a+ (bS+CS 2) + (clG+eG2) + (fT+gT 
2)+ (IK+iK 2) 
The above quadratic equation means that the marginal effect of 
each independent variable on liquidity change is not measured only by 
the size of its coefficient ( as in the linear model) but it is also 
influenced by the level of the-variable and the coefficient of its squared 
value. 
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6. Ststiqtic%; l Anslysis (2): 
Using the above quadratic model, only bank size and capital/ 
deposits ratio appeared significant in determining liquidity behaviour. 
This is consistent with the results of the previous linear model. As 
is shown in the following equation, growth rate and deposit mix were 
insignificant: 
L= 54.628 -3 071S + 0.073S 
2+0 051G + O. OOiG 
2- 0-501T + 0.006T 
2+I 974K 
(ý. 283)* (3-985)* (;. 544) (0.676) (0-740 (0-937) (ý. 123)* 
- 0.025K 
2 
(3.611 )* 
R2=0.621 
DF = 81 
Dropping the growth rate and deposit mix from the equation, the 
liquidity function takes the following form: 
L= 56.865 - 3.525S + 0-081S 
2+ 
1-500K - 0.019K 
2 
(5-428)* (4.781)* (4.103)* (3-387)* 
2 R=0.601 
DF -, = 85 
As compared with the previous linear model (equation 11.4 Table 5-5), 
the above quadratic model improved the fit since (1) The independent 
variables explained higher percentage of liquidity variation. 
R2 became 0.601 as compared with 0.428 in the linear model). (2) The 
coefficients for S and K and also for their squared values were 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Due to the above, one can 
therefore say that the quadratic model is a better fit and the liquidity 
function of commercial banks in Jordan is quadratic in size and in 
capital & reserves/deposit ratio. 
To illustrate this, however, the estimations in both the linear 
* Statistically significant at the 0o'level. 
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and the quadratic forms are presented diagramatically and the observa- 
tions are plotted in the diagrams. Since we have a three dimensional 
model, it was necessary to adjint the observations in order to plot 
them in two dimensional graphs showing the effect of each independent 
variable on liquidity. The procedures adopted were as follows: 
Fitted plane is of form: 
L=a+ bS + cS 
2+ 
dK + eK 
2 
In order to plot the L-S and L-K relati6ns 'separately, we neglect the 
influence of one variable on liquidity when dealing with the other. 
In other words, we adjust the L value corresponding to the S (or K) 
to that which the model would predict if the K (or S) were zero. 
The estimated curves are: 
(1) K=0-L=a+ bS + cS 
2 
(2) S=0: Lk=a+ dK + 
Since actual observations n 
ations to get rid of S (or K) as 
LL 
s 
LkL 
2 
e 
ever have zero S or K, we adjust observ- 
follows: 
W+ eK 
2) 
(bS + cS2) 
The estimated curves for Ls and Lk are shown separately in figures 
5.3 and 5.1+ respectively. Both figures illustrate that plotted obser- 
vations are presented in a quadratic rather than in a linear form. As 
regards to liquidity - size relationship (L S 
), the estimated quadratic 
fit shows that the initial effect of size on liquidity is negative up 
to a certain size level, then afterwards it becomes positive. As is 
shown in Figure 5.3, the marginal effect on liquidity of a unit change 
in size is negative up to size 22% (when the marginal response of liquidity 
is zero), -then it takes a positive slope. The negative side of the 
relationship is consistent with the earlier theoretical treatment, 
emphasising economies of scale and asset diversification potentials 
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associated with large banks, which accordingly enable them to operate 
at less liquidity as compared with smaller banks. What seems interesting 
and deserves explanation here is the positive marginal response of 
liquidity when bank size exceeds a certain level. This behaviour has 
two possible explanations: 
(i) Economies of scale of large banks may turn to diseconomies of 
scale once bank size reaches a certain level. If this is the case, the 
adverse effects of diseconomies of scale ( which may result from a 
more sophisticated and bureaucratic control of bank management) can 
lead to less policy implementation, which is reflected in the overall 
efficiency of the bank. In such a situation, maintaining a high 
excessive liquidity can be considered as one aspect of the bank, declining 
operational efficiency. 
(2) The positive liquidity-size relationship may result from the strange 
behaviour of some large banks which, irrespective of their size, main- 
tain high liquidity. If this is the case, other factors which were not 
included in the modal (such as the institutional factors) seemed to 
influence liquidity decisions of these banks, thus leading them to 
operate at a high excess liquidity, without being guided by liquidity-size 
criterion. 
However, a close examination of Figure 5.3 will help to decide 
which of the above possibilities in likely to be the case. The figure 
cleerly shows that the strange behaviour of one large bank (Bank A) 
seemed to influence liquidity-size relationship in the positive direction, 
since the rest of the plotted observations pertaining ., 
to the other banks 
fell within the declining, side of the fitted curve. This means that the 
liquidity considerations of this large bank might be influenced by 
exogenous factors excluded from the model, rather than bank size. As 
mentioned at the outset of this chapter, bank liquidity can be largely 
influenced by institutional factors which were difficult to ireasure, 
such as bank management's attitude and propensity to avoid or accept 
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risk. 
(') 
Judging by a close knowledge of liquidity behaviour of Bank 0 
A. one can say that due to very cautious and conservative policies adopted 
by its management, the Bank tended, on average, to operate at a high 
excess liquidity throughout the period under review. For this reason, 
a high level of liquidity was maintained irrespective of the large size 
of the Bank. Such a situation ultimately influenced the estimated 
liquidity-size curve to take a positive trend. If one overlooks the 
strange behaviour of this one bank, then banks in general behaved 
according to the theoretical treatment of the negative association 
between the two variables., as is illustrated by the figure. However, 
such an explanation of the positive side of the liquidity-size 
relationship seems more likely to be the case, especially if one 
takes into account the difficulty of finding any reasonable explanation 
of the first possibility, which related the positive response of 
liquidity to a unit change in size to diseconomies of scale. This 
is further supported by the absence of an appropriate theory associating 
diseconomies of scale to large banks. 
(2) 
As far as the relationship between liquidity and capital & reserves/ 
deposit ratio was concerned (Lk), Figure 5.4 makes it clear that the 
estimated quadratic form is a better fit than the linear. The quadratic 
shape of the relationship means that the marginal response of L to a 
unit change in K is positive up to a certain point when K reaches 4eo 
(where the marginal effect is zero) aftenvhich the marginal response 
takes a reversed sign. This means that for banks with small values of 
K. the linear term (the positive sign)_seems to dominate the relationship. 
As K increases, the second order term comes to dominate the relationship 
with a negative responsive sign. As was theoretically discussed, the 
association between L and K may take both signs, depending on how one 
(1) 'See P. 146 
(2) As was discussed earlier, economic literature emphasised the existence 
of economies of scale in large banks. Se. e, Pp. 163-165. 
181 
a m 0% . 
12 . 93 0 & % 
< 12 
4 
ýýe 
43 
0W LL 0m 
x 0 00 
NO 
CL 
at 
V 
"M CL 
a 
u 
CD 
e C3 .0 
so C4 0 
o. 
"00 
0 
-03'. 
Cl. 
J3 
3C 
,X xx 0 00 
0 
. 
0 
0 
0-. 
00 o 
x 
N 0 
+ al 
!e 
C3 
GO C, to Arb 
C)zS paisnfpo I % -1 
182 
views K. If capital and reserves were considered on the liabilities, 
side to serve as a substitute for liquidity on the assets sideg L. and 
K would be associated through an inverse relationship, showing that 
banks with higher K, ceteris naribus, can operate with less liquidity. 
The Jordanian experience showed that only in very few cases did banks 
consider their net worth as a substitute for linuidity. As can be seen 
from the Figure, only in rare cases(') (when K exceeds 40/`-) some 
observations fall within the negative side of the fitted curve. The 
dominant case was that L and K were positively related, thus reflecting 
two possible behaviours which were both applicable to the Jordanian 
situation: - 
Firstly, some banks followed conservative dividend policies leading 
to accumulate banks' net worth at a rate higher than the growth of 
deposits. This appeared to be the case in some banks, particularly one 
Arab bank owned by its government. In privately owned banks, dividend 
policies may be largely influenced by =tinuous pressures from share- 
holders, who are usually eager to increase dividends. This, however, 
may not be the case in governmental owned banks where the distribution 
of dividends, and even profit considerations, may not be of prime 
importance. In such cases, a bank net worth may increase at a higher 
rate as compared with the growth of deposits. This situation seemed 
to be accompanied by a conservative asset selection preferring invest- 
ment in highly liquid forms. As a result, K and L moved in the same 
direction. 
Secondly, other banks appeared to. follow aggressive policies 
leading them to accept a low net worth to deposit ratio, and at the same 
time operate at a low liquidity level. Clearly, this also led to 
a positive relation between L and K. However, this seemed to be the 
(1) This comprises only 8 out of the 90 observations Plottea in the 
Figure. 
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case in many banks which, due to the rapid increase in their deposits 
in recent years, experienced a declinino- ratio of net worth, to deposits. 
This decline was, in fact, behind the CW's decision of 1975 to raise 
the minimum capital requirement for each bink from JD 250,000 to JD 
5009000. 
('-) 
Summ, qrV and ConcliLsions. 
Attempts were made in the above analysis to relate liquidity to 
a selected set of balance sheet ratios, which may possibly explain 
liquidity behaviour. The influence of these ratios was examined with 
the aid of the multiple regression technique. The main findings of the 
analysis can be summarised as follows: - 
1. The liquidity function was found to be quadratic in bank size and 
in the capital & reserves/deposit ratio. Both factors were statistically 
significant (at the 99 per cent level of confidence),, explaining 60.1% 
of liquidity variation. 
2. Bank size was the dominant balance sheet factor determining liquidity 
behaviour. Banks seemed to behave in accordance with the theoretical 
explanation of the liquidity-size relationship, which associated the 
two variables with a negative sign. This was the general case except 
for one large bank in which liquidity appeared. to be influenced by 
other institutional factors (excluded from the model), rather than 
by the bank size criterion. The strange behaviour of this bank seemed 
to lead liquidity-size relationship to take a positive sign when bank 
size reached a certain level. 
3. Capital & reserves/deposit ratio also had a significant impact 
upon liquidity. It was shown that the theoretical treatment of the 
influence of this variable is ambiguous. The direction of the relation- 
ship between the two variables may take both signs. The Jordanian 
(I) See Chapter 4, P. 95 
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experience revealed that most of the Plotted observations fall on the 
positive side of the estimated quadratic fit. This meant that this 
factor was rarely considered by bankers as a substitute for liquidity 
on the asset side of the balance sheet (a case in which Lk relationship 
would be negative). The dominant positive sign associating L and K 
was a reflection of the existence of both conservative as well as 
aggrezsive bank management in Jordan. In some banks, conservative 
dividend policies were accompanied by conservative nsset portfolio 
policies výhereas in others aggre3siva management policies prevailed 
in both sides of the balance sheet. 
4. The remaining two factors bank growth rate and the ratio of Q9 
time and saving deposit/total deposits, were not significant in in- 
fluencing liquidity behaviour. This finding was interesting particularly 
with regard to the deposit structure. Chapter 6 will now consider 
the policy implications of the above findings. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF EXCESSIVE LIQUIDIrY 
HOLD3NGS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Three major conclusions emerge from the analysis of the previous 
chapter regarding the liquidity behaviour of the commercial banks in 
Jordan. These conclusions, together with the policy measures that 
are discussed later in this chapter, have been based upon (1) the 
preceding statistical examination of the influence of the balance 
sheet factors on bank liquidity behaviour,, and (2) the personal 
interviews that the author conducted with the representatives of the 
commercial banks operating in Jordan during the summer of 1978 - 
Firstly. little attention has been given to the balance sheet factors 
in bank liquidity considerations. 
Commercial banks in Jordan have not paid sufficient attention to 
the structure of their balance sheets when deciding upon their liquidity. 
This has been shown by the earlier statistical analysisp and has bee', 
further substantiated throughout the personal interviews with the 
senior managers of the commercial banks. The preceding statistical 
work revealed some irrational aspects of balance sheet management, 
particularly with regard to the insignificant impact of the maturity 
structure of deposits on liquidity behaviour. For all banks taken 
together, the general case was that the composition of deposits, 
whether on call or tied to certain periods, did not play an important 
role in determining asset portfolio selection. This was made worse 
in the case of the Jordanian banks (taken separately) whose liquidity 
showed a significant positive marginal response to a unit change in 
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the ratio of term deposit to total deposits. This was not only 
paradoxical in view of the earlier theoretical discussion, which 
negatively associated the two variables, but it was also against 
general principles of rational banking practice. 
The personal. interviews conducted with bank? representatives 
threw. further light on the statistical results obtained earlier. 
Prior examinations of the balance sheet factors seemed to be of 
little significance in determining bank liquidity. It was understood 
that liquidity behaviour of commercial banks, in general, was mainly 
determined according to the demand made upon their credit,, rather 
than balance sheet factors. - 
The demand for bank credit (thus liquidity 
position) was largely influenced by prevailing as well as expected 
economic and political circumstances. 
The insignificant role played by balance sheet factors can be 
partly attributed to the lack of academically qualif ied persons with - 
adequate banking orientation among those who are responsible for general 
policy in mamy commercial banks. Bank policies (including liquidity 
considerations) are determined by the bank's board of directors. As 
a private shareholding company,, the members of the board usually 
represent the major owners participating in the bank. Therefore, some 
members may assume their positions without being well qualified in 
banking. It was noticed that bank liquidity was largely influenced 
by the attitude of the bank's board of directors, especially the 
chairman's (i. e. whether it was conservative or aggressive, optimistic 
or pessimistic). This indicated the fact that liquidity behaviour of 
commercial banks, in, general, was largely influenced by personal judg- 
ment and intuition, rather than being guid6d by rational balance sheet 
management. 
Secondly. excessive liquidi. ýZ levels maintained by banks. 
Another major conclusion to be drawn from the preceding analysis 
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is that excessive liquidity holdings were not justified by the structure 
and the relationships between the main components of the bank balance 
sheet. Chapter 5 showed that these factors might have necessitated 
this behaviour. Some important balance sheet factors were found to 
be insignificant in determining liquidity. It can be, therefore, 
concluded that if banks took a full account of balance sheet factors, 
they would be able to operate with lower liquidity. 
(') 
The fact which clearly emerged from personal interviews was that 
the maintenance of excessive liquidity was largely due to conservatism 
and over-cautiousness on the part of many banks. Still influenced 
by their recent past when they used to operate under the colonial 
monetary system, some older banks continued to adhere to their orthodox 
lending policies and practice, which prevented them from venturing into 
innovative areas of activities. 
(2) 
As was shown in Chapter 2. operating 
at a noticeable high level of liquidity was one characteristic feature 
of colonial banking, which was largely the outcome of the very strict 
and cautious operational policies adopted by the banks. It was also 
noticed that banks' conservatism has been particularly encouraged by 
the prevelance of political instability in the region, particularly 
prior 1973, 
(3) 
which led mary banks to pursue strict lending policies, 
thus further intensifying their liquidity preference. Moreover, these 
The examination of the balance sheet ratios is not in fact)enough 
for a close assessment of bank liquidiiy. This should not only be 
based on a bank's past record, as reflected in its balance sheet, 
but it should also consider the current and future flow of funds 
through the bank. This means to examine the cash flow forecast 
which reveals the extent to which the bank can meet alý expected 
obligations within the due time. See Jack Revell. "The-t-olvency 
of Banks". The Banker, (Jan. 1975) P. 28. 
(2) This point is discussed later in this chapter, see P. 195 
(3) For this impact on bank activities, see Chapter 2. P. 24 
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banks tended always to be very liquid in order to meet any sudden 
withdraw4l of deposits that may result from such unstable conditions. 
However, with the new operational circumstancesobanks I behaviour 
and attitudes should correspondingly have changed. Over-cautiousness 
and excessive liquidity holdings might have been justified during the 
period of monetary dependence because: 
i) There was no central bank which commercial banks could have 
resorted to in need of liquidity. 
ii) Lack of domestic investment opportunities, especially in the 
absence of any national development programmes. 
iii) Absolute freedom given to commercial banks to invest abroad, 
mainly in liquid forms. 
iv) The highly volatile and unstable nature of government deposits 
held by commercial banks, which comprised an average of 36% 
of total deposits. 
(') 
Moreover, the argument that excessive liquidity holdings are 
justified by uncertainty and regional political instability does not 
seem to be a strong one. No bank, whatever its liquidity position, can 
escape financial embarrassment when such circumstances create nervousness 
a ng depositors, unless the central authorities interfere to regulate 
deposit withdrawal in order to protect the banks from the danger of a 
run on their deposits. This was what in fact happened in Jordan 
immediately after the 1967 War. In anticipation of substantial with- 
drawal of deposits, the CBJ restricted withdrawals by each customer 
from licensed banks to JD 100 per month. 
(2) 
In further support to banks' 
liquidity after this war, the government also decided to deposit with 
(1) J. Salah, The Evolution of the Banking System in Jordan, op. cit. 
P. 42. 
(2) This measure came into effect in the first day of the June War 
(the Sth) 1967, see CBJ, Fourth Annual Report,, 1967, PP. 35-36- 
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the banks amounts equal to a fixed proportion of their total fixed 
liabilities: Government's support to all banks amountýd to JD 7009000. 
(') 
Such measures were effective in preventing large withdrawals of 
deposits by their owners, who gradually resorted their confidence 
in the banking system. 
(2) 
Thirdly. there are high social as well as private costs involved in 
excessive liquidity holdings. 
Maintaining unnecessar7 excessive liquidity had undoubtedly 
significant repercussions on the overall performance of the economy., 
as well as on the banks themselves. The adverse effect of this behaviour 
can be illustrated in the following three major areas: 
(a) A social opportunity cost was involved in adhering to this practice, 
in the sense of utilizing unnecessary holdings of liquid assets for 
financing economic development projects. 
(3) 
(b) Holdings of excessive liquidity minimised the effectiveness of 
domestic monetary management. Clearly, the effectiveness of a central 
bank's actions depends largely on the liquidity position of the commercial 
banks at the time when monetary policy measu; res are taken. Central 
banking experience in Jordan proves that the high level of commercial 
banks' liquidity worked to frustrate domestic monetary management, 
because these banks rarely resorted to the CBJ for liquidity purposes. 
(1) This measure came into effect in the first day of the June War 
(the 5th) 1967, see CBJ, Fourth Annual Report. 1967, PP. 35-36. 
(2) Private sector's deposits resumed growth in 1968 and , 
1969, after 
experiencing a decline in 1967. See Chapter 4. Table 4.2. P. 98 
(3) This point will be further illustrated when discussing policy 
implications, see P. 194 
(4) J. Salah, The Evolution of the Banking Sývstem in Jordan, op. cit. 
P-70. 
190 
This situation made it difficult for the CBJ to influence the volume of 
bank credit, as well as the money supply, by varying its own domestic 
assets. Thus, reducing the high liquidity level maintainedýby commercial 
banks was of paramount significance for the operational efficiency of 
domestic monetary policy. - 
(a) Operating at excessive levelsýof liquidity must have adversely 
influenced the profitability of the commercial banks. Undoubtedly, 
this practice involved a private opportunity cost in the sense of 
investing excessive liquidity in other competing less liquid assets, 
yielding higher rates of return. As is well known, banks usually 
consider the liquidity and safety of any operation on the one side, 
and its profitability on'the other. Evaluating and, weighing these 
factors is an inherently complex task. This is because assets carrying 
relatively high yields are generally less liquid and riskier than assets 
having low yields. As private business institutions, banks work to 
maximise their profits by holding assets in less liquid forms. However, 
the ability, to invest in illiquid assets is largely restricted by the 
need to meet deposit withdrawals, which accordingly necessitates 
maintaining 'appropriate' levels of liquidity. 
(') 
If'banks increase their 
liquidity holdings above the level which can be deemed appropriate to 
meet liquidity requirements, the excess will be at the expense of their 
profitability. On the other hand, if banks undertake more aggressive 
investments by excessively increasing the proportion of illiquid assets 
In fact, banks maintain a certain level of liquidity to meet other 
purposes,, which are related to the existence of uncertainties. 
Moore revealed that the sources of uncertainties which banks 
possibly encounter are: The number of customers who might default, 
possible fluctuations in deposit liabilities, changes in the market 
value of securities held in asset portfolio., and adverse clearings. 
See Moore, Basil, J. An Introduction to the Theory of Financet 
Asset-Holder Behaviour Under UncertainiýYN-ewYork: The Free 
Press, 1968) PP. 156-68. 
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in their portfolio, this might endanger their liquidity. Thus, the 
yield and liquidity implications of an asset management decision are 
perhaps the most important and most difficult problem facing bank 
management on a continuous basis. 
However, both the previous analysis and the personal interviews 
supported the fact that the high level of liquidity maintained by 
commercial banks was unnecessarily excessive, which must have involved 
considerable opportunity costs. Some 'aggressive' banks believed that 
the high level of liquidity kept by other banks was much above the 
usual liquidity needs, which was a reflection of their conservative 
banking practice. Aggressive banks, in general, believed that operating 
at a level of liquidity just around the minimum level specified by 
the CBJ would be safe, and arq holdings much above this level can be 
considered unnecessarily excessive, 
A number of important policy measures arise from the above 
analysis, so that unless-new operational and organisational procedures 
are evolved and implemented, both the technical efficiency of the 
commercial banks and their future contribution to domestic economic 
development will be impaired - 
(1) The CBJ should ask the commercial banks to follow a more rational 
attitude to balance sheet management; particularly, due attention should 
be paid to the relationship between liquidity holdings and the maturity 
structure of deposits. Assets and liabilities should be closely 
matched by maturity. The insignificant impact of the deposit structure 
on liquidity holdings should further encourage the CBJ to ask commercial 
banks to extend their operations' into longer-term activitied. The 
earlier argument(l) of introducing the term lending technique into 
(1) See Chapter 4, pP,. 129-133 
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Jordanian banking practice is further supported by the findings of 
this chapter. This innovation is not only necessitated by'the signif- 
icance of this type of lending to economic development needs. 9 but. *'it 
is now further encouraged by holding a high relative weight of term ' 
deposits and, at the same time, maintaining excessive liquidity, 'It'ý" 
is believed. that commercial banks could have been a potential source 
for longer-term lending., had they followed a proper matching between 
their assets and'liabilities in this way. - 
(2) There is a need'to establish, within each individual bank,, -'a 
specialised research department comprising a well qualified and 
trained staff for the purpose of conducting research and studies 
pertaining to the main aspects of bank'activities. Balance'sh6et 
management and the relationship between certain assets and liabilities 
are of special importance. Such studies can be accordingly forwarded 
to the board of directors for discussion and approval. In this way, 
the top decisions concerning the general policy of the bank'(including 
liquidity considerations) will be established on a more-academic and _ 
thoroughly studied basis. 
The need to establish speoialised. departments for research 
work was, in fact,, felt during the personal interviews; for exampleg 
some of the interviewed managers related the insignificant influence 
of the maturiV structure of deposits on liquidity to the lack of 
sufficient flexibility within the bank's operational system, which 
was important for carrying out quick investment decisions. This 
was coupled with the absence of-aaequately prepared investment studies 
which could be readily available to absorb any additions to the bank's 
funds. ' An efficient bank should quickly manage to shift its resources 
to'aaequate channels and within the appropriate time. When-the bank 
lacks flexibility and qualified specialistsv Part OfIts resources 
may remain idle or invested. in readily liquid forms., For this reasonp 
it might have often happened that a large proportion of saving and time 
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deposits had been invested in liquid assets, which were easily and 
quickly obtained. These term deposits were, in effect, employed as 
if they were demand deposits. Clearly, this situation not only diverted 
bank resources away from longer-term investments, but it also deprived 
the banks themselves of wider profitable opportunities had their assets 
appropriately matched the structure of their resources. I 
However., comm roial banks may hesitate to create specialised- 
departments for research work purposes, because of the long-term 
benefits associated with this speoialisation, and because of the cost 
element involved. In reality, the cost would be greatly minimised 
if one considers the Indirect benefits of the research work., which 
would be reflected on the overall efficiency of the bank. In fact, 
one big bank took the initiative by establishing a speoialised research 
department for its own purposes. 
0) 
Other commercial banks, even the 
small ones, should follow this example - this may not necessarily require 
the establishment of large departments with sophisticated techniques, 
but every bank has to tailor its own department to its particular 
needs. In this respect, the CBJ can be of a great help, given the 
long experience and qualified personnel of its research department. 
(3) Commercial banks should direct their lending policies towards 
more innovative banking procedures. It was clear, partioularly during 
the personal interviews, that many commercial banks were still adhering 
to orthodox lending practice, which was reflected in maintaining 
excessive liquidity. Their strict adherence to orthodoxy became 
increasingly-irrelevant as shown earlier. Social as well as private 
opportunity costs implied by this behaviour were seen to be considerable. 
Banks should dynamically adjust themselves to their particular 
environment; they have to create new lending methods and techniques 
to suit their econonq's changing conditions, Two areas of innovations 
(1) i. e. the Arab Bank. 
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are of particular relevance here: 
(a) Part of the excessive liquidity holdings can be utilised for 
financing economic development projects through consortium activities 
with specialised credit institutions. As was frequently indicated., 
commercial banks usually prefer to invest their funds In highly, 
liquid forms, and restrict their credit largely to short-term commercial 
activities. They are reluctant to finance economic development projects, 
mainly because of the high risk involved and the long-term nature 
of the credit required. The element of risk can be greatly reduced 
if these projects are sound and thoroughly studied. Commercial banks 
in Jordan are not in factequipped with adequate expertise in risk 
assessment. The proposed research departments may bridge-this gap. 
Meanwhile, it is important for commercial banks to participate in 
economic development with the co-operation of the specialised credit 
institutions to finance joint development projects. This type of 
loan innovation appears to be both a promising and practical method. 
Specialised credit institutions have special systems for preparing 
projects' feasibility studies, and are also equiped with risk assessment 
expertise. Due to this reason, these institutions are able to select 
the economically viable and profitable projects. In this way, risk 
considerations can be largely minimised, and commercial banks can feel 
more secure about their future investments. Moreover, the financial 
requirements of the selected projects, can be appropriately shared between 
the commercial banks and the specialised banks. The latter can provide 
the long-term needs and the required technical advice, whereas the 
former can meet the short and medium-term financial requirements. This 
will be a practical opportunity for the commercial banks-to introduce 
the term lending technique (which has been frequently recommended) into 
their practice. Thus, participating with specialised credit institutions 
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in joint financing of development projects will absorb part of banks' 
excessive liquidity. This will consequently reduce both the social 
as well as the private costs involved in maintaining this practice. 
Government backing of the selected projects can further encourage 
commercial banks to undertake this type of business. 
(') 
Some interviewed 
senior bankers emphasised that this will be important to give more 
confidence to the commercial banks and encourage them to finance 
developmental activities. However., the Government is already backing 
some big industrial enterprises,, and it will be socially beneficial 
to extend its backing to cover those projects which can form successful 
consortiums. 
(b) 'Conservative' banks,, in particular, are required to abandon their 
strict adherence to 'armchair' banking and move towards dynamic banking.. 
by marketing their services and exploring domestic investment opportunities. 
One main difference between a 'conservative' banker and an 'aggressive' 
one is that the former is an armchair banker who passively awaits for 
the appropriate business to come to him. An aggressive banker, in 
contrast, actively seeks business and is not conventionally restricted 
by certain types of business or collateral. 
(2) 
The latter is more 
dynamic and innovative,, and thus more suitable to the changing nature 
of the developing economy. It was shown that both types of managements 
existed in commercial banking in Jordan. The conservative banks still 
(1) Government backing may take the form of participating in the share 
capital or guaranteeing the success-of the project by, for example, 
securing the distribution of an annual minimum rate of net profits 
to the shareholders. 
(2) For a further differentiation between orthodoxy and unorthodoxy 
in banking practice and the unsuitability of the former,, see 
G. Nwankwo, "Traditional Banking in Developing Countries., " The 
Bankers' Magazine, (Feb. 1973) PP. 65-68. 
196 
strict3, y adhered to an orthodox lending practice of armchair banking. 
They never ventured to look for business or explored new investment 
opportunities. Unorthodox banks also existed with aggressive lending 
policies', venturing bey6nd the traditional banking practice. They 
were not satisfied by waiting for business to come to, them asking 
for finance., but they also went out searching for new business and 
acquainting customers with their services. 
However, the competition between the above two types of banks 
prior to 1973 was not active, and each one bad its own share in the 
market. The recent increase in the number of commercial banks and 
the keen competition that followed made it difficult for the conservative 
banks to maintain their previous level of business, whilst adhering to 
their strict orthodoxy. 
(') 
Active competition in the credit market, 
resulting from aggressive policies approaching borrowers with competitive 
offers, led to a noticeable transfer of customers away from the 
conservative banks. As a result, a large proportion, of conservative 
banks' funds were kept idle, thus further increasing their excessive 
liquidity holdings. A senior conservative bank manager related the 
increase in excessive liquidity holdings of his bank to the lack of 
available avenues for domestic investment, resulting mainly from the 
recent competition between banks. However, it is believed that it 
was the lack of adaptation on the Part of many banks rather than the 
shortage of domestic investment opportunities that led these banks 
(1) For competition in domestic banking, see chapter 5. PP. 155-161 
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to maintain excessive liquidity, This belief was supported during an 
interview with another conservative bank manager, who emphasised that 
if his bank does not change its conventional credit policy to face 
the now competitive market, there will be a gradual loss in customers 
and a continuous rise in liquidity. The above belief can be also 
proved by the steady rise in the demand for bank credit extended by the 
aggressive banks. An interview with an aggressive bank's manager 
revealed that the demand for credit made upon its bank was more than 
to be met by the current capacity of the bank. This led the bank to 
borrow from another conservative bank, with excessive liquidity holdings, 
at a rate of 6%. and then relent to the public at 9%. This was in 
fact a clear example of the availability of domestic investment opportun- 
ities., which were greatly increased since thelaunching of economic 
development programmes in 1973. Conservative banks are, therefore, 
required to move towards innovative lendingp-ractices by marketing 
their services and approaching the borrowers with attractive offers. 
They should go out to business and explore new investment channels 
for investing their excessive liquidity. Their armchair banking would 
be better replaced by dynamic and innovative banking. However, such 
changes require comprehensive studies of the market conditions, which 
the previously proposed research departments can adequately provide. 
(4) There is a need to develop an active money market and encourage 
inter-benk borrowing, which may reduce excessive liquidity holdings. 
It was shown in Chapter 4 that commercial banks, particularly 
American ones, began to shift their emphasis towards the liabilities 
side of their balance sheet as a major source of liquidity. This was 
illustrated by the 'liability management' theory that emerged in the 
1960's. 
(1) 
Banks realised that they could secure their liquidity 
(1) See Chapter 1+, P. 124 
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best, not only by holding liquid assets in their portfolios, but 
also by resorting to the money market for additional funds. The 
reliance on the liabilities side of the balance sheet was greatly 
facilitated by the existence of active money markets, through which 
banks were able to raise funds by offering attractive yields on the 
borrowed funds, and by issuing new types of deposits, such as certific- 
ates of deposits. Therefore, promoting such a market in Jordan will 
make it easier for the commercial banks to operate at a comparatively 
lower liquidity, because they can quickly meet their needs of funds 
through the market. It was understood throughout the personal inter- 
views that due to the absence of this market, commercial banks 
sometimes maintained liquidity above the level which was required to 
meet current needs. For example, it often happene& that banks kept 
part of their funds in a highly-liquid form in order to redeem a 
future liability maturing in one or two weeks time. If an active 
money market was available, these funds which were kept idle (or 
invested in low yield forms) would be employed somewhere else, and 
the need for liquidity could be met through the market at the time 
when the liability matured. Clearly, this situation must have had 
some opportunity costs since these funds (which were tied up liquid 
for a certain period) could be invested in other alternative assets 
yielding higher rates of return. 
(5) Maintaining excessive liquidity in commercial banking further 
requires the monetary authorities to adopt a positive and more 
realistic interest rates policy. It was., shown in Chapter 3 that due 
to the adverse effects of pursuing a traditional low interest rate 
policy (in particular its impact in reducing the real yield on financial 
savings to negative values), the CBJ was asked to raise domestic 
interest rates to realistic levels. The full argument for introducing 
such a change is dealt with in Chapter 11. What is necessary to point 
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out here is that the above argument is further supported by the need to 
reduce excessive liquidity holdings of the commercial banks. Lijuiaity 
preference on the part of the bankst in general, must have been 
intensified by the prevailing low real loan rates. Effective low 
real rates on bank credit have undoubtedly discouraged commercial banks 
to venture beyond the traditional lines of business, thus restricting 
their credit to well-established borrowers. A low real maximum ceiling 
on loans rate'was not sufficient to cover the usual administrative 
costs and the potential default risks involved in new lines of business, 
particularly those connected with development programmes. This accord- 
ingly encouraged conservatism ard led to maintaining excessive liquidity 
in domestic banking. Prominent monetary economists observed the 
above effect in many developing countries, that are traditionally 
adhering to effective low real interest rates policies. McKinnon 
states that: 
"In addition to restricting the overall volume of bank lending, 
the interest ceiling ensures that the trickle of available finaace 
flows to completely safe borrowers whose reputation is known or 
whose collateral is relatively riskless. Or worse, the great 
excess demand for loans allows alloc&tions to be contingent on 
political or 'establishment' connections. Importers holding exc- 
lusive licences, or the largest landowners, or various government 
agencies are likely to be the beneficiaries. "(1) 
Shaw also emphasises that "Effective low ceilings on real 
loan rates intensify risk aversion and liquidity preference on 
the part of intermediaries. Banks and o1ther-s' keep a privileged 
place in their portfolios to established borrowers, especially 
trading firms with a long record of stability. They have little 
incentive to explore new and less certain lending opportunities. "(2) 
Ronald McKinnon, Money and Capital in Economic Developmentp OP-cit. 
P-73. 
(2) Edward Shaw, Financial Deepening in Economic Development, op. cit. 
P. 86. 
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Finally, the CBJ may work to reduce bank liquidity by the 
introduction of a special deposit scheme, so that any bank which 
maintains liquidity above a minimum required level has to deposit 
a specified proportion of the excess liquidity in the form of a 
special deposit with the CW. These deposits can be used by the 
latter., either for re-lending to the specialised credit institutions, 
or utilised directly for financing productive projects with close 
connections to development programmes, 
O) 
Prior to a reassessment of these innovations in the content of 
a consideration of the role of the central bank (Chapter 11),. the 
remaining parts of the financial system(i. e. the non-bank sector)need 
to be outlined and analysed. 
Such innovations will be discussed in detail in Chapter 11. See PP. 
372-378. 
PART C 
THE NOIT-BANTK FTNANCT-AL 3NSTTTUTIONS 
201 
CHAPTER-7 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING THE EVOLUTION 
AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NON-BANK FINANCIAL SECTOR IN 
ECONOMIC DEVELORUM 
(I) NON-BANK FINANCIAL INTERIEDIARIES AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
MONETARY POLICY. 
The rapid growth of non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFIS) 
in developed countries raises controversial issues regarding the influence 
of these institutions on the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
(') 
The increasing importance of NBFIs in the financial system is seen 
by many as a potential threat to monetary stability, thus requiring 
the monetary authorities to exercise some degree of control over their 
activities. This view emerged in the U. S. A. in the early 1950's, 
mainly as a result of the important theoretical work of Gurley and 
Shaw. 
(2) 
A similar study, the 1959 Radcliffe Committee's Report on 
the Working of the U. K. Monetary System, called attention to the threat 
posed by the existence of a large supply of near-money assets held by 
NAFIs when monetary control was confined only to the control of the 
(1) The controversy rose as whether to consider NBFIs as similar to 
commercial banks (thus subjecting them to administrative monetary 
control), or as different financial intermediaries (thus excluding 
them from central control). In general, the controversy took 
three main aspects.; First1y,, the distinction between the two 
types of intermediaries was made on the ground that only the 
liabilities of the commercial banks are widely used as a medium 
of exchange. Secondly, whether the activities of NBFIs affect the 
general liquidity position of the economy. Finally, whether these 
institutions act as loanable funds brokers Just operating as clearing 
stations for ex-ante savings on their way to borrowers, or they can 
create loanatle funds by their own operations, like the commercial 
banka. For a full review of the controversy and the related referencest 
See: G. Clayton, "British Financial Intermediaries In Theory and 
Practice" Economic Journal, (Dec., 1962) PP. 869-886. 
(2) See: J. Gurley and E. Shaw, "Financial Aspects of Economic Development" 
American Economic Review. (Sept.,, 1955) PP-515-538. 
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liquid assets held by the co=ercial bankso(i) 
In developing countries, however, NBFIs are still at an early 
stage of development, constituting only a small part of the financial 
system. Institutions specialising on'either the mobilisation Of 
resources, or the disposition of such funds between different outlets, 
are noticeably limited. Commercial banks'are still by and large 
the predominant element in the financial system. Thus, much of the, 
controversy regarding the impact of the NBFIs on the effectiveness of 
domestic monetary management is irrelevant to most developing countries. 
Jordan is a case in point. The size of NBFIs is still relatively small 
as compared with the commercial banks. Highly developed specialised', 
institutions similar to those available in developed countries, such 
as finance houses, investment trust companies, unit trusts, and special- 
ised investment agencies are still non-existent. Moreover, in spite of 
some diversification in the financial system in recent years., the majority 
of NBFIs is concentrated on the credit side as represented by the 
specialised credit institutions. Apart from the Housing Bank 
(established 
1974) which has been active in mobilisiný funds in addition to its 
role in extending housing credit,, none of the specialised credit 
institutions shows any Interest bi attracting domestic savings. ' In- 
contrast to commercial banks, therefore. 'the liabilities of these 
institutions are not used as a medium of exchange. For this reason, 
together with the small relative size of NBFIs, it can be concluded 
that the existence and operations of such institutions have not in 
fact-significantly impaired the effectiveness of monetary management 
in Jordan. However, it will be shown that because of its mobilisation 
activity, the rising importance of the operations of the Housing Bank 
must have left some influence on the general liquidity position of the 
G. Clayton, "Briti3h Financial Intemediaries In Theory and Praotioe"v 
op-cit. P-87. 
203 
economy. This situation requires the monetary authorities to subject 
this particular specialised institution to some kind of control in 
order to prevent any frustration of domestic nonetary management policies. 
One of the other problems that can exist in developing countries 
is the unofficial intermediary role performed by money changers that 
sometimes may be important, especially where there is a trade bias to 
the development of the economy. In Jordan, for example, money changers 
(Sarraffeen) are permitted to undertake direct dealings in foreign 
exchange and local cilrrency, but there are no official statistics that 
reveal the magnitude of their operations. This market operated together, 
and in competition, with the official money market to finance foreign 
trade transactions. Despite many attempts made by the Central Bank of 
Jordan to regulate and influence their operations, the Sarraffeen 
continued to be out of any effective central control. 
(1) 
The problem, 
on the one hand, is that this unofficial market positively adds to 
the mobilisation and activation of monetary funds, but, on the other 
hand, if these activities are not effectively regulated, the efficiency 
of any national monetary policy pursued may be partially impaired. In 
developed countries, these activities are usually institutionalised 
and make subject to central bank regulation. 
(II) THE EVOLUTIONARY PATTERN OF THE NON+-BANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS-'TN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AS COMPARED TO DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. 
In developed countries in general, NBFIs have gradually evolved in 
response to the normal processes of market pressure. 
(2) 
Apart from 
(1) This area is beyond the scope of this the! §is. For some further 
details, See Fariz, Z., The Role of Foreign Trade in the Economic 
Development of Jordan, (U. K. : Keele University, Ph. D. Thesis, 1978) 
PP. 226-228 
(2) E. Nevin, capital Funds in Underdeveloped Countries, op. cit. P. 73. 
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a few cases where official intervention resulted in the establishment 
of specialised institutions to fill certain gaps in the credit structure, 
in general,, the financial system expanded and diversified in accordance 
with the increasing demand made upon its services. Private profit 
considerations were almost sufficient to induce further financial 
specialisation and diversification, thus leading the financial system 
to take a 'demand-following' pattern of evolution. 
(') 
Government finan- 
cial agencies, where they existed, played only a marginal and supplem- 
enting role as compared with the part played by the privately owned 
institutions. 
(2) 
However, this was not the case in developing countries 
in which NBFIs were 'supply-leading' rather than 'demand-following' 
institutions. In general, NBFIs were established in advance of the 
demand made upon their services. In these countries, profit expectations 
were highly uncertain and unable to attract sufficient funds to be 
invested in some important sectors (such as agriculture and manufacturing) 
which were still at a rudimentary stage of development. Thus, private 
institutions for financing such activities were not likely to evolve 
through the free forces of the market, which accordingly necessitated 
official intervention by deliberately creating such specialised 
ins t it ut ions . 
(III) THE NEED FOR DELIBERATE CREATION OF THE NON-BANK FINANCIAL 
SECTOR IN DEVEWPING COUNTRIES. 
The failure of the free forces of the market mechanism to develop 
For the evolutionary patterns of financial institutions, see 
Chapter 1,, PP. 8-9 
(2) E. Nevin, op. cit. P-74. 
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an adequate network of NBFIs resulted in creating certain'financial 
gaps in the financial structure, which seriously hindered the growth 
of developing economies. To achieve the set development objectives, 
development planners in these countries emphasised the necessity of 
bridging such gaps by deliberately creating specialised financial 
agencies to perform specific important functions. The development of 
some basic sectors, such as agriculture, manufacturing., and housing 
has been given special attention in most developing countries within 
comprehensive developmentýprogrammes. These sectors, however,, suffered 
from a lack of adequate finance necessary for their-development. 
Commercial banks were generally reluctant to finance. these sectors, 
mainly because of the long-term nature of the credit required, and 
because of the high risk involved in financing such activities. Their 
reluctance was further accentuated by their strict adherence tol'orthodox 
banking practice which restricted their lending to short-term,, self- 
liquidating transactions available in the foreign trade sector. Given 
the significance attached to these sectors in national development - 
plans, it was therefore highly-costly for developing countries to wait 
without bridging such a gap in the financial, system. - This task has 
been shouldered by the central banks in these countries. - where the 
prevalence of underdeveloped financial infrastructure necessitated- 
a larger developmental role of monetary policy. Central banks in 
todayls developing countries are not only concerned with pursuing 
selective credit policy aiming at influencing the allocation of bank 
c. redit in favour of development,, but they are equally interested in 
setting-up an adequate network of specialised institutions to fill 
certain gaps. It is recognised that even in developed countries the 
approach of "institution-relateWl is more useful and effective than 
the "market-related" approach in directing the allocation of financial 
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resources towards developmental activities. 
(') 
Since commercial 
banks are private profit maximisation institutions, their operations 
may not coincide with social costs and benefits if they are left to 
function in accordance with the free forces of the market. Reliance 
on market allocation of bank resources is socially more harmful in 
developing countries, where the possible divergence between private 
and social costs and benefits is greater than in developed countries. 
However, due to the large size and the risky nature of the credit gaps 
in these countries as shown above,, the "institution-related" approach 
of monetary policy there should not only be confined to encouraging 
the flow of bank credit to priority sectors,, but it should be also 
extended to "institution-creating" approach by setting-up necessax7 
non-bank financial intemediaries. 
The creation of specialised credit institutions was not only 
necessitated by a lack of finance in certain industrial sectors., but 
it was also encouraged by the absence of adequate finance in specific 
sections within the same industry. General experience in most countries 
shows that small and medium-sized industries, and some new concerns 
in particular industries, often encountered difficulties in obtaining 
sufficient finance. 
(2) 
Private financial institutions were so reluctant 
to finance such businesses because of the administrative expense ard 
high default-probability involved. 
(3) 
This accordingly led to the creation 
of government specialised agencies capable of providing these sectors 
with adequate assistance. Similar gaps in the capital market also 
(1) Morison, L and Brown., R., "Monetary and Credit Controls in the 
U. K. ". The Banker (August: 1975) P. 879. 
(2) Gupta, L., The Changing Structure of Industrial Finance in IndLa; 
The Impact of Instituti2nal Finan2e (Oxford, Clarendon, 196---91-P. 86. 
(3) E. Nevin., op. cit. P. 84. 
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existed in the more developed countries, such as the U. K., where the 
experience revealed the existence of what was called "The Macmillan 
Gap", Established upon government request, the Macmillan Committee 
pointed out the great difficulty encountered by the smaller and 
medium-sized firms in raising capital. The investigations of the 
Committee and the recommendations that followed led to the formation 
of special institutions for financing such concerns. 
(') 
In addition to specialised credit institutions, government inter- 
vention in developing countries was also extended to the rest of the 
non-bank financial sector, by setting-up other institutions with 
different financial specialisation,, such as stock exchange markets, 
pension funds, postal savings banks, and other investment corporations. 
The creation of these specialised institutions was deemed, by development,, 
planners, as necessary channels for effective mobilisation of national 
savings and their productive utilisation in long-term domestic investments. 
By so doing, such institutions were expected to perform an important 
role in facilitating and achieving the set development goals. As will 
be shown later., development planners in Jordan rightly placed great 
emphasis on the non-bank financial sector as an essential instrument 
for achieving the country's development objectives. The establishment 
of this sector and its activities were largely assisted and promoted 
by successive development programmes., and by government legislation 
and other fiscal incentives. 
(IV) CHARACTERISTICS AND FUNCTIONS OF SPECIALISED CREDIT INSTITUTIONS 
-Ul CONTRAST TO COMIMCIAL BPNKS. 
Specialised credit institutions are closely related to development 
(1) Raymond Frost, "The Macmillan Gap, 1931-53", Oxford Economic 
Papers (1954) PP. 181-201. 
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finance and this is why they are sometimes referred to in the literature 
as "development banks". One distinguishing difference between these 
banks and the ordinary commercial banks is that while the activities 
of the latter are completely guided by profit considerations, the 
criteria adopted by the former in selecting projects for assistance 
place particular emphasis on the economic priority of the project and 
(I ) its significance for economic development. Development banks are 
characterised by combining both banking and developmental criteria 
when taking investment decisions. 
(2 ) 
As banks, they are concerned with 
the profitability of their investments as can be judged by examining 
the financial position of the enterprise concerned, its capital 
structure, the value and quality of assets provided as collaterals, 
etc. As development agencies, at the same time., they are interested 
in the national priority of the selected enterprise and its overall 
impact on promoting economic development. This dual nature of develop- 
ment banks makes their role of particular importance from the stand- 
point of economic development, This is because not all "bankable" 
projects are necessarily important for economic development, nor is 
every economically essential project necessarily "bankable". 
(3) 
There 
are many projects which may satisfy only one of the above attributes, 
thus creating some difficulties for development bankers when taking 
(1) Gupta, op. cit. P. 102. 
(2) For more details of the banking and development functions of 
development banks,, see: Bdýkey, S., Problems and Practices of 
Development Banks (Baltimore. 1959) PP. 49-55; Basu, S., Theo 
and Practice of Development Banking (New York: Asian Publishing 
House,, 19657-51; and Houk, J., Financing and Problems of 
Development Banking (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1967) P. 2. 
(3) Boskeyt OP-cit. P-50. 
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investment decisions. Such a situation becomes more difficult 'if a 
proposed project is expected to produce general benefits for the 
economy (such as increasing employment Opportunities and improving 
the balance of payments' position) without direct benefits being 
accrued to the enterprise itself. However, as is generally observed, 
development banks cannot achieve their developmental objectives if 
they largely confine themselves to *bankable" projects; at the same. 
time,, they cannot frequently overlook the profttability of their invest- 
ments which may endanger their financial position. 
(') 
A development 
banker should carefully consider both aspects of development banking. 
The above characteristics of development banks are reflected in 
their particular functiors which differentiate them from the ordinary 
commercial banks. From a functional point of view,, a development bank 
is distinguished from a commercial bank if it isdesigned to perform 
banking and promotional functions. 
(2) 
Moreover. , the nature of the 
banking function in both types of intermediaries is clearly different. 
The banking function of development banks covers areas that commercial 
banks do not usually undertake. While the commercial banks restrict 
themselves mainly to financing short-term transactions., the principal 
financial function of the development banks is the prdvision of 
medium and long-term capital. Development banks can also perform 
their role as a channel for long-term finance through direct equity 
participation in domestic enterprises., or by guaranteeing loans 
obtained by these enterprises from other sources. Furthermore, 
Boskey, P-50,, and Basu, P-5% 
(2) Houk,, p. 2 
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by underwriting attempts of borrowers to raise equity or debt, these 
banks can generate public confidence in domestic industries, thus 
stimulating the flow of private savings towards long-term financial 
instruments. 
(') 
Clearly, such functional aspects of development banking 
have special implications for promoting domestic capital markets. 
In addition to the above financial functions, a development bank 
has also a promotional role as a major source of technical assistance, 
which is necessaz7 for encouraging domestic entrepreneurship. This 
aspect of development banking has a special significance in developing 
countries, which largely suffer from a lack of comprehensive investment 
surveys., and the absence of dynamic entrepreneurs with business attitudes 
towards operations in new fields of investment. 
(2) 
Development banks 
can help to minimise these difficulties by providing managerial guidance 
and technical advice, on the one hand., and by initiating feasibility 
studies and pre-investment surveys in various sectors of the econonor 
on the other. By exploring and identifying viable domestic investment 
avenues, indigenous businessmen will be encouraged to take advantage 
of the new investment opportunities so highlighted. Development banks 
can thereby greatly assist and hasten the development process. 
Given this theoretical framework, the three chapters that follow 
examine how, and to what extent, the non-bank financial intermediaries 
contributed to Jordanian economic development. In particular, attention 
will be given to considering the following 5 main questions - 
(1) Were these institutions 'demand-following' or 'supply-leading' 
institutions, and how did the type of evolution influence the develop- 
ment process? 
(1) Furness, E., Mone-v and Credit In Developinf, _Africa. OP-cit- P-34. 
(2) Houk op-cit. PP. 3-4. 
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(2) What were the J-oles given by development plans to the non-bank 
financial institutions? Were these assigned roles realistic or merely 
ambitious? To what extent were these institutions able to perform 
their planned role? 
(3) What was the nature of the financial gap which necessitated the 
creation of each specialised institution. - and was their establishment 
really justified by the actual needs of the economy? 
(4) Did specialised credit institutions operate properly within a 
development banking context as has been theoretically discussed? 
Were their operations consistent with the development strategy as envisaged 
by economic development plans? What operational criteria, ýýere adopted by 
these institutions as distinct from ordinary commercial banks, and 
did - such criteria directly promote growth? 
(5) Finally, has the creation of the non-bank financial sector 
adequately filled the previous gaps in the financial system; and if 
not, how can this be better achieved? 
These questions will, be considered firstly in the case of the 
specialised credit institutions (Chapter 8) and subsequently the 
contractualfinancial institutions and Postal Saving Fund (Chapter 
and thereafter the Amman Financial Market (Chapter 10). 
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Chapter 8 
THE SPECIALISED CREDIT INSTITUT S 
Specialised credit activity is a post-independence phenomenon 
in Jordan. During the colonial period, there was a distinctive gap in 
the financial structure represented by the absence of specialised credit 
institutions (SCIs) to finance the needs of specific important sectors 
of the economy, which were inadequately served by commercial banks. 
Due to its straight-jacket style of monetary control, the Currency 
Board System was neither able to correct the existing bias in bank 
credit towards the foreign trade sectorl nor to develop an effecitve 
specialised credit mechanism to assist and promote the development 
of these sectors. Since the monetary authorities continued to pursue 
substantially the same type of monetary policy throughout the first 
14 years of political independence, the above-mentioned credit gap 
remained essentially unchanged, depsite the-establishment of the Municipal 
and Village Loans Fund (1957) and the Agricultural Credit Corporation 
(1959). Diversification of the financial institutional infra-structure 
had to await the setting-up of the CBJ in 1964, and the concomitant 
launching of the 7 Year Development Plan (1964-1970), the development 
goals of which required such changes if they were to be achieved. 
The Plan remarked on the un atisfactory developmental role played 
by the financial institutions in the past, and emphasised the need 
for greater future participation of these institutions if the 
planned rate of economic growth was to. be achieved. 
(') 
To that end, 
the newly established Central Bank was given larger responsibilities 
and greater powers than itspredecessor(the Jordan Currency Board) to 
(1) Jordan Development Board, 7 Year Plan for Economic Development.. 
OP- Cit- P-336 
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facilitate and assist the implementation of this programme, by organ- 
ising and adapting the country's financial structure to fit domestic 
development needs* 
(1) 
In particular, certain key sectors were singled 
out as requiring institutional attention, being seriously inhibited 
by a shortage of private capital and entrepreneurial talent - these 
were: agriculture,, manufacturing, housing, and mimicipal and rural 
affairs. 
(2) 
The Plan realised that credit-supplying agencies were 
not only important to provide direct financial and entrepreneurial 
assistance, but it was also essential to create the public confidence 
in these sectors, thus attracting further private investments. 
(3) 
The development of SCIs was further encouraged by the 3 Year Plan 
of 1973 and the 5 Year Plan of 1976. In recognition of the significance 
of the above mentioned sectors in achieving overall development 
objectives on the one hand, and the continued inadequacy of capital and 
entrepreneurial guidance available in such sectors on the other, both 
plans demanded a strengthening of the network of SCIs. either by 
assisting the already established institutions or by creating new ones 
with sufficient resources and adequate expertise. 
(4) 
Moreover, the two 
plans went-further in pointing out that some operational deficiencies 
existed in these institutions, thus requiring them to adapt their 
policies and techniques in accordance with domestic development require- 
ments* However, the extent to which the government responded to the 
plans' recommendations regarding the setting-up of SCIs, and the extent 
(1) Ibid. P- 338 
(2) Ibid. P. 209 and 341 
(3) Ibid* P. 209 
(4) National Planning Council, Three Year Develo]Zent Plan, op. cit. (P. 60) and the Five Year Plan, op. cit. (PP. bd-72) 
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to which the latter succeeded in performing their assumed developmental 
role will be revealed throughout this chapter. 
Undoubtedlyl the official interest and encouragement given to 
SCIs led to a noticeable increase in the number of these institutions 
and in their activities, This is clearly indicated by Table 8.1 which 
shows that by 1977, there were six credit institutions specialising in 
financing and promoting the key sectors of the economy* A clear indication 
of the growth of these institutions is provided by statistics of the 
volume of their credit. This rose from only JD 12.08 million in 1967 
to JD 80.14 million in 1977- 
(1) 
Most of this increase occurred after 
1974 due, firstly, to the general rise in the activities of all 
institutions resulting from launching development programmes, and 
secondly, because of the entry of a new active institution (Housing 
Bank) into the specialised banking field. Since its establishment in 
1974, the Housing Bank recorded spectacular growth, increasing its 
relative share in specialised credit from 17-50/0 in 1975 to 53.6% in 
1977. This accordingly led to a remarkable decline in the relative shares of 
- other SCIs as shown by the table. 
Despite the relative increase in the absolute volume of specialised 
credit, the lower part of the same table demonstrates that the relative 
share of this type of credit in total credit extended by the banking 
system rose only slightly from 23-70A in 1967 to 24.60/6 by 1977- 
Specialised credit formed, on average, 21.6% of total credit throughout 
the whole period. Commercial banks continued to dominate in the banking 
0 
system in extending credit, with an average share of 70-%6. The 
relative importance of commercial banks decreased throughout the period, 
declining from 76-30/6 to 61.80,6 between 1967 and 1977. This was partly 
due to the continuous rise in specialised credit, and partly to the 
entry, in 1970, of the Central Bank of Jordan into the field of credit 
However, a large proportion of this increase was a reflection of 
price inflationt given an average rate of inflation of 15% per annum 
during this period. The above rise in specialised credit therefore 
only doubled in real terms. 
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extension. The share of the'latter gained in relative importance over 
the years, rising from only 5.4% in 1970 to 13.6% by 1977. 
There now follows a series of four case studies of the four main 
economic sectors in which institutions were createdl viz. agricultureq 
manufacturingg housing, and municipal and rural affairs - sectors of-prime 
significance in domestic development programmes. Their priority is 
reflected in their high relative share in total investment under the 
country's development plans, as shown by Table 8,2. The Five Year Plan 
placed even further emphasis on the development of these sectors, thus 
raising their relative share in total investment to 64*2ýo as compared 
Table 8.2 The Significance of the Main 
0, 
Priority Sectors in Total Plans' Investment 
Three Year Plan Five Year Plan 
Sector 1973-1975 1976-1980 
1. Agriculture 1 15-5 17.9 
2. Manufacturing (including minino 14.5 30-0 
3- Housing 19-5 11.2 
4. Municipal and Rural Affairs 8.2 5-1 
Total (1+2+3+4) 57-7 64.2 
ITotal Plan Investment 10000 100,0 
Source: National Planning Council, Three Year Plan (P-36); 
Five Year Plan (P. 64) 
vith 57.7ýo under the Three Year Plan. Among these sectors, the 
manufacturing was particularly encouragedl its relative share rising from 
14-5ý0 to 30.0ýo during the two plans' periods respecitvely. 
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I 
The Agricultural Sector 
1.1. The Need For Specialised Agricultural Credit 
Agriculture constitutes an important sector in the Jordanian 
0 (1) 
economy, being 1770 of GNP and employing 18% of the total labour force* 
Due mainly to the high risks and uncertainties involved in agricultural 
investment, profit expectations failed to stimulate an adequate inflow of 
private funds towards agricultural activities. Chapter 4 showed that 
only a small average of 2-3N of commercial banks' credit went in favour 
of the agricultural sector. 
(2) 
Agriculturalists, especially small farmers, 
had therefore to resort to non-institutional sources of funds, such as 
money-lenders and shopkeepers, to meet their financial requirements against 
extremely high rates of interest. This situation led the government 
to intervene in the market by setting up specialised institutions for 
financing and promoting agricultural development. These are now represented 
by the Agricultural Credit Corporation and the Jordan Co-operative Organ- 
isation. 
1.2. Specialised Financial Intermediaries in the Agricultural Sector: 
1.2.1. The AE]Eicultural Credit CorE2ration (ACC) 
The ACC was established in 1959 to replace the three inefficient 
existing specialised agencies operating in the agricultural sector - the 
Agricultural Bank (formerly created in Transjordan. in 1920), the Village 
Loan Scheme (administered by the Jordan Development Board) I and the 
Agricultural Co-operative (administered by a separate government depart- 
ment). 
(3) 
These agencies operated quite independently from each other 
(1) For GNP contribution, see Chapter 49 Table 4-7; and for the employ- 
ment firgures, see Five Year Plan, op. cite P, 25 
(2) Chapter 4. Table 4-7 
Khayyat, Abdul Razzakj Government Rural Supervised Credit in U. S. A. 
and Jordan, ILS. c. Thesis, (U. S. A.: Colorado State University: 
Spring 1966) P. 4 
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which led to a high degree of counter productive overlapping in their 
operations. 
(1) Moreovers none of the above agencies had enough resources 
to meet the demand of farmers, nor did they have adequate qualified 
staff to operate efficiently* 
(2) 
To improve this situations the Government 
finally decided to create the ACC which became the major source of finance 
in the agricultural sector. 
The ACC is a semi-autonomous government insititution aiming at 
providing all credit-worthy farmers with a source of credit to keep 
them in business, increasing their farm production, raising their income 
level, and Protecting them from resorting to merchants and money lenders, 
(3) 
For this purpose, the ACC extends its credit to individual farmers, 
agricultural projects and other agro-industries with immediate impact on 
promoting agricultural activities. Since it commenced operations in 
1960 UP to 1977, the ACC extended 33,031 loans valued at JD 23.11 million 
to some 50,366 borrowers. These loans were of special importance because 
they were granted for long-term periodsl which appropriately suited the 
development requirements of the agricultural sector* As can be seen 
from Table 8-3, loans of medium and long-term maturities comprisedg on 
average, 91.1% of total credit throughout the period 1960-1977; the 
remaining percentage of 8.9% was in the form of short-term and seasonal 
credit to finance current farm expenses, such as payment of labour costs 
and purchase of fertilizers and seeds. The medium-term loans were used 
mainly to finance the purchase of farm machinery, and physical improvement 
of agricultural land, and the promotion of livestock farms and poultry 
industry. The long-term loans were issued for construction of farm 
(1) Ibid, 
(2) Sharabi, Burhaiýq"Agricultural Credit in Jordan', A Paper Presented 
at the Agricultural Capital Project Course C &Man: June 2o - July 269 1973) P, 2 
3. Aresvikq Oddvar, The Agricultural Develo=ent of Jordan, (London: 
Praeger Publishersq inc. 1976) P*21r---ý- 
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Table 8rj Loans Extended by the 
Ap, ricultural Credit Corporption. 1960 - 1977 
Year No. of No. of Value of 
Relative Importance of 
Transac- 
tions 
Borrow- 
ers 
Loans 
(JDIOOO) Short- Medium & 
term Long-Term 
Credit /0 Credit % 
1960 4015 14,1+82 09458 50.7 49.3 
1961 2,000 2p6i8 0,470 13.5 86.5 
lc, 62 2p688 3., 433 1p036 4.8 95.2 
1963 2,938 3,485 0,903 - 100.0- 
1964 IJ63 2p223 OP833 - 100.0 
19965 2v 01+9 2,658 19207 - 100.0 
1966 2PI47 2,588 1,294 - 100.0 
11,67 1,331 1,733 Ov675 - 100.0 
1968 1,350 1p607 0,747 - 100.0 
1969 832 1.0100 0., 567 1.0 99.0 
1970 868 19114 0,438 8.9 91.1 
1971 19616 1,955 0,710 10.2 89.8 
1972 - 1,592 29032 1,439 
6.8 93.2 
1973 2,448 3*020 1p844 15-1 84.9 
1974 1,617 29122 29139 10.2 89.8 
1975 19632 13,618 3,190 9.0 91.0 
1976, 19029 1,412 2,792 12.7 87.3 
1977 816 1,, 166 1 2068 16.4 1 
83.6 
Total 339031 509366 
1 
23010 
Aver. 
196o- 1,835 2,798 1,284 8.9 91.1 
1977 
1 1 1 
Source: Agricultural Credit Corporation, Anniial Reports. 1960 - 1977 
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buildings, major irrigation projects and the establishment of 
agricultural industries and marketing facilities. All the above 
types of credit were extended against comparatively lower rates of 
interest as compared with those charged by commercial banks, ranging 
from 6% for medium and long-term loans to 8% for short-term loans. 
The rate of interest on the latter category was subject to a 1% 
discount if farmers repaid their loans. in due time. 
(1) 
The significance of ACCIs credit is further emphasised by the 
fact that this specialised credit was largely extended to projects 
with a close connection to development programmes. As a development 
institution, the ACC applied both profitability and economic development 
priority criteria when selecting projects for finance. An interviewed 
head of department in the ACC explained that his institution gave priority 
to finance projects which fell within the framework of development plans. 
This was the case especially for big projects which had immediate impact 
on promoting agricultural output. Prior to the approval of a loan, ACC 
technical staff usually prepares an agricultural plan for the proposed 
project, revealing the financial aspects of the project and its profitability, 
the specific purposes of the loan required, and also the expected ways 
by which the implementation of the project can promote general. agricultural 
and economic activities. Moreover, loans are normally supervised and 
controlled by the ACC to ensure that they are used for the specific 
purpose for which they are granted. 
In extending credit, the ACC requires certain collateral which usually 
takes the form of i va le property, such as agricultural land. The 
maximum ceiling of loans granted should not exceed 75% of the assessed 
value of the securities provided. Although this type Of collateral is 
usually required by ACC, other types of security can, in certain 
circumstances, be accepted especially where borrowers are srfiall farners, 
(1) Agricultural credit Corporation, "A Historical Review of 
Agricultural Credit in Jordan', (Amman: Undated Internal Paper, 
in Arabic) P. 2 
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or those who do not own land at all* In such cases, a financial 
security may be accepted with the maximum ceiling for each loan not 
exceeding JD 500, secured by two guarantors of good financial standing. 
In rare cases, moreover, shares and stocks can also be used as security 
for loan up to the extend of 8076 of their value. 
(') 
As will be shown 
later, the concentration on mortgage of land as collateral has greatly 
minimised the opportunity for small farmers and non-owner farmers to 
obtain adequate funds from the ACC. 
However, the emphasis on good collateral, which mostly implied 
first rate mortgage on immovable properties, was necessitated by the 
hard experience of agricultural credit in Jordan, as reflected in the 
low rate of loans recovered. The repayment record of ACC has not been 
satisfactory over the period under review, as can be seen by Table 8.4. 
Despite some improvements in the rate of collection in recent years, 
the repayment of instalments due has been noticeably low, averaging 
around 44? o during the whole period* This situation can be explained by 
three main factors. Firstly, when the ACC war. created to replace the 
three institutions previously operating in the agricultural sector, it had 
also to inherit the assets of these institutions* which were mainly loans 
extended to farmers, These loans had a very low recovery rate since 
they were mostly granted only in emergency cases, and were thus considered 
as welfare loans. 
(2) 
Such unpaid loans were transferred to the ACC which 
accordingly affected the general rate of loan collection. Secondly, 
the high dependence of Jordanian agriculture on rainfall which led to 
high fluctuation in agricultural production. 
(3) 
The fully irrigated 
(1) For collateral requirements, see 0. Aresvik, opecito P. 274 
(2) 0. Aresvik, OP-eit- P- 276 
Such fluctuations were clearly reflected in the contribution of 
agriculture to GNP. See Chapter 4. Table 4.7 
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Table 8.4 LOAns Recovered and Loans due for 
Recovery for the Period 1961 - 1977 
Year Loans Recovered 
(JD'OOO) 
Loans Due For Recovery 
(JD , 000) 
(2) 
Loan Recovery 
Ratio (3) 
--(1) as% of (2) 
1961 0,427 IpO39 41.1 
1962 Op6y+ 09639 99.2 
1963 0,474 1,441 32.9 
1964 0,708 1., 267 55.9 
1965 09691 IpI27 -'61-. 3 
1966 0,462 1,600 28.9 
1967 0,501 1,904 
_26-3 
1968 0,404 2,, 479 16.3 
1969 09691 29184 31.6 
1970 0,445 2,438 18.3 
1971 09639 29294 27.8 
1972 09821 3,731 22.0 
1973 Op856 1,770 48.0 
1974 1,192 2pO31 58.7 
1975 1,939 3,097 62. -3ý 
I- 976 19658 2p893 57.3 
1977 1,756 2p875 61 f 
Average 
1961 - 1977 44.0 
Source: (1) For t1le period. 1961 - 1970., see B. Sharabi, op. cit. P. 10 
(2) For the period 1971-: - 1977, the Annual Reports of-the ACC. 
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0 
agricultural area comprised only 770 of the total cultivated land. 
Naturally, this situation made it difficult for farmers to repay loans 
during years of drought. Thirdly, continuous political instability in 
the region further reduced the ability of the ACC to recover its credit. 
The 1967 War, and the consequent occupation of the West Bank of Jordan, 
made it almost impossible for the ACC to collect loans granted there. 
Moreoverg successive Israeli raids on the Jordan Valley and the Ghor 
area (the most fertile agricultural land) after 1967 led to serious 
disruption of agricultural production. This was further worsened by 
the internal disturbances of 1970, which seriously affected the overall 
performance of the Jordanian economy. All these factors worked to 
reduce the ability of the ACC to recover its loans. 
1.2.2. The Jordan Co-operative Or&Misation (JCO) 
The history of the organised co-operative movement in Jordan can be 
traced back to 19529 when the first co-operative law Ho- 39 was issued to 
establish the co-operative department within the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Labour. 
(2) 
This encouraged'the creation of co-operatives 
which were mainly agricultural credit and thrift societies, similar to 
those of the Raiffeisen organisations in Germany. 
(3) 
Their function - 
was to provide their members with small seasonal loans. Initiallyl the 
co-operatives were concentrated mainly in the rural areas of the country 
where the need for their services was highly demanded. Their purpose 
was to fill a certain gap in the credit system resulting from the concen- 
tration of organised credit in urban areas* Even when credit was available 
(1) Total cultivated area in the East Bank of Jordan was 350,000 hectaresl 
out of which only 259000 were fully irrigated. See IBRD, Current 
Economic Position and Prospects of Jordan (October 1972) P. 22 
Jordan Co-operative Organisation, "Co-operative Societies in Jordan, 
1972 - 197711, (Amman: March 19789 In Arabic) Pl 
0. Aresvik, op. cit. P. 278 
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in rural areas, it was largely confined to big borrowers who were able 
to provide the required collateral. Small farmers were umble to obtain 
sufficient funds from the organised market, due to the absence 
of adequate collateral and because of the high risk associated with 
small agricultural units. Such borrowers had,, thereforej to resort 
to money lenders to finance their needs against high rates of interest 
0ý (1) reaching . 
50ý6. To improve this situation, the co-operative movement 
placed particular emphasis on meeting the needs of small farmers and 
reducing, as far as possible, the influence of money lenders in the 
agricultural sector. 
Thusl the 1952 co-operative law was followed by an active co-operative 
movement throuhgout the country. By 1964, the number of co-operative 
societies had increased to 688 as compared with 42 in 1952* During 
this period, as Table 8.5 shows, their membership rose from only 2,000 
to 44,438 with total credit reaching JD 1.19 million. Credit extended 
to members was increasingly financed by the share capital of the 
co-operatives and their members' deposits. The former financed 24% 
of credit extended in 1964 as compared with l9ob in 19529 whereas the 
latter increased its relative share from only 0*10/o to 100/6 during the 
same period. 
As the co-operative societies increased in numberg so many governmental 
agencies were established to finance and assist this expansion. The 
Jordan General Co-operative Union was first established in 1959 to provide 
financial assistance as well as other supplying and marketing facilities. 
This was followed by the setting up of the Co-operative Training Centre 
Jordan Co-operative Organisation, Co-operative S-ocieties 
-in 
Jordan, 
1972 - 1977, op-cit. P. 1 
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Table 8.5 Development in Number. Membership.. 
Capital. Deposit and Credit Extended 
by Co-operative Societies. 1952 - 19ZZ* 
Year Number of 
Societies 
Number of 
Menbers 
Share Capital 
(JD) 
Member Deposits 
(JD) 
Member Loans 
(JD) 
1952 42 2pOOO 
1953 50 2.9091 8 j, 
61+3 29 44.. 256 
1954 69 3,193 12,337 172 72022 
1955 134 6.9123 38v697 6p7-37 163037 
1956 161 8#833 52pO16 23P837 246PO38 
1957 209 11p646 819801 45', 666 467,248 
1958 247 14,520 33PO86 37v296 584,680 
1959 255 15PO31 1699290 70,577 6409627 
1960 335 21003 18SP555 77p683 6161207 
1961 428 29,11+3 221v 792, 89,110 622.9391 
1962 589 30., 331 238,564 97,537 7489225 
1963' 06 30,969 307,667 135,339'- 1 M4,514 
1964 688 44,438 292y808 118#273 IP188,786 
1965 702 43,058 333,035 136,354 Iv201p982 
1966 709 43,299 332.. 754 164,896 IP208.9669 
1967 716 43,461 353,217 180,352 IpI899102 
1968 1 710 42059 344,688 1730% 972,521 
1969 680 43,599 354,689 154,423 
'930,423 
1970 695 44,771 422,921 163,238 974,677 
1971 712 45056 452-. 9626 160,397 i, 
172J, 471 
1972 720 47040 513,162 168.9897 673., 487 
1973 464 269923 654., 661 1739953 10253,682 
1974 474 299808 883,824 210#882 1P436,140 
1975 492 33,332 1,304,314 255PI09 IP982,884 
1976** na. n. a. 2,478,459 321.9816 2196iiP822 
1 1977** l 635 1 50,629 13,664,487 1 5369585 1299429397 
Source: JCO, Annual StRti. -, ticql Bulletin. 197_5.1977 
*Covers both the East Bank and West Bank of Jordan. 
Member Deposits and loans for 1976 and 1977 cover the East Bank only. 
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in 1963 and the Co-operative Audit Union in 1964 to render essential 
services to co-operative societies. 
(') 
The former concentrated on 
providing adequate co-operative culture and education, besides training 
accountantsl managersl and other required personnel. *The latter wasq 
on the other hand, responsible for auditing the financial accounts, of 
the co-operatives and organising their budgetse However, due to the 
lack of co-ordination in the activities of these agencies, and because 
of the high degree of overlapping in their operations, the Government 
recognised the need for establishing a new specialised institution 
capable of handling all co-operative affairs in the country. Thus, a 
new start was made with the introduction of the Co-operative Law No, 55 
of 1968, which provided for the establishment of the Jordan Co-oPerative 
Organisation (JCO) to replace the formerly'existing agenciest and to 
act as a parent institution for all the co-oPerative societies operating 
in the country. 
(2) 
With its capital being, jointly shared between the co-operative 
societies and the Government, the-JCO aimed at assisting the development 
of different co-operatives, particularly those catering for the needs 
of small and medium-sized farmers and artisansý The Jordanian experience 
showed that the obstacle hindering the development of the rural sector 
had both financial as well as technical aspects. 
(3) 
The former reflected 
the difficulty of channelling adequate funds to small and medium-sized 
farmersq whereas the latter represented the'lack of technical expertise 
and round management among farmers who had little or no business experience. 
(4) 
(1) For the development of these institutions and their functions, see 
the JCOI Co-operative Societies in Jordan, 15ý72 -_12Z7, op. cit. P, 2- 
(2) Arafeh, M., Howarth, F., and Klemann, P., "The Co-operative Movement 
in Jordangs (A=nan: Report Published by the JCO, July 1977) PA 
(3) Ibid. P- 34 
(4) Ibid. 
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As a development institution, the JCO faced both aspects of the problem 
and concentrated its efforts on overcoming them. On the one hand, it 
acted as a banker for co-operatives and their members, including the 
provision of all types of loans. On the other band, it promoted the 
growth of all co-operatives by providing technical advisory services, 
supplying and marketing different agricultural itemsj and by training 
staff and members of co-operatives. 
As a supplier of funds, the JCO provided co-operative societies 
with loans to help then; in meeting their commitments towards their 
members. Loans extended increased more than five times during the 
three years covered in Table 8.6, rising from JD 0-38 million in 1974 
to JD 3-39 million by 1977. During this period, an average of 410% 
of total credit was in the form of seasonal and short-term loans, used 
to finance the members' needs for seeds, chemicalsq fertilizers aid 
other current co-operative expenses. Medium-term credit comprised, on 
average, 36,2% of total credit. Such loan were used mainly to purchase 
equipment and to improve agricultural land. Longer-term loans accounted 
for an average of 2.2ý0, extended to finance construction purposes. 
Interest charged on the above loans ranged between 6% and 8yog depending 
on maturity, purpose, and type of co-operative. 
(1) 
The repayment record of the JCO appeared to be more satisfactory 
as compared with the ACC. During 3.974 - 1977, the rate of collection 
of loans averaged around 84.9% of loans due for recovery. This ratio 
can be compared with a lower ratio for the ACC9 which accounted for 
59.8% during the same period. 
(2) 
An interviewed manager in the ACC 
(1) JCO, Co-operative Societies in Jordan, 1972 -1977, op. cit. P. 16 & 17 
(2) See Table 8.4 
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related the relative success of the JCO in collecting its loans as 
compared with the ACC to the difference in the procedures of loans 
extension in both institutions. According to its law, the JCO cannot 
extend new credit to any co7operative unless the latter repays all loans 
due for recovery. This encouraged co-operatives to repay loans in due 
time in order to obtain new credit, thus leading to a general rise in the 
loan recovery ratio* 
Table 8.6 also reveals the interest of the co-operative movement 
in the agricultural sector which claimed, on average, more than three 
quarters of total co-operative credit during 1974 - 1977* The relative 
importance of credit extended to agricultural co-operatives was gaining 
in importance, increasing from 59-5N in 1974 to 86-7% by 1977. This 
increase occurred despite the decline-in the relative size of the 
agricultural societies in the co-oPerative sector, as measured by their 
number and the size of their membership. Table 8.7 illustrates that 
the relative size of agricultural societies in the co-operative sector 
showed a continuous decline over the period, dropping from 74.1ý6 in 
1970 to 43.40,6 by 1977. This decline can be explained by two reasons. 
Firstly, the number of agricultural co-operatives decreased in absolute 
terms from 146 in 1970 to 131 by 1977. This was mainly'a result of 
amalgamation and re-organisation of the co-operatives operating in the 
agricultural sector to take a wider range of responsibilities. This took 
the form of bigger units called 'multi-purpose co-operatives' for providing 
farmers with a full range of services, with credit and supply constituting 
their major activities. However, despite the decline in the absolute 
number of agricultural societies, their membership rose from 5,938 to 
10,435 between 1974 and 1977 -a reflection of forming bigger size 
co-operatives to replace the formerly operating small onesl which had 
limited purposes. Secondly, the decline in the relative size of agricul- 
tural societies was also due to a noticeable expansion of the co-operative 
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movement to cover areas outside the agricultural sector, such as urban 
thrift and credit* mutual benefits, housingt consumer, crafts and artisans. 
The number of these non-agricultural co-operatives rose from only 51 
in 1970 to 171 by 1977. Their members also witnessed a continuous riset 
reaching 17,280 in 1977, as compared with merely 3,467 in 1970. This 
expansion has been largely assisted by the financial and technical 
services rendered by the JCO. 
1.3. Conclusions and Assessment of S22cialised A&Eicultural Credit 
As development agencies, the ACC and the JCO have undoubtedly 
promoted the growth of the agricultural sector. Their contribution to 
agricultural development had both financial as well as technical aspects* 
On the financial side, specialised credit granted by these institutions 
represented the major source of institutional finance in the agricultural 
sector, accounting - cm - average 
78-90/6 throughout the period 1970 to 
1977. The remaining percentage of 21.1% was financed by the commercial 
banks which formed the other source of institutional credit. An 
examination of Table 8.8, however, shows that specialised credit decreased 
in relative importance from 92.0ýo in 1970 to 63-50/6 in 1977, This decline, 
particularly since the launching of the development programme of 1973, 
was attributed to the rise in the proportion of commercial banks' credit 
going to agriculture. As the table demonstrates, the relative share 
00 of bank credit rose from only 107o in 1972 to 20-370 in 1973, and continued 
to rise over the years, reaching 36-5ýo by 1977. This increase occurred 
at the expense of the relative share of credit extended by the ACCI 
which was almost halved, declining from 81.1% to 46-7ýo between 1970 
and 1977- 
Despite the decline in the relative importance of specialised loansq 
this type of credit continued to claim the major element of institutional 
finance in 1977, comprising about two thirds of the total. However, 
the significance of specialised credit was in fact related to its long- 
term nature which was necessary to finance the development requirements 
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Table 8.8 Relative Importance of Specialised 
Ap, ricultural Credit in Total 
-Institutional Finance Available in, 
the Agricultural Sector. 1970 - 1977 
(JD, 000) 
ý 
Institution 1970 - 1971 1 972ý, 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 Aver. 
1970 
-77 
A. Specialised 
Credit 69719 6,682 79271 8,094 ý9,105 10,626 12,799 14,483 
1. ACC 59922 59912 6,408 
. 9269 
7ý 7,976, ý-8,867 9,724 10,644 
. 2. 
JCO 0,797 0,770 0,, 863 
'09825 _1,129, 
1,759 
ý3,075 
3,839 
B. Commercial 
-Banks' Agr. 09583 0,799 Op8O4 -2,061 '3,745ýý 39608 -5,162 -8,311 Credit 
C Total Agr. 
Credit 79302 7,481 8,075, 10,155 12P850-, 14., 234 179961 22,794 
(A + B) 
(A) as a% 
of (C) 
92.0 89.3 90.0 79.7 70.9 74.7 71.3 63.5 78.9 
(B) as a% 
of (C) 
8. Oý 10.7 10.0 20.3 2 9. 25J, 
I 
ý8, -7 I ý36-5 
21.1 
(1) as a% 
of (C) 
81-91 79.0 79.3 71.6- 62.1 -62.3 54.2- 46.7 67.0 
(2) 
. as a% 
of (C) 
10.9 10.3 10.7 8.1 8.6 i2.4 16.8 11.9 
Source: (1) ý CBJp Monthly Siatistical Bulletin 
(Nov. -74) -, 
Monthly Stj3tj, 3tjcpl Bulletin (June 78) ' 
233 
of agriculture. Bank Credit was always confined to short-term loanse 
The ACC and the JCO were the Only institutional source for long-term 
agricultural credit. Moreover, the geographical extension of ACC and 
JCO services into rural and remote areas further increased the-significance 
of specialised credit for the country's economic development. Appendix 
8.1 shows that specialised credit furnished by-the ACC was distributed - 
between diffrent regions of the countryl with the share of the Amman - 
area comprising an average of 25-5% during the period 1973 - 1977- On 
the other hand, the JCO also expanded its activities to finance and 
promote co-operatives operating in-different parts of Jordan. Appendix 
8.2 reveals that 45-7ýo of total co-operatives were situated in Amman and 
Zerka area, whereas the remaining were located in other regions of the 
country. Such geographical distribution of specialised credit was in 
contrast to commercial banks' credit which was mainly concentrated in 
Amman and other major cities. Clearly, by extending their services to 
cover larger geographical areas, both the ACC and the JCO helped to 
minimise the adverse effects of the bias in the credit-systemg resulting 
from the concentration of bank branches in the main prosperous cities. 
As far as the technical side of their contribution to agricultural 
development was concerned, the role of both institutions has been even 
greater* By preparing feasibility studies and advising farmers on 
technical aspects of their projects, the ACC worked to direct agricultural 
investment towards sound projects and helped farmers to overcome their 
ignorance of technical knowledge. On the other hand, the services 
offered by the JCO to the co-operative societies has assisted the 
development of the co-operative movement in rural areas. The promotional 
role of the JCO manifested itself, firstlys in providing co-operatives 
with sound management in the preparatory stage of their establishment, 
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then secondly, in rendering these co-operatives technical -advisory services 
necessary for their operations, and finallyg in operating adequate 
training programmes to educate and train co-operatives' members. 
However, although the above discussion has clearly shown the 
significance of both specialised institutions in developing the agricul- 
tural sector, the financial needs of this sector have not been sufficiently 
met. The credit gap in the agricultural sectorl though greatly reduced, 
still exists. -According to ACC sources, the agricultural sector still 
did not receive sufficient funds necessary for its development. 
(1) 
This was also recognised by the Three Year Development Plan of 1973. 
(2) 
Available institutional credit from both the commercial banks and 
specialised institutions failed to satisfy, the-increasing demand for 
funds, which was intensified with implementing development programmes. 
Farmersl therefore, continued to resort to non-institutional sources 
of funds to finance'their requirements. A study prepared by the 
ACC estimated that money lenders still comprised about one quarter of 
the organised finance in the agricultural sector. 
(3) 
The ACC ., 
justified its inability to adequately meet the demand for funds made 
by farmers to its limited financial resources* 
(4) 
An examination of the 
liabilities side of the ACC's balance sheet as of December. 319 1977 
(5) 
reveals the absence of any financial contribution made by the private 
sector. The ACC relied exclusively on funds provided by official sources 
(1) B. Sharabi, op. cit. P. 6 
(2) National Planning Council, Three Year Development Programme, 
1973-1975, op. cit. P. 60 
(3) Agricultural Credit Corporation, "Agricultural Credit in Jordan" 
(Amman: Undated Report,, In Arabic) P. 1 
(4) Ibid, P- 3 
ACC, Annual Report, 1977 
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and by the International Development Association. Capital (government 
contribution) and net profits comprised 62ý0 of total financial resourcesq 
whereas 33% constituted loans made by the government, the Central Bank, 
and the International Development Association. The ACC's financial 
capacity can be substantially increased by tapping private sector'. 
savings through issuing long-term agricultural bonds to be subscribed 
by individuals and private institutions. The introduction of such debt 
instruments can be assisted by the Central Banks and should now be 
facilitated by the existence of the Amman Financial Market. 
Although the co-operative societies were largely encouraged with 
the establishment of the-JC09 the spread of the co-operative movement 
did not adequately extend to the rural sector of the economy. This 
was pointed out by development planners who prepared the Three Year 
Development Programme. The Plan revealed that the co-operative societie's 
were not sufficiently distributed in the country, thus leaving a large 
area of the agricultural sector without their essential services. 
(') 
In realising the significance of co-operatives, in developing the agricul- 
tural sector, the Five Year Plan of 1976 greatly stressed the necessity 
of strengthening and expanding the co-operative movements with a view 
to including the maximum Possible number of farmers in different regions 
of the countrys 
(2) 
The Plan also demanded the close co-ordination of 
credit policies of both the ACC and the JCO to encourage the organised 
co-operative movement- within the general policy of agricultural develop- 
menteN However, the absence of co-operatives in many parts of Jordan 
deprived small farmers of obtaining co-operative credit and forced them 
(1) National Plan"ing Council, Three Year' Development Progra=e, 1973=L5. 
op-cit. P. 59 
(2) .. Five Year Development Programme , 1976 -80, op. cit. P97 
Ibid. 
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to resort to money lenders. This situation must have been exacerbated 
because a large number of small farmers could not obtain credit from 
the organised na ket, due mainly to the lack of adequate collaterale 
Small farmers constitute the bulk in the agricultural sector since the 
pattern of land ownership in Jordan is predominantly one of small- 
holdings. 
(1) 
This group of farmers (includingrl9n-ox%mer-operators9 such 
as sharecroppers and renters) found it difficult to obtain credit even 
from the ACC which specialised in financing agriculture. Although 
the announced policy of the ACC was intended to reach all types of 
farmers, especially the small ones, 
(2) 
it has been recognised that the 
prescription about security accepted by the ACC as collateral for loans 
(usually mortgage of land) has greatly minimised the opportunity of 
(3) 
small farmers to obtain credit. This was either because their land 
ownership was below the required level or because they did not own 
, (4) land at all. As a result, such farmers had to resort either to 
co-operative societies or, if these were not available, to money lenders. 
This clearly requires further extension of the co-operative movement 
throughout the country as an essential step for effective agricultural 
development. 
(1) B. Sharabil op. cit. P. 8 
(2) B. Sharabi, op. cit-'P. 8 
(3) 0. Aresvik, op-cit- P. 275 
(4) Farmers who obtained funds from the ACC were those who owned land 
above two or three hectares in irrigated areass and above ten, 
hectares in dry areas. According to the 1965 agricultural census, 
more than half of the nearly 40,000 farms in the East Bank were 
below five hectares and about 25 per cent were below two hectares. 
On the other handl non-owner-operators were ineligible to obtain 
credit from the ACC unless they could provide guarantors who 
owned land to secure the loans. 
See ibid. 
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ii 
The Manufacturing Sector 
II. l. The Need for S32ecialised Manufacturing Credit 
When independence was achieved in 1946, the manufacturing sector 
was in an embryonic stage of development, confined only to artisan 
produCtion. ', ' Following independence, this sector expanded and 
diversified to include some basic industries catering for domestic 
needs. Throughout the two decades-ending in 1976, manufacturing 
0 
production grew rapidly at an average annual rate of 137b. This expansion 
has been particularly encouraged by the Three Year Plan of 1973 and the 
Five-Year Plan of 1976, which both aimed at diversifying the economy's 
industrial structure by developing its manufacturing sector. Thus, by 
1976, the relative contribution of manufacturing to GDP accounted for- 
0 (1) 18*2% as compared with 11*9ýb in 1973- However, the development of 
this sector has been largely impeded by continuous political instability 
(such as the 1967 War and the 1970 civil disturbances) which created a 
high degree of uncertainty and accentuated pessimistic business expec- 
tations. Clearly, in un table and uncertain circumstancess people 
tend to prefer investment in highly liquid forms with quick returnss 
rather than tying up their savings for longer-term activities, character- 
istic of the manufacturing sector. Such unfavourable conditions further 
intensified commercial banks' conservatism and accentuated their 
adherence to financing traditional lines of business available largely 
in the foreign trade sector. It was indicated in Chapter 4 that 
commercial banks made , 
little contribution towards financing manufacturing 
expansion. Evea when bank credit was extended to manufacturing, it was 
exclusively confined to short-term loans extended to big borrowers,, - 
(1) See Chapter 49 Table 4.7 
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and well-established industries. The financial needs of, medium and 
small-scale industries were not adequately met, and the long-term credit 
facilities necessary to develop this sector were conspicuously lacking. 
The goveri3ment had, therefore, to, fill such a gap in the credit system 
by deliberately creating a special institution for financing these needs. 
11.2. Specialised Financial Intermediaries in the Manufacturing Sector 
11.2.1. Industrial Development Bank (IDB) 
The IDB was established in 1965 to absorb the activities previously 
undertaken by the Industrial Development Fund and the Development'Bank 
of Jordang which had both been responsible for industrial financing. 
The former Industrial Development Fund war, established in 1957 to 
finance manufacturing and tourism activities, whereas the Development 
Bank of Jordan was created as early as 1952 to extend agricultural and 
industrial credit. 
(1) 
Due to lack of resources and duplication of 
(2) 
efforts, both agencies were unable to meet the increasing needs of 
manufacturers, which finally led the government to amalgamate them in 
one main institution capable of rendering adequate assistance to the 
manufacturing sector. Such government action came, in fact, in response 
to the recommendation of the Seven Year Plan of 1964, which clearly 
revealed the inadequacy of the previously operating agenciesq particularly 
the Industrial Development Fund, in meeting the vital needs of this sector. 
The Plan showed that during the period 1959 to 1962, loan approved by 
the Fund amounted to JD 0-36 millionwhereas a further JD 1.00 million 
of feasible and sound loan applications had to be refused for lack of 
funds. 
(3) 
This meant that the Fund approved only one quarter of the 
(1) U. N. "Financing of Manufacturing Industries in Selected Countries 
of the Middle East", Industrialisation and Productivity, (N. Y.: 
1968) Bulletin No. 137,77-93- 
(2) IBRD, The Economic Development of Jordan, op. cit. P. 231 
(3) Jordan Development Baordl Seven Year Programme for Economic 
Developmentq op. cit. P. 212 
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total sound loan applications provided by customers. Clearly, this 
situation must have greatly hindered the development of viable manufac- 
turing projects, which led the Plan to strongly recommend the establish- 
ment of a new specialised institution capable of assisting and promoting 
this sector. The proposed institution was-expected to assist manufac- 
turers by providing them with the required financial as well as 
technical assistance, thereby encouraging private investors to channel 
further resources into, this priority sector. 
The Government responded quickly to the above recommendation. One 
year after launching the Plan, the IDB was created as a mixed enterprise, 
with the Government financing one third of its authorised capital of 
JD 3.00 million. In order to encourage the private sector to subscribe 
the remaining JD 2.00, the government, firstly, paid in its whole share 
of capital and, secondly, guaranteed a minimum dividend of 6% per annum 
on shares held by the*public and, finally,, it exempted these dividends 
from income tax. 
(') 
In case profits were insufficient to cover the 
minimum dividend, the government also guaranteed to pay the difference. 
(2) 
By 1977, the share capital of the private sector was'fully subscribed, 
thus encouraging the IDB to raise its authorised capital to JD 6 million 
in order to mobilise further funds for industrial investment. 
The IDB now operates within the legislative framework provided by 
Permanent Law No- 5 (1972)* According to this Law, the Bank has been 
given powers to perform banking, as well as other promotional functions, 
related to industrial development. As a development bank, it was 
empowered to extend loans for different maturities besides fulfilling 
other promotional activities, such as'providing technical assistance, 
(1) Industrial Development Bank, Law No. 5 of 1972 (Amman: Official 
Gazette No. 2351 Dated 16.3-1972) Article 20 
(2) Ibid. 
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advisory services, preparing feasibility studies, and conducting market- 
ing surveys. In order to encourage industrial expansion, the Law enabled 
the IDB to participate-in the ownership of domestic enterprises. Further- 
more, the Bank was also empowered to help different industries to raise 
capital by, firstly, issuing guarantees for loans obtained from other 
financial sources and, secondly, by underwriting of shares and 
debentures and, finally, by assisting the development of a domestic 
capital market. However, how far this has been fulfilled by the Bank 
after twelve years of operations will now : be discussed. 
In terms of financeg the extension of loans has been by far the 
Bank's largest sector of activity. The financial operations of the Bank 
were largely concentrated on credit extension rather than equity invest- 
ment* Table 8,9 demonstrates that the amount of loans outstanding at 
the end of 1977 comprised 95-lN of total financial assistance, thus 
leaving only a small percentage (4.9ýb) in equity participation. As 
of December 319 1977, the Bank's equity investment accounted for 
JD 0.53 million, which represented share holdings in eight major 
industrial projects. 
(') 
Loans outstanding, on the other band, amounted 
to some JD 10-31 million extended to 240 enterprises. The cumulative 
loans approved by the Bank throughout its history amounted to JD 18-55 
million, distributed amongst 420 projects. 
(2) 
Out of this total, 
82-570 went in favour of manufacturing industries and the remaining 
percentage of 17-5N was granted to projects in the field of tourism. 
(3) 
The sectoral breakdown of loans outstanding provided by table 8.9 
reflected the structural pattern of Jordanian industry, which was 
largely concentrated on satisfying domestic demand. Apart from the 
(1) IDB, Annual Report, 19ZZI, P. 21 
(2) See Table 8.10 
Industrial Development Bank also specialises in financing the 
toursim sector, in addition to manufacturing industries, 
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TAble 8.9 -, Outstanding Loan-, and Equity 
TnvestTrent of the IDB as of December 31.1977 
JD' 000 
Medium-Term Lo erm Total 
(2 (3) 
Industry No. of Value %of No 0 of Value 
%of No. of Value % 
Loans (3) Loans (3) Loans 
Non-Metalli. c 29 19137 12 6% 41 1,753 17.0 Mineral Products 
Fabricated Metal 1 90 3 497 4 587 5.7 Products 
Food 7 151 11 1033 18 1 p2811. 12.5 
Textile 8 63 10 580 18 . 64.3 
6.2 
Shoes Manufac- 6 195 3 34 9 229 2.2 turing 
Chemicals 12 255- 11 851 ý-23-- 1-106 0 10.7 
Plastic 15 245 7 321 22 
. ý566 
5.6 
Wood &: Wooden 3 29 2 250 5 279 2.7 Products , _, 
Paper & Paper 1 5 8 738 743 7.2 Products 
Beverages 3 83 6 235 318 3.1 
Tobacco 1 24 2 45 3 69 0.7 
Photography 5 38 - 5' 38 0.4 
Machines & 
17 250 13 406 30 656' 6.4 Equipment 
Others 8 78 5 2i3 13' 291 2.8 
Hotel & 12 188 19 1 , 
482' - 31 1,751 16.8 Tourism . 
1 
I A. Total Loans 128 2#831 27.5 1 112 170482 72.5 240 
1109313 1100-0 
- 
B. Ecuity 
' 531 Investment 
C. Total Finan- I Op844 
cial Assistance 
(A) as a% of (C) 55.1 
(B) as a% of (C) 4.9 
Source- IDB, Annup, l Re-Dort, 1977 
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proportion going to hotels and other tourism activities, the major 
beneficiaries in the manufacturing sector were non-metallic mineral 
0 
products, which absorbed a relative share of Mb, followed by food 
industries and chemical projects whicý claimed respectively 12-5 0 
and 10-7N of total specialised credit. 
The IDB's lending policy demonstrates its function as a development 
institution as distinct from a commercial banking concern* In contrast 
to commercial banks' short-term loans, credit extended by the IDB 
was only for medium and long-term maturities, with the relative 
importance of the latter comprising-72-5% of total loans oiitstanding 
at the end of 1977. The interest cbarged by the IDB of 8ýo (including 
I? o commission) was comparatively lower than that usually charged by 
the commercial banks. 
W 
The distinction between the two types of 
intermediaries manifested itself also in the specification of security 
required as collateral for loans. While commercial banks usually 
emphasise the type of assets available for collateral, the IDB also 
took into consideration criteria such as the earning potential of the 
enterprise and efficiency of its management. 
(2) 
Furthermore, the 
operational criteria of the IDB were also different from those adopted 
by ordinary commercial banks. While profitability was established 
as the only criterion to be observed when taking financing decisions 
in commercial banking, the acknowledgement of a project as meriting 
priority by the development plan was also of equal importance in the 
investment decisions of the IDB. Article 10 of the IDB's Law of 1972 
stipulated that both bankable as well as economic development consider- 
ations should be taken together in selecting projects for finance* 
(1) As shown in Chapter 5, interest charged*by commercial banks ranged- 
around 9ýo plus an extra commission rate ranging between 0 Y/b and 2ý6- 
(2) U. N., Studies On Development Problems In Selected Countries of the 
Middle East, 1973, (N. Y.: 1974) P, 21 
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Investment decisions were usually taken after a comprehensive study 
of the financial aspects of the project. and its profitability, in 
addition to the likely gain to the economy (in the sense of creating 
favourable effects on employment and impToving the balance of payments 
position). Clearly, these operational lending policies had a direct 
promotional impact on industrial development. 
The specialised loans extended by the IDB were essentially 
important for economic development because this type of credit was used 
to finance the purchase of fixed assets necessary for industrial expansion. 
Classified according to purpose, Table 8*10 shows that the bulk of 
64.2% of total specialised credit was extended for purchasing machinery 
and equipment, 12% was used for factory construction, whereas the 
remaining percentage of manufacturing credit of 6-30A financed the purchase 
of raw materials. Such a distribution pattern of specialised credit, 
which favoured the financing of fixed assets, gave the allocation 
function of the IDB a special significance from the standpoint of 
economic development; particularly taking into account that commercial 
banks (another institutional source - of financing manufacturing ) only 
granted short-term credit for financing working capital. 
As far as promotional activity was concernedg the IDB was equipped 
with the necessary machinery for project evaluation. Prior to the 
approval of loans, comprehensive studies of the financial and technical 
aspects of the proposed projects were preparedl together with their 
overall impact on developing the national economy. In order to ensure 
the proper use of loans, a follow-up division was created in the Bank 
in 1971 to deal with loans granted from first disbursement to final 
repayment. 
(1) 
The aim was to keep the Bank informed of all developments 
(1) IDB, Annual Report, 1971, P. 3.1 
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and progress of its clients, and to render advice on financials 
managerial, and technical sides of their projects. At the same time, 
an information centre of various types of machinery and their manufac- 
turers vas established in the Banks with the purpose of assisting local 
industrialists in choosing the most suitable machinery for their 
projects* 
(1) 
Up to, 1975, the activities of the IDB were mainly confined to - 
financing large-scale industry and well-established enterprises able 
to give the necessary technical documentations and to provide the 
required collateral. 
(2) 
However, a development bank cannot ignore the 
essential needs of small-scale industries, especially in countries 
where these occupy an important part in the economy. This is the case 
in Jordan in*which the manufacturing sector is composed mainly of 
small-scale industries and handicrafts. The number of large-scale 
establishments (employing over 100 each) accounted for 15, or only 0.2 0 
of the total number of Jordanian industries. 
(3) 
Enterprises employing 
between five and ninety-nine persons were 580 in numberg comprising 
80 . 8; 6 in relative importance of the total. Small-scale industries 
(those operating with less than four persons each) formed the dominant 
share of 90/b. or a total of some 6,000 concerns. The development of 
the latter type of industry is particularly important from economic 
and social points of view, as was indicated by the Three Year Develop- 
ment Plan of 1973, which pointed out the essential needs of these types 
(1) lbid, 
(2) IBRD, Current Economic Position and 
_ProsRects 
of Jordan, OP-cit- P-38 
(3) For classification of employment according to size of industry, 
see: National Planning Council, Five Year Plan, 1276 -_198011 op. cit. 
P- 170 
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of industrialistsq and the necessity of financing and promoting their 
activities. 
(') 
The Plan recommended that a special Fund within the 
IDB should be established with an initial capital of JD 0-30 million 
to finance small-scale businesses against comparatively lower interest 
rates. 
(2) 
Following this recommendationg the--Small-scale Industry and 
Handicrafts Fund-was established within the IDB in 1975* By the end of 
1977,, the total number of loans approved by the Fund during its three 
years of operation accounted for 262, amounting to JD 0.41-million. 
The spread of credit among borrowers was clearly reflected in the 
average amount of loans which was noticeably less than that of the 
IDB* Table 8.11 reveals that the average size of the Fund's loans 
was JD 1,568 whereas that of the IDB accounted for JD 509128.0) 
Despite the high risk usually involved in lending to small-scale businesses, 
the repayment record of the Fund proved to be satisfactory and more 
successful than that of the IDB. Throughout its existence, the rate 
of collection of instalments fell due averaged 97% as compared with 
850,6 for the IDB* 
Although the amount of loans approved by the Fund accounted for 
only less than JD 0.50 million, neverthelesst the geographical 
distribution of loans and the comparatively large number of beneficiaries 
in different types of small concerns gave the fund's activity a special 
importance. Geographically, loans were distributed throughout the 
country as indicated by apppendix 8-3- Out of the 100 loans granted 
during 1977,6.5 were extended in Amman, Zerkaj Ajlun and Irbid, whereas 
. the remainder were scattered in other towns. On the sectoral. side, business- 
men in different domestic industries benefitted from the Fund's loans, 
National Planning Council, Three Year Plan, 1973 - 1975, op. cit. P*120 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) See Table 8.10 
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with the major share going to carpentry, garments and knitting, and 
construction materials, which together absorbed three quarters of loans 
extended during 1977 (See Appendix 8.4). 
Table 8.11 Loans Approved by Smll-Scale 
Industry and Handicrafts Fund 1975 - 1977 
Year No. of Approved Average 
I 
Loans/ 
Loan Loan Loans Recovery 
JD JD Ratio 
1975 52 72,205 1,388 n. a. 
1976 110 169,425 1,54o 96.0 
1977 100 169,200 1,692 99.0 
Total 
1975 - 1977, 262 41o, 83o 1,568 97.0 
Source: IDB, Annual Reports, 1975 - 1977 
11.3. Conclusions and Assessment of Specialised Credit in the ManufacturipL 
Sector 
The financial operations of the IDB have increasingly assisted and 
facilitated manufacturing growth. Although commercial banks continued 
to claim the lion's share of total institutional credit extended to 
manufacturing, Table 8.12 shows that specialised credit increased its 
relative importance from only 8.6ýo in 1965 to 28.80/o by 1977. As was 
the case in the specialised agricultural credit, the significance of 
credit extended by the IDB was related to its long-term nature, which 
appropriately met the expansionary requirements of manufacturers. What 
made the IDB of special importance was the fact that up to December 1977, 
this institution represented the only institutional source for financing 
the long-term requirements of the manufacturing sector. Commercial 
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bank credit to this sector was confined to short-term loans,, Moreover, 
a domestic capital market, through which enterprises could raise funds 
for long-term purposes, was only established in 1976 and began operations 
at the beginning of 1978. 
The previous analysis has shown that the financial assistance 
rendered'by' the IDB was predominantly concentrated in the field of 
credit-extension, and only a very small proportion of total'finance 
0 (averaging around 4.97b) went in favour of equity financing. Th s 
situation was maintained, although the IDB's Law did not fix any 
restrictions on its ability to participate in the ownership of domestic 
industries. However, development banking experience showed that due to 
the comparatively higher risk involved in equity investmentl this form 
of finance should not constitute the bulk of operations. Development 
bankers do not, 'in general, advise that equity finance be made from 
borrowed funds; thusl a development bank should limit its ability to 
extend this type of assistance to the extent to which it has itself 
received equity capital. 
(2) 
When applying this recommendation to'tlýe 
Jordanian case, it became'obvious that the amount"of equity investment 
was still far from the ability of the IDB to finance equity, as measured 
by its capital capacity. By the end of 1977, equity financing comprised 
only 17ýo of the paid-in 'capital of the Bank. Clearly, this behaviour'' 
reflected a very cautious operational policy on the part of the IDB, 
leading to an extreme preference of safer cannons of finance available 
intbýe form"of credit extension, 'rather than riskier operations in 
equity investment. The latter type of assistance has been increasingly 
demanded by businessmen to finance their expansion, after implementing 
successive development programmes. If it has to be properly a 
(1) Houk, Financing and Problems of Development Banks, op, cit, P, 20 
(2) Ibid. 
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development bank, the IDB should further undertake riskier business by 
channelling more resources towards equity financing. It may even 
launch a wider role in equity investment aiming at encouraging the private 
sector to invest their savings in equity holdings in different industriestin 
which the Bank has already an equiýy-participationý-_- '', Equity 
investment policy can be therefore made with a view to re-selling shares 
to domestic investors once public confidence in them has been established. 
The adoption of this type of policy seems to be an appropriate one, given 
the present economic situation-in Jordan, for two reasons: firstly, the 
increase in the number of enterprises seeking capital as a result of 
implementing development programmes and, secondly, the utmost need for 
creating confidence in the recently established Amman Financial Market. 
Similar policies have been adopted by other development-banks in 
developing countries where they had, sometimes, to even sell their most 
profitable investment after bearing the risk and cost of the development 
stage of the projects. 
(') 
A development bank can supplement its direct finance to manufacturing 
by ways and means which help these industries obtain funds from other 
sources. Although the IDB was empowered to issue its guarantees for 
credit extended for, projects from other financing institutions, it has 
not so, far shown any practical contribution towards guaranteeing business. 
(2) 
This type of activity has been quite substantial in some developing 
countries, such as Ghana, where its development bank's obligations under 
(1) Ghana is a case in point where equity investment was an active 
form of financing manufacturing. See: Harlander, H. and Mezger, D., 
Development Banking in Africa, Seven Case-Studie22. (Munchen: 
Weltforum Verlag, 1971) P. 69 
(2) The IDB's annual reports, which usually reveal its activities, 
do not show any guarantee operations undertaken by the Bank, 
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guarantees exceeded the bank's total funds by some 306 to-60%. 
(l) 
Moreover, the IDB made a minimal contribution towards helping domestic 
industries to raise capital, by means of underwriting their shares and 
debts, or by assisting the development of a capital market. Through ' 
these channels, the IDB could have been more helpful in financing, though 
indirectlyl the long-term requirements of various industries. These 
important aspects should take part in the future role of the IDB. 
On the promotional side, the IDB has greatly assisted the technical 
efficiency of projects put before it, but at the same time, has shown 
little initiative in exploring and identifying suitable investment 
opportunities in the manufacturing sector taken as a whole. Financial 
assistance was only made after economic and'technical feasibility 
studies were made by the Bank. Furthermore, the Banks with the help of 
its follow-up division, also offered consulting services'to the clients 
concerning different-technical aspects of their projects. However, 
apart from the establishment of the information centre of various types 
of machinery (which operated to assist local manufacturersl clients and 
others in selecting suitable types of machinery), the IDB played only 
a limited role in promoting the general activity of the manufacturing 
sector. In other words, the IDB exhibited little interest towards 
conducting comprehensive pre-investment surveys-aiming at identifying 
viable investment opportunitiesq either to develop them on its own, I or 
to present them to domestic entrepreneurs. As was theoretically discussed, 
this aspect of development banking, is very important in developing 
countries, such as Jordan, where the-absence of adequate investment 
surveys further intensifies the reluctance of entrepreneurs to venture 
(1) Harlander and Mezger, OP-Cit- P, 79 
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into new lines of business. However, if the IDB has to enter this 
field, which is indeed necessary for a proper fulfillment of its devel- 
opmental role, additional resources must be made available to the Bank. 
Given the expected high cost involved in such activities in relation to 
the expected long-term return, the Bank must be able to obtain funds, for 
this purpose, on easy terms through the Government, the Central Bank, and 
other international development institutions specialising in industrial 
financing. 
In fact, additional resources for the Bank are also needed to enable 
it to meet the increasing demand made upon its services, particularly 
after implementing development programmes which largely emphasised the 
manufacturing sector* As has been repeatedly shown, one major aim of 
both the Three Year Plan and the Five Year Plan was to diversify the 
economy's industrial structure by strengthening its manufacturing sector; 
thus for this purpose, 15YO of total investment of the former Plan was 
allocated to promote manufacturing industriesq whereas this proportion was 
doubled as envisaged by the latter ? lan. 
(') 
Total financial assistance 
granted by the IDB was still limited as, compared with the planned invest- 
ment. As can be-seen by Table 8.12, total financial assistance extended 
by the IDB formed 15*9ýo of the planned investment in the manufacturing 
sector during the period of the Three Year Plan, and about 676 of the 
planned investment as envisaged by the Five Year Plan during the first two 
years, ending in 1977. The IDB cannot expand its financial role unless it 
seeks a major increase in its resources. Apart from the private sector's 
contribution to the equity capital of the Bank, the latter showed no 
attempt to mobilise domestic savings for industrial financing. An 
(1) See Table 8.2 
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examination of the Bank's balance sheet of December 31,1977, 
(1) 
revealed 
that 30ý0 of its total financial resources came from capital and reserves, 
another 340 was financed by loans from the Central Bank, and a percentage 
of 36% represented loans from regional and international development 
institutions. The IDB can increase its financial capacity if it - 
actively seeks other domestic sources of finance, by offering term deposits 
and issuing long-term industrial bonds. In so doing, the IDB can obtain 
further funds necessary for industrial financing, ands at the same time, 
can also institutionalise part of the communityts savings, which could 
be otherwise held in unproductive forms. 
Finally, the decision to establish-the Small-Scale Industry and 
Handicrafts Fund within the IDB, as a response to the 1973 Plan, was 
essential to finance the needs of small businessmen who could not obtain 
credit elsewhere. The significance of this Fund was shown to be related 
to the widespread distribution of its credit on both the geographical 
as well as the sectoral side. The first three years experience of the 
Fund was encouraging, showing little risk in financing small concerns 
as reflected in a highly successful repayment record. Howevert because 
the Fund had only been newly established, and also because of its limited 
financial resources, 
(2) 
the number of borrowers benefftinq from its 
loans throughout its existence comprised only 4.4% of the total number 
of small-scale concerns operating in the country. 
(3) 
Given this, together 
with the necessity of promoting this group of businessmen, from both the 
economic as well as the social point of view, further financial resources 
should be allocated to the Fund to enlarge its activities. 
(1) IDB, Annual Report, 12Z7 P. 28 and 29 
(2) -The FundIs capital accounted for only JD 0-32 million as Of 31-12-1977- 
(3) During the period 1975 - 1977, loans were extended to 242 borrowers, 
which formed 4.4ýo of the 6tooo small-scale industries, employing less than four persons each. 
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III - 
The"Hotýsing Sectýr 
III. I. *-The Need for Specialised Housing Credit. 
Since its existence, Jordan has been faced with se rious h- ous ing 
particular combination of economic , social, problems' resulting from a 
as wall as political factors. 
(')' 
Housing s'UP'Ply has always' lagged ' 
behind demarid. 'A high per'annum natural p*opulation growth of 3*5%; ""' 
the normal process of economic and S'ocial development which leads"to 
a rise in the number of new independent households; and'internal 
migration'from rural areas to'the cities whereýinve'stme I nt and- job 
opportunities were becoming available, have all intensified the problem. 
These trends have-been'exacerbated by the compulsory migrations of 
Palestinians in the-two wars of, 1948 andt1967, _which-boih put 
tremendous 
pressure on dwellings. -The recent temporar7 immigration flow of 
Lebanese-(particularly during-1976) following internal- , disturbances 
in theirýcountry also'added to the'housing'crisis, This has been 
further intensified by a new-source of demand emerging from the'rural 
areas, -aiming'at improving the'standard of rural'hou-sing which was 
no longer suitable-for modern living'. ' All these factors caused th'e 
demand for housing to, considerably exceed the-iUPPIYý'especially 1. the 
demand made by the low income groups, 
Privateýinvestment in the housing sector-was not*sufficient t, o 
satisfy-the increasing neecli for housing. ' This was officially re; og-m 
nised as'inclic&ted, firstly, by-the Seven Year Development Programme, 
1964 --1970. The, Flan pointed out. the lack of adequate financial - -- - 
facilities for housing financing, and recommended that a special 
financing institution had to be established to fill this gap. 
(2) 
Following'this, the'government finally'decided to establish the Housing 
(1) Most of these factors were pointed out by the 5 Year Development 
Plan. 76 - 80v P-348 
(2) Jordan Development Board, 7 Year Plan, OP-cit. P-303 
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Corporation in 1965 to assist the private sector in financing housing 
needs. However, the creation of this institution did not solve the 
problem, and the gap between demand and supply still considerably 
existed. This was clearly pointed. put by the Three Year Development 
Plan of 1973, which considered the absence of adequate credit available 
for housing purposes as the major factor contributing to the housing 
crisis. 
(') 
To solve. this problem.. the-Plan recommendýd the establish- 
ment of a government or a semi-government houding bank with adequate 
resources to. assist the development of the housing sector. 
(2) 
This 
manifested itself in the. creation of the Housing_Bank_in 1974, which was 
the most recent as well as the biggest institution amongst the 
specialised banking sector. 
111.2. Specialised Financial Intermediaries in the Housing Sector. 
111.2.1. The Housing Corporation (HC) '- 
Following the recommendation of the 7 Year Plan, the HC was 
established in 1965 as. a semi-government institution, albeit with an 
independent status. The HC was the first lending institution specialising 
in financing the housing sector, with a particu3ar emphasis being placed 
on accommodation for civil servants and people belonging to low and 
limited income groups. To achieve its objectives, Law No. 27 for 
1968 empowered the HC to practise financial as well as promotional- 
functions. Besides granting loans for housing construction, the HC 
can also prepare housing designs and conduct general surveys covering 
all aspects of housing activity. 
(3) 
(1) National Planning Council, Three Year Development Plan, op. cit. Pe-281 
(2) Ibid. P. 283. 
(3) Law No. 27 of 1968 for the HC. Article IV. 
1 11 
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The role of the HC has passed through four distinct phases of 
development. During the first few years of operation ending in 1968, 
the HC specialised in granting loans to individualr, and housing co- 
operative societies. A total of 624 loans, amounting to JD 1.40 million, 
were granted for long-term periods reaching 15 years. ' 0 against 57b simple 
interest. By 19689 however, the lending policy of the HC had changed to 
concentrate only on designing and implementing comprehensive housing 
projects to be distributed between beneficiaries on rental purchasing 
base. Loans were granted at 5% interest on a reduced balance'basiý, -for - 
periods reaching 20 years. This new policy was seen as a practical step 
towards the solution of the housing problem of the limited and low-income 
Table 8-13 Loans Extended by the Housing 
Corporation, 1965-1976 
Year Type of Loans No. of House 
Units 
Amounts of 
Loans 
(JD) 
Average 
-Loans (JD) 
1965-1968 Individual and 
Housing Societies 624 1,397,154 29239 
1969-1972 Comprehensive 
Housing Projects 66o 1,207,000 11829 
1973-1975 Comprehensive 
Housing Projects 29904 6,5759000 29264 
1976 Comprehensive 
Housing Projects 524 1,7699571 3,377 
Total 
1965-1976 49712 109948,725 2,324 
Source: Housing Corporation, The Housing-Problem in Jordan 
(June 1978) P. 27 and 28 
groups by providing them with lower cost dwellings. 
(') 
During this 
period, which extended to 1972, some 660 house units were distributed 
(1) Housing Corporation, The Housin& Problem in Jordan, (June 1978) P. 28 
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with a value of JD 1.21 million. The third phase of development 
witnessed a noticeable increase in activitiesl accompanied by the Three 
Year Development Plan, 1973 - 1975. The Plan required the HC to continue 
its previous policy of providing comprehensive housing projects in 
different-areas of the country. The total cost of the Planned investment 
during the Plan's period was estimated at JD 6-75 million. 
(') 
Table 8.13 
shows that the HC was able to implement 2,904 house units with a total 
cost of JD 6.58 million, a figure comprising 97% of the planned invest- 
ment for the HC. Due to the continuous increasing demand for housings 
the Five Year Plan of 1976 further required the HC to construct 7,500 
housing unitsl having a total estimated cost of JD 25 million during the 
Plan's period* 
(2) 
Finance for these projects was envisaged to come from 
the-EC's resources, as well as from other domestic and foreign sources. 
However, about half of the planned investment in these projects during 
the first year of the Plan (which was estimated at JD 3.83 million) was 
financed by the HC, As can be seen by the table, the HC, provided 524 
house units, costing JD 1.77 million during 1977. Thus, throughout its 
existence, the HC has extended 4,712 house units, with a total cost of 
JD 10-95 million- 
Undoubtedly, the above lending activities which concentrated on 
accommodating the lower and limited income groups have given the HC a 
special significance from both the economic as well as the social pointS 
of view. ý However, due mainly to its limited financial resources, the 
HC was unable to meet the, ever-increasing demand for housing. This was 
clearly indicated by the Three Year Plan which recommended the creation 
of the Housing Bank to assist housing developmentq by providing loans 
(1) National Planning Council, The Three Year Develo)Ment Plan, 1973- 
1975, op. cit. P. 282 
(2) National Planning Council, Five Year DevelopRent Plan, 1976 - 19809 OP-cit- P- 353 
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to individuals, housing co-operatives, and also to the"HC to'help' in , 
achieving its objectives. -Available statistics show. -that by 1977, the 
Housing Bank provided about 5VP of the HC' a total resources, 
(') 
This gives some evidence.. to the significant role played by the Housing 
Bank-in housing financing as will-be shown in the following'analysis. 
111.2.2. The Housing Bank (HB) ýI 
The HB came into being in response to the, recommendation of the- 
Three Year Plan, with the purpose of solving the, housing, problem in - 
Jordan. It was established as a public shareholding, comparq in accor- 
dance with-the special law which gave the HB large powers and facilities 
to practise its functions, much wider than those given to commercial banks 
and-other private companies as shown in their respective Laws (i. eý 
the Banking Law and the Compariy Law). According to its'Law,,, -the'HB 
was given some important, concessions over private companies (including 
commercial banks) which helped it to-expandirapidly during a short 
period of time. These concessions fell. into two-main categories, ý Firstly, 
unlike commercial banks and other private companies, all HB financial 
operations-were exempted from any government, tax or fees. 'This ", 
includes . -the exemption of 
the Bank's own profits, and interest paid 
on funds deposited with the Bank, from income, tax., Seconny, the HB-. - 
experienced a preferential treatment in government offices and depart- 
ments, which were asked by'law_to, give priority to the Bank to facilitate 
its operations. However,, thO special Law constituting the Bank has 
passed through SUCCe331Ve amendments aiming at increasing its capital 
(1) Total HC resources at the end of 1977 were JD 16.00 million of 
which half was financed by the Housing Bank, whereas the rem"aining 
50 came from the following: 2C% from the HC's inflow from repayments 
of instalments and interests; 16% from the annual government contri- bution; IU; Iofrom Central Bank Credit; and the rest of 4% represented loam from the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development. See: 
HC, Housing Problem in Jordan, op. cit. P. 29 
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and expanding its activities, During four Years of operations, the Law 
was amended five times, thus raising the Bank's authorised capital from 
only 0.50 million in 1973 to JD 18.00 million by 1977. * 
The HB is unique amongst specialised banking institutions. Although 
the HB has an image of a specialised credit institution created for 
housing purposes, it is also active in many areas of commercial 
banking, It is the only specialised institution that accepts deposits 
from the public. An examination of the Table 8.14 reveals that, unlike 
other SCIs which relied heavily on their capital, deposits comprised the 
major source of funds for the HB, accounting for an average of 70.6% 
of total resources during the period 1974 - 1977. As a mobiliser of 
funds, the HB operated as any commercial bank offering a full range of 
account services, and accepting all types of deposits. Throughout four 
years of operations, HB deposits increased from only JD 3.17 million 
in 1971+ to JD 36.75 million in 1977, an average rate of growth of 
138% per annum. The HB was able to attract increasing proportions of 
deposits, which rose in relative importance oftoltal resources from 
60.8% to 66.91'a between 1974 and 1977. The number of accounts rose 
tremendously from only 2,532 to 37,522 during the same period. 
(') 
This 
occurred despite the-stiff competition for deposits which the banking 
system experienced since 1973. 
(2) 
The HB was established in accordance with the Temporary Law No. 41 
of 1973, which fixed its capital at JD 0.50 million. This was soon 
amended by Temporary Law No. 48 of 1973 which raised its capital to 
JD 1.00 million. The permanent Law of the Bank was issued in April 
1974 which increased its capital to JD 2.00 million, divided into 
2.00 million shares. The Permanent Law was under further amendments 
by three temporary laws no. 14 for 1975; No. 49 for 1975; and No. 8 
for 1977. The first amending law raised the authorised capital of the 
Bank to JD 12.00; the second aimed at expanding its activities; and 
the latter further increased its authorised capital to JD 18.00 million. (See: Housing Bank, Annual Reports of 1975v P. 28 & 30; and 1977, P. 15. ) 
See Appendix 8.5 
See Chapter 5. PP. 155 - 161 
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The success of the HB in mobilising funds can be attributed to 
branch expansionist policy and other innovative techniques which were 
introduced to the system for the first time. As far as the network of 
branches was concerned, the Bank expanded its activities into geographical 
areas which were either inadequately covered by commercial banks or 
which were not served by any bank at all. By operating in areas where 
no banking competition existed before (such as Tafileh which was prev- 
iously served exclusively by the Jordanian National Bank) and by 
establishing a branch in Fuhais (where no other bank existed), the HB 
has undoubtedly expanded the national market for banking services and,, 
(I 
at the same time, increased its relative share in the banking system, 
Moreover, the Bank introduced a new method for extending its services 
to rural areas which were still too small to justify the establishment 
of a permanent branch. A "mobile" branch operated in such areas to 
acquaint people there with bank services, and to provide them with 
ordinary banking facilities. These branches benefited from the premises 
of village councils, which were used as temporar7 locations for 
(2) 
conducting their operations. Clearly, this innovation widened the 
geographical coverage of bank networks, thus attracting new customers 
into the banking field. However, the widespread geographical distribution 
of HB branches is evident by Appendix 8.5. which reveals that the nunb er 
of branches were more than tripled b6tween 1974 and 1977, with the 
largest share going to areas outside Amman. Out of the 15 branches 
existing in 1977,11 were situated outside. -the Capital. The relative 
share of Amman's branches decreased over time, declining from 6C% in 
1974 to only 26% by 1977. 
(1) Jordan Time3 (Amman: Sunday, March 19,1978) P. IV 
(2) Housing Bank, Annual Report. 197 v P-51 
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Branch expansionist policy was supplemented by 'the introduction of 
some innovative techniques aiming at encouraging the growth of deposits. 
i Besides offering competitive interest reaching 5: tyo on saving dep6sits. ' 
the HB ran, for the first time in the country's banking history. - a 
lottery on savings accounts. Two draws of the lotter7 were held during 
1977, with a total value of JD 20,, 000. 
() 
As a result, the relative 
importance of this type of deposit within the deposits mix rose from 13% 
in 1976 to 24ro in 1977. 
(2) 
Another innovation introduced by the Bank 
was in the form of extending work, hours in the, afternoon, vhich provided 
considerable convenience fbr government employees who worked during normal 
banking time. As compared with therest, of commercial banks vhich oper- 
ated till 2.00-p. m., the HB extended its services in many branches till 
5; 00 in winter and 6: 0 in summer months. 
(3) 
Clearly, such innovations,, 
together with the grographical expansion of branches, led to a continuous 
rise in deposits to form the major source of HB resources. 
After deposits, paid-up capital constituted an important source'of 
funds, comprising an average proportion of 22. -rl- of total'resources. HB' 
capital underwent successive increases-throughout the period under review. 
It was initially established by an authorized capital of only JD 0.50 
million, which was exclusively subscribed by the government and'the Central 
Bank. This was successively-increased to reach JD 18.00, million by 19779 
of which JD 10.26 million was fully paid-up. JD1., million of the paid-up 
capital was equally subscribed by the government 'and the Central Bank; 
(1) HB, Report of the Board of Directors For Financlal Y 
31.12.1977. P. 12. 
(2) See Table 8.18. 
Jordan Times, op. cit. P. M. 
263 
JD 6.00 million was subscribed by Oil-Producing Countries; and the balance 
of JD 3.26 million was held by the private sector, predominantly Jordanian. 
These figures illustrate the success of the HB in mobilising overseas 
funds in the form of equity capital. As Table 8.14 demonstrates, overseas 
capital contributed by 
'at least one tenth to total bank resources in 1977 
As far as use of funds is concerned. - the pattern of resource allocation 
clarified the role of the HB as a specialised institution for housing 
purposes. In contrast to ordinary commercial banks, the HB allocated a 
lower proportion of its resources to liquid assets. As was shown earlier, 
the HB operated under a special law and was not, therefore, subject to 
the Banking Law,, which forced the banks to maintain a minimum liquidity 
ratio. However, Table 8.15 shows that liquid assets held by the HB 
experienced considerable change between 1974 and 1977, declining in 
relative importance from a high level of 79.3% of total assets to only 
14.8%. The Bank was very liquid in 1974 because it just commenced its 
operations; but once it established itself, it began to divert more 
resources towards promoting housing activities. This took the following 
three different forms of assistance which all aimed at solving the 
country's housing problem: - 
(I ) Lending Activities. Credit extension, formed the bulk of HBI s 
operations, absorbing 78.2% of total resources in 1977, as compared with 
only 18.6% in 1974. During the first years of operations, credit was - 
granted only to individuals and housing co-operative societies, With a 
continuous rise in its resources, the Bank sought an amendment in its 
law aiming at expanding its activities into new lines of business. The 
As explained by Table 8.14, about 17% of the private sector' 3 equity 
share in 1977 were non-Jordanian. This represented 1% of total Bank 
resources. If this is added to the 10.9/"fo representing overseas 
government subscription, the total overseas contribution to equity 
capital becomes exactly II Y% of total resources of HB. 
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Temporary Law No. 49 of 1975 enabled the Bank to extend loans for 
commercial purposes, and also to invest in the equity capital of companies 
operating in construction industry. Starting in 1976, moreover, the HB 
expanded Its credit to cover the public sector. As can be seen by Table 
8.15, loans extended to local ministries accounted for 13% of HB resources 
in 1970, and further increased to 20.2% by 1977. Personal loans, however, 
continued to claim the predominant share, forming 31.1% of total resources. 
In extending credit, EB followed a preferential policy favouring loans 
extended to individuals and co-operative housing funds, as distinct from 
loans granted for commercial and investment purposes. 
(') 
Since one 
objective of the HB was to encourage the creation of co-operative housing 
societies which could provide low-cost housing, 
(2) 
this type of borrower 
was given further preferential treatment. In addition to the priority 
given to these societies, loans were extended against comparatively lower 
interest rates ranging between 7% and 7-; %, depending on the maturity of 
loans vvhich reached 20 years. Loans extended to individuals for housing 
purpose came second in the preference scale, with interest rates ranging 
from 7ý0 to 81%, varying with the maturity of loans which reached 20 
years. On the other hand, commercial loans were granted only for a 
maximum period of 5 years, and against higher interest rates of 9, ', 1- plus 
1% commission. However, when granting individual loans, the HB required 
the borrower to own the land or the building for which the loan was given. 
These loans were extended with a maximum ceiling of JD 7,000 on the basis 
that instalments should not exceed one third of the borrower's steady 
monthly income. Furthermore, the HB asked fbr real estate or other 
tangible securities as collateral for loans. In all. cases,, a particular 
emphasis was placed on the ability to repay the loan-ýfrom the borrower's 
future income. 
For the preferential lending policy of the HB, See HB Annual Reportv 
1974, PP. 36-38. 
(2) HB Law No. 4 for 1974, Article 6-C. 
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Table 8.16 shows the importance of the HB's loan activity in alleviating 
the country's housing problem. Throughout four years of operations, loans 
issued by the HB accounted for 8,297, with a total value of JD 58.90 
million. This assisted in establishing 15,, 851 housing units, with a 
total area of about two million sq. meters. The repayment record of the 
HB has been very successful - loans recover7 ratio averaged around 99. YZ, 
an indication of sound lending policies adopted by the Bank. From its 
inception, the HB extended its activities to meet the need for housing 
credit throughout the country. However, due to the concentration of the 
housing problem in the Amman Area, this region claimed the lion' s share 
in total credit, absorbing an average of 7(f/b during the period under 
review. Following in relative importance, as shown by Appendix 8.6, were 
Irbid and Zerka which claimed 7.8% and 7.10o' respectively. The relatively 
higher share of these two cities, as compared with the remaining regions, 
was a clear reflection of the increasing pressure on housing to accommodate 
larger part of population concentrated there. 
Table 8.16. Loan Activities of the Housing Bank. 1974 - 1977. 
Year No. of 
Loans 
No. of 
Financed 
Units 
Amounts of 
Loans 
(m JD) 
Financed 
Area 2) (thou m 
Loans 
Recover7 Ratio 
% 
1974 718 762 1.8 101 n,, a. 
1975 29092 2,774 
. 
8.6 392 99.9 
1976 39078 8,006 j3.1 973 99.9 
1977 2,409 4009 15.4 510 99.9 
'rotal 
'1974-1977 
1 
8 297 
-1 
5,851 
1 
58.9 
1 
1976 
1 
99.9 
1 
Source: Housing Bankt Report of the Board of Directors for financial 
Year ending 31/1 V77. Table 3 
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(2) Equity Investment. The HB has quickly moved from purely credit- 
creating activities to that of investment banking. The amendments of 
temporar7 laws No. 49 for 1975 and No. 8 for 1977 enabled the Bank to 
participate in the equity capital of domestic enterprises with close 
connection to construction industr7, in particular, and to the general 
development of the economy in general. 
W 
This was seen by the HB as a 
necessary step towards combating inflationary pressures that could follow 
a generous extention of loans without a corresponding rise in the produc- 
tion of building materials. 
(2) 
Moreover, equity investment was viewed 
as an appropriate channel for assisting general economic development and, 
at the same time, achieving suitable profits to'shareholders. 
(3) 
However, 
although a small proportion of HB resources were directed into equity 
financing, Table 8.15 reveals that this type of investment was gaining 
in importance during 1974-1977,, rising from only 0.6yo to 2.1%. BY 19773, 
HB paid-up equity investment accounted for JD 1.2 million distributed 
between 10 different domestic companies operating in construction, 
manufacturing, as well as financial fields. 
(4) 
More than half of this 
investment was made during 1977, which witnessed the creation of new 
enterprises within the framework of the 5 Year Plan. In so doing, the 
HB has directly assisted the establishment of these enterprises, ard 
also promoted the purchase of their equity by the private sector after 
giving them the public confidence. 
(3) Direct Investment in Real Estate Projects. Financed completely 
by the HB, a major project of real estate investment with a total cost of 
JD 8 million has been unclertaken since April, 1976. 
(5) 
The project comprised 
HB, Law No. 4 for 1974, Article 7. H. 
(2) HB, Annual Report. 1977, P-37. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) Ibid. P-36. 
(5) Ibid. P. 39. 
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a huge commercial complex covering a floor area of 80,000 sq., meters. 
The estimated income from this project,, which is expected to be ready 
by 1980, is JD 2 million per annum. In addition to this investment, 
the HB rented thrqe floors of its own new building which has been used 
as a mdin Office since 1977. The rent returned to the Bank an annual 
income of 91% of the total cost of the building. However, direct invest- 
ment in real estate projects still comprised only a small proportion of 
total resources not exceeding 31% by 1977 (See Table 8-15). 
111.3. Conclusions ard Assessment of Specialised Housing Credit. 
Given the unique feature of the HB as a mobiliser of funds,, besides 
its spe'Cialisation in housing financing, it is necessary first to assess 
the extent to which the Bank has been successful in institutionalising 
savings, before assessing itsoontribution (together with the HC) to 
the solution of the country's housing crisis. Part A of Table 8.17 
demonstrates the success of the Bank in attracting deposits as measured, 
firstly, by the steady increase in its relative importance in total 
deposits held by the banking system and, secondly., by a higher annual 
growth rate of its deposits as compared with that of commercial banks. 
The HB has steadily increased its relative share in total banking deposits, 
rising from only 2.8% -in 1974 to 11.5% by 1977. HB deposits,, moreover, 
increased rapidly at an average annual rate of 138%. whereas commercial 
bankz' deposits grew at a slower rate of 3516 throughout the same period. 
As indicated earlier, this success can be attributed to branch expansionist 
policy,, together with some innovative methods which were employed by the 
HB. 
However, such an active mobilisation role played by the RB must have 
influenced the liquidity position of the private sector. Item 5 of the 
same Table shows that deposits held by the HB increasingly contributed 
to the private sector's liquidity (Money Supplyw. ide1y defined),, rising 
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Table 8.17 The Relative Importance of HC and HB Activities. 1974-1977. 
(In miUions of JD) 
1974 1975 1976 1977 Average 
Annual 
%, 74- 
77 
A*. 1. HB deposits 3.17 10-85 ý2-79 36-75 
I 
2. Commercial Banks' deposits 111.98 158-CV+ 227.24 283-81 
3. Total Deposits 115-15 168.89 250-03 320-56 
(1) as % of (3) 2.8 6.4 9.1 11.5 7.5 
Average Annual Growth 
R t f (1) - 242.3 110.0 
61.2 J38.0 
a eo 
Average Annual Growth 
Rate of (2) 30.5 41.1 43.8 
24.9 35.1 
4 M2 (MI + Quasi Money) 216-74. 277-75 358.92 438.99 
5: 0) as a% of (4) 1.5 3.9 6.3 8.4. 5.0 
B. 4. Specialised, Housing Credit 3.80 7.75 25.69 45-73 
4.1. HC 2.83 2.44 2.34 2.77 
4.2. HB, 0.97 5.31 23-35 42.96 
5. Commercial Banks' Housing 18.84 26.28 30.86 33.83 Credit 
6. Total Housing Credit* 22.64 34-03 56-55 79-56 
(4) as % of (6) 16.8 22.8 45.4 57.5 35.5 (4-1) as % of (6) 12.5 7.2 4.1 3.5 6.8 (4.2) as % of (6) 4.3 15.6 41-3 54.0 28.7 
C. % of Loans granted by HB 425.0 18: 1.8 
I 
303.4 to planned credit" 
Source: (1) Central Bank of Jordan, MonthIv Statistical Bulletin, (June 
1978) Table No. II , 12 and 17. 
(2) National Planning Council., 5 Yesr Plan, oP. cit. P-360. 
* Loans outstanding at the end of the period. 
Ratio of Loans disbursed during each year to planned investment for 
the HB as envisaged by the 5 Year Development Plan. The Plan envisaged 
that half of the private sector's planned investment in the housing 
sector during the Plan's period should be financed by the HB. See: 
5 Year Development Plan, OP-cit. P-354 &: 360. 
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in relative importance from only 1.5% in 1974 to 8-4% bY"1977. This 
situation must draw the attention of the Central Bank to the possible 
impact of HB operations on the effectiveness of pursuing domestic monetary 
policy, which has been so far confined only to commercial banks' 
activities. It was shown that the HB operated under a special law excluding 
its operations from banking control regulations. If the HB maintains 
its distinct rapid growth, whereas it continues to be out of monetar7 
control, future monetary actions might be frustrated. The Central Bank 
should deliberately study such effects which may require subjecting this 
unique institution to some kind of central control. 
On the allocation side, specialised housing credit (extended by both 
the HB and the HO has undoubtedly financed a large, part of the 'countr7ls 
housing needs. As is shown in Part B of Table 8.17, this type of credit 
increased its relative importance in total institutional finance available 
in the housing sector from only 16.8% in 1974 to 57.5% by 1977. The 
remaining percentage was furnished by commercial banks. The rise in the 
relative role of specialised credit came from the HB side rather than 
the HC's. Whereas the relative share of the latter declined from 12.5% 
to 3.5% during the period under review,, the former rose in relative 
importance to reach 54% by 1977 as compared with only 4.3% in 1974. Such 
a tremendous rise in the relative share of the HB was attributed to 
generous lending policies adopted by its management. This can be evident 
by comparing the volume of loans disbursed by the HB with its planned 
financial role as envisaged by the Five Year Plan. Part C of the same 
Table shows that during the first two years of the Plan's period, actual 
achievements of the HB in relation to its planned investment averaged 
around 303%. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that by such generosity the 
HB has properly contributed to the solution of the country's housing 
problem, because this problem also has a qualitative dimension, Given 
the reasons behind the housing crisis in Jordan (emanating mainly from 
Z71 
the influx of refugees and displaced persons together with voluntarily 
internal migration from villages to cities),, the problem has been 
particularly great for people belonging to the low and middle-income 
groups. This fact was clearly illustrated by a recent study prepared 
by the HC which estimated the need for housing during the coming 10 years, 
ending in 1986. 
(1 ) 
According to th is s tudy, about 53%, of the country Is 
housing needs was estimated to be required for accommodating people 
belonging to low-income group, 25% for middle-income group, and the 
remaining 22% for meeting the housing needs fbr the higher-inoome group. 
However, given the operational lending policy of the HB, Y&ich required the 
borrower to own land or buildings as a pre-requisite for obtaining a 
loan,, it appeared that about half of Jordanian households belonging to 
low-income groups (in which the need for housing was highly concentrated) 
had been hardly touched by HB, services. With an annual income not exceeding 
JD 600p 
(2) 
a Jordanian household belonging to this group would find it 
almost impossible to buy land or to own a building in order to be an 
eligible borrower from the Bank. HB lending operations were in fact 
directed towards certain categories of population belonging to middle and 
higher-income groups, who could satisfy the necessary conditions for 
obtaining loans. Moreover, large proportions of credit extended were not 
used for borrower's own housing needs, but largely utilised for renting 
and other commercial and investment purposes. Although this undoubtedly 
satisfied specific needs for housing, which were further intensified with 
the sudden influx of Lebanese particularly during 1976, the essential 
needs of lower-income groups and a large part of the middle-income group 
were still inadequately met. One main result of this situation was that 
(1) Housing Corporation, The Housing Problem in Jordang OP-cit. P-13. 
(2) According to the HC estimation, 50/% of Jordanian households belong 
to the low-income group, with total annual earnings not exceeding JD 600. See Ibid. P. 12. 
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HB operations indirectly widened the economic and social differences 
amongst Jordanians. 
It can also be said that the generosity with which the HB poured money 
into construction activities has unwittingly intensified inflationar y 
pressures. The HB started operations at a time when the supply of factors 
of production to the construction sector, particularly labour,, far from 
satisfied demand. The market already experienced a shortage of manpowerv 
as a result of emigration following the higher wages offered in the neigh 
bouring Arab Oil-Producing Countries. The generous lending approach 
adopted by the HB intensified this shortage, with the resultant sharp 
rise in labour wages. At the same time, domestic industries producing 
building mterials were also unable to satisfy the rising demand on their 
production.. thus leading to a considerable increase in prices. 
(') 
However, 
as was shown earlier, the HB tried to alleviate this problem by directing 
its investment policy towards equity financing of domestic enterprises 
producing building materials. 
Another criticism which can be leveUed against the HB rose from the 
analysis of its financial structure. An examination of the maturity struct- 
ure in both sides of the balance sheet reveals a lack of co-ordination 
and matching between the composition of deposits (which constitute the 
major source of funds) and the maturity of loans extended (which comprise 
the main channel of investment). By 1977, for example, current deposits 
(payable on demand) accounted for 62% of total deposits. Saving deposits 
came second in importance with a relative share of 24%. These deposits 
were of a similar nature to demand deposits since they could be also with- 
(2) 
drawn at any time. Thus,, the relative proportion of deposits which were 
Between 1975 and 1977, for example,, the wholesale prices of Cement, 
Iron Bars, Window Glass Sheets, and Clay Tubes increased by 55%, 14%, 
15C%, and 15c% respectively. See Housing Corporation, The Housing 
Problem in Jordan, op. cit. P. 37. 
(2) Housing Bank, Annual Report12Z7,, op. cit. P. 23. 
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payable on demand comprised 86% as of December 31,1977. The remaining 
14% formed term deposits held for certain maturities. However, the weak 
position of term deposits in the deposit mix was accompanied, on the assets 
side, by a loan portfolio with distinctly longer maturity. Table 8.18 
reveals that 62% of loans outstanding at the end of 1977 had long-term 
maturities ranging between 5 to 15 years, whereas the remaining percentage 
of 38% represented medium-term loans granted for periods of up to 5 years. 
Although this test is only a crude measure to assess the financial structure 
of the HB, 
(1) 
nevertheless, it clearly points out that maturities between the 
major components of assets and liabilities have not been precisely matched. 
(2) 
Deposits contributed to toal resources by 66.9% in 1977 whereas, on the 
other hand, housing loans of medium and long-term maturities absorbed 
78.2% of total resources in the same year. Another 5% of HB's resources 
was utilised for long-term finance in the form of equity participation 
and real estate investment. Although a large part of long-term assets 
must have relied on the substantial paid up capital (which contributed 
to toal resources by 18.7%), nevertheless, the HB; should have relied 
more on term deposits, which were necessary to match its pattern of 
lending. When the question of poor matching maturities between deposits 
and loans was raised duting an interview with a senior official at the 
HBO, the answer forthcoming was that the Bank had always had a sound 
financiaLposition and had never experienced any financial difficulty. 
He added that even if there will be any financial embarrassment in the 
future resulting from a sudden nervousness on the part of the public, the 
HB will be safe because all its liabilities towards other parties are 
(1) A proper assessment requires a close examination of the inflow of 
instalments and the general cash flow of the Bank, which are not 
at the disposal of the study. 
(2) There may well be good practical reasons for this, e. g. building 
societies in Britain have traditionally been able to finance their 
activities relying on the fact that their demand deposits are not 
usually subject to rapid general withdrawal. However, due to the 
relatively unstable economic and political environment prevailing 
in developing countries, short-term deposits cannot be largely 
relied upon for extending long-term housing credit. 
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Table 8.18 -, Composition of Deposits and the Maturity Structure of 
Loans Extended by the HB. 1974 - 1977. 
Zyne DeDosi t Mat ity of Loans 
Year CUrrent Saving Notice Time Total 1-5 5-10 10-15 Total 
Years Years Years 
1974 58 8 8 26 100 13 35 52 1.100 
1975 70 9 8 13 100 36 31 33 100 
1976 73 13 6 8 100 30 54 16 100 
1977 62 24 6 a i0o 38 33 29 100 
Average 
Percentage 66 14 7 13 100 29 38 33 100 
1974-1977 
Source: Housing Bank, Report of the Board of Directors For 
Financial Year Ending_11.12.77, Tables No. I&2. 
completely guaranteed by the government. 
(') 
However, the operational 
history of the HB has still been short. The maturity of the main assets 
and liabilities should be properly matched. It is the author's belief 
that, as a housing bank specialising in granting medium and long-term 
loans., the HB should considerably increase the relative weight of term 
deposits in the deposit structure. The enthusiasm by which the HB has 
been operating (which was largely encouraged by concessions and guarantees 
provided by the government) should not engulf it in future financial 
difficulties. 
Finally, it can be concluded that despite the recent imrease in the 
HC activities and the establishment of the HB, the housing problem still 
existed as revealed by both the 5 Year Plan and the HB itself. 
(2 ) 
Housing 
(1) Article 17 of the HB Law No. 4 for 1974 States this fact. 
(2) See 5 Year Plan, P-348 and HB, Annual Report of 1977, P. 25. 
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supply has still been lagging behind-demand. The gap was even widened 
for people belonging to lower- and middle-income groups, whose opportun- 
ities for meeting their housing needs were minimised, given higher con- 
struction costs resulting from rising inflationar7 pressures and land 
speculation. This situation requires further financial support to the HC 
to increase its ability of providing comprehensive housing'projects, with 
lower construction costs, for the benefit of lower- and limited-income 
groups. 
IV 
Municipal & Village Councilil Sector 
IV. I. The Need for SpecialiSed Credit. 
I 
The natural process of socio-economic development faced local govern- 
ment (municipals and village councils) with increasing pressures on essen- 
tial public services in the field of education,, electricity, water supply,, 
and other public utilities. At the municipal level, the continuing influx 
from rural areas to the cities, with economic development projects 
concentrated there, together with the sudden increase in population as 
a result of the 194,8 and 1967 wars, have greatly intensified the need for such 
services. At the village level, the need for continuous modernisation 
of the rural oommunity,, and the necessity of implementing development 
projects to counteract internal immigration to the cities, have assumed 
large expenditure by the village councils. Local resources for both 
municipal and village councils were small in relation to their assumed 
development responsibilities. Due to the long-term nature of these needs, 
and the high risk involved, commercial banks were usually reluctant to 
extend credit to this sector. There was, therefore, an essential need 
for an official intervention to create a specialised institution for 
assisting local governments in connecting various regions of the country 
with-adequate network of necessary services. 
276 
IV. 2. Financial Intermediaries in the Municipal & Village Councils' Sector. 
VI. 2.1. Municipal and Village Loans Fund(MVLF) 
Prior to the establishment of the MVLF in 1966, loans to municipalities 
were provided by the Municipal Loan Fund which operated within the Jordan 
Development Board; whereas village councils received credit f'rom. the Village 
Loan Fund which was administered by the Agricultural Credit Corporation. 
(') 
The 7 Year Plan of 1964 revealed that both Funds operated with very limited 
financial resources which prevented them from adequately fulfil-ling their 
role. 
(2 ) 
The'Plan, therefore, recommended the amalgamation of the two 
agencies in one autonomous specialised institution., capable of providing 
further assistance to local governments. The MVLF was thus established 
with government share capital of JD 1.76 million. 
0) 
The Government further 
increased its equity financing to reach, by 1977,55% of total capital 
of JD 4.90 million, the remaining percentage comprising not profits accrued 
to the Fund throughout its existence, 
(4) 
Table 8.19 shows the scope of MVLF activities during the period 1967- 
1977. Loans were extended to local governments to help in financing 
development projects within their areas. Village councils were given 
preferential treatment over municipalities, in terms of maturity of 
loans and interest rates. Whereas the maximum period of loans extended 
to the former reached 15 years with interest of the latter received 
credit for shorter maturities, not exceeding 10 years, against higher 
interest rate of 5V-. 
(5) 
Throughout il years of operations, the Fund 
granted 1047 loans for financing essential services. Classified according 
(1) mvLF, Achievements During 1966-1976, (Amman: LIVLF, In Arabia) P. 9. 
(2) Jordan Development Board, 7 Year Plan, op. cit. P-358. 
(3) MnF, Annual Report. 1977,, P. 10. 
(4) Ibid. 
(5) WEY, Annual Report. 1977, P. 12. 
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to purpose, public utilities absorbed the lion's share of total loans, 
comprising an average ratio of 40.2%. Educational activities came second 
in importance, with a relative share of 25.2%. The, remaining percentages 
of 18. Wo and 15.8% were utilised for financing water supply and electricity 
projects. 
Clearly, the provision of such services was a pre-requisite for attaining 
economic progress. Given this fact, special emphasis was placed by the 
Government on the development of municipal and rural affairs within its 
comprehensive economic and social development programmes. This sector 
accounted for 8.2% of the total investment of the Three Year Plan of 1973 
and 5.1% of the. Five Year Plan of 1976. As is shown below, only a 
small proportion of the planned investment was financed by the MUF. 
IV. 3. 
-Conclusions 
and Assessment of Specialised Credit in the Municipal 
& Village Councils' Sector. 
The MUF was not in fact an adequate instrument for financing and 
promoting the enormous development needs of local governments. It largely 
restricted its assistance to credit extension, showing little contribution 
towards the provision of technical and advisory services. Even the credit 
provided by the Fund was insufficient to finance various development 
projects of municipalities and villages. 
(') 
The same table shows that 
only less than one quarter of the planned investment of both development 
plans was financed by the MVLF. This was mainly due to a lack of , 
sufficient resources available for the Fund which restricted its ability 
to extend firther credit. The MVLF relied exclusively on funds provided 
by the Government, the Central Bank, and other concerned regional and 
international development agencies. An examination of MVLF balance sheet 
(i) MVLF, Achievements During 1966-1976, OPicit. P-36. 
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of 1977 reveals that the above three sources of funds provided the bulk of 
financial resources, with respective relative shares of 25/16,40%, and 
17%01) The Fund showed no attempt to enlarge its financial capacity'by 
attracting private sector's savings, in the form of issuing long-term 
development bonds which could be guaranteed by the government. Thus. 
the ability of the MVLF to extend loans was automatically dependent on 
the extent to which it received official financial assistance itself. 
On the promotional side, the performance of the MUF in providing 
technical assistance and other advisox7 services was unsatisfactory. This 
institution was not in fact equipped with the necessar7 machinery capable 
of rendering this service. Its operations were characterised by excessive 
goverment beaurocracy. There was an obvious lack of qualified personnel 
and technical staff which could move the Fund towards a proper development 
institution. The Five Year Plan pointed out the weak technical machiner7 
attached to the Fund, asking the Central Bank of Jordan and the National 
Planning Council to study the possibility of re-organising this institution, 
so as to enhance its effectiveness in promoting urban and rural develop- 
ments. 
(2) 
Following this recommendation, a stucV was initiated with the 
help of the World Bank expertise to replace the MUF by a new independent 
specialised credit institution, capable of providing further assistance to 
local govemments. 
(3) 
The study, which is still under preparation,, is 
likely to propose a new name for the new institution, "The Municipal and 
Rural Development Bank". which it is envisaged will concern itself more 
with proper development banking. The proposed institution will be 
The remaining percentage was mainly financed by accumulative net 
profits of the Fund. See: WiLF, Annual Report. 1977, op. cit. P. 10&11. 
(2) National Planning Council, Five Year Development Plan, 1976-1980, 
OP-cit. P-367. 
(3) MVLF, "Sector Notes". Unpublished Study (1978) P. 2. 
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supplemented by greater finanoialresources and equipped with dynamic 
technical machim ry and research facilities. 
( I) It will seek to render 
further assistance to urban and rural areas by,, firstly, financing basic 
social services (such as education, public utilities, etc. ) and, then, 
by'implementing income generating projects to improve the living standards. 
Such an institution will also provide the required technical assistance 
and advisory services to its clients. If the above services are actually 
undertaken by the new institution, the existing financial as well as 
technical gaps in this sector will be greatly reduced. 
Having analysed and assessed the operations of the six speoialised 
credit institutions operating in the country, the next Chapter will deal 
with contractual financial institutions and the Postal Saving Fund. 
(1) Ibid. P. 9. 
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CHAPTER 
THE CONTRACTUAL FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES AND 
THE POSTAL SAVING FUND 
The supply-leading pattern of evolution was not only confined to 
the already discussed SCIs, but it also characterised. the evolution of 
other financial institutions with different specialisations. Apart from 
insurance companies which were privately initiated, the remaining NBFIs 
covered in this and in the following chapters were deliberately created 
and assisted by the government to perform specialised. financial functions. 
However, whether their creation was justified by internal economic and 
financial neeas, and the extent to which such institutions performed 
their assigned developmental role needý to be examined. This. chapter 
covers contractual saving institutions (i. e. insurance. companie3 and 
pension funds) together with the Postal Saving Fund, whereas the follow- 
ing chapter is concerned with the recently established. Amman Financial- 
Market. 
However, it is important to state at the outset that the analysis 
of the role of the financial intermediaries covered in this and in the 
following chapters is largely constrained by two. factors. Firstly, 
the lack of adequate published statistics pertaining to activities of 
some intermediaries, namely insurance companies. Although the Insurance 
Control Law of 1965 required ever7 company to submit annual balance 
sheets to the Controller of Insurance in the Ministr7., of Economy,,. there 
is still a serious statistical gap represented by the absence-of a 
combined balance sheet covering insurance business-in Jordan. -Secondly, 
the recent establishment of some institutions, namely the Pension Fund 
and the Amman Financial Market (1976 and 1978 respectively) deprives 
the analysis of a mcre satisfactory assessment of their activitie3, 
-based 
upon sufficient statistics describing their performance. Nevertheless, 
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because this thesis aims at covering the whole financial-sector in 
Jordan, it was found necessary sometimes to resort to approximate 
measures to fulfil this purpose. The author's field study trip in the 
SummeroflMzade the above task easier, both by conducting personal 
interviews with people in charge of these institutions, and by obtaining 
unpublished statistics which greatly helped in the following analysis. 
I 
The Contractual Financial Institutions, 
As distinct from deposit-type intermediaries and specialised credit 
institutions discussed in the previous chapters, the prime purpose of 
contractual financial institutions(i. e. insurance companies and pension 
funds) is the provision of a specialised service-protection against 
defined future risk as specified in insurance contracts or pension 
schemes. To protect themselves or their families from long-term contin- 
gencies, such as retirement and early death or lengthysurvival, people 
usually depend on pension plans, or resort to-life insurance organisations. 
In performing their functions, such institutions receive a continuous 
inflow of personal savings in the form of periodic pension and life 
insurance premiums. Contractual savings so mobilised are accordingly 
channelled, by these institutions, to different investment outlets. Such 
institutions-are therefore significant for economic development as both 
mobilisers and allocators of funds. - 
Given the long-term nature of their liabilities,, these intermediaries 
are in a favourable position to place- their funds in long-term financial 
instruments. The significance of contractual'financial institutions is 
particularly evident in developed countries where they represent 
effective channels for the mobilisation of national resources and their-' 
productive investment. In developing countries, in general,, the insurance 
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industry and pension schemes are still insignificant,, both in mobilising 
national savings and in changing the- investment pattern towards long- 
term financing. As will be shown, such institutions are still of 
limited importance for Jordan's economic development as compared with 
their counterparts in the more advanced countries. 
I. I. The Insurance Sector 
During the colonial period, insurance business in Jordan was 
entirely carried on by branches and agencies' of foreign companies. 
(') 
This situation continued to prevail up to 1951, when the first domestic 
company (Jordan Insurance Co. Ltd. ) was established. However, the 
domestic element in the insurance industry remained very weak until 
the introduction of the Control of Insurance'Law of 1965, which set up 
formal regulations governing insurance activities; the object also being 
to encourage Jordanian companies to enter this field. Although the 
absolute number of Jordanian companies remained constant (3) UP to 
1973, their relative importance in the total nunber of companies 
operating in the country increased after the promulgation of the Law, 
due to a large with"drawal of foreign companies from the market. With 
the Ins'urance Law being effective by March 1965,15 out of the 27 
operating foreign companies immediately withdrew because they were 
unable to satisfy the new conditions. This accordingly led, as can be 
seen by Table 9.1. to a noticeable rise in the relative importance of 
domestic companies from about only one tenth of the total to one 
quarter before and after March 1965. However, the recent'rise in 
(1) The following historical development of instrance industry in Jordan 
benefited largely from information taken during three personal inter- 
views made by the author in A ust 1978 with people in charge of 
three leading institutions: -Il) Mr. Ahmad Abdulkhaliq, General 
Manager, JordRn Insurance Compan (2) Mr. SamiHabibi, Ganeral Manager. 
Middle East Insurance Compa (3) Mr. Marwan Shukum, Senior Official, 
American Life Insurance Compan . 
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Table 9.1 Development in the Number of Insurance 
Companies* operating In Jordan in Selected Years** 
1965 1971 1974 1977 
Before the kfter the 
issuance of Issuance 
the March 1965 of the 
Insurance Law Law 
1. Domestic Companies 3 3 3 6 14' 
1.1. Life*** n. a. n. a. (2) (2) 4) 
1.2. Non-Life n. a. na. (1) (4) (10) 
2. Foreign Companies 24 9 12 13 16 
2.1. Life*** n. a. n. a. (6) (6) (7) 
2.2. Non Life n. a. n. a. (6) (7) (9) 
3. Total Companies 27 12 15 19 30 
3.1. Life*** n. a. n. a. (8) (8) (11) 
3.2. Non-Life n. a. n. a. (7) (11) (19) 
(I) as % of (3) 11.1 25.0 20.0 31.5 46.7 
_ (2) as % of (3) 88.9 75.0 80.0 68.5 53.3 
(3-1) as % of (3) n. a. n. a. 53.3 42.2 36.7 
(3.2) as % of (3) na. n. a. 46.7 57.8 63.3 
Source: (1) Figures for 1565 were obtained throughout a personal 
interview with the General Manager of Jordan Insurance 
Co. Ltd. in August 1978. 
(2) Figures for other years, Ministry of Industry and Trade. ' 
Insurance Division, Annual Reports of Insurance in Jordan (In Arabic) 
Including branches and agencies of foreign insurance cOmpr-nies. 
Years for which statistics were available. 
Including companies and agencies transacting other types of 
insurance besides life insurance. 
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insurance activities in Jordan (which largely resulted from implementing 
the development projects of 1973 and 1976 plans) has encouraged new 
Jord. anian businessmen to enter this field. The number of national 
companies rose noticeably to 14 by 1977 as compared with 6 in 1974, 
thus increasing their relative share from 31.5% to 46. Vo. The encouraging 
economic conditions have also attracted, though to a lesser degree, some 
foreign companies to conduct business in Jordan. The same table reveals 
that the number of overseas companies rose from 13 in 1974 to 16 by 1977. 
However, such an active entry of new companies was in excess of the 
absorptive- capacity of the market, a situation which resulted in fierce 
competition in the industry, with some companies sustaining loss. 
(') 
This accordingly led the government to temporarily cease issuing new 
licences for insurance business. 
Until the promulgation of the Control of Insurance Law of 1965, 
all insurance companies were free to invest their resources abroad. This 
situation was similar to the freedom given to comrercial banks toward 
overseas investment before the introduction of the Central Banking System. 
The above Law aimed at regulating and. supervising insurance business in 
Jordan. A controller of, insurance in the Ministry of Economy was 
appointed to implement the purposes of this Law. According to the Law. ' 
all insurance companies carrying on business in the country must be 
public shareholding companies, with the paid-up capital of a Jordanian 
company not less than JD 100,, 000., and that-of a. foreign company not lessý 
than the equivalent of JD 250P 000. 
(2) 
Further strict conditions have 
(1) See: Jordan Insurance Company Ltd.,, Report of the Board of Directors, 
(Amman: 10 July 1978) P. ; Middle East Insurance Company, Report 
of the Board of Directors (Amman: 26 April 1977) P-3. 
(2), Official Gazette, Control of Insurance Law of 1965, No. 1826, 
Articles 5&6 (Amman: 1.3.65) 
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to be met by all companies which were required to furnish (before commen- 
cing operations) as a deposit a sum of money, or its equivalent in other 
acceptable assets, amounting to JD 20 000 in case of life insurance 
and JD 10,000 in case of general insurance. 
( 1) The deposit has to be 
kept at a commercial bank in the name, and for the benefitlof the company 
but to the order of the Minister of National Economy. The Law also 
aims at influencing the pattern of resource allocation in favour of 
domestic investment. All foreign companies dealing in life insurance 
were not allowed to transfer abroad more then 10jýo' of insurance premiums 
collected to meet various expenses. 
(2) 
Companies (domestic and foreign) 
transacting other typeo of insurance were also sibject to restrictions 
as follows: 
(3) (1 ) In case of marine insurance, not less than 3W- of 
the total premiums collected during the previous year must be retained 
in the country, and (2) In other. clasoes of insurance, the above per- 
centage was fixed at 4(Yl'o. 
Thus, the introduction of the above Law has regulated insurame 
business in Jordan within a legislative framework aiming at encouraging 
and influencing this vital industry in favour of national needs. It was, 
therefore, not surprising that the 7 Year Plan of 1964 recommended the 
application of the Cor&. rol of Insurance Law (which was already prepared). 
as soon as possible. 
(4) 
The promulgation of this Law came one year 
after launching the Plan. However although the Law directed insurance 
companies' funds towards investment in domestic activities, it neverthe- 
less left it open for these companies to choose the type of domestic 
Ibid. Article 8 
(2) Ibid, Article 19 
(3) Ibid, Article , 49 
(4) Jordan Development Board, 7 Year Programme for-Economic Development, 
oP. cit. P-345 
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investment without any restrictions. This appeared to result 1. in an 
unsatisfactory composition of their investment portf6lio, considered 
from an economic development viewpoint. The Three Year Plen of 1973 
referred implicitly to this point by requiring further controlling of 
the uses of funds available to insurance companies, through more 
effective application of the Insurance Law. 
(') 
As a response to this 
recommendation, the^Minister of National Economy i,; sued a decision, 
in October 1973, requiring all insurance companies to allocate a 
certain percentage of their reserves to the fb1lowing areas, which were 
closelyýconnected to development prograurnes-, 
(2)., - 
15/'-'. of total reserves for financing the industrial sector, 
either by subscribing to., or buying shares of industrial 
companies. 
(2) 20/'o of total reserves for finaacing projects envisaged in 
the 3 Year Development Plan, which might take the form of 
loans extention or contribution to government development 
bonds and any bonds issued by concerned quarters. 
(3) 576 of total reserves for financing housing loans for the' 
employees of insurance companies, and the holders of life 
insurance policies. 
(4) 5Cr- of total reserves should be deposited with the Housing 
Bank. 
Table 9.2 provides information pertaining to premiums collected 
by the insurance sector, classified according to type of business and 
nationality of company. The increasing role played by domestic insurance 
companies was reflected in the steady rise in their relative share in 
total premium collected by all companies. Between 1971 and 1976 (for 
which data were obtainable) domestic companies succeeded in approximately 
doubling their relative share from a figure of only 32.61o to 61.4%. 
(1) National Planning Council, 3 Year Plan'. op. cit. P. 46. 
(2) Central Bank of Jordan, Tenth Annual Report. 1573, P. 75 &: 76. 
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As demonstrated by the table,, the bulk of premiums collected by 
domestic companies came from non-life premiums which claimed, on 
average, 41.8% of total premiums collected by the whole insurance 
industry during 1971 - 1976, whereas an average of only 2o8% represented 
life premiums. Although foreign companies also depended more on non- 
life premiums (averaging 37.5% of the total), they were still more 
successful, than the domestic companies, in attracting life premiums 
which accounted for an average of 17.9% during the same period. 
However, the small relative share of life premiums collected by 
the insurance sector as a whole (representing an average of 20. T% of 
total premiums) reflected the weak position of life insurance in Jordan. 
Despite the fact that life premiums collected were almost trebled in 
absolute terms, rising from only JD 0.59 million in 1971 to JD 1.50 million 
by 1976, still this represented a vex7 small proportion of personal 
savings as compared with the situation in the more advanced countries. 
Whereas in the U. K., for example., savings administered by life insurance 
companies accounted for about 40% of total personal savings, 
(') 
this 
percentage was not more than eo in the Jordanian Case. 
(2 ) 
Given the 
relatively limited scope of public social security s'bhemes in developing. 
countries (including Jordan) as compared with developed countries, one 
would expect people there to resort more to private insurance organisa- 
tions to secure their future, or that cC their famil: L- s. However, the 
weakness of life insurance business in Jordan can be explained by a 
combination of the following economic, religiotE, social, as well as 
educational factors: - 
(1) G. Clayton, British Insurance (London: Elek Books, 1971) P. 318 
(2) Personal Savings in 1974 (the recent year for which statistics 
were available) accounted for JD 74-58 million. 
289 
Table 9.2 Premiums Collected Classified 
According to Type of Insurance and 
Nationality of Comparxy2 1971 - 1976 
(%) 
1971 1972 1973 1971+ 1975 1976 Average 1971-76 
A Marine 26.3 28.6 35.9 33.4 29.1 37.6 31.8 
B Fire 9.3 9.2 7.9 7.6 8.0 6.4 8.0 
C Motor Vehicle 19.6 22.4 22.3 28.1 36.8 35.1 27.5 
,D Accident 13.2 11.3 9.3 9.6 15.3 13.2 12.0 
1. Non-Life Prem- 
jims, (A to D) 68.4 71.5 75.4 78.7 89.2 92.3 79.3 
1.1 Domestic 
Companies' (29.7) (31.4) (34.6) (41.3) (55.2) (58-4) (41.8) 
Premiums 
1.2 Foreign 
Companies' (38-7) (40-1) (40.8) (37.4) (34.0) (33.9) (37-5) 
Premium- 1 
2. Life Premiums 31.6 28.5 24.6 21.3 10.8 7.7 
1 
20.7 
2.1 Domestic 
Companies' (2.9) (2.9) (2-7) (2.4) (2.9) (3-0) (2.8) 
Premiums 
2.2 Foreign 
Companies' (28-7) (25.6) (21.9) (18.9) (7-9) (4.7) (17.9) 
Premiums 1 
3. Total Premiums 
(I & 2) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
3.1 Domestic 
Companies' (32.6) (34-3) (37-3) (43-7) (58.1) (61-4) (44.6) 
Premiums 
3.2 Foreign 
Companies' (67.4) (65-7) (62-7) (56-3) (41.9) (38.6) (55.4) 
Premiums 
Source: (1) Figures for the years 1971 - 1974, Uinistry of Industry and 
Trade., Insurance Division. 
(2) Figures for 1975 - 1976 , the 
Central Bank of Jordan. 
Annual Report. 1977, P-53 & P-55. 
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(1) Economic Factors. As is known,, life insurance Policies 
serve as a channel for holding an individualls-savings, besides their 
purpose of protecting the insured against early death or lengthy survival. 
The low level of per capita income in Jordan (accounting for JD 213 in 
1977) made it difficult for peopleý in general, to accumulate large 
savings (thus holding insurance policies) out of their meagre Income. 
This was made worse during the. inflationary period of'1973 - 1977, 
wherein high price inflation 05% Per annum) further minimised the ability 
of individualsto purchase insurance- policies, due to the rising cost of 
living. Many life policies at this time were cancelled because of the 
in4bility of the insured to carry on paying life premiums in light of 
the continuous increase in domestic prices. 
(2) Religious Factors. - A large part of the Moslem population 
are still against the life insurance principle because they believe that 
it is in conflict with Islam's fatalistic teaching that people should 
submit to God's will and accept whatever the future brings to them, 
including death., life is not in an individual's possession but in Goals 
hand. Thus, to insure one's life runs counter to Godlsýalleged will. 
(') 
The religious rejection of life insurance can beýalso, interpreted on 
the ground that this activity is a type of gambling which is forbidden 
in Islam. In signing a life policy, an insured person, knows how much 
he (or his family) is going to get after his death, but he does not know 
how much he is going to pay. ý -111, 
However, an increasing part of people think that life insurance 
is not against religion. Their argument is based on the ground 
-Ahat the object of insurance is not securing one's death itself,, 
but the risk and adverse consequences that his death may bring 
to his family. Thus, insuring one's life, they argue, does not 
mean interfering in God's will but securing the future of his 
family when such a consecluence occurs, 
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'Social Fqctors; ' Strong'family relationships, which-still 
exist in Jordan and in other Middle Eastern Countries, work to reduce 
the need of people for life insurance. Clearly, in circumstances where 
family responsibility extends towards, supporting relatives in need of 
assistance, the protection motive for life insurance is, comparatively 
less. In case of the death of, the family"s main earner, his relatives 
usually find ways and means by which-they share their financial respons- 
lbility towards the deceased's family. 
Educational Factors. The development of life'insurance 
depends largely on the readiness of people and their understarding, of 
the benefits and the services that this industry can render to the 
in&ured, as well as to the national econoW. The extent to which this 
industry can succeed in business is closely connected to its ability to 
acquaint people with its services and provide them with adequate 
insurance education. ' Although Jordanians exhibited a growing under- 
standing of, and response to, life insurance as was reflected'in the' 
threefold increase in collected premiums in 1977Nhere was'still'a large 9 
part of the'population who had little knowledge of insurance benefits. 
This situation requires effective educational cainpaigns to fully acquaint 
the people with the twin purposes of life insurance: as a saving'channel 
and a protection system. The 'educational aspect, is very important, for 
life insurance because it is only by attracting voluntary saving by 
the private sector that this can develop; whereas other types'Of-insurance 
may greatly flourish because of, government, compulsory'regulations (as 
will be shown in the case of Jordanian-marine and motor car instrance). 
(1) See Table 9.3 P. 296 
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However, the government can indirectly promote life insurance 
by providing tax concessions to policy holders. The Jordanian tax 
system, in fact, provides some incentives to individuals but these are 
not sufficient to effectively encourage them to buy life insurance 
policies. The Income Tax Law of i964. allows for an amount equal to 5% 
of an annual premium paid by an individual to be- deducted from his 
taxable income - provided that the amount of the set-off permissible under 
this Article shall not exceed JD 8. 
(1) 
Clearly, such an allowance is 
too small compared to, the situation in the U. K., for example, where 
savings in the form of life insurance are considerably, favoured by 
the tax system. Among other incentives adopted by the British Govern- 
ment., the most important tax concession given to individuals is that half 
of all premiums paid can be deducted from. taxable income - on the cond- 
ition that eligible premiums may not exceed one-sixth of total income. 
(2) 
According to Kay and King, the substantial tax advantages attached to 
life insurance premiums are strongly behind the rising popularity of 
life insurance as a form of holding personal saving in Britain. 
(3) 
As far as non-life (general) insurance is concerned, Table 9.2 
reveals that marine insurance occupies the leading role with a relative 
share in total collected premiums averaging around 31.8% during 1971 - 
1976. Marine insurance, together with other types of general insurance, 
were largely encouraged by compulsory government regulations as provided 
by-the Control of Insurance Law of 1965. Article 47 of this Law states 
that any real estate and movable or immovable property within the 
country.. or any goods imported into the country may hot be insured 
Official Gazette. Income Tax Law No. 25 for 1964 (Amihan: 17.10.64) 
No. 1800, Article 32. 
(2) J. Kay and M. King, The British Tax Syste (Oxford: Oxford-Univier- 
sity Press, 1978) P. 62. 
(3) Ibid. P. 63 
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abroad directly or indirectly by arLy person. 
(') 
Moreover, all general 
insurance business, particularly-marine insurance, has been largely 
promoted by the launching of the development programmes of 1973 and 1976, 
and the consequent increasing demand for insurance made by various 
economic sectors. Given the above compulsory legislative Article. - 
together with an average annual increase in imports of 3eb during the 
period under review, it was not surprising that marine insurance flour- 
ished remarkably to increase its relative share in total collected 
premiums from 26.37o in 1971 to 37.6% by 1976. 
Motor vehicle insurance came second in importance with an average 
relative share in total collected premiums of 27.5%. This branch of 
insurance was not, only encouraged by the above mentioned Article, but 
it was further assisted by another legislation, issued In 1968, requiring 
all vehicles to be insured. According to the Compulsory Insurance 
Law No. 37 of 1968, 
(2) 
all movable vehicles operating in the country, should 
be covered at least by third party insurance. - Although statistics - 
for this period were not available to indicate the effect of this Law, 
clearly, this must have greatly promoted the developrMnt of motar vehicle 
insurance. 
The distinction between life and-non-life insurance is particularly 
important when discussing the significance of the insurance industry for X_ 
a country's economic development. The developmental impact of insurance 
organisations lies basically on their role as financial intermediaries, 
which can-potentially be an effective vehicle for the mobilisation of 
national savings and their utilisation in capital market's instruments. 
In this regard, life insurance companies are, favourably placed to serve 
as long-term investors in the capital market, compared to their, general 
(1) Official Gazette, Control of Insurance Law of J965, op. cit. Article 47 
(2) Reference is made here to the personal interview conducted by the 
author with Mr. Abdulkhaliq'., General Manager of Jordan Insurance 
Company. 
294 
insurance counterparts. The investment behaviour of companies dealing 
with life insurance usually shows a preference towards long-term 
I 
financial instruments which, in effect, reflects the long-term nature 
of their liabilities and their less need for liquidity. The contract 
in life insurance differs from that in general insurance because it is 
usually a long-term one and the premiums are collected over a period 
of years; whereas the contract in general insurance is normally agreed 
on an annual basis Given this situation, the investme rrt pattern 
of the latter is largely biased towards the holding of short-term assets 
to. satisfy high liquidity needs, whereas lesser need for. liquidity, 
in the case of the former enables the investment managers there to 
channel the largest part of the steady inflow of premiums into long- 
term investments. 
(2) 
Since a consolidated balance sheet of insurance companies is still 
not available in Jordan, it is difficult to analyse end assess satis- 
factorily the role of the insurance industrV; in the country's economic 
development (by examining sources and uses of funds). The lack of 
required statistics, moreover, makes it also difficult to examine the 
extent to which the above theoretical distinction in portfolio behaviour 
between life and non-life insurance companies applies to the Jordanian 
case. However, taking collected premiums as a crude measure of their 
mobilisation of the contractual savings of the community,, Jordanian 
insurance industry showed steady progress. Table 9.3 demonstrates that 
total premiums rose from only JD 1.86 million in 1971 to JD 8.84 million 
by 1977. Despite this progress, however, the industry still plays a 
For a detailed differentiation between the two types of insurance, 
see Clayton, G. and Osborn, W., Insurance CompaRy Investment; 
PrinciDles and Policies (London: Allen & Unwin, 1965) 11-14 
(2) For the role of each type of insurance in the capital market, 
see G. Clayton,, British Insurance, -op. cit. PP. 313 339 
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limited intermediary role compared to other financial institutions, 
especially the commercial banks. Throughout the period under review, 
for example, collected premiums constituted only 0.01% of GNP, whereas 
bank deposits accounted for 30% of GNP during the same period. 
Moreover, the extent to which insurance companies were able to 
make funds available in the capital market can be shown by their net 
acquisition. of premiums after allowing for the outflow of claims. 
Insurance companies receive each year an inflow of premiums exceeding 
disbursement to policy-holders plus overhead expenditure, thus investing 
the surplus in different assets to cover their liabilities. The ability 
of the insurance industry to accumulate such surpluses is indicated 
by the ratio of premiums collected (P) to compensation paid (C). 
(1) 
P/C figures, therefore, reveal how many times the funds mobilised by 
the insurance sector (in the form of premiums) cover the payments of 
claims. Table 9.3 illustrates that P/C ratio for all insurance 
companies averaged around 2.2 during the whole period, indicating 
that premium inflow was more than twice the outflow of claims. The 
same table also demonstrates-the favourable position of life insurance 
companies as potential investors in the capital market; this is reflected 
-in their higher P/C ratio compared to their non-life insurance counter- 
parts. An average P/C ratio of 6.4 for the former and only 2.0 for the 
latter clearly reflected the relative significance of life insurance 
companies in making more funds available for capital market activities, 
compared to the general insurance business. 
Finally, it can be concluded that the insurance industry in 
Jordan is still of minor importance for economic development. Since it 
is incapable of mobilising substantial amounts of national savings, it 
is therefore unable to feed the market with considerable investable funds 
(1) Such surpluses would be available for investment after allowing 
for administration and other costs. 
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Table 9.3 Premium Collected (P) and Compensatio 
Paid Out by Insurance Companies (C) 
Claisified According to Z)rpe of 
Insurance. 1971 - 1977 
Life Insurance Non-Life Insurance Total Insurance 
p C P/C P CI P/C P C P/C PIGNP 
JDfOOO JDIOOO % JDIOOO JD'OOO % JDI 000 JD1 00( % 
1971 588 83 7.1 1j275 796 1.6 1#863 879 2.1 0.008 
1972 625 101 - 6.2 19570 6oo 2.6 2v195 701 3.1 0.008 
1973 664 192 3.5 29039 736 2.8 2,703 928 2.9 0.009 
1974 756 117 6.5 12,792 1,545 1.8 39548 1,662 2.1 0.009 
1975 413 29 14.2 3,419 1,911 1.8 3,832 IP940 2.0 0.010 
1976 483 142 3.4 5,806 3,153 1.8 6,289 3,295 1.9 0.012 
1977 1,503 371 4.1 7,332 5,496 
_1.3 
8,835 5,, 867 1.5 0.014 
Average/"I- 
1971-77 
1 
6.4 
1 1 12.0 1 1 
2.2 
1 
10.01 
Source: As Table 9.2 
necessary for financing long-term development, needs. Their small. 
significance for capital market development is shown by the fact that 
by the end of 1977, the financial investment in government bonds and 
companies' shares of three leading insurance companies(') did not exceed 
1% of the paid-in capital of the public shareholding companies listed on 
(1) These are: Jordan Insurance Company, Middle East Insurance Company, 
- and the American Life Insurance Company. According to unpublished 
figures prepared by the Monetary Division at the Central Banx. of 
Jordan, the above three mentioned companies were. estimated to hold 
about 8CY/o of the total assets held by the whole insurance sector. 
As of Dec. 1977, the assets held by each of these companies 
accounted for JD 4.78 million,, JD 1.21 million and JD 2.60 million 
respectively. 
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the Amman Financial Market. 
(I) 
This situation was unfavourably compared 
with the important allocative function of insurance companies in developed 
countries. In the U. K., for example, the large resources of insurance 
companies, and their willingness to hold long-term investments, made 
such intermediaries able to operate as active investors as well as 
underwriters in the London Stock Exchange, a factor which considerably 
promoted and strengthened the activity of this institution. According 
to Clayton and Osborn, British insurance companies usually undexw ite 
more then half of any new issue in the capital markeO 
) 
1.2. The Pension Fund (PF) 
Pension and provident funds are insurance-type institutions, which 
are also classified as social security programmes. Such specialisecl 
institutions differ widely from one country to another, depending on 
their scope of coverage, methods of financing, and whether they are 
administered by the state or by the private sector. The significance of 
these funds is not only related to the social service they provide, but 
they are also important for economic development as financial intermed- 
iaries, deriving their funds mainly from contractual savings which 
are subsequently invested in long-term activities.. 
In general, pension plans are designed to pay on retirement a 
pension equal to some fixed percentage of employee! s final salary. 
Benefit payments are mainly financed by contributions from employees.. 
(1) Government bonds and industrial, shares held by the three companies, 
accounted for less than JD 1.0 million, (see balance sheet figures), 
whereas the paid-in capital of listed shareholding companies was 
JD 110.10 million. (See Hashim. Sabbagh,, " Amman Financial market: 
Role & Objectives, " Amman: 1978) P-5. 
(2) Clayton and Osborn, Insurance ComnapZ Investment, op. cit. P. 231 
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together with other sources, such as earnings on investments and 
government subsidies. Provident funds, on the other hand, mobilise 
compulsory savings from certain categories of employees covered in the 
scheme and contributions from their employers. In case of retirement.. 
for example, contributors receive benefits consisting of their share iný 
the accumulated savings plus interest accrued,. mostly payable in one 
lump sum. 
(') 
Both pension and provident funds can accumulate surplus 
so long as contributions on behalf of covered and currently working 
employees (inflow) are in excess of the compensation paid to the retirees 
(outflow). The surplus so accumulated can be channelled to various 
investment outlets, thus giving such institutions an important role in 
financial intermediation. 
The intermediary function of pension and provident funds is of a 
special significance for economic development because such institutions 
are more able than other financial intermediaries to feed the market with 
continuous inflow of long-term investable funds. Unlike commercial 
banks and other saving institutions, the liabilities of pension funds are 
of a longer-term nature which facilitates. thOir investment'in long-term 
assets. In contrast to bank deposits, people consider their savings with 
pension and provident funds as completely illiquid, since they cannot 
withdraw them for a long period of years. The liabilities of such funds 
are payable only when the-retirement is due, thus giving them a high 
degree of predictability. This, together with, the complete absence of 
sudden withdrawals on their liabilities,, enable these institutions to 
hold riskier and longer-term investment portfolio more than any type of 
financial intermediaries. 
(1) For a detailed discussion of various social security programmes, 
and their mobilisation role, see: Franco Reviglio. " Social Security: 
A Means of Saving Mobilisation For Economic Development, " w 
Staff Papers (July 1967) PP- 324-- 362 
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As far as Jordan is concerned, pension and provident schemes are 
still of limited importance compared to other countries' where such 
institutions are instrumental in fostering domestic development. 'Provident 
funds are privately established in large commercial and industrial 
corporations, where employees can draw lump sum severance and retirement 
payments when they leave work. - Employers also contribute to the aggregate 
funds which are usually administered and invested by the corporations. 
Due to the absence of any published statistics or information regarding 
such funds, it is very difficult to reveal their pattern of investment 
or the extent to which they make resources available for financing 
development. However, it is believed that the resources accumulated by 
private provident , funds are not large enough t6 form an important 
iource 
of development finance. 
It was not until 1976 that a pension fund for government employees 
was introduced in Jordan* Prior to this date, pension affairs were 
dealt with by a special department within the Ministry of Finance. The 
Pension Fund (PF) was established, 'in accordance witý thý*pmvisiOnal 
Law No. 6 of 1976, to s'hoýlder the present and fAUre'Obligations of 
the government as stipulated in the country's civil and military pension 
laws. 
(') 
In addition to this purpose, the PF also aims at playing a 
promotional role in the Jordsnian economy,, by investing its resoiir6ei 
I,, 
(2) 
in projects within the framework of development programmes. 
The PF was created in response'to 4' a recommendation made by the" 
Three Year Plan of 1973. 
(3) 
Thisfeame into effect in 1976, when the 
Central Bank of Jordan took the initiative by transferring JD 15.40 
(1) Pension Fund, Law No. 6 For 1976, Article 4. A. 
(2) Pension Fund, Report on the operations of the Fund. (Amman: June 
1978) In Arab ic v_P. I 
(3) National Planning Council. Three Year Plan, OP-cit. P. 43 
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million of its profits to form the paid-in capital of the new institution. 
During this year, special profits accrued to the Bank as a result of 
revaluation of its gold holdings at the'new price of U. S. $ 100 per ounce 
(instead of the previous rate of $ 35 per ounce). 
(') 
Such profits are 
usually transferred to support the government budget. Instead of 
financing current government expenditures, it was decided this time 
to use the profit to constitute the capital of a new institution 
capable of promoting and financing development projects. 
(2) 
However, it seems that the Law creating the PF, and the studies pre- 
pared earlier, did not give sufficient consideration, to the methods , 
of funding and their adequacy to meet the PF obligations,, in view of the 
prevailing civil and military pension laws. Thus, as the PF started 
operations, it soon realised the difficulty of operating on a self- 
funded basis,, since its current revenues were much less than-needed to cover 
current obligations towards pensioners. A report prepared by the PF 
estimated a deficit of JD 9.78 million during 1978.0) Benefit outflows 
were estimated at JD 12.98 million, whereas employees' contributions 
together with current revenues from investment were expected to reach 
only JD 3.20 million. Given this situation, the PF envisaged three 
ways to solve this problemý4) 
Changing the existing government pension laws with the purpose 
of increasing the current inflow of funds. This would mainly involve 
lengthening the work period of employees and the percentage deducted 
from their'salaries. 
(5) 
Moreover, the government would also be required 
W Pension Fund, Report on the Fund operations. op. cit, P. I. 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) Ibid. PAO 
(4) Ibid. P. 10 13 
(5) Uruguay, for example, has a successful social security sector 
because of hi h contributions made by employees, ranging from 
38.5'/"-'to 44. of wages and salaries. See Reviglio, op. cit, P. 330 
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to Support the current inflow by transferring to the PF a certain per- 
centage of employees' contributions (a case similar to private provident 
funds where employers pay, for example, double the percentage paid by 
the employees). 
(2) Providing lump sum payments by the government whenever the 
PF faces financial difficulty. It was estimated that the PF required 
JD 120 million in order to meet its obligations during the coming three 
years. Government subsidies would be needed from time to time to enable 
the PF to assume its financial obligations as shown by the Law. 
(') 
(3) Finally, it was proposed to change the PF to'a state investment 
corporationg specialising only in investing funds and promoting development 
projects, without a direct commitment to pension obligations. According 
to this solution, the Ministry of Finance would continue, as before, to 
meet its obligations towards pensioners. Any p1rofits that accrued to 
the proposed corporation would be transferred to the government to help 
in financing part of pension expenditures. 
However, the PF's Board of Directors was in favour of the last 
solution, emphasising the necessity of amending the Fund's Law with the 
purpose of changing the PF to a state investment corporation. 
(2) 
This 
decision was taken in view of the country's utmost need for a specialised 
investment institution-with sufficient resources capable of promoting 
and financing development projects. Thus, a proposed Law was prepared in 
(1) This was the experience in many developing countries, such as 
Columbia, Argentina, and Brazil, where large government subsidies 
made their social security programmes successful. Even in the more 
developed country, such as France, Belgium, and Italy, pension funds 
were greatly assisted by considerable transfers from their respec- 
tive government. See Reviglio, op. cit. Table 4 (P-337) and 
Table 6 (P. 340) 
(2) Pension FuncL , Report on the Fund operations, op. cit. P. 11 
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1978 to be officially approved, giving a new name for the PF ýs "Jordan 
Investment Corporation" with an authorised capital of JD 25 million. 
According to the proposed Law, the new corporation is expected to play 
an active developmental role by creating viable development projects 
within the country through (a) undertaking comprehensive investment 
surveys and initiating feasibility studies of selected enterprises 0? 
(b) financing these projects directly, or arranging for' their finance 
from domestic and foreign sources. Development finance can be also met 
through undertaking joint-venture projects, with the corporation 
shouldering a higher risk than other partners. The Corporation also 
aims at supporting the operations of the recently established Amman 
Financial Market through active dealings in the listed financial 
instruments. and by encouraging the establishment of sýecialised saving 
and investment organisations. 
Thus,, the proposed amending Law aims at creating a new institution 
specialising in the inveltment field, without committing itself to 
pension obligations as was the case in the previous PF's Law. - Article 
5 of the proposed Law confines the aim of the new Corporation-to 
investing its resources in Jordanian projects with close relation to 
development plans. The only connection between the Corporation and 
pension obligations is shown in Article 16 of the proposed Law, which 
states that all net profits accruing to the Corporation should be 
transferred to the government as contributions to pension payments. 
Employees' contributions to pensions should be channelled to the Corpor- 
ation for investment (together with its capital and any funds transferred 
by the government and the Central Bank) in areas closely connected with 
development programmes. Given this situation, the proposed institution 
is not a pension fund in the real sense, rather it is an investment 
agent of the government specialising in financing and prom I oting develop- 
ment projects. 
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The PF's Board of Directors has already taken steps to move 
towards the above proposed Corporation. It asked the Minis try of Finance 
to continue dealing with pension affairs, thereby enabling the PF to 
concentrate its activities in the investment field. 
(') 
As regards, its 
role in the capital market, the proposed new corporation would have 
a promotional impact, similar to that of the PF, as a, long-term investor 
in the market. The nature of liabilities in both institutions is the 
same, iri the sense of their predictability and the absence of a sudden 
withdrawal by the public. The new institution may be even more capable 
of feeding the market with long-term investable funds, given its larger 
resources and a higher degree of specialisation in investment. 
However, the extent to which the PF was significant in capital 
market activity was shown in Table 9.4. Since its existence in 1976 
Table The Allocntion Pattern of Pension 
Fund' s Resources, 1976 - -31Z, 
5ZI 97 
(Millions of JD) 
1976 1977 31/5/78 Average 
Value Value % Value % 76 - 78 
1. Government Bonds 8.77 56.8 6.19 39.7 7.68 40.9 45.8 
2. Companies' Shares 6.44 
1 
41.7 8.52 54.7 
1 
10.07 
1 
53.5 49.9 
Capital Market 
Assets (I &: 2) 15.21 98.5 14-71 94.4 
- 
17.75 94.4, 95.7 
3. Deposits with 0.06 0.4 0.66 4.2 0.83 4.4 3.0 Banks 
4. Others 0.17 1.1 0.22 1 1.4 0.22 1.2 1 1.3 
Total Assets 15-44 100.0 15-591 100.0 18.80 100.0 
1 
100.0 
Source: Pension Fund, Report on the Fund operations, (Amman: June 1978) 
Arabic. 
(1) Pension Fund, Report on the Fund operations, op. cit. p. 1. & 2 
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up to May 1978, Capital Market instruments held by the PF comprised, 
on average, 95.7% of its total resources. The remaining small percentage 
of only 4.0/6 was held in other forms, mainly in bank deposits, thus 
reflecting its little need of liquidity. The PF's investment behaviour 
is consistent with the earlier theoretical discussion which favourably 
places pension funds as important holders of capital market instruments. 
In fact, such an allocation pattern of resources distinguishes the PF 
as an active investor in the capital market, compared to other financial 
intermediaries. As was shown in preceding chapters, commercial banks 
were very reluctant to invest in long-term financial assets; specialised 
credit institutions concentrated their activities in credit extension-, 
with a very small proportion of their funds being invested in equities; 
even insurance companies (which are usually active investors in the 
capital market) were found to be of small significance, due mainly to 
their limited financial resources. The important role played by the PF 
in the capital market is shown by the relative share of its long-term 
holdings of financialassets in total assets available in the market, a 
W 
percentage accounting for about one tenth by 1977. This represented 
14.10or of government bonds outstanding and 7. Vo of the paid-in capital of 
the public shareholding companies registered at the Jordzinian Exchange, 
However, although such a contribution is considerable comparing with that 
made by other domestic financial intermediaries, the role of the PF in 
the capital market is still limited comMred to the situation in other 
developing countries, where pension funds play an important role in 
financing development. In developing countries where pension schemes 
reached advanced levels, such-as Malysia, Uruguay., Panama, and Argentina, 
(1) Government debt outstanding accounted for JD 43 million, whereas the 
paid-in capital of the listed companies formed JD i10.10 million. 
As a percentage of the total government and private capital 0 
market assets, a holding of JD 14.71 million by the PF represents 
9.6% of the total. 
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pension funds there were able to mobilise large funds which were then 
made available for financing capital market activities. For example, 
pension funds' holdings of government bonds, as percentages of public 
debt outstanding in the four 6antioned countries, accounted for 6(rl-, 53/6v 
4W6, and 3% respectively. 
(') 
II 
The Post Office Saving Fund (POSF) 
Post office savings facilities form part of an existing governmental 
system aiming at mobilising funds from small savers and channelling them 
into investment outlets. Their location in post offices make them access- 
ible to a large part of the population who are already by use familiar 
with and confident in the post office. Such facilities are especially 
important in developing countries where they can, through an adectuate 
geographical coverage, develop habitual savings trends among people 
belonging to low-income groups.. whose savings are too small to attract 
the attention of other types of financial intermecliaries. 
The post office savings system in Jordan is of a recent inception, 
having been introduced only in 1974. In September of that year, the Post 
Office Saving Fund(POSF) started operations in accordance with Law No. 
34 of 1966, and the Law amending it, No. 11 of 1974. The principal 
purpose of the POSF is to develop the saving habit among Jordanians 
and to increase their knowledge of the concept and benefit of savings, 
particularly with regard to small savers. 
(2) 
To encourage individuals 
to use the savings facilities provided by the post officesl Article 5 of 
the Law states that the government guarantees all the Fund's liabilities 
See Reviglio,, op. cit. Table J2, P-352 
(2) Post Office Saving Fund, Law No. iI of -197 , 
Article 4 
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towards the others. In addition to creating public confidence, the Law 
also provides two forms of financial incentives aiming at encouraging 
the POSF: (a) excluding all the fund's activities from government fees 
and, (b) exempting interest earned on deposits held with the Fund from 
income tax. 
(') 
The extent to which this has been effective in mobilising 
savings will be now examined. 
Table 9.5 demonstrates that the POSF has been active in extending 
the network of its offices throughout the country. The number of offices 
rose steadily from only 24 in 1974 to 87 by July 1978, with the largest 
increase being experienced in areas outside Amman. The relative share 
of Amman's offices declined gradually during the whole period,, reaching 
21% of total branches by July 1978, as compared with 42% when the POSF 
commenced operations in 1974. In absolute terms, the number of offices 
operatingin areas other than Amman increased more than five times 
(rising from only 14 to 69))whereas Amman's offices were less than 
doubled (increasing from 10 to 18) during the period. Such an expansion 
was instrumental in attracting new depositors as reflected in the steady 
rise in their number, which reached 42,223 by July 1978 as compared with 
only 7,308 in 1974. 
Given the minimum deposit acceptable by-the POSF of half a Jordanian 
Diner, the above noticeable increase in the number of depositors did 
not necessarily lead to an equally important rise in deposits. The same 
table shows that although deposits mobilised from the public increased 
more than 18 times during the period under study, these deposits were 
still very small, not exceeding JD 1.50 million by. July 1978. This figure 
represented only less than 0.5% of private sector's dep'osits-mob-ilised. by 
the commercial banks. 
(2) 
The fact that post office savings facilities 
Ibid., Article 10 
(2) Interest paid by the POSF was competitive with that paid by commercial 
banks. In an attempt to attract further resources., the PQSF raised 
the interest rate three times since its existence. It was, firstlyg, 
increased from 4% to 5% in 1975v then to 5Y, ) in 1976 and, finally, 
to 6% in 1977. 
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were mainly introduced to encourage the savings of low-income groups 
led to the holding of a large number of small accounts, which is reflected 
in the small average of deposit held by each customer (i. e. JD 25). 
The limited size of savings attracted by the PO, ', F clearly demonstrates 
its weak position amongst other financial intermediaries as a channel 
for mobilising funds. However, the significance of this institution 
should not only be judged on quantitative terms, but also the qualitative 
aspect of its activity should be taken into consideration. The geograph- 
ical expansion of branches and their accessibility to the public must 
have encouraged the saving habit among small savers. The extention of 
activities to villages and remote areas of the country must. have attracted 
a large number of customers, with small savings, who were not used to 
dealing with financial intermediaries. According to statistics obtained 
directly from the POSF, about 6G% of the post office savings facilities 
in 1978 were located in small villages where other ordinary financial 
institutions hardly existed. The success of the POSF in attracting 
new customers was shown by the rise, albeit-slowly, in the percentage 
of depositors to total population throughout the whole peiod. Table 
9.5 shows that whereas only 0.3% of the total population had access to 
the saving facilities provided by post offices in 1974, this percentage 
rose to 1.576 by July 1978. Despite-this., however, the population covered 
by the POSF was still small compared to other developing countries with 
effective postal savings systems . In Malaysia, for example, the number 
of depositors who had access to post office savings facilities comprised 
15% of total population. 
(') 
R. Emer7, The FinancialInstitutions of South East Asia -A Countr 
bV-Countr_V-Stu (London: Praeger Special Studies, 1970) P-333. 
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Since the funds deposited with the POSF were small in size, this 
institution was consequently unable to provide considerable amounts of 
development finance. Table 9.6 demonstrates this fact, showing that 
capital market assets hold by the POSF accounted for_J. D 1.4.2 million 
by July 1978,, a figure less than 1% of the total assets available in 
the Jordanian Exchange. 
(') 
However, the pattern of theýPOSF resource 
allocation indicated a clear preference towards holding capital market 
assets, which absorbed 85.3% of its total resources in July 1978 
(cash 
and deposit held with other banks formed only 4.91o). This pattern of 
investment reflected the relatively stable-nature of the POSF's liabi-Ii- 
ties represented in saving deposits (which claimed 90.3% of total resources), 
the remaining percentage being advances from the government. Given the 
favourable position of capital market assets in the investment portfolio 
of the POSF,, it can be said that this institution is expected to play 
an important role in capital market activities once sufficient resources 
are mobilised from the Public. 
Chapter 10 now concludes this survey of the non-bank financial 
sector with an analysis of the Amman Financial Market. 
See footnote (1) P. 297 
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CHAPTER 10 
THE AMMAN FINANCIAL MARKET 
The significance of a stock exchange for a countr7's economic 
development lies on its potential role as a catalyst by which the 
long-term savings of the community can be converted into productive 
real investment. 
0) 
Given this i=lortant function, many developing 
countries have emphasisea the development'of a domestic secýrities 
market as an instrument for promoting growth, without sometimes proper 
examination of the expected benefits and opportunity costs th 
I at thiý' 
process-., may involve, particularly as the benefits accompanying the 
introduction of such institutions in developing countries can be greatli 
limited by the prevalence of an underdeveloped economic and financial 
environment. 
(2) 
This chapter attempts to examine and assess the recent 
introduction of a domestic stock exchange in Jordan. 
As is the general case in developing countries, Jordan's Stock 
Exchange followed a supp3, v-leading pattern of evolution, and was n; rther 
encouraged by goverment legislation and promotional polibies. The' 
necessity of introducing such a specialized institution was repeatedly 
emphasized by development planners. ' as shown by the'; eountr7ts three 
David Williamst "The Growth of Capital and Securities Markets"j 
Finance and Development (September 1966) P. 214 I 
(2) Wai and Patrick "Stock and Bond Issues and Capital Markets in 
Less Developed Countries", IMF Staff Pýpers (JulY 1973) P. 254 
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development'plahs of 1964,1973, and 1976. Although the creation of, 
a domestic securities market was recommended in the 7 Year Plan as, 
early as 1964, the actual establishment of this institution took, place. 
only in 1976, when a. special law creating the Amman, Financial Market 
(AFM) was passed. This delay raises a number of issues to which answers- 
must be sought 
-(I) WHY WAS THE CREATION OF 
A DOMESTIC, CAPITAL MARKET SO-, 
PROLONGED? 
In recommending the creation of a domestic capital market, the 
7 Year Plan of 1964 noted: 
ýI.. I iz 
*. *"considering the state of recent economic and financial development 
in Jordan, serious efforts must be made to encourage and accelerate 
the growth of a capital market in the country. Although the 
development of such an institution is essentially, a, slow process, 
its early establishment would be instrumental in orienting Jordan's 
financial structure to the long-term growth requirements and potent- 
ialities of the economy. "(1) 
The Plan stated that such a market should be established before January 
1966. However, whether the above recommendation was a rational one needs 
to be examined with particular reference to the stage of economic and 
financial development attained by the country at that time. 
Important studies have been undertaken by many economists to 
examine the constraints and the conditions necessary for the introduction 
(2) 
of a capital market in the particular environment of a developing economy, 
One such study by Arolow outlines some of the necessary pre-conditions 
for a reasonably workable capital market to emerge in a developing 
'(3) These are related to both sides of the market: the supply economy, 
of capital market instruments by various deficit units, and the demand 
Jordan Development Board, The 7 Year Programme For Economic 
-Development. L op. cit. P-345.1 1 
(2) See: Edward Arolow.. "The Development of Capital Markets in Africa, 
with Particular Reference to Kenya and Nigeria% W Staff Papers, 
(July 1971) PP. 420-469; George Maniatis,, "Reliability of the, Eguities 
Market to Finance Industrial Development in Greece". Economic 
. Development and Cultural Change 
(Vol, 19 for 1970-71),, PP-598-620; 
and Wai & Patrick, op. cit. PP. 253 - 302. 
(3) Arolow, op. cit'. P. 423. 
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for them made by different surplus units. On the supply side, 'there-' 
should be a large supply of securities and new issues available on a 
regular basis. On the demand side, there'has-to be (a) a fair-degree of 
monetization of an economy to permit a suirficient'inflow of savings"'in-l' 
financial forms. . (b) There is-a need fcr a certain degree of'sophistic- 
ation of behaviour among investors, which directs their, investments" ' 
towards holding long-term financial instruments vis-a-vis physical assets 
and short-term monetary assets. In addition to supply and-demand ý- 
factors, Arolow added a further condition that, a, network of financial 
institutions must be either in existence, or developed in"order to 
facilitate and promote capital--market activities, 
To what extent were these forces of supply and demand sufficient 
in Jordan to introduce a domestic capital market immediately following 
the recommendation of the 7 Year Plan? - During'1964-- 1972,, there was an 
obvious lack-of adequate statistics and information, which made'the task 
of examining any actual or latent forces of supply and demand extremely 
difficult. For example,, to reveal the size-of potential'supplies of 
capital market assets, statistics pertaining to the number ofýcompanies, 
type-of ownership (whether. private or public shareholding companies), - - 
and financial statements revealing-their'capital structure and methoas-ý- 
of financing were conspicuously lacking. -Therefore, it is necessary to 
resort to general, though less accurate, indicators-to, fulfil the purpose. 
-On the supply side, the'structure of the-, Jordanianýeconomy,, with, ý'its 
very-narrow industrial base-appeared to minimise the, opportunity'for, 
offering volumes of securities sufficient to-operate a reasonablyýworkable 
capital market. Clearly, a relatively extensive industrial foundztioný 
usually offers a wide scope for the supply, of-capital market assets, to 
finance-expansion; whereas on the other hand, the predominance of agric- 
ulture (with relatively small-scale producers and a high self-finance 
element) minimises the scope for potential supply of corporate securities. 
(1) See Arolow, op. cit. P. 427, and Maniatis, op. cit. P. 600. 
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Jordan's manufacturing sector was still at an early stage of development, 
contributing only 9.2%o to GDP in 1964, whereas, agriculture's relative 
share accounted for about 25%... The weak industrial base of the country 
continued to prevail throughout the period under review, with an average 
relative contribution, from industry of only 10.7%. Not only was the 
opportunity for issuing corporate shares circumscribed by the countr7ls 
narrow industrial structure, but the type of ownership of industrial 
concerns also worked to minimise the potential supply of such assets. 
A characteristic feature of Jordanian companies was that they were either 
family-owned or private shareholding enterprises, both of which did not 
offer their. shares for public subscription.. Although statistics to 
support this fact are not available, figures. issued at the close of the 
period (1972) showed the relatively small number of public shareholding 
companies, 
--which 
were able to offer stocks to the investing public. Only 
72 out of the existed 2,671 Jordanian companies were publicly owned with 
share, capital of a mere JD 44-53 million. 
(') 
The scope for the-supply of capital market assets was also narrowed 
by serious political instability during this period, which adversely 
influenced the rate of economic growth, -and, subsequently,,. the potential- 
ities for raising capital to finance expansion. 'All development projects 
included in the 7 Year, Programme were-suspended following the.. 1967 War 
and the subsequent-Israeli occupation of the West Bank. Continuous 
political unrest in the-country. - which culminated in the. civil war, of, 
1970, further added to the serious-deterioration in-'economic activity. 
This wasýreflected in a slow or, negative rate of, growth, in GDP during- 
(1) Ministr7 of Econozy, Companies Control Division, Second and-Third 
, Annual Report of Jordanian Companies. 1972 - 197310 (Amman- Co-operative 
Press Workers Society) P. 56 kArabio). 
I-. 1. 
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this period as shown by Table 10.1. Thus, given the aforementioned 
structural characteristics of the Jordanian economy,, together with a 
slow rate of economic growth and a high degree of political instability, 
it can be safely said that the potential supply of securities was not 
enough to create a viable operative stock exchange in the countr7. 
As indicators of the demand for capital market assets, four approaches 
can be used as shown in Table 10.1 .- 
(1) Private Sector's Savings/W ratio indicates the ability of indiv- 
iduals to accumulate savings out of their income (which can be-possibly ., 
used for purchasing securities). 
(2) The Monetization ratio reflects the degree to which the eoonoqr 
is monetized (which is important to permit and facilitate the accumulat- 
ion of savings in financial forms), 
(3) Quasi money/M2 ratio gives an indication of the degree of 
sophistication of investors and their willingness to hold long-term 
financial assets vis-a-vis short-term assets. 
Finally,, the relative importance of individuals' holdings of 
government bonds In total bonds outstand reflects people's preference 
to invest in more advanced forms of wealth (represented in capital market 
assets). 
The same table also reveals the weak potential aemand for securities 
as reflected in the small proportion of total incomes allocated to Savings. 
Throughout the period 1964 - 1972, the ratio of private sector-.. savings 
to GNP was low, averaging around 13.4%. This situation was similar to 
the general experience of less developed countries where people managed 
to save anannual average of 131'a of totai-income during -1 %0 1966- a 9 
much lower ratio than the 21% experienced in the more advanced countries* 
A. Kamarck, "African Economic Development: Problems and Prospects"y 
African Report (Washington: Jan. 1969) Vol. 14, PP. 16-18. (cited by 
Arolow, op. cito P. 425). 
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Clearly, the low levels of incomes in Jordan, as well as in other 
developing countries, made it very difficult for individuals to save a 
sufficient part of their incomes and then divert it into financial 
investments. 
. Taking the monetization ratio as an indicator of the degree to 
which the economy permitted the accumulation of financial savings (at 
the expense of holding wealth in non-financial forms).. Jordan showed 
noticeable progress in this area. The Jordanian monetization ratio 
averaged around 4e/o throughout the period under review, rising from 
33.4% in 1964 to 55.7% in 1972. This was higher than any ratio achieved 
by the 31 African countries included in Arolow's study, in which Egypt 
recorded the highest ratio of 39-5%-(') However, whereas achieving a high 
monetization ratio allows for further accumulation of savings in 
financial forms, this does not necessarily mean that such savings are 
made available for capital market activities. A large part of the mone- 
tized assets may be held in short-term, liquid forms, which do not increase 
the demand for capital market instruments. This was the general case 
in Jordan as reflected in the last two indicators, which clearly 
revealed the investment psychology among Jordanians, who exhibited 
a strong liquidity preference and risk-aversion that dominated the 
pattern. -of their financial investment during this period. 
As typical individual investment behaviour in a developing country, 
Jordanians' investment portfolio during this period placed a high emphasis 
upon liquidity, and showed extreme reluctance towards holding long-term,, 
risky financial assets. The investment attitude of the mass of savers 
remained traditional, in the sense of preferring forms of assets that 
involved a high degree of safety and liquidity, rather than investing 
Arolow, op. cit. P. 424 
jo 
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their savings in more sophisticated and risky forms of wealth. Wai 
and Patrick pointed out that such extremely cautious investment behaviour 
is inherited in the particular environment of a developing country, and 
can be changed only gradually during the course of economic and financial 
(1) 1 development. As an economy grows, sequential phases of financial 
development occur: firstly, the monetization of economic activities 
takes place at the expense of barter and, secondly, the commercial banking 
system emerges as the main source of financial activity and then, finally, 
a speciaiised, network of different long-term financial institutions 
develops and expands to dominate the financial structure. To-day's 
developing countries have not yet reached the finalstage of financial 
development that has been attained by developed countries. Thus, the 
absence of relatively active institutional machinery dealing in long- 
term financial instruments narrows the opportunity for developing such 
assets. The largest part of individuals' financial savings are kept in 
liquid forms, either in cash hoarding or in deposits with commercial banks. 
Moreover, the low level of incomes prevailing in these countries further, in- 
tensifies liquidity preference among the investing public. As circumstances 
change during the development process (due mainly to rising per capita 
incomes and expanding financial institutions), investors' behaviour 
gives less importance to liquidity and greater weight to yield, thus 
shifting towards investment in risky and long-term capital market 
instruments. 
(2) 
Thus, the relatively small degree of economic as well as financial 
development attained by the country, and continuous political instability 
experienced during this period, worked together to intensify the willing-7 
ness of Jordanians to hold their financial wealth in liquid forms. 
(1) Wai and Patrick, op. cit. PP. 276-280 
(2) Ibid. 
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The. small contribution of quasi-money to total money. 'supply (averaging 
around 21.8%) was a clear reflection of, liquidity preference'among ,' 
Jordanians who were averse to holding a considerable proportion-of their 
financial assets in forms other than currency and demand deposits. 
Another indicator of the dominance of the short-term element in'the 
domestic investment portfolio was the relatively limitea're-sponse- 
shown by the public to hold the long-term government development bonds, 
which were first introduced in 1971. As a proportion of total government 
debt outstanding, individuals' holdings averaged around 5.7% during, the 
two years 1971 and 1972. This was a small percentage, especially as 
compared with the following period through which the public exhibited a 
rising willingness to invest in such long-term assets. '' 
The above analysis clearly ýreveals, that ýneither the supply of mor 
the demand for securities was sufficient to operate a rea6onably workable 
stock exchange in Jordan during the period 1964 - 1972. The recommendation 
of the 7 Year Plan to establish a domestic stock exchange'by January 
1 1%6 did not appear to be a realistic one, given the stage of economic 
and financial development attained by the country at that time; The 
1964 Plan asked the already established Central, Bank, together with other 
governmental departments, to prepare for the implementation of the stock 
exchange programme. 
(') 
Such a recommendation came at a time when the 
Central Bank had just started operations, and when it itself needed 
expertise and qualified personnel operatives. However, the failure to 
respond to the Plan's recommendation was not only related to the fact 
that such a recommendation was too ambitious, but it was also explained 
Jordan Development Board, 7 Year Programme for Economic Development, 
OP-cit. P-345. 
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by the 1967 War which'suspended the implementation-of the Plan, itself. 
The-deteriorating economic conditions were excacerbated by further, politi- 
cal upheavals which added, to the-difficulty-of introducing-important 
institutional developments in the country. 
It was only in 1973 that a'-relative degree of'political stability 
permitted a new era of planning economic development with the launching 
of the 3 Year Plan. This Plan was more realistic than its precursor 
as regards introducing a domestic capital market since it asked the 
Central Bank to study and look into the possibility of operating such 
a market, rather than fixing a date for its creation as recommended 
by the previous Plan. However, serious studies started only in 1976, 
when the 5 Year Plan further required the Central Bank to expedite 
efforts to establish a domestic stock exchange with the assistance of 
specialised international agencie's. 
(2 
Following this, a mis3ion from 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) visited Jordan, upon the request 
of the Governor of the Central Bank, during 1976 to study the possibility 
of creating such a specialised institution in the Jordanian environment. 
Studies prepared by the Central Bank, with the help of the mission's 
expertise, showed that the rising number of corporate enterprises, and 
the noticeable economic progress achieved by the Jordanian econonq in 
7 (3) 
recent years, justified the setting-up of a domestic stock exchange. 
The IFC estimated a rough volume of JD 200 million in securities outstan- 
ding by 1980, a figure which was considered adequate to warrant the 
establishment of a light institutional structure for the securities 
market, 
(4) 
Thus, in June 1976, the'provisionall'Law No. 31 was issued to 
provide the general framework for the operations of the AFM. 
(5) 
A 
(1) National Planning Council, 3 Year Development Plan, op. cit. P. 46_ 
(2) 5 Year Development Pla v P-71 n op. cit. 
(3) Hashem Sabbagh, "Amman Financial Market: Role and Objectives". op. cit. P. I. 
Gerard de. La Fortelle, -"F#aneial-Intermediation in Jordaný-A. Desk 
Survey",, (IFC: August 1976) P-36 1 
(5) Official Gazette, Amman Financial Market Law No. ji, (Am n: June 1, 
1976) No. 2629. 
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preparatory stage of further 18 months was necessary for the Exchange to 
start activity, which effectively took place in -TanuarY 1978. However, 
whether the changing economic as well as financial circumstances 
reasonably Justified this institidtional change needs to be examined. 
(2) DID THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS CHANGE IN FAVOUR OF 
SETTING-UP A DOMESTIC STOCK EXCHANGE? 
In order to answer this question, the supply and demand analysis 
employed earlier will be used together with relevant statistics that are 
available for the period since 1973 and can be used as indicators of 
the potential sources of supply and demand on the Jordanain Exchange, 
The same table (10.1) reveals noticeable changes in both supply 
and demand factors in favour of establishing the AFM,, as compared with 
the previous period. As far as the potential supply of securities is 
concerned, all the ratios used show encouraging signs. Throughout the 
period 1973 - 1977, the annual rate of growth in GDP averaged around 
16. Vo as compared with 7.4%. in the previous period, a clear indication 
that a higher degree of economic growth accompanied the implementation 
of development plans. - This subsequently, increased the-potential supply 
of securities to finance-eoonomic expansion. The.. economy 
_also 
experienced 
a relative structural change in favour of the manufacturing'. sector at the 
expense of the agricultural sector - another indication of rising opportu- 
nities to issue corporate securities. The table also shows that while 
the percentage GDP share of manufacturing output rose from an average 
of 10.7% to 16.4% during the two periods, the relative share of agriculture 
dropped noticeably from 2(ra to 12.5%. Not only was there a change in the 
countr7's industrial structure,, but there was also a change in the 
organisation of Jordanian companies which encouraged cap I ital miiket 
development. Although adequate information pertaining to type of owner- 
ship of Jordanian enterprises and theirmethods of financing were still 
lacking, recent published statistics revealed the rising significance of 
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the Jordanian corporate sector -a development that was necessary to 
widen the scope for issuing long-term financial instruments. ' Table 10, '2- 
demonstrates that the subscribed capital of public shareholding companies 
registered at the AFM when'it co=enced operations accounted for JD, 
144.91 million, an increase of at least JD 100.88 million . 'On the ,*- 
1972 level. 
(') 
Theexpanding corporate sector accompanied the implemen- 
tation of various development projects implied by both plans of 1973 
and 1976. This was made evident by the fact that out of the 67 public 
shareholding companies listed at the AFM by June 1978,39 companies 'were 
established after 1972. 
(2 ) 
This, together with the encouraging changes, 
in the aforementioned supply indicators, clearly indicated a noticeable 
increase in the potential supply of capital market assets during the 
second period under review. 
Table 10.2 Development in the Sub-3cribea 
Capital of Jordanian Public Shareholding 
Companies Between 1972 and 1977 
1972 1973 1977* Changes 
72 - 77 
Subscribed Capital (JDN) 44-53 52,00 14J+, 91 100-38 
Source: AFM 
*Figures for 1977 pertaining only to companies registered at the AFM with 
paid-in capital of JD 100,000 and above. 
As far as the demand for such assets was concerned, all the demand 
factors employed earlier worked to promote the emergence of the AFM, as ,' 
(1) The total increase in the subscribed capital should be more 'than this 
figure since only companies with a paid-in capital of JD 100,000 and 
above each were allowed to register at the AFM. 
(2) AFM, Unpublished Statistics. 
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compared with their ins ignif icant impact during the previous period., 
Jordanians were able to save more of their incomes --the, _private-sector's 
savings/GNP ratio increased froman average-of 13.4,54 during 1964 - 1972 
to 16.6% during 1973 - 1977. The ability to'accumulate'such savings in 
financial forms was also increased as-shown by the rise in the monetiz- 
ation ratio which increased from, an average of 48/'o- to M% between the 
two periods. Moreover,, investmentýbehaviour of Jordanians-exhibited a 
change in favour of holding long-term financial assets:. firstly,, -the 
ratio of quasi-money to total money supply rose, on, average,, -from 21.8% 
to 27.5% and, secondly, the relative importance of-individualsl-holdings 
of government bonds reached an, average of 21.3% of total bonds out- 
standing, as compared with mere 5.7%, during, the previousýperiod. 
Clearly, the above analysis-favoured-the emergence of the-AFM as 
is shown by the historical-development of factors indicating-the 
potential supply of securities and the demand for them throughout-two 
distinct phases of economic development, covering-14 years. Theýcreation 
of such an institution appeared to be necessary to institutionalise- 
individuals' savings in long-term forms-and then make them, available. - 
for financing-the expanding corporate sector. However, -the actual, 
performance of, the. AFM once it was established might not have been in 
line with what was, envisaged. The-actual levelsýofsupply and demand-, 
could have been so limited that the net benefits accrued to the economy 
by. establishing the AFM would be negligeable. ', This will now be revealed 
through examining the size of the AFM and levels of trading activity 
during one year of operations, and by comparison with relevant-experiences 
in other-developed, and developing countries. 
(3) ONCE IT-WAS-ESTABLISHED, WHAT LEVEL OF ACTIVITY DID THE AFM 
CREATE AND HOW DID THIS COMPARE WITH OTHER COUNTRIES? 
Table 10.3 demonstrates that trading activities on the AFM, in 
terms of both number and value,, grew noticeably throughout 1978. The 
number of transactions totalled 858 in December as compared with 251 in 
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January, whereas the value of transactions rose from only JD 153tOOO 
to JD 603, ooo during the same period. Activity on the Exchange reached 
its peak during the second quarter of the year, when the number of trans- 
actions rose to 2,651 with a total value of JD 29050#000. This could 
be related to the rising popularity of the AFM as reflected in the increase 
in both the number of companies whose shares were traded in the market and 
in the total number of shares traded. The former rose from 39 to 54 
wh4reas the latter increased from 286 to 944 between the first and 
second quarters of the year. However, the volume of activity on the 
AFM during the remaining two quarters experienced a relative decline as 
compared with their levels in the second quarter. The value of shares 
traded dropped to JD 1,, 279,, 000 during the thiiýd quarter but again rose 
to JD 1,646,000 in the last quarter. Throughout 
_the, 
whole yýar,, total 
transactions on the AFM nunbered 8,398 with an aggregate value of 
JD 5,618,, 000. This gave an average value of JD 669 per transaction. 
When capital market experiences in other countries were taken 
into consideration, the AFM appeared to be small in size and inactive 
in transactions compared to developed as well as developing countries. 
The comparison was made easier by the interesting comparative study 
of W&i and Patrick, which provided useful statistics pertaining to 
capital market development in a large number of countries. 
(') 
Important 
stock exchange relationships indicating the size of the market and the 
degree of activity in-both developed and developing countries are shown 
in Table 10.4 together withýthe corresponding figures of the Jordanian 
Market. -As far-as-size was-concerned, all adopted measures-clearly, - 
showed the thinness of capital markets in developing countries (sample 
of 25) in comparison to their counterparts in developed countries 
(sample_of 20). Moreover, three oUt of the four employed measures 
indicated the narrowness of the AFM, even when compared with the situation 
in-developing countries. This was obvious in the first measure reflecting 
(1) Wai and Patrick, op. cit. 
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the average number of companies listed, which accounted for 644 in 
developed countries, 172 in developing countries, and only 66 in Jordan. 
When relating the volume of transactions and the value of capital listed 
to macro-economic and monetary variables, two measures also indicate 
the small size of the AFM compared to developing (as well as developed) 
countries. The table shows that whereas the value of transactions on 
the Jordanian Exchange accounted for only 1% of GNP,, transactions/GNP 
ratios were 3.2% in developing countries and 12.3% in developed countries. 
When the ratio of capital listed to M2 was taken as a measure, the above 
same result was obtained - the Jordanian ratio formed 25.3; - as compared 
with respective ratios of 52.1% and 217.6% in developing and developed 
countries. It was only when the ratio of capital listed, to GNP was 
employed as an-incLicator of size that the Jordanian figure yielded a 
slightly higher ratio than what experienced in developing countries but 
was, of course, much less than that of the developed countries. The 
table makes it clear that while the volume of capital listed on the 
AFM comprised about one fifth of GNP,, the general experience of developing 
countries shows a, corresponding figure of only one seventh. Both figures 
are much smaller than that experienced in the developed countries as 
a whole, where the value'of capital listed on their respective exchanges 
is equivalent to the amount of their GNP. 
Moreover, the AFM exhibited a low degree of activity as compared 
with the situation in developed and developing countries. This is 
clearly indicated by the turnover figures of outstanding securities, 
ratios which also reflected the popularity of stocks as an assetý- and 
their speculative use. 
0) 
The same table demonstrates that while the 
Jordanian turnover ratio accounted for 5.1. the corresponding ratios 
for developed and developing countries averaged around 25.2 and 20.4 
respectively, w- Although this meant that the turnover figures of outstanding 
securities in developing countries showed lower rates compared to 
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developed countries, these results should be accepted with-some'reservation 
because they represent only the genergL1 situation of countries as groups, 
and do not necessarily reflect individual experiences. 7For example, 
if developing countries are divided into, sub-groups, Asian-countrie's 
show a high turnover ratio of, 41.6'- , which is much above, the-25.2 ratio 
experienced in developed countries as a whole, -Such a high figure- 
reflects, to a-great extent, substantial speculations in-marq Asian 
capital markets, such asýin. Korea and, China. - where their, respective turn- 
over ratios recorded very high levels of 63 and 60 during-theýperiod- 
1964-- 1971.0)ý ý As shown by the table, -the Jordanian turnover figure 
of 5.1 is close to the ratio of 6.5 experienced, in a group of African 
and Middle Eastern countries. However,, the, relatively low degree, of 
activity on the AFM, as compared with-the general-situation in both 
developed and developing countries, -is a clear sign, of (a), less popu-- 
latity of the stocks traded-as a type of-asset among'oth-er, alternative 
forms and (b) less speculative use of such assets, Both factors worked 
to reduce, the degree of trading on theýJordanian-Exchange. The first 
factor reflects a continuous weak demand fcr capital-market assets and- 
their unfamiliarity among Jordanians,, as-will-be now discussed. The 
second factor indicates-the-goneral--investment-behaviourýof the-investing 
public in Jordan, who held stocks as an-investment rather than for 
speculation-purposes., It is believed that, as in. manykdeveloping 
countries,, 
(2) 
the majority of Jordanian purchasers'of-stocks-keeptthese 
assets "for the long haul", as another means of holding-wealth, rather 
than for speculating on them on the Market floor. - This situationýsome- 
times led to the absence of a particular stock in the Market where 
potential buyers faced difficulty in, finding sellers even at*good prices. 
(1) Wai and Patrick, op. cit. P. 271 and 317. 
(2) This seems to-be the case: in many developing countries where the 
speculative motive is less important in holding capital market assets. 
See: Arolowp OP-cit. P. 4.68; and Emery, op. cit. P. 607. 
329 
(4) WH]f WAS THE AFM COMPARATIVELY SMALL IN SIZE AND. INACTIVE 
IN TRADING AS COMPARED WITH 1rS'COUNTERPARTS IN BOTH DEVELOPED 
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES? 
The comparatively small size of the AFM and the low degree of 
trading activity on its floor could be partly related to the newness, 
of this-institution, which has been operating only since January 1978. 
The previous indicators employed to measure size and activity are not 
ideal bases'for comparison between the short experience of the Jordanian 
Exchange with that of the older. capital markets that have been in 
business for many years. 
(')- 
The, time factor is particularly important 
in comparative studies of capital markets because, the development of 
such institutions is a gradual process through which, they gain. increasing 
popularity from both the suppliers of securities and those who demand 
them. Apart from this reason,. however, -the thinness of the, AFM is 
explained by many factors, which can be grouped again under the forces 
of supply and demand. As discussed below, the, relative limited supply 
of long-term instruments in the Market, and the weak demand made for 
them are the main obstacles hindering the-development of, the AFM. ,_ 
Revealing these hindrances is necessary for recommending. certain official 
policy measures to foster and assist. both sides, of., the Exchange.. 
On the'supply side, the development of the AFM was restricted by 
the limited scope for financial instruments offered to the public, 
Although the AFMIs Law accepted dealings in all financialassets issued 
by the government and other public corporations, 
(2) 
the Market has 
so far been confined to trading in private financial, instruments. - 
However, studies to list public debt-instruments on the Exchange were 
(1) The oldest capital market in the deyeloping countries included - in Wai and Patrick's sample was the Bolsa do Comercio de lima (Peru)p 
which was established in 1860, whereas the newest was the Malay 
Stock Exchange (Malaysia) which started operations in 1970. See Wai 
and Patrick, op. cit. Table 10, P-312. 
(2) Official Gazette., Amman Capital Market Law No. IL op. cit, Article 16. 
330 
undertaken with the assistance of the'Central Bank, but'have, 'not'yet 
been accomplishea. 
( 
Confining traaing to iiivate'financial"iziit-ruments 
has undoubtedly minimised the volume of trafiSactions On the AFM, -end 
thus worked to reduce its size as compared with'otýer'countries iýhere 
the government has played an active supplying role. In a sample of 13 
developing countries employed by Wai'and Patrick, "for example, govern- 
ment debt instruments claimed about 32% of total newýIssues"Of 3e'curities 
listed on their capital markets. 
(2) 
"1 ý ---; ' 
Moreover, even in the private sector, the scope'f6r-'c'apital market 
instruments was, limited only to one form, i. e. equity stocks'. Although 
the Law permitted trading on all debt*instruments'issued by listed 
(3) 
companies, -the Market showed no activity'inisuch initruments" 
because of their complete absence from the, companies"borrowing practice. 
When they-needed external finance; -Jordanian, commercial"and induitrial 
enterprises used to rely on either offering new-capitalishares'or'borrow- 
ing from the banking system, but never-raised medium or long-term fixed-- 
(4) 
interest bonds, The'virtualabsence'of any"type'of"debentures issued 
by4ordanian enterprises accordingly led to further limitation'on the 
scope for financial instruments traded on'the Exchange. 'When'the 5' 
Year Plan of 1976 called upon the authorities to create the AFMI, it also 
(1) Hashim Sabbaghq OP-cit- P-5. 
(2) Wai and Patrick. ' op. cit. Table 8. P-306. 
(3) Official Gazette, Amman Capital Market Law No. '31, op. cit. - Article 16. 
Given the absence of statistics pertaining to capital'-structure of 
industrial and commercial companies in Jordan, it is difficult to 
reveal the financial behaviour of these companies,, and its effects 
on capital market development. This made it impossible to 
calculate some important financial ratios, which can indicate the 
extent to which these companies rely on the capital market to 
finance their expansion e. g. the ratio of external finance to*, *, -'" total funds, equity to debt ratio, etc. ). 
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emphasised the necessityof creating-incentives to promote the supply 
side of the market. 'This wasdone,, '-amongst other things., by encouraging'ý 
domestic enterprises to issue debt instruments, in the form of long- 
term debentures to diversify and increase the supply of instruments 
offered to'the public, 
(') 
However., it will be shown that,. in order,, to 
create a viable market in private fixe'd-interest'securities. -the 
governmint (through the Central Bank)-should adjust the prevailing 
low interest rates to realisticlevels-in order, to enable private 
enterprises'to offer attractive bonds to the interested public. 
On'the demand side, demand for securities remained relatively weak 
which per se worked to narrow the size and limit-the*degree of'activity 
in transactions. Although this situation was partly a reflection of the 
weakness in the supply side, since Jordanian investors were faced with 
a na=ow array of instruments in which to invest, the demand side itself 
was insufficient to induce active trading on the Market. Whereas 
the weakness in the demandside could be generally attributed to the 
previously mentioned limitations which prevailed, though to different 
degrees, in developing countries (relatively low incomes and savings, 
liquidity preference,, eto. ), the absence of active institutional investors 
in the AFM further helped to keep the demand for securities at low 
levels. Statistics showing the type of investor in securities were not 
published by the AFM, but some indications clearly revealed the small 
influence of institutional investors in promoting the demand side of the 
Jordanian Exchange. In an active stock exchange, normally, capital market 
institutions (such as'contractual saving intermediaries, mutual funds, 
and investment and unit-trusQ-constitute the major source of demand 
for securities; -due mainly to the nature of their--longý-term! finanoial 
obligationsi In Jordan,, the limited resources ofsome of these institutions, 
(I ) National Planning Council, 5 Year Plan, OP-cit. P-71. 
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and the complete absence of others, helped to weaken the demand side 
of the AFM: firstly, insurance companiesand the Pension Fund were shown 
to have a limited role in holding capital market assets(') and, secondlyp 
specialised capital market institutions dealing in long-term financial 
instruments (mutual funds, investment companies, etc. ) were still non- 
existent in the Jordanian Exchange. These-institutions, together with 
contractual savings intermediaries, are the ones that give breadth, 
flexibility, and efficiency to the capital market. 
(2) 
The introduction, 
and promotion of these institutions will be shown necessary for active 
operations on the AFM. 
WHAT BENEFITS DID THE AFM OFFER TO THE ECONOMY AND WHAT 
WERE THE OPPORTUNITY COSTS INVOLVED IN ITS PROMOTION? 
So far, the above analysis has revealed the trading activities on 
the AFM and the factors hampering its development,, but what benefits 
accrued to the economy from the creation of such a specialisea institution, 
and what were the opportunity costs involved in promoting its activities? 
In general, it is difficult to provide a clear-cut answer to this kind 
(3) 
of question. Only society can decide on a matter such as this. 
This is made even more difficult in the Jordanian case, since the very 
short life of the AFM precludes the possiblity of reaching a judgement 
on its net developmental impact. Nevertheless, an attempt will be made 
to indicate an approach within which an answer can be tentatively given. 
To obtain the net benefits offered by the AFM, consideration of 
This was mainly as a result of the small resources obtained by the 
-former and the recent creation of the latter. 
(2) David William, op, cit. P. 215. 
Wai and Patrick noted that while only Society, could decide whether 
the net benefits were worthwhile, successful experiences of capital 
markets (such as in Brazil) yielded considerable benefits which 
made the above question easy to answer. See Wai and Patrick, op. cit. P. 298. 
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the opportunity costs implied in creating and-promoting this institution 
must be taken into account. The opportunity'costs may result fromp 
firstly,, shifting the focus of po3icy away from other alternative, 'ways 
of mobilising savings and financing investment and, '-secondly-, forgoing 
government revenues implied by providing fiscal incentives. 
(') 
The 
first form does not seem to be important since financial intermediation 
by other monetary and capital market Institutions continues to be4 
encouraged, and the creation of the AFM tends to'strengthen and diversify 
the intermediary function in-the-Joraanian economy. ' On the other hand, 
the promotion of the AFM'mUSt have-involved someopportunity costs in 
the form of government revenues forgoneý ', ' In order to encourage trading 
on the AFM, the Law abolished stamp duties on share sellingS -To reduce 
the cost of transactions, moreover, 'the Liw'preveiitedýlisted'eompanies- 
from collecting any fees on transferring ownership of'shares. However, 
it U-believed that the effect of such incentives-'is still nominal., 
and for an active promotion of'Ithe AFM, a variety of fiscalýincentives 
(involving larger opportunity costs)'need toýbe taken if the benefits 
of the AFM are to be considerable. 
On the benefits side, 'the short period' , of its'existence, makes it 
difficult to precisely assess the developmental impact of the-AFM, as 
a machinery for institutionalising 'savings and financing investment. It 
is difficult to indicate the influenc-e of the AFM onýraising'the-rates 
of aggregate savings and capital formation national, accountS figures 
revealing both variables have not yet been published for the year 1978, 
in which the AFM'started-toperations. Nevertheless-, one cari"say that the 
narrow base of the AFM, and the low degree of'activity on its flobr. - 
must have minimised the'-'benefits that this institution offered'to the 
econocy. The limited size of transactions - in the AFM meant 
(1) Ibid. 
(2) Wai and Patrick used this measure to reveal the developmental 
impact of the Brazilian Stock Exchange. See Wai and Patrick, 
op. cit. P. 297. 
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that only a small: volume'of savings were transferred through this 
channel towards financing investment. The small intermediary role 
played by the AFM is furtherýillustrated when it is compared with-the' 
role performed by other f inanciaLl 'inte rMe diaries. * Total transactions 
on the Exchange during 1978 comprised only 3% of credit outstanding 
of commercial banks and -rZ of outstanding, credit extended by specialised 
credit institutions. Even the small number'of transactions on the 
Exchange were not all made available for financing new investments since 
the figures included both new issuesýtogether with the previouslyý7: -- 
issued shares. The AFM served as a primary asýwell as a secondary'- 
market but statistics for dealings on each side were not available. 
Although the AFM performed a limited intermediary function., it 
offered, at the same -time, -important benefits In the sense of providing 
an appropriate and safe environment f6r, transacting long-term financial 
instruments. The existence of-the AFM, and the services it offered, 
must have influenced the investment behaviour'of individuals and- 
encouraged them to hold'capital market"assets -a trend which usually 
manifests itself in the-long-tem., ' This favourable impact came about' 
through two main services provided by the AFM: firstly, ''the creation of 
confidence'in share investment and, secondly; the provisiowof licjuidity, -ý 
Undoubtedly, the regulatory'power of the AFM must, have reduced uncertainty 
and risk associated with share, investment, thereby increasing their 
appeal to the public. By requiring listed companies-to'ae'elare their 
financial situations and make this information available to the-interested 
public, the latter's confidence in corporate'shares can be Promoted. 
(')- 
The influence of information flows on encouraging share investment may 
also occur through the regular publication'of share prices on the Market 
floor. This has the effect of minimising the possibility of misplacing 
(1) Any company raises new funds. through the Market must publish 
sufficient financial statistics and information in domestic daily 
newspapers* 
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individuals' savings as a result of misinformation-or-ignorance of 
real situations. Moreover, public confidence is further enhanced by 
the protective power that. the AFM isýequipped with to safeguard investorst 
interests, such as prohibiting manipulation, of-prices-and punishing 
those who indulge themselves in forbidden activities.. On the other hand,, 
the provision of liquidity_for asset holders through secondar7 market 
transactions must have encouraged public preference-for share, investment. 
Prior to the establishment-of the AFM, 'investors-had the opportunity 
to dispose of their shares through personal contact or local brokers 
who dealt-with-share trading as a side business - channels which frequently 
involved noticeable reduction in price, solely because of the need to 
sell. The setting-up of the AFM made it possible for investors to -, 
convert their holdings of-, securities through the Exchange at a reasonable 
price based on actual marketability of-these assets, -, rather thanýbeing 
determined because of-liquidity need. -- 
However, the-small intermediary role, played by the, AFM, represented, 
though to different degrees, a common. feature. of capital marketýexperiences 
in developing countries,, especially-during earlyýstages of development. 
(') 
Available studies of capital markets in developing countries all-reveal 
that the development of these institutions is a long-term, gradual process, 
whereby market securities gain increasing importance, and familiarity- 
from both savers as well as investors. 
(2) 
- Throughout this process, 
economic and financial developments induce changes favouring further 
encouragement of capital market institutions (in-the sense of widening 
the scope of supplied securities and enforcing sources of demand for them). 
It is because of the long-term development and the accompanied future 
benefits that it is difficult (and also unfair) to assess the performance 
and impact of the AFM during its very short history. 
(1) This was the general conclusion made by the previously mentioned 
studies which all emphasised the limited role of these institutions 
as a reliable source of financing investment in developing countries. 
See Wai and Patrick, P-300; Arolow, P. 467; and Maniatis, P. 618. 
(2) Ibid. 
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IS THE AFM FAVOURABLY SITUATED AMONG OTHER COMPETING, 
CENTRES TO SERVE AS A REGIONAL FINANCIAL MARKET IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST? 
Long-term benefits associated with capital market development are 
further expected in the Jordanian case, where goverment regulations- 
appear to encourage the AFM to act as a regional, financial centre in, 
the future, The Foreign Business Control Law was amended in 1978 to 
attract Arab capital towards Jordanian investment, and also toýallow, 
Arab projects to raise capital, in the Jordanian Market. As far as 
attracting funds is concerned, Arab investors (unlike other foreigners) 
are exempted from obtaining the approval of the Prime Minister when 
trading in financial instruments listed on the AFM. 
(') 
Moreover,, Arab 
citizens are allowed to buy listed financial assets with'any'currencyl 
with the unconditional freedom to sell such assets and transfer their 
values abroad. 
(2) 
Onthe other hand, the regulations also aim at. 
providing some facilities for Arab enterprises to raise capital in the. 
Jordanian Exchange. Although trading on the AFM is originally restricted 
to domestic financial instruments, ýthe new regulations permit, other 
Arab countries to raise funds-in the-Jordanian MarketV on the condition 
that these countries should equally allow Jordanian businessmen to 
obtain funds from their territories. 
(3) 
By such measures, obviously., the goverment aimed, -to develop the 
AFM as a regional financial centre, for, Arab countriest especially 
(1) Foreign Business Control Law for 1978p 
, 
Article--3-d--(still 
I unpublished in the official Gazette). 
(2) Ibid. Article 7-C. 
Ibid. Article 11-B. 
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following the outbreak of the civil war in the Lebanon, with the consequent 
elimination of Beirut as key financial centre of the Middle East. 
However, this has also been the policy in Bahrain, the United Arab 
Emirates, Kuwait, Tunisia, Egypt, Iran, together with Greece and'Cyprus; - 
who have all. implemented new legislation-aimed at removing a number of, 
restrictions on foreign investment, and providing larger facilities to 
attract overseas funds. 
(') 
The viability of,, and the, prospects for the 
AFM to play a regional financial role require a deep analysis and a 
comparative study showing the potentialities available-in the Jordanian 
environment., and their adequacy as compared with-the above mentioned 
competing centres, Although this is beyond, the scope of the present 
study, it can be briefly said that the Jordanian, regional financial role 
seems to be potentially less successful as compared to, other countries, 
which have already been active in this field. 'Bahrain and the United 
Arab Emirates have been frequently singled out by financial specialists 
as the strongest catndidates for replacing Beirut in-providing regional 
financial facilities. 
(2) 
Bahrain was the first' to welcome the international 
banking community, where 34 banks obtained-permission to, operate offshore 
business and 18 other banks were allowed to engage in full banking 
operations by 1977.0) The liberal commercial-and-financial laws 
prevailing in Bahrain helped to develop the country into an offshore 
financial centre where international banking units were not subject to 
any taxation on profits or income. 
(4), 
Similar development occurred in 
(1) Thomas Kelen,, "The World of Offshore Finance". The Banker, (April 1977) P-95. 
(2) See the following recent-articles published-in The Banker: -William 
Hall, "Bahrain's Banking Boom% (Jan. 1977) PPeT19__-75; Alan Moore, 
"A Roun&-up of the Financial Centres", (March 77) P2.107-115; Thomas 
Kelen, op. cit - Hikmat Nashashibi, "Regional Involvement for Arab 
Money" (May 7i; PP-33-34. 
(3) Thomas Kelen, OP-cit- P-95. 
00 An offshore financial centre is a place where international financial 
business can be carried on in a fiscally neutral way, i. e. without 
being subject to any domestic foreign exchange control or taxation* 
Bahrain imposes no exchange control or withholding taxes, nor does it 
have any personal or corporate taxes. See Kelen, op. cit. P. 93 & 95. 
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the United Arab Emirates which competed with Bahrain in, attracting offshore 
banking units to foxm the nucleus of a regional financial centre. In 
addition to the fact that this country had similar liberal commercial 
and financial Laws and was equipped with good telecommunication facilities,, 
it represented a potentially richer centre (due to its larger oil income) 
than neighbouring competitor, Bahrain. 
(') 
Commentators have emphasised 
these two countries as the strongest potential rivals. without any 
reference to Jordan. 
(2) 
One can therefore say that the relatively 
less liberal commercial and financial policies in Jordan, together with 
its poor domestic financial resources, compared with the above two 
oil-producing countries, minimise 'the opportunity for, the AFM to assume 
a regional financial centre. The fact that Jordan is a-confrontation 
state with Israel may give the two remote Gulf states further advantages 
over Jordan, in the sense of providing a relatively more stable and 
safe environment for attracting capital. , 
GIVEN THE LIMITED DEVELOPMENTAL IMPACT OF THE-AFM, HOW CAN 
THIS BE IMPROVED AND MT POLICY MEASTJRES NEED TO BE INTRODUCED 
TO MAKE THE NET BENEFITS OF THIS INSTITUTION WORTHWHILE? 
It has already been illustrated that the development of capital 
market institutions is a long-term gradual process that takes place 
during the course of economic and financial development. However, 
such a process could be fostered and hastened by promotional government 
policies that proved effective in other developing countries. Although 
circumstances are differentfrom one country, to another, the similarity 
inthe nature of problems facing capital market aevelopment-in developing 
economies (resting on supply and demand forces) makes it possible to 
(1) Kathleen Bishtawi', "Caution The Catchword'in UAE Banking n. The 
Banke . 
(March 1978) P. 69 
(2) Nashashibi, however, emphasised that Kuwait, Bahrain, and Cairo 
can potentially assume three different but complementary financial 
markets in the Middle East. He illustrated that while Kuwait 
is clearly developing as "in-to-out" financial centre for the regionp 
and Bahrain as "out-to-out" centre, Cairo is gradually progressing 
towards a centre attracting Arab capital for domestic development. 
i. e. "out-to-W centre. See H. Nashashibip OP-cit- P-34. 
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benefit-, from some successful innovation undertaken by other countries in 
this field. The weakness of the AFM was shown to manifest itself in 
the limited supply of long-term financial instruments and the insufficient 
demand made upon them. The proposed measures help to strengthen both 
sides of the Exchange, with the aim of increasing the volume of transac- 
tions and thus enlarging the benefits that this institution may offer 
to the economy. These measures are briefly discussed here. A fuller 
discussion on each point raised below will be found in the accompanying 
footnote references, 
FirstjV. Fiscal Measures. 
The government can substantially improve the supply as well as the 
demand sides of the AFM by increasing the attractiveness of capital 
market assets,, for both their issuers and their buorers, On the supply 
side, the government can further encourage the emergence of joint-stock 
companies (with widespread ownership of their equity capital) through 
tax incentives favouring this type of enterprise against normal and 
private shareholding companies. The Jordanian tax system subjeCýts all 
shareholding companies to a unified income tax rate of 35% on profit,, 
without differentiating between private and public . shareholding companies. 
(') 
By providing tax concessions for domestic companies to go public, the 
supply side of the AFM can be strengthened by offering further corporate 
shares to the investing public. 
(2) 
On the demand side, tax policies may serve as a strong stimulus 
for individuals to hold the AFM assets. Although the Jordanian tax 
system encourages holdings of such assets in the sense of exempting 
(3) 
from tax the czp ital gains that may accrue from the sale of securities, 
(1) Hani Abou Gebara,, Income Tax In Jordan (Amman: Royal Scientific 
Society Press, 197167 -POT. -In-j7a-bio. 
(2) This was successfully experienced in Brazil, where the tax 'structure 
discriminates clearly against private companies. See Wai and Patrickq 
op. cit. P. 295. 
Hani Abou Gebara, opcit. P. 22. 
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nevertheless, there is ample room for the effective use of tax policy to 
further influence asset preference of the investing public in favour of 
long-term financial instruments. Among a wide array of successful 
measures undertaken by developing countries, two are of special relevance 
to Jordan. 
(1) 
(a) A substantial tax benefit to purchasers of securities can be 
provided by deducting from gross taxable income a certain proportion 
of the cost of purchasing such assets - provided that exempted securities 
should be held for a specific minimum period. This incentive is similar 
to exempting from income tax a certain percentage of income spent on 
life insurance premiums. 
(b) More importantly, a much stronger incentive can be provided by 
permitting individuals and corporations to place a specified percentage 
of their income tax liabilities in special mutual funds - also on the 
condition that such subscriptions should be held for a minimum specified 
period. This was successfully introduced by the Brazilian Government, 
where the Decree-Law No. 157 of 1967 allowed 10% of individual and 5% 
of corporate income tax liabilities to be diverted into special mutual 
funds, the share of which should be held for a period between 2-4 years. 
(2) 
Such special mutual funds actively promoted the demand for securities since 
they provided about one quarter of the funds raised through the Brazilian 
Exchange. 
(3) 
The adoption of the above policies by the Jordanian 
Government would undoubtedly involve important opportunity costs 
in the sense of not only reducing Treasury tax revenues, 
The two recommended devices were illustrative of the Bra? ---ilian 
Government success in flourishing capital market development. 
See Wai and Patrick, op. cit. P. 294. For more details, see Walter 
L. Ness, Jr. Financial markets Innovation as a Development_ 
Strategy: Initial Results from the Brazilian Experience. 
New York University, Graduate School of Business Administration, 
Working Papers Series, No: 72-75 (N. Y. 1972). 
(2) Walter Ness, op. cit. P. 12 
(3) Ibid. 
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but also in increasing income inequality among Jordanians. The 
latter social cost is quite evident if one takes into acco'ýnt that Jordanian 
shareholders generally'b'elong'to middle-income and high-inc6me groups. 
Despite such costs, however, it is believed that the'expe'eted benefits' 
would be considerable, particularly through the influence of the 
demand incentives on AFM development. The proposed demand incentives are 
expected to activate and increase, to a large extent. 'the level of'dimand 
on the exchange made by the public as well'as other institutional inves- 
tors. The emergence of special mutual funds, in the manner described 
above, would undoubtedly improve the demand side of the"Market, and 
help to fill an important gap in its structure represented in'the 
absence of active institutional investors. ' 
Secondly. Monetary Measures. . 
Whereas the previous fiscal incentives aim at encouraging both sides 
of the Exchange, the following recommendations, which can be"implemented 
by the Central Bank, are confined only to the demand - side. The'Central 
Bank's responsibility towards the AFM lies'-generally'in creating"im'; a'ns ,, 
and conditions most conducive to its'development. Twoareas of imýortl' 
ance here are briefly discussed: 
(a) Providing an appropriate enviro=eiii, for'capitýl'marketýdevelop- 
ment. To further assist and promote the, aemand side of the*AFM, -the Central 
Bank should create encouraging conditions capable-of'pr6viding'attractive 
yields on long-term instruments traded on the Market's floor'. This' I can 
be-achieved through curbing inflationary conditions and pursuing iealistic 
interest rate policy inducive to financial development. ' These two 
issues are interrelated since the effective real return on holding finaný- 
cial assets depends on the prevailing rate-of*inflation. - The effect 
of inflation is obvious and more serious'in the case of fixed-interest 
(1) Whereas the opportunity costs in the form of government revenues 
foregone would result from both supply and demand incentives- 
discussed above,, the latter social cost of increasing income 
inequality would be mainly associated with demand incentives. 
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financial, claims, such. as saving deposits and long-term bonds, where 
a high rate of inflation works to lower their, xeal yields into, 
sometimes, negative levels. Equities, on the other hand, are generally 
less influenced by the adverse effect of infl&tion because their prices 
andyiel6 may rise with inflation. Given this explanation, it could 
be conceived that the recently experienced high rates of inflation in 
Jordan might not adversely influence the development of the AFM because 
it has been so far confined its trading to equity stocks. However, it 
is recognised that despite the theoretical explanation that share prices 
could benefit from inflation (because they provide better protection 
against price rises-as compared with other fixed-interest financial claims), 
the equity market can also be adversely influenced by inflation, when 
the latter may enhance uncertainty, shorten time horizons,, and create 
liquidity problems for companies. 
(') 
Moreover, the adverse impacts 
of inflation are expected to hinder capital market developmert when the 
AFM. starts to accept long-term, fixed-interest financial instruments. 
The future retarding effect of inflation on promoting such long-term debt 
instruments is further exacerbated because of the prevailing low interest 
rates in Jordan. It was shown in Chapter 3 that pegging interest rates 
to unrealistically low levels led to a negative real return on holding 
fixed-interest financial assets during recent inflationary years. 
The'Offect of inflation on minimising the real return on holding 
different types of financial assets is shown by Table 10.5 which clearly 
reveals that fixed-interest financial instruments are more affected by 
inflation as compared with equity investment, A high rate of inflation 
of 14.5% experienced during 1977 had considerably reduced the real return 
on both bank deposits and government fixed-interest bonds to negative 
rates of -8.7% and -6.554 respectively. The real yield of equities, on 
the other hand, was less influenced by inflation which had the effect 
Wai. and Patrick, op. cit. P. 280. 
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Table 10.5. Nominal and -Real Yields - of-Different 
Financial Assets 0 977) 
Nominal Rates Rate of Real Rates (Nominal. Rates 
Inflation minus inflation rate) 
Fixed-Interest Assets Equity Fixed-Interest Assets Eouitv 
Bank Deposits* Govt. Bonds Return on Bank Deposits Govt. Return 
Industrial Bonds on Ind- 
Shares**- ustrial 
shares 
5.8 8.0 13.4 14-5 8.7 -6-5 -1 -1 
Source: Appendix 10.1 
Average interest, on different types of deposits.. 
Sample of-12 public shareholding companies listed. on the 
AFM (See Append. 10.1) 
of depressing the real return on this t. N; pe'of investment to -1.1%. 
Given the abov6 situaiionp it would be therefore difficult under the 
prevailing low interest rate policy and the present high levels of infla- 
tion'to develop a viable market in fixed-interest debentures. 
(') 
In 
order to create such a marketp the Central Bank should realistically 
aajust the prevailing low interest rate, to enable such assets to offer 
I attractive yields to their holders. This is particularly important if 
the recommendation of the 5 Year Plan of 1976 (regarding the encouragement 
of Jordanian enterprises to raise'funds, through issuing long: lterm'bonds) 
is to effectively take place. 
(b) Promoting an active network of institutional investors in 
the APM. It has been shown that'ihe absence of'capital market institut-''' 
ions, handling long-term funds,, is a structural deficiency in the Jordanianý 
Exchange. - To facilitate"the implementation and operations of capital 
(1) This is consistent with the conclusion emphasised by Wai and 
Patrick regarding the effect of fixing low interest ratesjin developing countries. on capital market development. See Wai 
and Patrick., op-cit. P. 281. 
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markets usually, a variety of specialised institutions need to be 
established to mobilise long-term savings and make them available for 
the suppliers of securities. These institutions take the form of mutual 
funds,, unit trusts and other investment companies that provide a basis 
for the development of a capital market. Such specialised institutions, 
together with contractual saving intermediaries, represent the major 
source of demand in active, stock exchanges of developed countries. Even 
in many developing countries, capital market institutions were set-up 
before the creation of domestic stock exchanges. 
(') 
The existence of 
institutions offering a range of investment alternatives with varying 
degrees of yield, risk, and maturity satisfies the different tastes 
of investors and thus encourages the demand for securities. There is 
an urgent need to create an effective demand for securities in Jordan, 
by setting-up specialised investment corporations to deal in long-term 
funds and perform underwriting functions among their activities. The 
previously proposed tax-financed mutual funds are expected to activate 
the level of demand on the Exchange. This side of the AFM can be also 
encouraged by promoting the emergence of voluntary (private) mutual 
funds, whereby the contributions of small savers can be mobilised to 
feed the Market with large amounts of investable funds. It is the Central 
Bank that is able to take the lead to create and promote an adequate 
machinery of capital market institutions. This is part of its larger 
role in promoting the country's economic development and adapting its 
financial structure to fit domestic development needs. The Central Bank's 
responsibility towards this objective is dealt with in the following chapter. 
(1) Kenya and Nigeria were cases in point, See Arolow, op. cit. P. 441 
and 459. 
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CHAPHR 11 
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CENTRAL BANK IN PROMOTING DEVELOPMENT 
Central banks in developing countries can be instrumental in promoting 
I 
domestic economic development. Chapter 7 has shown that the underdeveloped 
financial infrastructure prevailing in such countries imposes larger 
responsibilitiO3 on their central banks and further requires these 
institutions to pursue an active monetary policy that is development- 
oriented. 
(') 
Moreover, due to the failure of free market forces in these 
countries to attract sufficient investment funds in priority sectors, it 
is incumbent on the government to set up specialised financial institutions 
to bridge such gaps in the credit system. Furthermore, vigorous official 
market intervention is required in order to actively induce a change in 
the asset portfolio behaviour of the commercial banks in accordance with 
the development strategy selected. This is especially important in 
developing countries where, because the divergence between private and 
social costs and benefits in the allocation of investment is potentially 
greater than in developed countries, reliance on the free allocation of 
bank resources is more harmful from social as well as economic points of 
view, 
However, such government market interventionist policies are usually 
implemented by central banking institutions, which are suitably geared 
for this purpose. Given their unique position as government agencies on 
the one hand, and their supervisory power over the financial system 
on the other, these institutions can greatly influence the allocation of 
bank resources in favour of development. Central banks' responsibility 
in'directing the flow of financial resources towards developmental areas 
is even greater in countries which inherited. a colonial banking system and 
practices that became irrelevant to post-independence conditions and 
requirements. This situation further requires these institutions to act 
positively, rather than passively, to adjust the financial system and bring 
See Chapter 7. PP. 205 - 206 
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its operations in line with the changing domestic needs. In, such circum- 
stances, central banks must pursue policies, procedures, and-follow other 
institutional innovations, that promote the achievement of this end. 
Firstly,, they have to make sure that, they always provide appropriate_ý 
conditions and financial-environzents most conducive to economic develop- 
ment. Secondly,, they have to make sure that financial institutions are - 
operating within the. general framework of domestic development programmes, 
and their activities are consistent with, the, defined development 
I 
strategies. 
When it was established in 1964, the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) 
inherited an underdeveloped financial system dominated by colonial 
banking practices from its preaecessorsthe Jordan Currency Board. (JCB). 
Since then, the crucial task of the CBJ has been to influence the 
country's financial systemýand adjust it completely to, different require- 
- Although ments necessitated by shifting towards domestic development@ 
the creation of the CBJ was concomitant with, the adoption and implementation 
of the 7 Year Plan-, (1964 - 1970). serious.. involvement in development 
started only in 1973, when the countr7 adopted the 3 Year Plan (1973 - 1975). 
Such a delay can be largely related to, the earlier period of political, 
instability following the 1967 War, which hindered the implementation 
of the 7 Ye4r Plan itself, and also-the. readjustment processes-of the 
financial system. 
('), 
The extent to which the CBJ, succeeded in its readaptation task and 
the factors hampering the pursuit of effective monetary management were 
fully discussed-in my M. A. Thesis, where it was shown that it achieved 
only partial success in influencing the country's financial system and 
(1) For the impacts. of the War on the Jordanian financial system,, see Chapter 2. P. 24 
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reorienting its -activities towards internal development *needs '(1 
)' 
This 
chapter seeks to investigate and identify those' areas-where' central be: ýýg 
po3icies and innovations can be usefully employed in Jordan toovercome 
the readjustment problem. To begin with, however, it is necessary to 
briefly outline the aforementioned limited'success that"was achieved to 
establish a background'for the innovational, policies that are to be recom- 
mended'l-ater. - This can be outlined'in the following four main areas: - 
(2) 
(a) A major achievement of the CBJ was the repatriation of overseas 
funds for investment' within the 'country 'itself. As a- result of this 
action, the compositional bias of bank liquid assets was significant1y 
changed in favour of domestic assets, particularly as compared with'thý 
previous'period of the JCB when the'commercial banks werefre'e to invest' 
abroad. Despite this, and attempts to lower the liquidity position of 
the. commercial banks, the'impact of the CW's, procedures was limited. ' This 
situation is mainly explained by the narrow 'Scope for domestic monetary 
management which made it difficult for the CW to effectively utilise the 
monetary instruments available inIts armoury. 
(b) Following the repatriation of overseas funds, commercial bahks 
I were compelled to seek other domestic investment avenues. Although the 
CBJ thereby strengthened the domestic credit base'of the banks, 'it was 
only partially successful-in influencing the distribution of credit,, 
both. on the sectoral side by'shifting more resources to priority sectors, 
and on the regional side by expanding the*scope for domestic credit to 
the remote areas of the country. 
(c) The contribution of the CBJ to the creation of an adequate 
financial infrastructure was not satisfactor7. Despite some diversification 
in the financial system with'the setting up of a few'new specialised credit 
institutions under the Central Banking regime, credit extended by the CBJ 
J. Salah, The Evolution of the Banking System in Jordan, op. cit. 
Chapter 4, PP. 61 - 114 
(2) For more details of the performance of the CBJ, see Chapter 2 of this Thesis, PP. 36-40 
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to those institutions only commenced in 1971, ýand still constituted a, ý 
small proportion, of. -their total resources. -On the other handp-the Bank's 
contribution to the formation of domestic money or capitgl markets, was 
nominal. .1ýýý 
(d)-The CBJ partly succeeded in reducing the high economic cost of 
money supply creation, particularly as compared with the situation'which 
previously prevailed under the Currency Board System. -The money'supply 
became increasingly influenced by domestic factors and less-connected to- 
external fluctuations-resulting from balance of payments-transactionsý-- 
Despite this improvement., -however, ', the latter was still, the dominant' 
element in determining changes-in the money supply. While. this was partly 
explained by the. limitea ability of the CBJ to adjust the money supply in 
accordance with domestic factors, it largely resulted from the heavy 
reliance of Jordan, on foreign aid. - The considerable, inflows of foreign 
aid received by the government hadýtheir immediate impacts. on major 
macro-economic variables (such as, GNP, -, consumption, savingsýand investment) 
which accordingly induced-large increases in domestic-money supply. 
(') 
The above conclusions were based upon the CBJ's performance up to- 
1975- -After this year, however, the Bank, took -ý4 more -active role in -', 
influencing the structure and'operations ofýthe financial-system in accor- 
dance with the rising development requirementsaccompanyiný the-implement- 
ation : of the Five Year Plan (1976 - 1980). - , -The Plan f urther -requiredz -. 
the CBJ to practise effective influence on finaneial,, institutions in order 
to-bring their activities-in line with the selected development-strategies. 
The increasing developmental-part played by the CBJ after 1975 was made 
evident throughout the previousýchapters-, when the role of each type of 
financial. institutionsýwas individually discussed. - This partially improved 
the_extent to_which the. Bank has succeeded in resolving the financial 
(1) For the significance of foreign aid in maintaining equilibrium in the 
Jordanian economy, see Chapter 3. PP. 53 - 59 
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readjustment problem, particularly in areas of diversifying and strengthening 
the country's financial infrastructure. As illustrated in Part C of-this 
thesis, the CBJ paid particular attention to specialised credit-institutions 
by extending further credit to support their financial resources. 
(') 
Moreover, the CBJ played the leading role in establishing the Amman 
Financial Market which commenced operations in January 1978, 
(2 ) 
Despite- 
this important institutional innovation, it will be shown, that for the 
Jordanian Stock, Exchange to be effective, further necessary central banking 
policies and procedures are still needed. However, apart-from the Improve- 
ment that occurred in this areaq the developmental impact of the CBJ 
during 1975 - 1977 was not impressive, particularly as regards its control 
over the liquidity of commercial banks and the allocation of their 
resources. 
(3) 
The above analysis reveals the fact that although the CBJ pursued 
a more and clearer positive role towards domestic development since 1973, 
this-was still insufficient to resolve the financial readjustment problem. 
In'today's developing countries, -in. partioular, central banks should 
not only expect private financial institutions to adapt, their operations 
within the general framework of development programmes, but they have first 
to provide- the appropriate financial environment that'helps the, readjust- 
ment processes to take place. - It is believed that the CW can play a, 
larger role if it is to participate effectively in economic development.. 
Domestic monetary policies should be flexible and formulated in the light 
of the ever-changing circumstances of the economy. In designing its 
policies and selecting its techniques, the CW should greatly benefit 
from the hard core experience of other countries and adopt what is 
adaptable and necessary for the special requirements of-its economy, 
(1) See Chapter 
(2) See Chapter 10 
See Chapter 4, PP. 120-143 
350 
Among a large range of successful financial innovations introduced by 
central banks in developing countries, a selected set was found appropriate 
for the domestic adoption'in Jordan in order to serve similar needs, It 
will be shown that the introduction of some of these innovations may 
require amendments of the prevailing laws and regulations to permit and 
facilitate the required-changes. However, for a'systematic discussion of 
the recommended policy measures, these are classified'in two main areas 
where the improvement of CBJ's actions is expected to take place: namely, 
the mobillsation of domestic resources and their productive utilisation. 
Mobilisation of Resources 
The following policy recommendations aim at, firstly, effective 
financialisation of domestic savings and,, secondly, inducing a change in 
the structure of the financial holdings in favour of longer-term assets. 
For this purpose, three important policy measures are required. 
'Firstly. 'the adoption of a flexible and realistic interest rate 
Polky capable of creating real incentives for holding financial assets. 
Jordan lacks a realistic and-purposive interest rate policy capable 
of effectively channelling resources into the financial system, and 
inducing a term transformation of financial holdings. This instrument 
of monetary policy has not been dynamically used for such purposes. Apart 
from very slight increases in'the deposit rate in 1976 and 1977, 
(1) 
interest 
rates on bank loans'and deposits have been almost static throughout the 
'period 1955 - 1977. This is a reflection of the pursuance of a conven- 
tionally low interest rate policy, whereby*ratesýpaid'and charged by 
commercial banks have generally been controlled, and suppressed by the 
(1) See Table 11.1. However, although the table reveals an earlier change 
in the deposit and loan rate$ in 19729 this might be related to 
inaccuracy of data, because/Afy9n this year that the Central Bank 
began to publish regular interest rates statistics, 
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authorities. On the credit side, banks were subject to a maximum 
lending rate of %Z, which was fixed in accordance with the "Ottoman 
Usury Lýw" when Transjordan was part of, the Turkish Empire. On the 
deposit side, the above ceiling on bank credit naturally worked to inhibit 
any substantial upwalrd adjustment in deposit rates because this would have 
the effect of minimising the banks' profit margin. Moreover, the CBJ 
hasbeen authorised by law to specify the minimum rates paid and charged 
by banks. 
0) 
However, the CBJ's action in this area was restricted 
by the above legislative celing on bank lending. This situation created 
some rigidities within the financial systerp,, which were inappropriate for 
the process of financial development, particularly during the inflationary 
Pýriod of 1973 - 1977. It is argued here that the changing financial and 
economic circumstances in Jordan necessitated the pursuance of a realistic 
and flexible interest rate policy capable of rewarding holders of financial 
assets positive real return on their savings. To achieve this, however, 
the above legislative obstacle fixing the maximum lending rate should be 
removed, in order to give sufficient manoeuvrability to the CBJ to 
i (2) effectively use this important instrument of monetary policy. 
A low interest rate policy can be operative in an environment of 
price stability, idiere a reasonable rise in prices does not endanger the 
real return on financial holdings. Table 11.1 illustrates that the 
adoption of such a policy was appropriate for the Jordanian economy 
during the-first-phase of development (1955 --1966) where-thb-small rise' 
in prices (not exceeding 1.4% per annum) ýorked to protect the real --- 
return on bank deposits, and also enabled commercial banks to obtain'a 
positive real reward on their lending. During this period, the annual 
(1) Central Bank of Jordan, Temporary Law No. 93 for 1966p Article 43- 
(2) This is what happened in Iraq, for example, where a legislation was 
enacted in 1970 exempting financial institutions from the V. maximum legal limit on interest rates fixed by the Chril Law. The aim was 
to give the Central Bank of Iraq discriminatory powers to set and 
regulate the interest rates in accordance with the country's changing 
conditions, See Hussain, A. E., Money. Banking and Moneta= Policy in 
Iraq,, M. A. Thesis (U. K,: University of Exceter, April 1973) P. 285 
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Table 11.1 , Nominal and Real Rates of, -Interest on 
Bank Loans and Bank Deposits. 1955 - 1977 
per annum) 
Nominal Rates (1) Rate of Real Rates (3) = (1 -2) 
fl ti I a n on 
Bank Loans Bank Deposits* (2) Bank Loans Bank Deposits 
1955. 7.0 
,, 
4.0 1.0 6.0 3.0 
1956 7.0 4.0 1.0 6.0 3.0 
1957 7.0 4.0 1.0 6.0 3.0 
1958' 7.0 4.0 1.0 6. o 3.0' 
1959 7.0,. 4.0 1.0 6.0, 3.0 
1960 7.0 4.0 1.0 6,0 3.0 
1961 "7-. 0 4.0 1.9 5.1 2.1 
1962 7.0 4.0 1.9 5.1 2.2 
1963 7.0 4.0 1.8 5.2 _2.2 
1964 7.0 4.0 1.8 5.2 2.2 
1%5 7.0ý- 4.0 1.8 5.2 2.3 
, 1%6 -7.0 4.0 1.7 5 3- 2.3 
1967 
. 
7.0 4.0 1.7 5-3., 2.3 
1968 7.0 4.0 0.8 6.2 3.2 
1969 7.0 4.0 7.8 -o. 8 -3.8 
1970 .0 7 4.0 
6.1 0.9-1 -2; 1 
1971 7.0, 4.0,, 5.7 10 -1 .7 
1972 9.0 4. '9 7.7 1.3 -2.8 
1973 9.0 4.9 -6.2, ' 
1974 9.0 -4.9 19.4 -10.4 -14.5 
1975 9.0 4.9 1119 -2.9 -7.0 
1976 910 5.6 15.3 -603 -9.7 
1977 9.0 5.8 14-5 -5.5 -8.7 
Average 
- 66 
7.0 4.0 1.4 5.6 2.6 
Average 
167 -72 
7.3 4.2 4.9 2.3 -0.7 
9.0 5.2 14.4 --5-4 -9.2 
Source: Official published statistics on interest are only available since 
1972. Prior to this year, data were obtained from: Y. Sukar, The 
Structure of Interest Ra , 
tes in Jordan, Central Bank of Jordan's 
publications (Nov. 74) P. 10. Figures for the period after 1972 
see, CBJ's Monthly Bulletins. 
Average interest on different types of deposits 
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real loan rate accounted for 5.6%. whereas the real deposit, rate 
averaged around 2.60% a year. However, this was changed during the 
second phase (1%7 - 1972) which experiencýd mild inflation with the 
increase in prices averaging 4-9/fo per annum. Since both lending and 
deposit rates remained low (the former rose by an average of only 0.3% 
whereas the latter increased by only 0.2% a year), their real rates 
were naturally reduced by the rise in prices. Inflation creates a 
discrepancy between nominal and real interest rates equal to the rise in 
prices. As shown by the table, the real deposit rate was even depressed 
to a negative level (-0.7%) whereas the real lending rate was reduced 
from 5.6% to 2.3/14. This situation became increasingly worse during the 
last phase of development (1973 - 1977) which witnessed high inflationar7 
pressures with the annual rate of-inflation reaching 14.4% per annum. 
The continued adoption of low interest rate policy., In such a high 
inflationar7 environment, naturally led to further depression in the 
real lending and deposit rates which accounted, on average, for negative 
annual rates of -5.4% and - 9.2% respectively (see Figure 11.1). Although 
the CBJ's action in 1976 to Specify alfloor' rate on saving accounts 
held by commercial banks led to a 1% average increase in the deposit 
rate, as compared with the preceding period, this was too small to 
protect the real yield of such assets. However, if the CBJ had desired 
to impose, or to promote, further rises in the deposit rate, this'could 
have been frustrated by the prevailing legiilative ceiling on bank lend- 
ing. As clarified by the table, the nominal loan rate during 1973 1977 
reached the fixed maximum of 9%. meaning that commercial banks were 
unable to offer a positive real return on deposits and, at the same 
time, maintaining a profitability margin sufficient to keep them in 
business. 
Chapter 3 has shown that, despite the noticeably negative real 
yield of bank deposits,, 
-Jordanians 
exhibited a surprising and increasing 
desire to hold such assets in their portfolio, as reflected in the 
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continued rise, in the financial intermediation ratio (M2/GNB). The 
possible reasons explaining such behaviour were'discussed there, - 
emphasising that-the monetary authorities should not be misled-by the 
slow adjustment process on the part of the investing public,, -which-was 
accustomed to a prolonged period of price stability., It was emphasised 
that if, -, people continue to receive increasingly negative returns on, their 
financial savings,, -it is very likely. -that they will, shy, away-from 
this type of, investment, and channel their savings towards more 
profitable real estate and other speculative transactions. -This may 
lead to financial disintermediation as happened, iniArgentina and Brazil, 
for example, when people gave, up holding-their, savings in financial - 
forms., thus causing a financial decline and a-, serious retarding effect 
on real economic growth. 
(') 
Although both, countries witnessed-higher 
inflationary rates comparing with the rates experienced in Jordan,, one 
cannot ignore the very possible reaction of, Jordanians, if the-real 
value, of-_their financial savings-continues to be substantially undermined 
by inflation. The monetary authorities,, it is believed,, should not 
wait for the occurrence of a similar situation -where people lose con-, 
fidence in financial holdings and then take actions, rather it. must 
prevent the possiblity of the financial disintermediation process. to 
take place, by offering positive and attractive rates. of return on 
financial savings. 
Apart from the existence of the Ottoman UsurY Law, the desire of 
the authorities to minimise the cost of investment seemed to be another 
factor behind the'maintenance of low and stable interest rate policy in 
Jordan. 
(2) 
This is consistent with the general experience in developing 
(1) Walter Ness, "Some Effects of'Inflation on Financing Investment 
in Argentina and Brazil, " In Arnold Sametz, ed., Financial Develop- 
ment and Economic Growth (New York: New York University Press,, 
1972) P. 234 
(2) The religious factor might have discouraged attempts by the 
authorities to raise interest rates. Given the traditional belief 
of many Moslems that interest is usUr'Y -, the upward adjustment of 
rates of interest might provoke this category of people. 
356 
countries where interest rate- policy has been, conventionally-used 
as a means of regulating the cost and availability ofýcredit-(loan 
rate) rather than as a tool for promoting savings (deposit rate). 
(') 
However,, such a traditional bias towards low rates of interest became - 
increasing1y irrelevant-to the changing circumstances in most developing 
countries (including Jordan) which experienced high rates, ofýinflation. 
This new development made it impossible to ignore the other side of 
interest rate policy (deposit rate) since the continued adoption of 
low rates of interest in inflationary conditions might endanger theý 
process of financial intermenation. Recent literature on interest 
rate policies emphasised the, significance of this monetary instrument 
in conbating inflation and mobilising financial resources. 
(2) 
Although 
v 
this new trend does not overlook, the significance of the credit aspect 
of interest rate policy, it places greater emphasis on-the deposit side. A 
purposive interest rate policy. -it is emphasised,, has to reconcile the 
conflicting requirements of-rates that are'appropriate to the desired 
level and composition of investment, and also attract enough to 
stimulate 'Savings. 
(3) 
It is such- a -policy that the CW `Should look for. 
Domestic interest rates in Jordan 'should be positive'in reaf term ,s and 
flexible; realistic enough to stimulate considerable savings but not 
too high'to inhibit internal investment. The experience of other 
a 
developing countries in which the adoption 6f/high interest rate strategy 
Anand Chandavarkar, "Some Aspects of Interest Rate Policies in 
Developing Countries", IMF Staff Papers (March 1971) P. 49; and 
Wai and Patrick, "Stock and Bond Issues and Capital Markets in 
Developing Countries". IMF Staff Papers (July 1973) P. 283 
(2) See Chandavarkar, op. cit; Wai and Patrick, op. cit; Ronald McKinnon, 
Uoney and Capital in Economic Development, op. cit.; Edward Shaw,, - 
Financial Deepening in Economic Development, opcit.; Robert 
Emery, The Financial Institutions of South East Asia., op. cit, 
(3) Anand Chandavarkar, "Some Aspects of Interest Rate Policy in less 
Developed Countries"p OP-cit. P-50 
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achieved substantial'benefits (such as China, Korea,, and Indonesia) 
should illuminate the way and encourage the Jordanian authorities to 
adopt a more flexible attitude towards interest rate policy. 
(')- 
'Although 
the upward adjustment of interest rates would undoubtedly involve further 
cost in financing domestic development, the overall expected net benefits 
would be worthwhile. A more-flexible and higher interest rate strategy 
in Jordan does not only aim at further financialisation-of domestic -, - 
savings,, but it also intends to facilitate, and achieve other monetary 
and economic objectives. The argument'for innovational interest rate- 
policy in*Jordan and the'expected benefits are summarise&as follows: - 
(1) A bolder interest rate policy can be used as an anti-inflationary 
instrument, on the one hand, and as an'effeotive tool for inducing a term 
transformation of financial assetsý, on the other hand. 
Raising the interest rate on bank deposits to a realistic level 
(capable of protecting'the real yield of such assets) would alleviate 
inflation, in the sense of reducing the high level of consumption and 
the 
changing the composition'of/domestio, investment portfolio away from 
The successful experience of a realistic interest rate pol: b y in 
these countries is instructive on the role of a positive real return* 
on financial holdings in achieving high levels of financial develop- 
ment. Their experiences should provide the Jordanian authorities, 
as well as other developing countries, with clear evidence for the 
great potentialities of a real positive interest rate policy, as an 
effective device of institutionalising domestic savings. This does 
not, however, mean a strict application of what was experienced 
in such countries because interest rates there were raised to a 
very high level to encounter the then high rates of ' 
inflation. In 
China (Taiwan), for example, a strategy of high interest rates 
began in March 1950 by irtroducing a special system of preferential 
deposits carr7ing a rate of 7% a month (i. e. 125% per annum compounded 
monthly). This had the effect of increasing time deposits from 
only NT ;92 million early in 1950 to NT X 37 million by August 1950. 
Following this success,, the. authorities, while maintaining nominal 
rates at high levels to offer positive real return# adopted a 
, polidy of 
lowering such high levels progressively with the decline 
in inflation. The Chinese successful experience was followed by 
similar experiences in Korea (I %5)'and in Indonesia- (1 %8), In 
both countries also, savers were offered positive real return 
where the nominal rates of interest exceeded the rate of inflation. As inflationar7 pressures eased, interest rates were subsequently 
decreased as eyperienced in Taiwan. See Chandavarkar, op. cit. PP-78-98. 
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speculative activities and towards financial, holdings. Chapter. 3. showed 
that the Jordanian economy has been, characterised by a high level of 
private consumption which has been further intensified during the, last 
phase of development (1973 - 1977). 
(') 
The negative, yield of financial 
assets led either to making it unattractive for, people. to save (thus 
consuming more), or,. to inducing socially 'undesirable' types of invest- 
ments by diverting resources towards. speculative-transactions in commod- 
ities and real estate activities. Offering attractive real return on 
financial holdings would encourage people to save more out of their income, 
and would also discourage the flow of. resources towards speculative -and 
unproductive channels. 
Moreover, by pursuing a flexible interest rate. policy aiming at 
constantly, providing positive real return on bank deposits, the monetaU 
authorities can achieve improvement in two major interrelated areas: 
(a) Inducing structural change. in the composition of domestic 
liquidity in favour of quasi money. Chapter 3 clarified the very 
liquid nature of the Jordanian economy, in, which. currency in circulation 
accounted for. more than one half of total domestic liquidity (M2) 
throughout the period 1955 - 1977. 
(2)ý 
The-relative importance of quasi 
money in total M2_(20.2%) was shown to be very small compared with 
developed as well1as developing countries. It was emphasised there 
that the inadequacy of the structure of domestic liquidity required 
effective and immediate. actions, by the monetary authorities to encourage 
a term transformation of M2. Central banking intervention in this-area 
was further required when the, quasi money element was found statistically 
significant in-inducing real growth, with a high correlation, ratio 
between quasi money/GNP and GNP per capita. 
(3) 
It is believed that the 
(1) See Chapter-3,, PP. 47-50 
(2) Ibid. Table 3.9# P-71 
(3) See Chapter 3y P. 86 
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upward ajustment of interest rates would help the authorities to reduce 
the high relative weight of the currency element: people would be encou- 
raged to 'switch' from holding idle cash balances into interest-bearing 
financial assets in order to get advantage of the positive real return 
on the latter. Since currency in hand is a non-interest-bearing financial 
asset, there is a precise opportunity cost in holding this type-of asset, 
which can be measured by interest earned on other financial holdings, 
such as bank deposits or government bonds. Thus, raising the interest 
rate on deposits (and on other financial savings) to real positive 
Ivels would accordingly involve a substantial increase in the qppor- 
tunity cost of holding currency. Figure 11.2 illustrates this point, 
showing that the real opportunity cost of holding cash (as measured by 
the difference between the curve of real rate of return on currency(l) 
and the curves of real returns on bank deposits or government bonds) 
would be increased with the rise of interest rates on alternative finan- 
cial holdings. 
(b) The expected decline in the relative importance of currency 
holdings would minimise inflationary pressures, because part of the 
excess liquidity in theeconomy (represented in currency in circulation) 
would be mopped-up by the financial system. Currency holdings are idle 
funds kept outside the financial system, thus representing an immediate 
threat to price stability: such funds are readily available for spending 
on consumption and other speculative activities. 
(2) A higher interest rate strategy would undoubtedly enlarge the 
size of the organised financial market at the expense of the unorgan- 
ised market, thus further promoting domestic financial intermediation. 
Since nominal interest rate on currency is zero, the real interest 
rate on holding this asset is represented by the rate of inflation. 
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The above expected reduction in the relative importance of idle 
cash balances. - which would be attracted to the financial system, leads, 
to the expansion of. the organized financial market. The probable, result 
of offering a positive real rate of interest in the organised sector would 
be to reduce the flow of resources into the unorganised sector, because 
the yield gap between the two sectors would be minimised. This, together-, - 
with a, safer environment in the organised sector, ýwould encourage the 
flow of resources into the financial system, #us providing a-higher 
degree of financial intermediation. Clearly, such a shift towards'the 
organised financial market implies improvement in the allocation'pattern 
of resDurces in favour of productive investments, . 4- ý 
Raising interest rates would enlarge the scope for domestic-, 'I, ' 
monetary management and-expand the area of effectiveness of monetary 
policy. -, 
One major problem-of pursuing effeotive monetar7 policyýin Jordan 
has been, the high excessive liquidity, of the econocy which has been 
largely beyond ý the influence of the CBJ. It has been shown that - a- large 
proportion of M2-was held in idle currency holdings., which-were'diffi'4 
cult to control or adjust when the need rose to subject domestio- 
liquidity to central influence. By reducing this. element andý expanding 
the organised financial sector,, the scope and effectiveness of monetary 
policy would expand because the CW would be able to practise-more in- 
fluence on domestic asset portfolios. Moreover, _, the adoption of a 
flexible interest rate policy itself would assist'domestio monetary 
management by adding an effective monetary tool to the already available 
weapons in the CW's armoury. -1 1, -I 
Besiaes-reducing the excessive liquidity of the economy, a higher 
interest rate strategy can also encourage co=ercial banks to reduce 
their excessive liquidity holdings. This would be of'special significance 
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for widening the scope for domestic monetar: y policy., The high liquidity 
maintained by the commercial banks has deprived the CBJ of the effective 
use of the discount mechanism, because commercial banks rarely resorted 
to the CBJ for liquidity purposes. 
0) 
Chapters 5 and 6 revealed that 
commercial banks in Jordan have generally maintained high liquidity ratios, 
much above the minimum level prescribed and desired by the CBJ. Maintaining 
excessive liquidity in commercial banking was shown not only to frustrate 
domestic monetary management, but also to involve a considerable 
opportunity cost in the sense of utilising such liquid funds for finan- 
cing development activities. However, it was argued there that the 
prevalence of low interest rate policy in Jordan could have been a 
factor, among others, explaining excessive liquidity holding by commercial 
banks. 
(2) 
Effective low real rates on bank lending must have intensified 
liquidity preference on the part of many banks, by further discouraging 
them to venture beyond the traditional lines of business,, thu's confining 
their credit to privileged and well-established borrowers. The low 
real ceiling on loans rate was seen by these banks to be insufficient 
to cover the usual administrative costs and the potential default risks 
involved in new lines of business. 
(3) 
Thus, by pursuing a realistic 
interest rate policy, the CBJ not only can practise more influence on 
the domestic liquidity of the economy (by reducing the currency element), 
but it can also encourage commercial banks to reduce their excessive 
liquidity holdings (by seeking new areas of business) which would 
eventually-lead to further control on their activities. 
(I ) See J. Salah, The Evolution of the Banking System in_Jordan, op. o it. P. 79 
(2) See Chapter 6. PP. 198-199 
(3) McKinnon and Shaw empha31Se the above adverse effect of depressing-, 
interest rates into low levels, which deprives a large number of 
potential borrowers in developing countries of having an adequate. 
access to bank credit. Their views were shown in Chapter 6. P. 199 
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(4) A realistic interest rate policy is further required if the 
domestic capital market in Jordan is to expand to include trading in 
long-term industrial bonds. - 
Chapter 10 revealed the official desire to develop, the Amman, 
Financial Market (which has been so far restrictea*to equity traaing) 
into a bond market. It demonstrated also that the effect of inflation 
is usually more serious in the case of fixed-interest financial assets 
(such as bank deposits and long-term bonds) as compared with its 
impact on equities. The real value of the former is directly undermined 
by inflation, whereasýthe latter-is generally less influencea, by inflation 
because its value and yield can rise with the increase in prices. The 
adverse effect of inflation on the former was further intensified in 
the Jordanian case, due to the adoption of'a low interest rate policy 
which depressed the real yield of such assets, into negative levels. If 
the Jordanian Exchange is to deal in long-term, 'fixed-interest financial 
instruments as recommended by-the 5 Year Plan, then such assets should 
be competitive with. alternative investments by yielding, a reasonable 
real return. Pursuing a-higher interest rate strategy would apply to 
all fixed-interest financial, assets, besides bank deposits. - Without 
protecting the real return on such instruments. -it would be difficult 
to develop the Jordanian Exchange into an operative and active bond 
market. 
The preaominance of private savings in aomestio saving structure,, 
and the relative small-size of contractual savings in the private sector, 
create a favourable enviro=ent for the use of a higher interestýrate 
policy to stimulate private voluntary savings. 
The success of a high interest rate strategy depends largely on the 
I 
extent to which domestic savings are responsive to variations in interest 
rates. Doubts have been raised about the interest elasticity of savings 
in developing countries, where the volume of savings is a function of 
1, ,-ý. 
: 
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incomes rather than the level'of interest rates. 
(')ý-However, 
the empirical 
evidence for both developing and developed countries was-inconclusive in regard 
to the sensitivity of savings to interest'rate changes. 
(2)- 
Even'in the U. S. A... 
incomes and wealth were found to be significant in determining private savings, 
, (3) rather than the level of interest rates. DeVpit8 sach-disagreement 
on the interest elaoticity of savings, it'is recognised that where'the 
size of private savings is important, and when such savings are held 
voluntarily rather thancompalsorily, the potentialities of, the use of a' 
higher interest rate policy to stimulate'savings are greater. 
(4) 
By 
applying this to Jordan, a wide potential scope for-interest-Sensitive 
savings. seems; to be available. The'relative size of the private sector 
in domestic savings was significant. 'accounting for 80/7io' of the total'during 
1960 - 1972. 
(5) 
On the other hand, most of theseTIsavings were voluntarily 
hold-by the private sector - contractual savings were still of little signi- 
ficanee in Jordan. 
(6 ) 
This gives more chances for a positive interest 
rate policy'to stimulate private'savingS. Further, ' though unstatistical, 
evidence for'thS sensitivity of the Jordanian'private sector to interest 
rate changes was clear in'1971, when the issue of government bonds, yielding 
interest higher-than those on bank deposits led to a partiii-Iswit'chl 
in financial savings from the latter to theformer, - 
"(6) Finally, given the'need and desirability 'for pursuing a flexible 
and positive interest rate policy in Jordan, the authorities should 
constantly manipulate nominal interest rates to ensure a realisti6 
return on financial holdings. Efforts to curb inflationary pressures- 
are of special importance here, becausG-for fixed-interest financial 
(1) Khatkhate,, D. "Analytic Basis of the Working of Monetary policy in 
less Developed Countries", IMF Staff Papers (Nov. 1972) P-539 
(2) Chandavarkar, *Some aspects of Interest Rates policies in 
developing countriesp" OP-cit. P-78 
(3) Khatkhate, OP-cit- P-540- 
(4) Chandavarkarp OP-cit- P-75 
(5) See Appendix 3.2 & 3.3 
(6) For the limited role of contractual savings institutions. see Chapter 9 
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assets to offer a positive yield,, there should -either be relative price 
stability, or a change in nominal rates of interest to bring them into 
line with the rate of inflation. The upward adjustment of interest should 
not only be confined to the deposit rates, but should also cover the 
structure of domestic rates of interest, i. e., interest on other competing 
financial instruments and the lending rates. 
(') 
The authorities can 
start the practical process by raising the deposit rates to a 
realistically positive level, i. e. one which both preserves the purchasing 
power of the money and provides, in addition, a reasonable rate of 
return, 
(2) 
Afterwards, the lending rates could be set several points, 
higher than the average deposit rate, in ordee, to maintain the profit- 
ability margin ofýthe banks. Other financial instruments and the lending 
rates of other financial institutions could then be adjusted within a 
coherent overall-interest rate policy. However., the upward-adjustment. 
of rates of interest should be influenced, and guided-by the extent to 
which various economic sectors can absorb the increase in the costcC 
borrowing. This requires a further close examination of this important 
point, which can be undertaken by, the CBJ before deciding upon the per- 
centage increase in the deposit rates., If. however., the above prescribed 
level, to which the nominal deposit rate has to be raised, might lead to 
prohibitive lending rates, the former could be lowered to a level which 
would initially preserve the. real value of deposits, with a very small 
real yield, or even without any yield at all. -This would., at least,,, 
ensure people that the real value of their savings are-not depreciating 
an 
in real terms because of inflatidn. The aim of introducing/innovational 
interest rate policy in Jordan is to use such a monetary instrument 
positively and purposively to achieve substantial benefits for the economy 
as discussed above. 
(1) For the prevailing structure of interest rates in Jordan, See Appendix 
11.2 
(2) When inflationary pressures ease, of course., nominal rates can be 
subsequently lowered. However, for the above practical adjustment 
processes of interest rates, see Robert Emery, The Financial 
Institutions of South East Asia, op. cit. P. 705 
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"The choice is not so much between particular levels or structure 
of interest rates as between rigid and flexible policies". (i) 
Whereas interest rate policy can be vigorously and actively used in the 
Jordanian context, a proper adaptation of this policy instrument to the 
changing economic conditions is equally necessary. On the whole, how- 
ever, one has to agree with the proper application of the higher interest 
rate strategy as Chandavarkar puts it: 
"An appropriate overall interest rate policy for a less developed 
country will,, however, have to be based on a delicate balancing of 
the requirements of rates realistic enough to stimulate saving but 
not too high to inhibit investment in desired channels. "(2) 
Secondly, the CBJ is required, to introduce the system of guaranteed 
cheques into the commercial banking practice. since this would popularise 
the use of cheques as a means of payments and further-promote the bankkS 
habit. 
The CW should encourage the introduction of the guaranteed cheqUS3 
system into domestic banking practice, whereby the issuing banks-. -. 
undertake that a maximum fixed amount of any transaction. will be honoured, 
In the U. K., for example, the cheque card system., where a ceiling of 
L50 is honoured by the clearing banks,, plays a significant role in 
providing confidence in cheques which are, widely used to settle domestic 
transactions. Although the cheque in Jordan is protected, by Law,, 
(3) 
its 
are 
use is still unpopular since p eoplej usually averse to accepting it as 
a means of payments. Apart from cases when the-drawer-is known to 
the beneficiary,, or when the latter accepts the risk-of-going through long 
administrative-and legal procedures if the cheque is drawn without 
balance, the usual practice is to demand cash to settleeveryday - 
(1) Chandavarkar, "Some Aspects of Interest Rates Policies in Less 
Developed Countries". op. cit. P. 105 
(2) Chandavarkar,, Anandq "Interest Rates po2icies in Developing' 
Countries". Financ6 and Development (March 1970) P. 27 
(3) According to the Law, ary cheque that is given to other parties with- 
out balance entails a certain period/Uprisonment for the payee. 
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transactions. 1n fact, people cannot be blamed for this behaviour 
because the full amounts of cheques are not guaranteed by the banks., 
Undoubtedly,, people's reluctance to accept cheques would have been much 
less had the banks guaranteed to pay a fixed amount per transaction . 
However, there is no reason why such a useful cheque guaranteed system 
cannot be applied in Jordan. This would effectively promote the banking 
habit, and further channel resources into the financial circle. The 
element of currency in circulation would be minimised in relative 
importance in total-M2, a major objective that the CBJ should always 
endeavour-to-achieve, 
- Thirdly. Centralbanking action is needed not, only to induce a term 
transformation in domestic liquidity (M2). -but also-to promote'-long-ter 
capital market instruments by creating newInstitutions dealing, in such 
assets. ýI--I-Ii 
It was shown in-chapter 10 that one structural weakness in the "' 
Jordanian Stock Exchange was the absence, of capital market institutions 
which usually mobilise long-term funds and make them available for 
investment. Active institutional investors, such as mutual funds-, unit 
trust, and-other-investment companies were virtually non-existent iný- 
Jordan. Besides,, contractualýsaving institutions (i. e. insurance 
companies and pension funds) were shown to be -of little importance both 
as mobilisors of long-term savings and holders of capital market assets. 
This situation weakened the demand side of the Jordanian exchange, which 
was largely confined to individual investors. To effectively activate 
the demand side, the need to set up investment companies, and other 
private as well as public capital market institutions dealing in long-term 
instruments, was shown to be urgent if the Jordanian Exchange is to, 
become an important source for financing development. The creation of 
such institutions is important to encourage the accumulation of long- 
term financial savings, which are still insignificant in the private 
sector asset portfolio., The CBJ,, which took the necessary steps to 
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establish the Amman Financial Market, is also able to promote the 
creation of capital market institutions. - 'yet another essential step for 
activating the Jordanian Exchange. 
"11 
The Allocation of Resources 
Whereas the previously discussed measures aim at assisting develop- 
ment through influencing the size and structure of domestiefinancial 
aavings,, the CBJ can equally promote development by operating on the 
allocation pattern of financial resources. The purpose of the CBJ's 
actions here is to exercise a closer confrol over bank activitiesq' and 
further encourage the flow of bank funds into developmental areas. 
As was sho-in in my M. A. Thesis, the CW since its inception in 
1964 up to 1973 played a passive qualitative influence over bank credit. 
Since the implementation of domestic development programmes in 1973, the 
CW has been increasingly active in domestic credit management; with 
the purpose of, firstly, subjecting credit under its control and, 
secondly, directing further resources to priority sectors. - Allereas the 
second aspect aimed at exercising qualitative influenc'e ovei'bank credit 
to adjust it in accordance with developmental needs, the first endeavoured 
to restrict the expansion of credit (excluding that g'oing to priority 
sectors) which increasingly contributed to domestic liquidity and to 
the rising Anflationary pressures. Table 11.2 shows that bank credit 
was a major source of domestic liquidity after 073, inducing about half 
of the increase in M2 during 1973 - 1977, This was compared with a 
corresponding figure. of 22.3% during 1970 - 1972. 
(2) 
To restrict credit 
(I ) J. Salah, The Evolution of the Banking System in Jordan, oi;. oit, P. 76 
(2) As Table 11.2 illustrates, net claims on the governmentWere the 
largest expansionary element inducing domestic liqui4ity between 
1970 - 1972, whereas the external sector exerted a contractionary 
effect. The noticeably large impact of the public sector might be 
related to the huge government expenditures which reflected the 
official intention to reactivate the economy after the 1970 civil 
disturbances. 
369 
expansion, especially for non-essential purposes, the CW employed many 
instruments, which also aimed at influencing the allocation of bank 
resourass in favour of development. Prior to 1975, these instruments 
included credit ceilings, credit, /deposit ratio, and the reserves and 
liquidity ratios. 
(') 
Ho2wever, the application of such instruments 
achieved Only a limited success, as credit expansion continued to endanger 
domestic liquidity and the sectoral distribution of credit remained 
heavily geared towards financing foreign trade and construction sectors 
(2) (both sharing about two thirds of total credit by 1975) . 
Monetary policy became more stringent during 1976, when credit 
expansion reached the highest level ever, contributing 75-Y1- 
-t? 
domestic 
liguidity as is shown in the table. Whereas the CBJ continued to adopt 
credit guidelines, (whereby credit ceilings were examined and reimposed 
every six months) and further lowered the credit, /deposit ratio, 
(3) 
new 
instruments- were ecployed to influence the lending capacity of banks, 
together with the direction of their credit. In order to reduce the 
ratio of overdrafts to other types of credit facilities, commercial 
banks were required (during the first half of 1976) to keep with the 
CW, over and above their legal cash reserves, a special interest-bearing 
X1 deposit of . on their overdraft to customers, 
(4) 
To further minimise 
the ability of banks to extend credit, a memorandum was issued in December 
1976, raising the minimum liquidity ratio from the previously prescribed 
(1) For the monetary instruments employed prior to 1975 and their effect, 
see J. Salah, oP. cit. PP 76 - 80 
(2) See Appendix 4.5 
(3) The ICFv' ceiling on credit expansion continued to operate during both 
halves of 1976, whereas the maximum credit/deposits ratio was 
reduced to 75% during the first half and to 7C% during the second 
half. (See Central Bank of Jordan, Annual Report. 1976, PP. 48-49) 
(4) Central Bank of Jordan, Annual Re-port. 1976, P-48 
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level of 30% to'32% (during the first month of th'e date of issue) 
and to 35% (during the follo'Wing three months). 
( 
The'minimum 
reserve requirements ratio onýAemand deposits' was'also raised from 
12% to 15%. whereas that imposed on time and saving deposits'remained" 
unchanged at 1 2%. 
(2) 
This was the"first timeýdifferential reserve 
requirements according to t. ype of deposit were used'in Jordan, a 
stop in the right direction as will'be shown later. Finally, the CBJ 
the 
also used/interest rate instrument to increase, albeit slightly, the 
cost of credit by specifying a floor lending'rate of 7.5%. 
(3) 
At the begiming of 1977,, however,, the above restrictive measures 
were temporarily relaxed following the noticeable decline in general 
economic activity, which was largely caused by an obvious slowdown in 
the trade and real estate sectors. 
(4) 
Banks became generally cautiouz 
in their lending as a result of their experience with certain loans on 
which delays on repaymentfad arisen because of losses incurred by 
borrowers in real estate transactions, or because of th6'ielatiie 
depression in inventories of imported goodi. 
(5) 
To cope'with the new 
situation, the CW suspended the previous limitations on bank credit 
(1) Central Bank of 'Memorandum. No. 216/76 
(2) IMF,. Jordan - Recent Economic DevelonSeni, 
(Febý'6,1978) P-33 
(3) On Jan. 1,, 1976, Memorandum No. 1/76 was issued to regulate the 
rates of interest charged and paid by commercial banks as follows: 
(a) the minimum prime rate of interest charged on'credit facilities 
for financing commercial purposes shall, be 7.0. (b) The minimum 
rate paid on saving deposits shall range -between 5% and 50 
according to type of deposit (see Central Bank of Jordan, Annual 
Report, 1976, P. 49 
(4) Central Bank of Jordan, Annual Report. 15r77, P. 36 
(5) IMF, Jordan - Recent Economic Development, -op. cit. P-33 
372 
and the other restrictive measures adopted- earlier in 1976. Credit 
ceilings were -first suspended, then the requirement of a special 
deposit on overdrafts was. eliminated, the maximum credit/deposit-ratio 
was abolished, and finally the minimum ligiddity ratio was resorted-to 
its original level of 30%. 
(1) 
Commercial banks were given complete 
freedom in their domestic asset choice, -urging them to allocate further 
resources towards developmental areas. However, in an attempt to 
encourage development finance by banks, the CBJ decided to, deduct the 
subscriptions of these banks to the capital of the Housing Bank and 
the Industrial, Development Bank (priority investments) from their 
deposits, for the purpose of calculating the capital/deposit ratio; 
in addition, bank assets in the form of development bonds and treasury 
bills (other priority investment) were also allowed to be deducted 
from the deposits of their customers, for the purposes of calculating 
the same ratio. 
(2) 
However, despite the above increasing active role played by the 
CBJ in t1s area of credit management, the allocation pattern of bank 
credit has not been in line with the set development strategy of 
diversifying the domestic econoiMr and strengthening its industrial bise. 
(3) 
It Was shown in chapter 4 that only. a. slight shift occurred in the 
sectoml distribution of bank credit in favour of agriculture and - 
manufacturing industries,, sectors of prime priority within the country's 
development strategies. Between 1973 - 1977, the relative importance 
of credit extended to agriculture rose from 3.3% to only 4.1%, whereas 
the proportion want in favour of manufacturing increased from 10.2% to 
(1) Central Bark of Jordan, Annual Report. 1977, P-36 
(2) Ib id. 
For development strategies in Jordan, See Chapter 3. PP. 41-64 
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13.3%, 
(') 
Bank credit was still largely confined to the foreign trade 
sector which managed to maintain its relative share by 1977 at the- 
same level as in 1973 (i. e. 40.5%). 
(2) 
For commercial banks to con- 
tribute effectively to the development process,, the above bias towards 
the traditional financing of the foreign trade sector should be 
radically removed,, and substantial proportions of bank credit should, 
be channelled to priority sectors in order to facilitate the required 
structural changes in the real economy. To achieve this, further 
prior planning and specification of-the allocation pattern of bank 
resources is necessary to bring them in line with the defined develop- 
ment strategies. This implies a more active and vigorous selective 
role of credit policy within an overall "institution-relatee approach 
of monetary policy control. As illustrated, in chapter 7, an effective 
pursuit of this approach (where the asset portfolio behaviour of comm- 
ercial banks is subjected to the desire of monetary authorities. 
rather than being determined by the free rOrces of the market mechanism) 
is further required in developing countries in which the possible - 
divergence between the private and social costs and benefits in the 
allocation of financial resources is greater than in developed countr- 
ies. 
(3) 
Within this approach, two areas of-central banking innovation 
were found appropriate and useful for domestic application in Jordan. 
Firstly. an effective-use of the differential reserve requirements 
system with the objective of influencing the asset portfolio behaviour 
of the commercial banks in favour of Priority investments. 
('+) 
(1) & (2) See Appendix 4.5 
(3) See Chapter 7, PP. 205 -206 
(4) The author would like to mention here that some illustrative 
technical aspects of the selective use of this instrument were 
obtained from the Bank of England during the author's study visit 
to the Bark in April 1979. Staff from the Latin American Group 
(overseas Dept .) and also from the CashiezisOffice were particularly 
helpful in providing relevant data and also in discussing some 
technical sides of applying this instrument to the Jordanian 
environment. 
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As is, generally recognised, the resort to a reserve-requirements 
techniclue usually produces good results in the underdeveloped financial 
environment, where the successful application of other traditional 
monetary tools is limited. Since a central bank,, -by varying the legal 
required reserves, can directly influence-the liquidity position-of 
commercial banks and thus their ability to lend, this instrument can 
be used in developing countries as an alternative to, open market 
operations (traditionally used in developed countries) to influence 
bank credit and dampen inflationary pressures. 
(') 
However, although 
the-CBJ frequently relied on this weapon as a main, instrument of"' 
domestio, credit management, 
(2) 
its application was-not satisfactorily 
successful, because the new specified floors were always much less 
than the already high levels of reserves kept'with the CBJ. - In, conditions 
where commercial banks maintain excessive reserves, then small changes 
in the'required ratio would not sufficiently, infixience'the'ability of- 
banks to-reduce lending, because they can run down their excessive 
reserve holdings to- most the new, prescribed ratios. It was shown that 
the actual ca3h--reserves ratio for commercial banks in Jordan, was- 
about twice as much as the minimum legal level specified by the CBJ-, 
during 1964 - 1977. 
(3) 
This clearly suggests that for this instrument 
to be effective in the Jordanian, context, variations in'reserve require- 
ments should be large enough to bring about the.. desired- impact. ' -- 
(1) Furness, E., Money and Creait in Developing Africa, op. cit. P. 222 
(2) The reserve requirements ratio was initially fixed at 7% in'jan., 
1%7, then raised to 10%, in Dec. 1970 and to 12% in July 1974. 
Recently, differential reserve requirements according to type' 
of deposits were introduced in 1976,, raising the ratio on demand 
deposits to 15%., whereas that on time and saving deposits 
remained at the same level of 12%. 
(3) Whereas the commercial banks were required to'maintain with the 
CW a cash ratio accounting,, on average, for IWo during 1%1+ 
779 the actual ratio maintained was, 23%* thus giving a free . cash reserve ratio of 13% ke t voluntari3y bi'the barks. See- 
chapter 4, Table 4.8j (Po 1441nd also Figure 4.5oB* (P-141) 
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In developing, -countries,, however, legal reserve requirements were 
used not only to exercise quantitative impact on bank credit, but also 
as a selective instrument aiming at changing the asset portfolio of 
commercial banks in favour of priority investments. A differential, " 
reserve requirements system has been successfully introduced in many 
developing countries, whereby different prescribed ratios . were linked 
to the composition of commercial banks' assets in order to encourage the 
flow of funds-into socially 'desirable' sectors. Latin American 
countries-were particularly innovative in this area, where commercial 
banks were allowed to mintain a lower cash reserve ratio, provided 
that prescribed percentages of their portfolio consisted of specified 
(I ) 
types of loans and investments, Besides influencing the asset 
portfolio behaviour of the commercial banks,, this instrument was also 
used in many countries to encourage a term transformation of bank 
deposits., In Columbia, for example,, differential 
I 
reserve requirements 
were imposed on commercial banks, descriminating between types of 
deposits and, at the same time, encouraging the flow of bank funds into 
developmental activities. This is illustrated by Table 11.3 which 
shows. for instance, a higher percentage ratio on private sight deposits 
as compared with that imposed on saving deposits (the former being 
fixed at 47,1% whereas the latter was set at 2Wo, as of Oct,,, 31,1977). 
However, the latter ratio could be reduced to only 0.5% if banks allo- 
cated the differenc6 (i. e. 19.5%) to specified categories of assets 
(see footnote 3 below the table). Clearly, the application of such a 
system would serve. two important goals of monetary policy: (1) encour- 
aging commercial banks to seek the more stable saving and time deposits 
(1) This system was extensively used in Mexico,, Argentina, Columbia, 
Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, and Peru. See A. Brimmer 
"Central Banking and Economic Development: The Record of Innovation! q Journal of Money. Credit and Bankin (Nov. 1971) PP. 787 - 789; 
and D. Fritz, "Measures to increase commercial bank financing of 
Industry in Developing Countries". Industrialisation and Product- 
ivity, Bulletin 13 New York: U. N. Publication, 1969YW. 93 - 95 
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Table 11.3 Ordinary Legal Reserve Requirements and 
Marginal Reserve Requirements in Columbia. 1975 - 19771 
Deo. 1975 Nc. 1976 Oct. 1977 
I. Ordinary Legal Reserves 
Sight Deposits and Deposits less than 30 days 361 41ý 47 1 
Deposits of more than 30 days 29 
2 2? 29 2 
Sight & Time Deposits of Public Sector Entities 80 80 80 
Saving deposits of the private sector 203 203 203 
Certificate of Deposits 10 10 10. 
Foreign Currency sight and time deposits 30 20 20 
31. Marginal Reserve Requirements (special deposits 
- 
Sight Depo3its. and deposits less than 30, days 1004 1005 
Certificate of Deposits 100 
4 
Saving Deposits 1004 
Foreign deposits coverted'into local'ourrency 100 
6 
1006 
Source: Data were directly collected from'the Bank of England (Overseas 
Department - Latin American Group) during a stu4y visit in 
April 1979. 
I For the first col $ 100 million, the legal reserve requirements'is 18% 
2 Of which 14%'can be held in bonds of the Industrial Financial -Fund' 
and the Caja Agravia_(Priority Investments) 
3 Of which 19. Vo can be held in bonds of the Central Mortgage Bank (priority investments) 
On increases of these deposits above the levels of 20-11-1975 
On increases &f these deposits above the-levels of 31-1-1977. 
The Central Bank considers as part of these requirements any 
increase in banks' own resources used for their rediscount operr-tioni 
with the specialised funds. (Priority Uses) 
On increases in these deposits above the levels of 22-AO-1976 
of which a certain percentage can be alternatively used for 
holding prescribed assets approved by the Central Bank. 
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which, have a lower required reserve ratio and 
(2) inducing a change in-the 
- 
(I) 
,- structure of bank assets in favour of priority investments, 
The CBJ can usefully introduce a similar system of differential 
reserve requirements to serve the above two purposes, which are of 
special concernfor domestic monetary policy in Jordan. It is interesting 
to, mention here that the CBJ1s action in 1976ýto fix two cash reserve 
ratios according to type of deposits (15% on demand deposits'and, 12%o, on 
saving and time deposits) would help in the application of, the aýove 
suggested technique. In addition-to utilising the differential reserve 
recuirements as-an inducement for commercial banks to seek longer-term 
savings, these banks can be also encouraged to finance priority sectors, 
if the CBJ extends the use of this instrument*to influence bank asset' 
portfolio behaviour. To be effective, however, the above suggested 
system-should have two features: (1) it must be flexible to allow for 
necessary changes to take place when the need rises, either in the priority 
areas or in the-prescribed percentages, and 
(2) the difference between the 
prescribed ratios ancl the implied incentives should be large enough to 
produce the expected-changes, in both the structure-of banks' deposits 
as well as, in the composition of their assets., 
In Mexico, for example, where differential reserve requirements have 
been in use for more than two decades, the authorities appeared 
to be satisfied with the results obtained under this system. It 
was felt that such a system was instrumental in encouraging banks 
to take an interest in types of productive loans which they'had not 
made before because of inertia or force of habit. The authorities 
further believed that since banks became accustomed to extending 
such loans and found them to be remunerative,, they might well 
continue this type of lending even-in the. absence of the imposed___ 
ratios. See Brimmer, op-cit. P. 788 
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Moreover, the differential reserve requirements may be supplemented 
by marginal reserve requirements (i. e. sped al deposit) which can, further 
influence the volume and direction of bank credit, particularly to serve- 
tight monetary objectives during inflationary conditions. In addition 
to observing the ordinary differential reserve requirements, a central 
bank may also require commercial banks to maintain a certain percentage 
of the increase in their deposits in a special interest-bearing deposit. 
A special deposit scheme has been largely used in many developed countries, 
such as the U. K., as a quantitative instrument to exercise a direct 
influence on the liquidity of the commercial banks and their ability 
to lend. However, this can be also used as a selective instrument of 
credit policy to influence the flow of bank resources towards priority 
sectors. Special deposit schemes have been selectively used in Mexico 
and Columbia, in which commercial banks were required to maintain,, 
aside from the ordinary legal reserves,, marginal reserves of certain 
percentages on the increase in different types of deposits - however, a 
commercial bank may waive these requirements if it invests its new 
deposits in sectors and in proportions established by the monetary 
authorities. 
(') 
As shown by Table 11 -3., Columbian commercial banks, 
were asked to observe marginal reserve requirements of 100/% against new 
deposits during the period 1975 - 1977. As an alternative to maintaining 
this special deposit, coir rcial banks could hold part of the prescribed 
percentage in priority investment (see footnotes 5 and 6 below the 
table). 
(1) D. Fritz, op. cit. PP. 93 - 94 
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, 
The application of marginal reserve requirements is highly -- 
recommended for the Jordanian context, especially when the CBJ-pursues 
tight monetary poliay aiming at restricting bank credit during inflationary 
periods. 
(') 
More important, however,. is the selective use of 
this weapon, as shown above, to induce vigorous change in the portfolio 
behaviour of commercial banks, to bring the composition of their assets 
within the defined and required structural changes in the real economy. 
(2) 
The direct influence and-the-consequent benefits-of differential reserve 
requirements even led developed countries to selectively use, this instru- 
ment to encourage commercial banks to hold a certain percentage of their 
resources to prescribed 'desirable' assets. A system of differential 
reserve requirements for selective purposes has been successfully intro- 
duced in marW ECC countries (such as France., Italy, Belgium) and-was- 
also recommended for the domestic application in, the U. K. 
W 
Secondly. the CBJ should encourage term loans byýcommercial banks 
through (1) rediscounting longer-term financial instruments. and 
(2) gr6viding Incentives and imposing legislative requirements to 
introduce such type, of lending into domestiobanking practice. 
The argument for, and the significance of,, introducing. the term 
lending technique into the Jordanian banking practice were fully 
As particularly experienced in 1976 when bank credit generated 
about three quarters of the increase in domestic liqudity. 
Although this percentage was reduced to one quarter in 1977 (see 
Table 11.2). figures for 1978 revealed that bank credit resumed its 
large expansionary effect on domestic liquidity,, inducing about 
three quarters of the rise in M2, (See Central Bank ofýJordan, 
Monthly Bulletin, (Feb. 1979) Table 3. 
(2) The developmental impact of this technique would be even more if 
the CBJ indirectýy allocate part of the accumulated marginal 
reserves into priority sectors through further lending to speoialised 
credit institutions. 
(3) Morison and Brown, "Monetary and Credit Controls in the U. K. ". 
op. cit. P. 1028 
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discussed in chapter 4. where it was shown that this type of innovation 
was not onýy necessitated by the rising need for long-term loans, - 
accomparVing the implementation of development programmes, but was 
further encouraged by the particular structure and nature of bank 
deposits about one half of these deposits had a relative stable 
character (in the form of time and saving deposits) whereas the other 
half(comprising demand deposits)had low annual turnover. 
(') 
However, for term lending to be undertaken by the commercial banks, 
it was argued, the CBJ should be first prepared to provide rediscounting 
facilities for long-term financial instruments when the need for liquid- 
ity rises. This has been the practice in many developing countries, 
such as Syria, where. term. lending by banks found support from the Central 
Bank that stood ready to rediscount medium and long-term debt instru- 
(2) 
ments Jordanian central banking legislation, in fact, confines 
rediscounting facilities only to financial instruments not exceeding 
(3) 
9 months. Thust if commercial banks are to be encouraged to venture 
into the term lending business, the above legislative impediment should 
141 (4) 
be removed to enable the CBJ to secure bank liquidity. Professor 
See Chapter 4,, PP, 97-106 
(2) United Nations. "Financing of Industrial Development of various 
countries in the Middle East". In: Studies on Development Problems 
in Selected countries of the Middle East. 197 (New York: 1974) P-39 
(3) Central Bank of Jordan, Law No. 23 of 1971, Article 39 
(4) However,, the CBJ may find it necessary to set up a special financial 
institution for redi3counting longer-term assets -if term lending- 
becomes increasingly important in bank activities. The CBJ can... 
benefit from the Indian experience in this regard where a re-Finance 
Corporation has been created with the participation of the Reserve 
Bank of India, the government, and some commercial banks. The aim 
was to re-finance, through the rediscounting mechanism, any commercial 
bank which became financially embarrassed due to term lending pp e rations. 
For more details regarding the I iuLian Re -Finance Corporation, 
see George Rosen, Some Aspects of Industrial Finance in India, 
op. cit. P. 102 
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Sayers has particularly eEphasised this point: 1- 11"IýI 
"The upshot is that the Central Bank, though especially, cautious 
in its own business with the general public, should adopt no 
rigid rule against medi=-term and long-term-lending by commercial- 
banks. Even the smallest banks must lend for longer-terms than 
would match their assets and the Central Bank must be prepared 
to supply liquidity in case of emergency. "(1) 
In recognising the significance of the term lending technique 
to their economies, many developing countries modified their bank legis- 
(2) 
lation to enforce this type of lending on domestic banking practice. 
For this innovation to effectively take place in Jordan., the CBJ may 
find it necessary to require commercial banks, by law, to extend certain 
percentages. of their funds to prescribed medium and long-term loans. 
Given a long history of strict adherence to conservatism on the part of 
many banks, these banks may not voluntarily undertake this type of new 
business. It was shown that the domestic application of this technique 
in Jordan does not. mean a complete departure from the traditional short- 
term lending practice, but a part ial deviation from strict orthodoxy, 
nedessitated by the country's changing economic needs. It is therefore 
suggested thatierm lending undertaken by commercial banks should not 
comprise the bulk of their credit, rather it should form only a moderate 
proportion of their furds,, which does not endanger their liqddity. The 
CBJ can benefit from the Greek experience where the Central Bank there 
fixed the required percentage of term lending at 10% of private saving 
and time deposits. which was later raised to 15%. 
(3) 
In the Jordanian 
case, the minimum required percentage can be specified by the CBJ with 
(1) R. S. Sayers, Central Banking In Underdeveloped Countries (Calro: 
National Bank of EgyPtj, 50th Anniversary Commemoration lectures,, 
_ 1956) P. 10 
(2) Guatemala, The Dominican Republic, Kore-at Piaguayt''and'Greece wire 
given as examples for the enforcement of term lending on domestic 
bank legislations. See Chapter 4, P. 128 
(3) Xenophon Zolotas, Monetary Equilibrium and Economic Development, 
with special Reference to the E: xperience of Greece, op. cit. P. 93 
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the co-operation of the commercial banks,, and should be-subject to- 
revision'in accordance'with changing circumstances. 'Moreover, the 
selective role-of the previously discussed differential reserve'requirel- 
ments system can be usefully employed here by the CBJ to encourage' 
commercial banks to'venture into this new and 'socially' desirable activity. 
In Columbia'where such a system-was extensively-used, commercial'banks 
could'hold, as'an alternative to maintaining the full prescribed percentage 
of marginal reserve requirements, a certain proportion of the required 
reserves in-loans to industry of maturity of up to 5 years. 
(1)''The 
-" 
enforcement-of term lending in Jordanian bank legislations., together 
with the selective use of the differential reserve requirements to serve 
this purpose, would ensure further allocation of bank resources in long- 
term developmental activities. Aý-' 
II-* 
Summary and Conclusions, 
The-preceding analysis has made it clear that, whereas financial 
intermediaries in Jordan, particularly the commercial binks, 'have in 
theory had to adjust their operations within the defined framework of 
development programmes, the Central Bank of Jordan has, in practice, 
first to provide the appropriate climate and other necessary conditions 
that encourage the financial adjustment processes to take place. Commer- 
cial banks, for example, cannot be expected to venture into term lending 
while the CBJ is not prepared to provide rediscounting facilities for 
longer-term financial instruments to secure their liquidity in need. 
It is also difficult to put bLlame only on the commercial banks for 
being unable to actively Imstitutionalise domestic savings and lengthen 
their maturity, while their ability to do so is restricted by rigidities 
in the structure and levels of interest rates. Central banks in 
(1) D. Fritzp OP-cit. P-93 
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developing countries should vigoroutly act as developmental agencies 
for their respective governments; they have, first of all, to pave the 
way and provide the conditions most conducive to financial development, 
then they should make sure that domestic resources are sufficiently 
mobilised and appropriately allocated in manners consistent with the 
selected development strategies. To this end, specific central banking 
innovations have been suggested in this chapter and their benefits have 
been fully discussed. Most important among these are (1) the adoption 
of a positive and purposive interest rate strategy aiming at influencing 
the size and structure of financial savings, and (2) the selective use 
of a differential reserve requirements system to vigorously change the 
composition of bank assetsin favour of developmental activities. It 
is believed that the active pursuit of such innovations would assist the 
adaptation process of the financial system and further augment the 
benefits of interaction between financial and economic development. As 
will be emphasised in the next chapter, a proper adjustment of the 
financial system to its special environment is particularly significant 
in countries, such as Jordan, where financial intermediation and the 
ways in which financial institutions perform their functions would well 
hasten or retard the process of real growth. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
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CHAPTER 12 
\ 
SU!, -flMY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has analysed and assessed the activities of 
different types of domestic financial intermediaries within the 
context of Jordanian economic development. Financial poli ies, 
innovations, and procedures have been prescribed to improve'the 
operational efficiency of the financial system and to enlarge its 
developmental impact. 
Jordan is an example of a country where priority has been 
specifically given in development plans for the concomitant evolution 
of the internal financial structure and system as part of the reans 
by which economic growth and structural industrial change may be 
effected. This policy preference therefore provides a case-study 
of a developing country which conforms with the special emphasis placed 
by recent literature on the role of financial intermediation in facilitat- 
ing and attaining real economic growth. As such it uny make a 
contribution to our knowledge of the role of the financial intermediation 
process in economic development. 
All three Jordanian development plans - the 7 Year Plan (1964-197pl, 
the 3-Year Pl-nn (1973-1975), and the 5 Year PlAn (1976-1980) - have 
emphasised the role of financial institutions in promoting real economic 
development. 
0) 
This policy was a necessary complement to an overall 
development strategy that emphasised the continued predominant 
importance of the private sector in the new context of the creation of 
structural industrial change. To further this objective, development 
planners sought to encourage private sector activity and initiative by 
(1) For development strategies in Jordan and the role given to financial 
institutions, see Chapter 3, PP. 41 - 64 
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specific government investment policies. This role therefore necessita- 
ted a concomitant importance being attached to the financial inter- 
mediation process in mobilising savings and effecting the efficient 
developmental use of funds thereby obtained. 
While each chapter of this thesis has analysed a particular aspect 
of the financial system, four main issues emerge as being crucial for 
the development of the general argument. While these are presented 
in the context of Jordan., the identification of these issues and the 
arguments that have been evolved, -may also be of relevance to other less 
developed countries that adopt policies that emphasise. the role of 
financial intermediation in economic development. 
'ISSUE 
I 
GIVEN A POLICY PREFERENCE THAT EMPHASISES THE ROLE OF 
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION, TWO THEORETICAL PROBLEMS NEED TO BE 
RESOLVED IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE ACTUAL QUANTITATIVE SIGNIFICANCE 
TO BE ATTACHED TO ITS DEVELOPMENTAL CONTRIBUTION - (a) THE PRECISE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND GROWTH (b) THE 
ACTUAL CAUSATION PROCESS UNDERLYING THIS RELATIONSHIP. 
(a) Whereas the theoretical issue of whether a country's financial 
system can actually influence real growth has not yet been conclusively 
resolved, there seems to be an increasing consensus expressed in the 
recent literature that financial intermediaries are not in fact neutral 
with respect to economic development. 
(') 
This would suggest that a 
country's financial structure and the operational techniques it adopts 
do tend to materially facilitate or retard its internal rate of real 
industrial progress. Given the significance attached to these institutions 
in the Jordanian context, the supposed link between financial inter- 
mediation and the economy's real growth needs to be statistically 
(I) See Chapter I, PP. 5-6 
386 
established. Quantitative analysis of this relationship by means of 
simple regression techniques demonstrates a general significant 
statistical association. 
('), 
The response of real growth (represented 
by WP/capita. ) to a unit change in financial intermediation (measured 
by M21GNP ratio) was found statistically significant at the 1% level. 
W Although the above empirical investigation established that 
financial development has accompanied real growth in the Jordanian 
case, it has not been possible to identify the precise direction 
of the causal relationship between the two variables. Chapter I 
demonstrated that, in theory, the causality of the relationship can 
run in either direction: economic growth can induce financial develop- 
ment and the latter can promote the former. 
(2) 
In practice, historical 
evidence of financial development in developed countries reveals the 
existence of two distinct types of financial systems, each having a 
different impact on real growthW_ 
(I) An active financial system which takes the lead in promoting 
economic growth through encouraging domestic entrepreneurship and 
direct financing of industrial expansion. Here, financial intermediation 
induces economic growth rather than the other way around. 
(II) A passive financial system which accommodates the demand made 
for its services without directly initiating economic growth. Here, 
the financial system only responds to changes in the real economy, thus 
leading the direction of the relationship to run from economic to 
financial development. Germany was cited as an outstanding example 
of the former, whereas England was considered a clear example of the 
latter. In both cases, however, each type of financial system was 
successful in adapting itself to its special environment. 
(1) See Chapter 3.. PP- 81 - 89 
(2) See Chapter 1, PP. 7- 10 
(3) Ibicl, PP. 1 -4 
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ARGUMENT 
While aggregate analysis did not resolve the causality issue., 
study of the financial system in its disaggregated form led to the 
general conclusion that 'supply-leading' financial institutions work 
to direct the causal influence from financial to economic development., 
whereas 'demand-following' institutions tend to reverse this sequence. 
This study has clearly shown the existence of both types of intermediaries 
in Jordan operating in different areas of the financial sector. The 
demand-following type shaped the evolutionary pattern of the commercial 
banks, whereas the non-bank financial sector (except the insurance 
industry) followed a supply-leading approach of development. Commercial 
banks developed and increased in number in response to the increase in 
the demand made upon them by different economic units. The network of 
bank branches was extended to satisfy the rising demand for financial 
services. This was why bank offices were mainly concentrated in the 
Amman area, -in which 
deposits were largely available and where loans 
were substantially demanded. These banks did not take the lead by 
establishing new branches and providing services in advance of demand, 
especially in rural areas where they could have been supply-leading 
institutions. Furthermore, they did not directly initiate economic 
growth in the sense of providing entrepreneurial talent, guidance, as 
well as finance, for the creation and expansion of domestic industries. 
Such activities were shown to dominate banking practice in many other 
countries, such as Germany and Japan. Commercial banks in Jordan, 
in fact, followed a similar path to that of England, where such institutions 
played a passive role, responding only to the demand for their services 
without direct initiation and promotion of growth in the real economy, 
Given this situation, their contribution to domestic economic development 
was merely confined to their role in carrying out and facilitating the 
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saving-investment process. 
On the other hand, the non-bank financial sector in Jordan emerged 
and developed on a supply-leading basis. Aside from the insurance 
industry, which was privately initiated, the rest of the non-bank finantial 
institutions was created by government initiative and was further 
developed by official policies. These supply-leading activities must 
have directly promoted economic development. By setting up specialised 
financial institutions and providing their financial and technical 
services in advance of the demand for them in sectors where such 
facilAties were either inadequate or virtually non-existent, these 
institutions must have taken the lead in permitting real growth to take 
place. The establishment of these non-bank financial intermediaries, 
particularly specialised credit institutions, was necessitated by the 
failure of the market mechanism to attract private investment in those 
basic sectors of the economy which were given special attention in 
domestic development programmes. 
0) 
Undoubtedly, if such institutions 
had not been deliberately created by the government, internal development 
would have been greatly retarded. 
CONCLUSION 
The nature and direction of the causal influence between financial 
and real development depend largely on the tYPe and function of the 
financial institution and the pattern of its evolution. The existence 
of both Idemand-following' and 'supply-leading' financial institutions 
in Jordan led to a reciprocal interaction process of influence between 
financial dqveloj5ment and economic growth. In the Jordanian context, 
therfore. 
-there 
is no' unique explanation for the chain of causation. 
(I ) See Chapter 
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ISSUE II 
TIE ROLE OF THE COMMERCIAL BANKS. GIVEN THE INITIAL IMPORTANCE 
OF THE COIVUERCIAL BANKS., EFFECTIVE FINANCIAL STRATEGY REQUIRES 
THEIR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN INNOVATORY CHANGES. HOW CAN THIS BE 
BROUGHT ABOUT? 
ARGUMT 
Despite the steady rise in both cleposit/GNP ratios and banking 
density ratios, commercial banks had little success in three major 
areas(') - 
(a) Institutionalising untapped sources of savings available largely 
in rural and remote areas of the country (bank branches were shown to 
be mainly confined to the Capital and other big cities and, commeroial 
centres). 
(b) Lengthening the term of the financial assets offered to the 
public (quasi money still constituted a very small proportion of total 
deposits). 
(c) There was a failure to introduce innovative techniques and effec- 
tive measures which could have encouraged the inflow of further resources 
into the banking system (the lack of active advertising campaigns and 
the absence of positive, and attractive return on financial holdings). 
As allocators of funds,, banks exhibited only limited success in 
altering the composition of their assets to match the country's changing 
requirements. Asset portfolio behaviour of commercial banks has not 
been in line with the development strategies adopted, and has not thus 
actively promoted the required structural changes in the real economy. 
Commercial banks were, in general, averse to venturing beyond their 
traditional lines of business and did not, thereforepursue innovational 
lending policies, which could have been instrumental in inducing the 
real growth of their economy. From an economic development viewpoint,, 
three areas of functional deficiency were recognised 
(2) 
_ 
See Chapter 4, PP- 106-144 
(2) See Chapter 4, PP. 120-145 
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(a) A strict adherence to the orthodox banking practice of confining 
credit to only short-term loans (the absence of any term lending). 
(b) A continued distinct bias towards financing the foreign trade 
sector (the sectoral. distribution of bank credit has not been sufficiently 
consistent with the new policy emphasis on diversifying and industrial- 
ising the national economy). 
(c) An excessive liquidity maintained by commercial banks which has 
been unnecessarily held (thus involving considerable opportunity costs 
from the private as well as the social points of view). Due to the 
significant implications of excessive liquidity holdings for the country's 
economic development, the liquidity aspect of the commercial banks was 
further analysed (chapters 5 and 6). A statistical model was developed 
to examine the influence of certain attributes and ratios within the 
bank balance sheet on liquidity behaviour. 
CCUCLUSION 
Despite a noticeable increase in their contribution to domestic 
financial intermediation activity, the commercial banks were not 
entirely successful in lengthening the maturiýy of financial assets 
and altering the pattern of resource allocation in favour of priority 
sectors. 
ISSUE III 
GIVEN THE FAILURE OF THE COMMERCIAL BANKS. TO BE 
IN THE VANGUARD OF DEVELOPMENT FINANCE ACTIVITY, A 
SIGNIFICANT PART OF ANY DEVELOPMENT ACHIEVED MUST REST 
ON (a) THE EXISTENCE AND PROLIFERATION OF NBFIS 
AND (b) THESE ORGANISATIONS MUST HAVE THE VISION AND 
INITIATIVE TO ANTICIPATE AND FILL ANY CREDIT AND/OR 
INSTITUTIONAL GAPS THAT MIGHT ACT AS DEVELOPMENT 
BOTTLENECKS. 
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ARGUMM 
Non-bank financial institutions in Jordan comprise specialised 
credit- institutions and other intermediaries operating in different 
areas of the financial sector. Chapters 7 and 8 emphasised the necessity 
of creating specialised credit institutions to fill certain credit gaps 
in basic sectors of the economy, which had been given priority in the 
country's development programmes. Six of these institutions were 
deliberately established by the government to specialise in financing 
and promoting the activities of agriculture, manufacturing, urban and 
the of 
rural affairs, and housing. Before/setting up/Ahese institutions, the 
above sectors suffered from lack of adequate finance necessary for their 
development. Commercial banks were generally reluctant to extend 
sufficient credit to these sectors, because of the long-term nature 
of the credit required and also because of the high risk involved in 
financing such activities. In addition to their significance as gap- 
fillers, specialised credit institutions adopted operational criteria 
and performed financial and promotional functions which clearly differ- 
entiated them from ordinary commercial banks. While the activities of 
-eria adopted the latter were completely guid4d by profit motives, the crit 
by the former in selecting projects for assistence placed special emphasis 
on the national priority of these projects and their contribution to 
economic development as a whole. In contrast to commercial banks, 
which are usually interested in the bankable aspects of their investments, 
specialised credit institutions tend to combine both banking and develop- 
mental criteria when taking investment decisions. 
(') 
The two types 
of intermediaries are also different from a functional point of view 
which further aads to the significance of the latter in economic develop- 
ment. As distinct from ordinary commercial banks, specialised banks are 
(I ) See Chapter 7, pp. 207 -210 
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designed to provide both financial as well as promotional fundtions. 
It was shown that specialised credit institutions in Jordan played 
an important role in promoting growth in their respective sectors 
through providing technical assistance and managerial guidance and 
advice. Furthermore, the financial function itself was different in 
nature from that performed by commercial banks since it covered areas 
that have not been undertaken by the latter. Whereas the principal 
financial function of specialised banks was the provision of medium 
and long-term capital, commercial banks! lending was only confined to 
short-term loans. Clearly, both the nature of the financial function, 
as well as the technical function performed by specialised credit in- 
stitutions, must have had direct promotional impact on real growth. 
However, it was shown that although the credit gaps in the above priority 
sectors have been noticeably reduced after the creation of the sPecialised 
institutions, such gaps still exist. 
(') 
This can be related to two 
major factors: 
(a) The insufficient degree of adaptation and the inadequacy of some 
operational policies pursued by specialised credit institutions. This 
was shown to be the case in most of these institutions, which were 
required to exhibit more adaptation and follow appropriate policies 
most conducive to the development of their respective sectors. 
(b) The lack of sufficient financial resources which greatly restricted 
the ability of mar; y institutions to perform their assumed developmental 
role. This was particularly the case in the Agricultural Credit 
Corporation, the Municipal and Village Loans Fund, and, to some extent, 
the Industrial Development Bank. It was suggested that the financial 
resources of these institutions can be increased not only by government 
contribution and central banking support, but also by tapping domestic 
sources of funds through offering term deposits and long-term bonds. 
(1) See the assessment of specialised credit in different sectors as 
shown in Chapter 8 
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Apart fm m the Housing Bank, which was active in deposit mobilisation, 
all specialised credit institutions showed little success in mobilising 
private savings. By tapping such sources of funds, specialised credit 
institutions can-obtain further resources necessary to expand their role 
in promoting their respective sectors and can, at the same time, 
financialise part of the community's savings which may otherwise be 
held in unproductive forms. The introduction of long-term bonds should 
now be facilitated by the existence of the Amman Financial Market, which 
only started operations in early 1978. However, for recourse to domestic 
mobilisation of private savings to be effective, the yield of the above 
suggested debt instruments should be competitive with other alternative 
avenues of investment, to make them attractive for the public to hold. 
This would undoubtedly involve higher costs in financing investment 
because the lending rates of these institutions would be partly increased 
to reflect the rise in the cost of borrowing from the private sector. 
Although this would be undesirable from an economic development point 
of view, the overall expected benefits would be worthwhile, in the sense 
of substantially increasing the financial capacity of these institutions 
and thus their ability to bridge the credit gaps in their respective 
sectors, which still hamper their development. The lending rates of 
specialised credit institutions would, however, be raised within the 
higher interest rate strategy suggested for Jordan, which would affect 
the overall structure and levels of domestic interest rates. 
(') 
As far as the remaining NBFIswere concerned, these institutions 
were shown to be of minor importance for Jordan's economic development. 
Chapter 9 made it clear that the insurance industry in Jordan had little 
developmental impact since insurance companies were unable to mobilise 
substantial amounts of contractual savings and make these funds available 
(1) See Chapter 11 PP. 350 - 365 
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for investment in capital market assets. The other contractual saving 
institution represented by the Pension Fund was only recently established 
(1976), thus playing a limited role in capital market activities. 
Moreover, although postal saving facilities increasingly encouraged 
habitual saving trends among small savers, the volume of savings attracted 
by the Postal Saving Fund was too small to constitute an important source 
of development finance. Finally, Chapter 10 demonstrated that the recently 
established Amman Financial Market has not yet-evolved as a significant 
channel for directing domestic savings towards financing investment. 
. 
CONCLUSION 
The allocative function of the specialised credit institutions 
gave them a special significance in domestic economic development 
because, as development agencies, these institutions were not only 
interested In th. e profitability of their investments, but they were 
more imr)ortentlv concerned with the economic priority of the selected 
projects and their overall impact on promoting growth. However, whereas 
the developmental impact of these institutions manifested itself in their 
role as allocators of funds (with little success achieved in the mobil- 
isation side), the other non-bank financial institutions remained of 
limited significance for Jordan's economic development, as both mobilisors 
as well as allocators of f unds. 
ISSUE TV 
GIVEN THE NECESSITY FOR, AND THE SIGNIFICANCE ATTACHED TO, 
THE NON-BAlNK FINANCIAL SECTOR IN THE COUNTRYS SUCCESSIVE DEVELOPMENT 
PROGRAMMES, THE GOVERNMENT MUST PROVIDE THIS VITAL SECTOR WITH 
EFFECTIVE ENCOURAGING INCEN=S. 
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ARGUMM 
The analysis of Part C has made it clear that the creation of 
the non-bank financial sector in Jordan was necessary and justified by 
the country's domestic needs. Successive development programmes emphasised 
the significance of different specialised institutions as essential 
instruments for achieving the overall development objectives. However, 
government promotional policies that have so far been taken have been 
insufficient to enable this sector to assume its assigned developmental 
role. Despite the provision of essential government legislation and 
the adoption of other official measures which aimed at promoting the 
specialised financial sector, further and more effective policies are 
still needed if this sector is to be an important source for financing 
economic development. 
Benefiting largely from government experiences in other developing 
countries, specific tax policies were found appropriate for domestic 
application in Jordan, in order to offer tangible and real incentives 
for savers, as well as investors, to use the specialised facilities 
provided by this sector. On the one hand, the government can substan- 
tially influence the asset preference of the investing public in favour 
of long-term financial instruments, if the tax policy is effectively 
used to provide strong stimulus for individuals to hold such assets in 
their portfolio. This can be achieved by offering attractive tax 
benefits to holders of life insurance policies and other capital market 
assets, as discussed in Chapters 9 and 10. 
(1) 
In order to further encourage 
the demand for long-term financial instruments, the government may 
also permit individuals and corporations to place a specified percentage 
of their income tax liabilities in special mutual funds, which can be 
subsequently invested in capital market assets. On the other hand, 
(1) See Chapter 9, P. 292 ; and Chapter Io, P. 340. 
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the government can also induce an increase in the BUPPly-of long-term 
financial instruments offered to the public, by encouraging the emergence 
of joint-stock companies through attractive tax incentives favouring 
this type of enterprise, against private shareholding and normal companies. 
However, although the adoption of the above tax policies would clearly 
involve important opportunity costs in the sense of exempting the 
Jordanian Treasury from obtaining part of the tax revenues, the net 
overall benefits were shown to be considerable. It is expected that 
the proposed tax concessions would provide real incentives-for both 
the holders of long-term financial assets, as well as for their issuers, 
which would promote the low level of activity on the Jordanian Exchange 
and thus augment the benefits from its existence. 
CONCLUSION 
The main method of i-m-oroving the contributions of NBFIsto the further 
development of the economy wouldseem to be throuLh fiscal measures. 
Finally, given the four issues raised above, considerations need 
to be given in the Jordanian context to the future role of the Central 
Bank. Since the financial system matters for the country's economic 
development, the CBJ should be further concerned with providing an 
adequate climate that is most conducive to financial development, so 
as to maximise the benefits of interaction between finance and real 
growth. Furthermore, central banking interventionist policies should be 
always flexible and effective in order to vigorously influence domestic 
financial intermediaries and adjust their activities in accordance with 
the selected development strategies. 
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This case-study has made it clear that, despite some success I 
achieved by different types of financial intermediaries in promoting 
real growth in Jordan, their developmental role can still be substantially 
increased. Domestic financial institutions., particularly the commercial 
banks, have not been satisfactorily successful in adjusting themselves 
to their particular environment, and adapting their policies and techniques 
to fit the new economic needs accompanying the implementation of develop- 
ment programmes. An appropriate adaptation of the financial system 
to the special needs of its economy is very important in countries, such 
as Jordan, where the development of financial institutions has been 
relied upon to promote growth in the real economy. Moreover, the empirical 
finding that financial intermediation matters for Jordan's economic 
growth should further add to the necessity of a proper adjustment on the 
part of the financial system, because the way in which this system 
develops and the manner in which it performs its functions will affect, 
for the better or worse, real economic progress. 
However, it was emphasised that while domestic financial institutions 
are required to exhibit more adaptation to the changing needs of their 
economy, the Central Bank of Jordan has, first, to provide an adequate 
financial climate that helps the readjustment processes to take place 
(e. g. pursuing realistic interest rate policy and providing rediscounting 
facilities for long-term financial instruments). 
(') 
Moreover, the 
Central Bank should actively seek policies and pursue innovations 
capable of exercising vigorous influence over the financial system and 
directing its operations towards development. Chapter II concentrated 
on this aspect, and outlined certain policies and techniques to be 
adopted by the Central Bank of Jordan in order to achieve progress in 
the following two main areas - 
See Chapter 11 
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(a) Influencing the size and structure of financial savings. 
The proposed measures do not only aim at further financialisation of 
domestic savings, but they are also concerned with inducing a change 
in the structure of these savings in favour of long-term assets. Firstly, 
there is a need to change the composition of domestic liquidity (M2) in 
favour of the more stable element represented by the quasi money. Secondly, 
there is a need to encourage holdings of long-term financial assets 
offered by the non-bank financial sector. As discussed in detail, 
lengthening the term structure of the financial assets should be an 
urgent concern of the Central BiLnk bf Jordan in order (1) to mop-up 
part of the excessive liquidity of the economy (largely held in cash 
kept outside the banks) which further accentuated inflationary pressures, 
and (2) to increase the availability of longer-term financial assets 
which can be utilised for financing long-term development needs. The 
necessity of encouraging a term transformation of financial assets was 
further supported by the empirical analysis of Chapter 3 which revealed, 
among other things, that the longer the maturity of the financial asset 
the larger the interaction between financial and real development and, 
thus, the greater the contribution of the financial system to the 
development process. 
(') 
(b) Adjusting the allocation pattern of bank resources in accordance 
with the set development strategies. It has been shown that central 
banking qualitative influence over the sectoral distribution of bank 
funds is particularly important in developing countries, where the 
divergence between the private and social costs and benefits in the 
allocation of these resources is potentially greater then in developed 
countries. This accordingly requires the central banks in developing 
countries to assume a larger developmental role in controlling and 
See Chapter 3, PP. 86 - 89 
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influencing the asset portfolio behaviour of commercial banks in fal 
of priority sectors. Thus, within an effective 'institution-related 
to monetary policy control, specific central bank innovatory policies 
were found appropriate if the composition of commercial banks' assets 
is to be altered in accordance with the country's development needs. 
The introduction of a differential reserve requirements system was 
particularly recommended in order to further subject bank activities 
under the central bank influence, and effectively encourage the flow 
of resources towards developmental activities. 
It is hoped that this thesis will be a contribution to the 
current policy discussion concerning the need for new banking techniques 
to promote structural change in less developed countries, so that their 
development potential can be increased under the often severe economic 
and political constraints within which they have to operate. 
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Appendix 4.1 
Bank Clearings and 
I 
Demand Deposits in 
Jordan, 1965-1976 
(In m113-ions of JD) 
Years Total Clearings Adjusted. 
Figures* 
Demand 
Deposits 
1965 99.68 149-52 24-50 
1966 144.24 21606 30.94 
1967 154-52 231-78 31-59 
1968 153.29 229.93 30-80 
1969 169.45 254.17 32.44 
1970 161-58 242-37 30.80 
1971 163-76 245.64 30.43 
1972 W4.7o 307-05 39.44 
1973 280.14 420.19 47.44 
1974 399.28 598.92 62.97 
1975 6go-59 1,035.89 92-51 
1976 19186-32 1,779.48 123-39 
Source: (i) International Monetary Fund, IFS, (1973 
Supplement). 
IMF. 9 IFS. , (Dec. 1977) 
(3) tv it (Dec. 1978) 
* Adjusted Figures for each year = Total Clearings + 5091S 
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Ap]2endix 8-5 Network of the H. B. Branches 
1974 - 197 
Year Number of Number of Branches 
Accounts 
Amman Other Areas Total 
Absolute % Absolute % Absolute % 
1974 2532 3 60.0 2 4o. o 5 10010 
1975 9634 3 37.5 5 62.5 8 10010 
1976 18238 3 23.1 10 76.9 13 100*0 
1977 37522 4 26.7 11 73-3 15 10000 
Source: Housing Banki Annual Repor 1974,759 76 and 
1977. 
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Arpendix 10.1 
Return on Industrial Shares in a Sample of 12 Jordanian 
Shareholding Companies in 1975* 
Company Return on Capital 
(Distributed profits 
as % of Net Worth) 
1. Jordan Petroleum Refinery 8.8 
2. Jordan Phosphate Mines 1011 
3- Jordan Cement Factories 5.2 
4. The Arab Pharmaceutical Mfg. Co. 4o. o 
5,, Jordan Brewery Company 8-3 
6. Jordan Paper Factories 10-3 
7- Jordan Dyeing Company 18.2 
8, Jordan Minerals Research 12-5 
9. Industriall Commercial & Agre Co. 9.0 
10, Jordan Dairy 12.0 
11" Jordan Worsted Hills 9.3 
12. Jordan Woollen Shareholding Industries 17-0 
Average Return 13.4 
Source: Annual Reports of the Above 
Mentioned Companies for 1975- 
Subscribed capital of these companies accounted 
for about JD 55 million, which represented 40% 
of the subscribed capital of total companies 
listed on the Am=an Financial Market. (Source: 
AFM9 unpublished Figures). 
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Appendix 11.1 Norranal and Real Rates of Interest on Selected 
Financial Assets, 1955 - 1977 
( per annum) 
Nom inal Rates" (1) Rate of Real Rate s (3) = (1 2) 
Year 
Currency Bank- * Govt. ** Inflation Currency Bank Govt. 
in Hand Deposits Bonds (2) in Hand Deposits Bonds 
1955 none 4.0 1.0 - 110 3.0 - 
1956 none 4.0 - 1.0 - 1.0 3.0 - 
1957 none 4.0 - 1.0 - 1.0 3.0 - 
1958 none 4,0 - 1.0 - 110 3.0 - 
1959 none 4.0 - 1.0 - 1.0 3,0 - 
1960 none 4.0 - 1,0 - 1.0 3.0 - 
1961 none 4.0 - 1.9 - 1.9 2.1 - 
1962 none 4.0 - 1.9 - 1.9 2,1 - 
1963 none 4.0 - 1.8 - 1.9 2.2 - 
1964 none 4.0 - 1.8 - 1.8 2,2 - 
1965 none 4.0 - 1.8 - 1.8 2.2 - 
1966 none 4.0 - 1,7 - 1.7 2.3 - 
1967 none 4.0 - 1.7 - 1.7 2.3 - 
1968 none 4.0 - 0.8 - 0.8 3,2 - 
1969 none 4.0 - 7.8 - 7.8 - 3,8 - 
1970 none 4.0 - 6.1 - 6.1 - 2.1 - 
1971 none 4.0 8.0 5.7 - 5,7 - 1,7 2.3 
1972 none 4*9 8.0 7.7 - 7.7 - 2,8 0.3 
1973 none 4.9 8.0 11.1 -11.1 - 6.2 - 3.1 
1974 none 4.9 8.0 19,4 -19.4 -14,5 -11.4 
1975 none 4.9 8.0 11.9 -11.9 - 7.0 - 3.9 
1976 none 5.6 810 15,3 -15.3 - 9.7 - 7.3 
1977 none 5.8 8.0 14.5 -14,. 5 - 8.7 - 6.5 
Average 
none 4,0 - 1,4 - 1,4 2.6 - 55-66 
Average 
none 4.2 8.0 4.9 - 4.9 - 0.7 1.3 67-72 
Average 
none 5.2 8.0 
1 
14*4 -14.4 - 9.2 73-77 
Source: Official Published Statistics on interest rates are only 
available since 1972. prior to this,, data were obtained 
from: Y. Sukar, The Structure of Interest Rates in 
Jordan, (Central Bank of Jordan's publications, Nov. 1974) 
Average interest rate paid on different types of bank deposits. 
Govt. bonds were issued only in 1971. The above rates are 
applicable to those held by individuals. Commercial banks' 
holdings of such securities yielded 6.25% per annum. 
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Appenaix 11.2 
Term Structure of Deposit and Lending Rates of Interest in 
Jordan as of December 31,1977 
per arrum) 
I Type I Interest Rate 
1. Central Bank of Jordan 
Bank Rate 5-00 
Long-term loans 4. oo 
Short-term loans 5.00 
Three Months# time Deposits 4. oo 
Deposits subject to Notice 3-00 
Commercial Banks 
Overdraft 9100 
Loans 9.00 
Demand Deposits 5.6o 
Saving Deposits 5-50 
Time Deposits 6.1o 
Specialised Credit Institutions 
3-1 Agricultural Credit Corporation 6. oo 
3.2 Industrial Development Bank 8. oo 
3-3 Housing Corporation 5.00 
3.4 Jordan Co-operative Organisation 6.? 5 
3.5 Municipal and Village Loan Fund 
Municipal 5-50 
Village 4-50 
3.6 Housing Bank 
Individual loans 8-50 
Commercial loans 9.00 
Co-operative loans 8-50 
Demand Deposits 5.25 
Saving Deposits 5-00 
Time Deposits 5-? 5 
Govt. Debt Instruments 
Treasury Bills 
4.91 
Development Bonds held by the Public 
8. oo 
Development Bonds held by banks 6.25 
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical 
Bulletin (December 1978) 
